# Hermeneutics of Objectivity I.

# Divine Comedy of Classical Metaphysics and Tragedy of Falsafa

**Václav Umlauf**

**(Logo)**

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### Table of contents

[1. Prolegomena to Hermeneutics of Objectivity 13](#_Toc102906084)

[1.1 Triadic Structure of Hermeneutics 42](#_Toc102906085)

[1.2 Metaphysics and *tertium ens* 58](#_Toc102906086)

[1.3 Prehistory of Objectivity 90](#_Toc102906087)

[1.3.1 Underworld of Objectivity 128](#_Toc102906088)

[1.3.2 Cosmological Substance of the Third Kind 144](#_Toc102906089)

[1.3.3 Foundation of Objective Physics 170](#_Toc102906090)

[2. Falsafa and Fate of Metaphysics 191](#_Toc102906091)

[2.1 Ambivalent Concept of Substance and Metaphysics (al-Fārābī) 194](#_Toc102906092)

[2.1.1 Emergence of the New Worldview 204](#_Toc102906093)

[2.1.2 Ontotheological Structure of Metaphysics 244](#_Toc102906094)

[2.2 Ontotheological Determination of Being (Ibn Ādi) 264](#_Toc102906095)

[2.3 Metaphysics of Objective Being (Avicenna) 275](#_Toc102906096)

[2.3.1 Objective Vision of Being 279](#_Toc102906097)

[2.3.2 Birth of Objective Metaphysics 302](#_Toc102906098)

[2.3.3 Ontotheology and Modern God 335](#_Toc102906099)

[2.4 Unity of the First Science and Cognition (Averroes) 363](#_Toc102906100)

[2.4.1 Metaphysics of the First Substance 378](#_Toc102906101)

[2.4.2 True Knowledge of Reality 402](#_Toc102906102)

[2.4.3 Intellect and Unity of Person 428](#_Toc102906103)

[2.4.4 Diaphanum and Life World 478](#_Toc102906104)

[2.5 Tragic Destiny of Metaphysics 513](#_Toc102906105)

[Abbreviations 535](#_Toc102906106)

[Index locorum 536](#_Toc102906107)

[Subject and Name Index 541](#_Toc102906108)

[Bibliography 547](#_Toc102906109)

*In recollection of all victims of modernity and postmodernity*

The affairs of contemporary science remind the story concerning the Tower of Babel in the book of *Genesis*. God of Old Testament made the people speak many different languages so they could not work together on building the city and tower. Now, business of science made by big transnational corporations is taken for the nature of the science as it is in itself; such nature of science is considered to be strictly objective; that kind of objectivity is taken as the fundament of the philosophy as the first science; that form of the first science is referred to be the metaphysics of Aristote; such kind of metaphysics as finally taken as the highest form of human love to wisdom. Examination of objectivity done exclusively at such a confused level takes a risk to be fundamentally wrong. The set of problematic concepts caused the emergence of objectivity in philosophy, and those ambiguities passed into the age of modernity afterwards. Modern thinking appeared at the beginning of the 14th century under the name *via Modernorum*. The obscurities hidden at the beginning of modernity contributed to the fact that new metaphysics lost the status of the first science afterwards. Specialized sciences developed autonomous methodology of scientific research from the 17th century. Nevertheless, they inherited philosophical concepts dating back to scholastic modernity. The worldview created by emergence of objectivity remains the basis of all sciences until today. Consecutively, modern sciences inherited unresolved conflicts and preconditions that had determined the emergence of modernity at the very beginning. Postmodernism rejoins modernity and objective vision of the world therefore it faces the same problems as modernity did. Nihilistic age of metaphysics inaugurated the terminal phase of objectivity. The metaphysics as the first science ceased to be dominant challenge for contemporary thinking. Modernity based on objectivity characterizes specific form of logic error named *circulus* *vitiosus*. The start of modern age includes the factors that caused its contemporary decline. Objective thinking cannot study circumstances of its own birth in a true way, since the commencement belongs to a different realm of truth. The research must take another point of departure prior to the metaphysics. Hermeneutics of mysteries preceded the metaphysics and the first philosophy. The most respected ancient art of interpretation can therefore explain the beginning of metaphysics and objectivity. The main task of hermeneutics is determined by the famous proverb written over the main gate of Delphi: “Know thyself!” Self-knowledge, which is imposed on mortals as a divine task, gives another reason why metaphysics cannot know itself. Objective vision brought about a new worldview, and it caused a basic change in understanding of the human subject. Original unity of the human being disappeared and modern collection of substances and hypostases took its place. The concept of modern God followed the path of modern subjects. Scholasticism introduced the concept of modern God in metaphysics to provide the supreme guarantee of the objective order. At the end of the 19th century the modern God finally disappeared, having no reasonable occupation in the present age of metaphysical nihilism. Postmodern humanistic sciences came after death of modern God and that of modern subject to provide a remedy for the vacuum of meaning. Postmodern sciences came into being in history of modern thinking that was already under influence of objective metaphysics. Therefore, the human sciences cannot see properly their own beginning either. Being a kind of Buridan’s ass, social sciences sway between two kinds of epistemology. Wilhelm Dilthey established the nature of science on the dichotomy between *Erklären* and *Verstehen*. Deterministic explication makes foundation for natural sciences, and hermeneutic understanding makes foundation of humanistic sciences. A typical quarrel of that kind exists between behavioral and humanistic psychology, between positivistic and hermeneutic attitude to the history and to humanities in general. Introduction of objectivity in the mode of *Erklären* brought about the death of the historial subject (*geschichtliches Subjekt*) in humanities. Nihilistic humanism disgraced human person as a real actor in the course of history. A science of postmodern subject determines the basic fact that something has changed on the chessboard of linguistic values based on never-ending game of reciprocal differences. Ferdinand de Saussure presented les fundamentals of the general linguistics in the years 1906–11. Taken in the synchronic system of language, every change in speech produces a new order of the linguistic meanings. The value (*valeur*) in the system of significations is created through the linguistic differences and oppositions. Classic metaphysics brought about critical foundation of knowledge that concerns events in the real world. Today’s nihilistic thinking glorifies system of never-ending irrational changes. Humankind has to adapt to them in the same irrational manner. Objective knowledge turned over into full-blown metaphysical nihilism. Postmodernist philosophy followed objective path to destruction since it lost free people as individual and acting personalities. Michel Foucault analyzed the different forms of impersonal épistémè in social sciences and society since the end of the 18th century. The humanist sciences followed development in philosophy in the period of metaphysic nihilism. The acceptance of objectivity brought Cartesian philosophy in a dead end as well. Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology rejects the historial subject (*geschichtliches Subjekt*) as a kind of prejudice. This prejudice impairs absolute insight into evident appearance of the phenomenon in a stream of pure consciousness. The concept of “pure consciousness” is a kind of philosophical construct put beyond the existence of the world and outside of existing human being. Husserl’s lectures in Paris (*Pariser Vorträge*, 1928) founded a new form of Cartesianism, which claims to be ideal version of science. The first philosophy follows evident meaning in the pure consciousness, and it makes description of absolute experiences.

The basic claim of Husserl’s phenomenology to be evident and objective knowledge constituted absolutely became obsolete in time when hermeneutics of facticity came into being. Martin Heidegger formulated program of hermeneutic phenomenology at the same time as Ludwig Wittgenstein published *Logisch-philosophisches Traktat* (1921). The treatise of absolutely objective logic introduced the worldview based on formal analysis of language. Analytic philosophy carried out new apotheosis of scientific objectivity. Philosophy of language rejects the metaphysics speculation since the meaning of such a “construct” originates from subjective experience. Husserl worked out the same form of objectivity on level of pure consciousness. Analytic philosophy disregarded meaning of the world and meaningful history (*Geschichte*) outside of language. Therefore, it took a one-way road to metaphysical nihilism as Cartesian phenomenology did. An ideal language based on principles of logic seemed to be endowed with precisely given meaning. New constructivism turned out to be the same academic myth like Descartes’s and Husserl’s transcendental consciousness. Neopositivist deduction of full objectivity in the style of Carnap work *Der logische Aufbau der Welt* (1928) became an inaccessible ideal in postmodern philosophy. The objectivity in analytic philosophy underwent grave crisis. Another killing blow came from criticism of pure analytic sentences and through collapse of atomist theory dealing with reference. Analytic philosophers unwillingly confirmed in the second half of the 20th century that neopositivism and logical formalism were unable to solve the question of reference, verification, meaning and truth as correspondence between external world and internal thinking. Objectivity of analytic philosophy was not objective enough since it failed to provide methodology for positive sciences. Karl Popper canceled in the treatise *Logik der Forschung* (1935) definition of scientific method based on logic deduction. Popper moved theory of science to induction with the help of method based on specific form of falsifying and observation of reality. Nevertheless, the price to pay was high in order to rescue objective nature of modern sciences. The science lost ideal of deductive investigation of reality. Aristotle’s work *The Posterior Analytics* postulated the method of deduction to be indispensable part of true scientific investigation. The present methodology of science put into question positivist notion of objectivity as absolute knowledge situated beyond the course of history and its effects (*Wirkungsgeschichte*). Thomas Kuhn drew the attention to paradigmatic changes determined by historical development of science. Paul Feyerabend added to paradigmatic changes another dimension of sociocultural, economic and political factors. Society and political strategies influence scientific research; therefore, science receives some standards from outside of itself. Endless transference of meaning given *ad hoc* brought about *coup de grâce* to the objectivity. Deconstructivist and neostructuralist philosophy make nihilistic variation of pragmatism and sophistry since it celebrates universal validity of metaphor.

Crisis of objectivity in sciences follows crisis of modern and postmodern subject. It ceased to be an actual person living in the common world. It came to a disjunction between human understanding and external world. Contemporary philosophy obliterated the notion of the person in twofold way. On the one hand, Cartesian phenomenology reduced the person to the pure consciousness that mirrors the internal world of absolute objective essences. On the other hand, human being was reduced to impersonal events of speech acts, language games, impersonal structure of language, etc. situated outside of the real subject. Structure of language reflects in itself human being and the world in a kind of postmodern idolatry. In the first case, the subject represents evident contents of absolute consciousness, in the second case makes indissoluble part of impersonal processes of language. Taken in themselves, transcendental egology and structuralism circumvent existence of the actual person living in the real world. Instead of real events, postmodern philosophy observes flow of essences in pure consciousness. Contemporary subject performs a kind of Shiva-dance made of virtual differences in order to create or to destroy *ad hoc* given structures. The crisis in the philosophy of language led adjacent crisis in epistemology to the climax and confirmed decline of metaphysics in the epoch of philosophical nihilism. Contemporary wave of deconstruction and cognitive neurophysiology replaced the foregone metaphysics. These nihilistic forms of the first science proclaim themselves guarantees of true and comprehensive knowledge of humanity and world. The real existence of world existing beyond representation done in the mode “subject—object” ceased to be investigated since Kant’s criticism of pure reason was introduced into postmodern philosophy. The crisis of scientific objectivity primarily concerns the self-understanding of the subject. At the end of the 19th century, the world became an aspect of the demiurge’s activity based on the will to power that relates to the postmodern subject. The attack on metaphysics from position of absolute will to power reminds the physicists of an unavoidable fact that it is the perspective of subject that creates a world of natural sciences. Friedrich Nietzsche considers human will as a kind of natural phenomenon. The will of scientists is not substantially different from physical forces that create the external world according to the law of action and reaction. The human will contemplates the world from an individual point of view formed by individually given *Lebenskraft*. The will to power is thus individualized and it determines every external action by its internal power, objective investigations of science included. The first theoretical nihilist found something essential in vision of the world as an aspect of the human will.

“And finally, they left out something of the picture without knowing it: the necessary perspectivism, by virtue of which every power center—and not only the human being—constructs the whole world from itself, i.e., measures, touches, forms it by its power… They have forgotten to include this prospective and ordering force in the ‘true Being’… Translate in academic vocabulary: being subject … “ [[1]](#footnote-1)

According to Nietzsche, scientists observe the world through their subjective will to power. Human will determines concealed way how a physical phenomenon presents itself to exact sciences. Nietzsche holds the concepts “thing as such” or “objective world” for products of fictive world of mind which must be smashed with hammer of new philosophy. At the end of postmodern objectivity and German idealism, Nietzsche proclaims the incoming nihilism of Western metaphysics as well as the death of modern God that metaphysics created as imago of its own nature. Ideal form of knowledge discovered and afterwards revised by Kant found its climax in metaphysics of nihilism offered by Nietzsche. He refused the Kantian view of objectivity. Nietzsche found the concealed viewpoint of objective science that is made by the will to power. That is the real vitality hidden behind Platonism. Metaphysical turn based on absolute truth as objective measure culminates in the nihilistic subject equipped with absolute will to power. The natural science is objective but apparently in the epoch of metaphysical nihilism, because it blindly follows the concealed logic of will to power. Unfortunately, scientists cannot discern this secret power. After introduction of structuralism into humanities, every form of subjective perspective created by Nietzsche’s will to power was suppressed. Converted into structuralism and into binary and digitally produced reflections, contemporary humanism eradicated even Nietzsche’s nihilistic subject that carried an absolute will to power. Hermeneutics take the quotation of Nietzsche about the invisible perspectivism of science as an important sign for philosophical meaning of objectivity. Nietzsche investigates objective natural sciences from the viewpoint of metaphysical nihilism. The scientists are blind as far as origin of objectivity is concerned. They see the world though their active will to power that is invisible phenomenon for them. Scientists cannot investigate properly how objective meaning of the world came into history of science and how it founded the contemporary worldview. Mathematics is valid as an axiomatic objective science. It recognizes since Kurt Gödel that its reason is based on the principle of incompleteness. There is a sphere of irrationality and oblivion in the center of objective science, in style of archaic divine authority called Lethe. This specific lethargy of objectivity makes postmodern science blind to concealed fundamental presuppositions of scientific investigation. Once again, nobody can investigate beginning of his or her own existence directly, in the first person.

Metaphysical nihilist Nietzsche closed postmodern epoch of philosophical thinking dating back to Suárez and Descartes. Modernity began in the second half of the 13th century when scholars of the Latin West discovered meaning of being channeled through objective form of metaphysics. The scholastic philosophy developed this vision of reality through Plato’s and Aristotle’s metaphysics transferred by late-antique, Arabian and Jewish thinkers. Avicenna (Neoplatonism) and Averroes (Aristotelism) have been the most distinguished thinkers to indicate the path to objectivity for Latin West. The hermeneutics explanation follows transformations of meaning of being (*Sinn des Seienden*) through worldview made by objective thinking. The history of modern philosophy confirms the fact that science is unable to see its own origin in the moment when the objectivity took the first steps into history of thinking. Hermeneutics consider objective thinking from the standpoint founded by historial (*geschichtlich*) development of hermeneutics. Previous meaning of being in the classic metaphysics was recast into objectively given form. Positive science is objective because the meaning of metaphysical being, substance, world, God of philosophers, etc. received objective character in a certain historic epoch of thinking. Hence, the interpretation made in a historial way (*geschichtlich*) that takes up the objectivity as the main point could not be objective. We must interpret the birth of objectivity by means of understanding founded in Greek vision of archaic truth (ἀλήθεια). The hidden nature of objectivity is true in another way that relates to the archaic concept of truth. The objectivity cannot take itself to be the subject of investigation in a historial way. It would have to find an answer to the question, when and why it has become intellectually ridiculous and contradictory and why it worked out the mechanism of its own destruction. In contrary to other philosophical disciplines, hermeneutics have direct and immediate relation to the commencement of philosophical thinking. The art of hermeneutics is archaic due to the Greek word (ἀρχή) that means the initially given divine authority and the order of the world. The same word signifies rule over the course of events determined by foundational powers and by the authority of the commencement. The ability to see such concealed events existed long before the arrival of metaphysics: in ancient mysteries, in artistic vision performed by ancient poets, in antique tragedy and in the first philosophy. The hermeneutics perceive the power of commencement “critically” due to original Homeric perspicuous activity (κρίνω). Critical vision concerns unstable situation and it is bound to discernment of outstanding warriors (τάχιστα ἔκριναν μέγα; *Odys*. 18.264). Homer’s epic acclaims Odysseus’s prowess of foresight (μῆτις) in many places. His ability of critical discernment reached nearly divine character. This warrior made use of practical reason in an excellent way in order to discern the whole of divine, human and natural events. Ingenuity of prevision put into practice supplied the ability of archaic seer that considered the whole of divine powers in the act of theoretical vision. Ancient rhapsodists such as Homer took part of aforementioned theoretical seeing to bring about artistic story of divine and human actors engaged in the Trojan War. The hermeneutics of objectivity follow manifestations of *alētheia* in form of unconcealment (*Unverborgenheit*) that revealed historial meaning of Being (*geschichtlicher Sinn des Seins*). Thinking of Parmenides apprehends original influence of the commencement through events revealed by the goddess of *Alētheia*. The Heliades as solar Muses led him to the source of truth. New vision of wisdom concerns unconcealed activity and meaning of Being as such. The first manifestation of Being appeared in mysteries and it passed over to Parmenides’s epic and Heraclitus’s sentences. After introduction of metaphysics, the question of Being changed into a question of being and its meaning (*Sinn des Seienden*). New history of philosophical truth has made academic system since Antiquity and Scholasticism until today. Following the same pattern, the interpretation must find out epochal turns of thinking that brought about the objectivity. Explanation must uncover proceedings that constituted origin of the objective being in the metaphysics. Metamorphosis of classic metaphysics in the objective form represents a peculiar phenomenon. It concerns historial manifestations of Being itself. Its activity is hidden to objective thinking, and it is impossible to detect in a merely positive way.

Gigantomachy concerning the substance replaced the Trojan War initiated by Helena’s kidnapping. The first philosophy was kidnapped as well and it became metaphysics. The substance makes the most valuable treasure of the new science of being. Contemporary nihilists of all kinds broke this fortress down with a Trojan horse of deconstruction and so-called post truths. Victorious crusaders came on a horse of instrumental rationality and nowadays, they carry out neoliberal looting of the Earth. A famous sentence from dialogue *Sophist* maintains that there is some kind of gigantomachy (γιγαντομαχία τις) concerning the substance (περὶ τῆς οὐσίας) caused by controversies of different thinkers (πρὸς ἀλλήλους, *Soph*. 246a45). The definite pronoun defines confrontations related to the substance and known actors dating back to the epoch of Plato. However, character of gigantomachy is not determined clearly due to the indefinite pronoun, “τις.” Thinkers after Plato have a certain freedom in determining the framework of today’s quarrel, according to Plato’s first choice. However, the battle follows definitions of substance done by previous philosophers that took part in the gigantomachy. The essay defines gigantomachy that struggles about true meaning of the objective substance. Archaic ability of discernment (*krísis*) must distinguish diverse forms of objectivity. The history of thinking follows, in the end, historial transformations of truth in form of unconcealed archaic *alētheia*. The hermeneutic must see hidden archaic truth correctly and it must distinguish critically different formes of truth. The whole of transformation of being (*Sinn des Seienden*) must be described in accordance with archaic vision of truth. Odysseus followed in this way activity and requests of goddess Athena and Homer answered in a similar manner the request of wise Muses. These concealed proceedings of “music” truth determined millennia of archaic thinking. Writers of tragedy preceded the origin of Plato’s metaphysics and they were contemporaries of the first philosophers. In the epoch of first philosophy, thinkers had to answer a new challenge of modernized society in Athens. Music, tragic and philosophical way of wisdom needs the art of hermeneutics to distinguish former manifestations of truth from the subsequent turn to objectivity. Archaic vision of truth joined harmoniously divine nature of the cosmos. Plato changed it afterwards into the thinking of modern subjects. The metaphysics of Latin West led nearly two-millennium-long war of metaphysics. It was exclusively the winners that wrote its official history and they finally destroyed themselves in the epoch of accomplished metaphysical nihilism of these days. Metaphysics follows concealed changes concerning Being of being (*Sein des Seiendes*), some of them done by a wise manner as well as those done in a nihilistic manner. The teaching of modernists contaminated scholastic debates since the 13th century. It has worked out the new order of objective knowledge based on a very problematic concept of substance and truth. The metaphysics unity of the world was no longer a main question since the modern subject recommended itself as a basic problem of metaphysic. This profound disharmony of classic and modern thinking let contemporary nihilism have its own way of proceeding. Conflict-laden modernity nurtures contemporary nihilism by instrumental reason, which crushes the last remnants of original wisdom up to the digital shreds stored in databanks. When speak weapons and nihilistic power, the Muses are silent. The objectivity appears victorious as to results, concept of truth, scientific methodology and other basic concepts still in use. The history of metaphysical crusade seems to be the biggest achievement of Western civilization. Philosophy of Hegel advertises itself as the final stage of reflection related to that fulfillment. The objective vision of history goes from nihilistic end of thinking to the commencement of philosophy.

Hermeneutic vision of history takes opposite way of proceeding. It starts at the commencement and then it goes to that what this commencement has founded by its power as a result. There is no transition from objective history of philosophy to historiality (*Geschichtlichkeit*) of thinking since the latter has no objective character at all. The positive thinking cannot investigate something that does not exist. The hermeneutic investigation of objectivity cannot be founded by Hegel’s and Gadamer’s philosophy based on effect of history in consciousness of subjects (*wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein*). This form of hermeneutics takes place in the philosophy and the ideology of German idealism. Nietzsche and Marx put an end to that epoch of objective thinking. They sent the modern subject of political ideology and philosophical idealism to the cemetery of modern and postmodern ideas. The proposed research is interested in the process of historiality (*Geschichtlichkeit*) that concerns the philosophical question of Being of being (*Sein des Seienden*). Historic events and modern history of philosophy relate to the concealed origin of objectivity. The origin manifests itself due to concealed effect of historiality of Being. Its truth is partly disclosed and partly hidden in the metaphysics. The preface about crisis of objectivity in epoch of contemporary nihilism has shown that “to be objective” does not equal “to be true” according to meaning of archaic *alētheia*. The original meaning of truth refers to tragic wisdom investigating true nature of the world, human being and divine powers. The hermeneutics follow critical and Pythian examination of Socrates. Therefore, it must find a concealed and dark part of objectivity and it must describe this phenomenon in an unconcealed and wise way. Effects of objectivity manifested in the history of philosophy originate in the darkness of archaic Being and in the thinking of writers that composed Greek tragedies. There was no objectivity at all, and at once, there is a kind of it since objectivity has originated somewhere and sometime in history of thinking. The concealed events of Being and thinking related to them generated this or that visible form of objectivity in the history of metaphysics. The discernment follows the path of archetypal events indicated through Odysseus’s archaic *métis*. Examination follows way of philosophical *métis* in order to discover basic events of objectivity. Their manifestation proceeds in a way of unconcealment (*Unverborgenheit*) of Being itself. This form of “existence in *alētheia*” reveals indirectly archegetic influence of historiality (*Geschichtlichkeit*) and it must be discerned in the act of critical evaluation and judgment. Wise and farsighted person wants to know how the things really are, and not as they seem to be. The original historial situation of objectivity cannot be evaluated objectively. There is but the facticity of an ontic phenomenon that is objective. Therefore, there are two kinds and manners of “being true” that wrap up the phenomenon of objectivity. Concealed and invisible historiality of objectivity separates itself from unconcealed and visible history of objectivity. The positive knowledge defines *hic et nunc* given fact or a phenomenon that has been manifested in a substantial way. However, the original form of this actual facticity is not objective because it conceals the authority of commencement. Visible phenomenon represents in a secondary, objective and positive manner that originates in the field of hidden historiality. The positively manifested phenomena differ fundamentally from the concealed way of their commencement. The historiality of objectivity is no objective phenomenon at all. It founds original meaning of phenomena in the truth as unconcealment of Being (*alētheia*). The interpretation of objectivity follows hidden and invisible effect of Being and its thinking. We must follow the path of archaic truth that is still present in the contemporary philosophic thinking. Archaic hermeneutics investigate the objectivity in the form of archaeology; therefore we must carry out a set of specific inquiries. The questions track original path and circumstances how objectivity materializes itself in history of thinking.

* How did the turning point in the metaphysical understanding occur that founded the epoch of objectivity?
* How can the phenomenon of the objective being is to be recognized in its original unconcealment (*alētheia*) that produced such a turn of thought?
* What kinds of metaphysical interpretations were formed in this process and how did they relate to each other?
* What formes of significations of being disappeared in each transformation and why?
* How did those transformations create a new set of metaphysics known as *via Modernorum*?
* How did the coming out of modern metaphysics shape the future destiny of the West civilization?

The concealed and so far unknown turn in thinking produced a new entity known as “objective being.” The ontological meaning of that entity was hidden at first and then it was revealed in an ontic way, namely through the history of Western thinking and in the new worldview. The revealing activity radically differs from revealed phenomena, from artistic works or from industrial products. They are inventions of the modern subject which takes itself objectively and observes the world accordingly. The introduction of objectivity represents the most important event of modernity and it determined the course of philosophy and the history of Western culture. Philosophy and history relate to invisible historiality of thinking and truth. That commencement inaugurated the beginning of objectivity. As objectivity conquered philosophy since the 14th century, scientific research became objective as well. The objectivity investigates itself objectively in classic logical error known as *circulus vitiosus*. The phenomena that are not valid in the perspective of objective *veritas*, they cannot enter the field of scientific research. The objective institution called “museum” exists as positive fact. This kind of objective existence differs from the original event, which founded the museum by divine power of Muses. Objectively is certain that no Muses exist. Therefore, we have an institution called “museum” and no mythical beings called “Muses.” The relation between the museum and Muses cannot be investigated objectively because it entails no truth according to modern science. Hermeneutic archaeology investigates how the Muses founded the museum in the original event of music truth. That kind of the divine authority is not objectively present in the modern museum. However, historial effect of Muses is hidden and present by authority of events which founded the first modern abode for the Muses in the third century B.C. in Alexandria. Without the Musaion in Alexandria, the history of philosophy is impossible, since all important works of the first philosophers were collected in this institution. The investigation of objectively not existent effect of Muses has fundamental meaning for hermeneutics. Somebody had to react to concealed challenges brought about by the historiality of thinking. Philosophy forged by the Musaion received the first meaning of being and afterward it became a “metaphysic” business. The original meaning of that event is given in the music truth as *alētheia*. After that event the initial meaning made in Musaion was confirmed through historicity of thinking, i.e., by the birth of metaphysics. The examination starts with historiality (*Geschichtlichkeit*) of Being, then it goes to historicity (*Geschichte*) of philosophic thinking and finally sums up the history (*Historie*) of its effects. The modern and postmodern age follows the reverse path. We can objectively investigate the history of modern museum, but by no means the concealed historial effect of Muses. Hermeneutics must go from the commencement to various effects founded by its authority. The reverse way would mean that reflection upon original condition of objectivity would be completely wrong.

# 1. Prolegomena to Hermeneutics of Objectivity

Objective worldview postulates knowledge of facts exempt of subjective opinions and prejudices. Justified epistemic approaches, exactly defined research fields, critically accepted and validated methodology of science, recognized set of paradigms, objective proceedings of measuring, evaluation of peers, reproduction of results, open and uninterrupted communication within the international community of scientists—all this makes guarantee of truth for natural sciences. The scientist can defend objectivity within the framework made of valid paradigms of natural sciences. That is not the case of a referee in sport or that of art critic. Nevertheless, objectivity of judges, journalists, politicians, priests, art critics, etc. depends on quality of her or his impartial judgment free of cronyism, external pressures, bribes, misleading emotions and prejudices. Hence, above-mentioned personality judges properly, fair, honorably and truthfully. Both definitions, either of exactness of cognition or impartiality of judgment, are based on principles of Kant’sphilosophy. His important work *Kritik der Urteilskraft* evaluates objectivity through double nature of judgment. The act of judgment is either objectively determined (*bestimmend*) or subjectively reflective (*reflektierend*, KdU 179). In the first case, the objective judgment evaluates sensory perception and empiric data under general *a priori* rules that determine objective form of scientific judgment. This proceeding generates objective knowledge of exact sciences. Correct classification of empiric data collected under universal rules relates to transcendental deduction of categories and to analogies of experience. The work *Critique of pure reason* investigates objectivity of natural phenomena in the limits of critically founded natural sciences. The judgment is determined by efficient causality based on external nature or on internal freedom (*Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*). However, this double type of objectively valid judgment is impossible to reach in case of artistic judgment or aesthetic values. Aesthetic judgment has only subjective character founded on reflective ability to judge. This subjective ability is not determined by the external world or the supreme moral and legislative will as it is the case of determining judgments. Done at the most general level, aesthetic judgments assume the non-binding opinions of reflective subjects. Kant’s third criticism shows that the reflective form of judgment contains merely the subjective act of the judgment (*das Subjective*). The general structure of the aesthetic judgment does not follow deterministic pattern of natural causality or that of legislative free will (*die Zweckmäßigkeit*).[[2]](#footnote-2) The judgment in matter of beauty, politics, finality of the world, etc. is determined by internal ability to recognize the final aim of some phenomena (e.g., natural order) or the realm of aesthetic values. The world which we judge in this way is not a natural world, but it is based on human freedom to act and to judge critically. The realm of freedom determines humanistic values and moral understanding. In this case, we sum up individual phenomena under general law with the help of principles constituted *ad hoc*. These general principles generate subjective meaning distinguished from deterministic pattern of pure and practical (i.e., ethical) reason. According to Kant, those kinds of judgments are valid merely on the level of intersubjectivity. That kind of common values originates in individual and subjective thinking. We can share those cognitions and judge them in a circle of equally enlightened humanists. Reflexive judgments have no objective validity of natural laws or moral laws. The determinism of beauty and the final purpose of the world do not originate from the causality of real things or from human freedom, but only from critical judgments given spontaneously and subjectively. First, there is manifested thing or appearance that creates a base for recognizing and judgment (*das Objekt*). The judgment originates either from the natural causality based on external state of affairs or from internal causality of free will (*bestimmende, reflektierende Urteilskraft*). The act of judging follows the transcendental ideal of critically investigated objectivity, which serves as basic criteria for judgments and recognizing (*reine Urteilskraft*). Kant found new insight into objectivity by determining anew how thing is judged by virtue of *a priori* given capacity of transcendental subject. This last level of subjectivity guarantees true and objective knowledge of the world. Valid deduction of both classes of objectivity follows ability to judge that makes part of every reasonable and free person. Judgments in matter of beauty, politics, etc. are determined merely by internal ability to recognize the final aim of some phenomena or the realm of aesthetic values. We make judgments that refer to the world, which is not a natural one, since it originates from free acts and from critical thinking. The realm of freedom determines humanistic values and moral understanding. In this case, the subject must rise up individual phenomena to general law with the help of the principles constituted *ad hoc*. These general principles generate subjective meaning distinguished from deterministic pattern of pure and practical reason. According to Kant, such judgments are valid merely on the level of intersubjectivity and that of common values originated in individual and subjective thinking. We can share those cognitions and judge them in a circle of equally enlightened peers. Kant founded the postmodern objectivity by determining how thing is judged by a *priori* given capacity of transcendental subject. This last level of subjective judgment guarantees true and objective knowledge of the world as a meaningful whole. Valid deduction of both classes of objectivity follows ability to judge that makes every reasonable and free person. Kant’s philosophy of objectivity follows Descartes’s teaching that stood under influence of Avicenna’s metaphysics. Objective vision from Avicenna to Kant became historic fact thanks to history of effects (*Wirkungsgeschichte*) and founded the epoch of Enlightenment.

The approach to objective judgment summed up the metaphysical and transcendental philosophy. However, the hermeneutic method discards positivist research of all kinds. Art of interpretation is related to original truth on the level of historiality (*Geschichtlichkeit*) and thereby fundamentally differs from objective thinking. Objectively conceived philosophy investigate positive meaning within the scope of history of effects. The interpretation based on historiality examines ontological meaning that precedes the beginning of objectivity. Its commencement cannot be given in any positive and objective way. At the moment of the emergence of objectivity, there is no established, visible and observable effect of objectivity as such. Objectivity did not exist as a positive phenomenon when it came into being as historial event (*Ereignis*). Hermeneutic approach considers phenomena of objectivity at three different levels of meaning: from the point of the objective history (*Historie*), from the point of unconcealed historicity of thinking (*Geschichte*) and from the point of concealed historiality of Being (*Geschichtlichkeit*).[[3]](#footnote-3) The research cannot constrain its scope to the enumeration of positive facts. They deal with the origin of objectivity and with the academic expansion of the objective worldview in the Latin West since the 13th century until today. The history of Late Antiquity as well as Middle Ages knows more or less the issues and works of key actors that provided intellectual insight into the concept of objectivity. The philosophy of Middle Ages created systematic overview of schools, authors and works in the timeline, in order to resume their mutual effect and influencing. Thanks to philosophical schools, a large part of sources that provide understanding intellectual controversies of this or that epoch, was preserved. The polemic concerning interpretation of Plato, Aristotle, Avicenna and Averroes formed a new form of scholasticism and opened new chapter in the history of Western thinking. The basic dispute constituting the modern objectivity occurred between Avicenna and Averroes and it went back to gigantomachy between Plato and Aristotle concerning the metaphysics of substance. The next quarrel in the Latin Averroism reached the high point by the church condemnation of 219 philosophical and theological theses on the 7th of March, 1277 in Paris and immediately afterwards in Oxford. The general history of objectivity needs hermeneutic historicity (*Geschichte*) of philosophy. Positive history of philosophy exists due to historicity developed by brilliant thinkers that changed the course of metaphysics. The specific character of the Being of the being (*Sein des Seiendes*) is revealed in the form of the hidden historiality (*Geschichtlichkeit*). It was created by those thinkers who determined the development of thinking for millennia. Heraclitus’s remark defines this timeless polity of intellectual aristocrats as follows: “One is ten thousand to me, if he is the best.” (DK 22, B 49) Only one thinker of thousands is able to change the fundaments of truth. Only the best of the best take part in the academic Trojan War as gigantomachy concerning the substance. Hence, they have a right to immortal fame in the history of philosophy because they have changed history of thinking. The essay searches the beginning of objectivity in a gigantomachy about objective meaning of substance. It is important to investigate what was founded by original power of Being and thinking. The historiality (*Geschichtlichkeit*) of philosophy manifests itself through the working of archaic commencement. Thinking of the first philosophers perceived the first apparition of Being. Movement of archaic wisdom hidden in mysteries received a new shape by Parmenides and founded the first philosophy. Afterwards, change of the first philosophy made by Plato and Aristotle founded the metaphysics. Modern objectivity appeared in the Latin West because of the change of metaphysics in the 13th century. Kant’s foundation of postmodern objectivity finished development of scholastic objectivity and therefore he stands at the threshold of contemporary metaphysical nihilism. The interpretation explores original meaning of objectivity since it changed the previous meaning of being in classical metaphysics. Thereby it came to the change in historicity (*Geschichte*) of philosophy. New figures of metaphysics points indirectly to concealed events of historiality of Being (*Geschichtlichkeit*). The interpretation understands epochal character of objectivity from the point of archaic *alētheia*. Transformations of metaphysics are absolutely important, since they explain philosophically existence of God, world and human beings.

Nietzsche reminded the ideal and objective science created by Plato and Kant of the fact that it is fundamentally blind to the nature of its own beginning. The transformation of seeing (“how I see”) into objective form of knowledge (“what I see”) encloses fundamental change of *alētheia* on the level of historiality (*Geschichtlichkeit*). Science produced by modern subject is not able to see this event. Interpretation examines the ontological level that concerns the revelation of archaic Being through the metaphysics of modern being. There is a difference between the ontological level of meaning and the statement of ontic fact. The threefold structure of the new understanding of phenomena is described in Heidegger’s terms *Gehaltsinn*, *Bezugssinn*, *Vollzugssinn*. These terms denote the first phase of the hermeneutics of facticity in the years 1920–23 (GA 59, 60–89). Heidegger’s lectures on the hermeneutics of facticity (summer semester 1923) investigate fundamental way how real understanding proceeds. Term “formal perspective” (*formale Anzeige*) constitutes new form of hermeneutic understanding. The use and manipulation of everything around us appear in the viewpoint of primary grasp (*Vorhabe*) that deals with a “such and such” thing or fact. Every day activity or scientific business cannot directly reach the fundamental meaning of the world. We see only what appears directly and objectively in the perspective of common sense or scientific research. Positive vision of an ontic entity as “this here” contains concealed levels of ontological understanding that provides basic meaning of being in all varieties: in metaphysical reflection, in everyday life, or in the criticism of Kant. Ontological interpretation has to enlighten basic way of understanding that formes everyday activities, scientific research and media manipulations.

“Everything depends on the way how to bring the understanding from uncertain, but nevertheless understandable meanings on the track of founding perspective (*Blickbahn*). Taking of that position can and must be done permanently by refusing positions that are *apparently* similar, insofar they force itself upon understanding since they dominate the present phase of research.” [[4]](#footnote-4)

We exist in an objectively given world and deal with everything that lies within our practical and theoretical reach. Ontological meaning of being reveals itself in a different and hidden standpoint of understanding. The quotation shows the first stage of Heidegger’s lifelong reflection that related to the way how concealed ontological events of Being determine ontic and positive meaning of phenomena. The work *Sein und Zeit* considers difference between the ontic fact (“what appears”) and the ontological view (“how it appears”) to be basic methodological framework for the new hermeneutics. By introducing the new method of investigation, Heidegger definitely renounced Husserl’s phenomenology and hence all metaphysics in a radical manner.

“The concept of ‘phenomenology’ signifies primarily the *notion of methodology.* It does not characterize the ontic content of ‘What’ are objects of philosophical research, but the way ‘*How*’ they are.” [[5]](#footnote-5)

The world perceived in everyday activity does not arise as it exists in itself (*Sich-nicht-melden der Welt*, SZ 75). Common meaning of the world deals with objective and practical way of understanding. For example, looking at the wristwatch is determined by common knowledge given in advance about what makes time as “time.” Concealed ontological perspective of time-perception is invisible in everyday activities and scientific definitions. Nevertheless, it determines objective way how commonly known objective meaning of “time” comes into being. The scientific measurement of the second contains exactly defined number in oscillations of electromagnetic radiation, which originates in the atom of cesium 133. For hermeneutics, ontic perceptions of time are predetermined by the hidden work of ontological understanding. It concerns the invisible way how the time is revealed as ontic phenomenon. Ontological understanding of time governs ontic way of appearance of that device, hence reveals its objectivity “as” a clock. The work *Being and Time* describes that type of epistemic pattern under the title “something *as* something” (*als-Struktur*). The ontic and objective understanding comes into being thanks to concealed insight into ontological understanding that provides basic structure of knowledge. Ontological interpretation of objectivity takes hermeneutic structure of preformed meaning to be the basis of suggested research. That hidden phenomenon underlines everyday use of the things, contact with people and scientific knowledge. The lectures on fundamentals of metaphysics (*Einführung in die Metaphysik,* summer semester 1935) call this perspective of pre-comprehension of being by the term *Vor-blickbahn*.

“The trajectory of the view must be cleared beforehand. We call that this previewing path as *Vor-blickbahn*, the ‘perspective’. The following statement will be upheld: the Being (*das Sein*) is understood not only in uncertain manner, since the preformed understanding of Being moves itself in an already given trajectory of ontological meaning (*Vor-blickbahn*).” [[6]](#footnote-6)

Transformation of Nietzsche’s perspectivism into the ontological pattern of *Vor-blickbahn* makes an important turn in the hermeneutics of objectivity. Heidegger proceeded from understanding of the world in the hermeneutics of facticity to the hermeneutics of *Dasein*, and, finally to reflection how the Being discloses itself through the first philosophers in the form of *Da-sein*. This historiality of Being (*Geschichtlichkeit des Seins*) founded the first philosophy. The next turn of historiality brought about metaphysics as specific understanding of the individual being. Changes in hidden historiality of Being produced different formes of metaphysics and therefore influenced the general course of philosophy (*Geschichte der Philosophie*). Finally, influence of objectively constituted philosophic schools, universities, academic institutions, development of science, etc. made part of general history of the West (*die Historie*). The methodology of research follows the approach of Heidegger. Concealed events in the commencement still produce a kind of ontological perspective that secondarily reveals the ontic form of objective understanding. The change of *Vor-blickbahn* in the philosophy generated a new meaning of being in the metaphysics (*Sinn des Seienden*). Ontological historicity based on the initial activity of Being produced classic metaphysics as a special kind of ontic knowledge. Ontology changed into an objective metaphysics created in the second step positive sciences that investigate this or that objective meaning of the world. The objectivity “as” ontic meaning of metaphysics produced theological, ideological, ecclesiastical, etc. facta in the general history of the Western thinking. The objectivity acquires its status in the specific turn of *Vor-blickbahn* that shapes fundamental understanding of the world. That is why the phenomenon of objectivity appears in the history of metaphysics. It is the first science to investigate the being as being. Hermeneutic examination runs in ontological framework of “what” is the objectivity “as” positively acknowledged facticity in contemporary science, ideology, structuralism, theology, etc. Entities have no meaning without preliminary set of *Vor-blickbahn* that makes the whole of metaphysical being present in its objectivity. There is no other way through which meaning of something could become an ontic fact present in the world. The concealed way of understanding produces fundamental meaning of being that differs from objective meaning of individual entities. The objectivity manifests itself “as” objectivity through a certain ontological perspective.

Hermeneutic understanding that concerns ontological constitution of meaning and truth keeps the fundamental value for critical investigation of objectivity. The essay must quit prejudices given in uncritical forms of objective thinking. Uncritical metaphysics and ontic kinds of hermeneutics bring about inappropriate way of proceeding. Their results cannot reach a true phenomenon of objectivity. Ontological and ontic ways of proceeding do not share the same genre of truth. The unconcealment of truth (ontology of *how* phenomenon is given) differs from the truth of positively revealed phenomena (objective fact of *what* is given). Hermeneutic insight in metaphysical *factum* and *positum* as subjective events represent but the finality of thinking that masks the real process of revealing the truth. Initial events of foundation differ from what appeared thereafter. Hermeneutic triangle (historiality of hidden Being, historicity of meaning of being in the metaphysics, history of objectivity in form of *metaphysica* *generalis* and sciences) is not the *circulus vitiosus* of objectivity that is made in a positive way of proceeding. Examination does not deal with the fact “what” is objectivity. Fundamental investigation cannot begin on the level of meaning made by objective entities. Common meaning of objectivity represent but the end of hermeneutic interpretation because it makes starting point of general sciences. The interpretation relates to the unconcealment of objectivity in the Western metaphysic. New form of the first science secondarily creates objective worldview in history of thinking. The hermeneutic order of triadic proceeding has the fundamental character. There is no revealed phenomenon without revealing events. The examined *Vor-blickbahn* of the objectivity creates the fundamental meaning of being that becomes a positive entity afterwards. This facticity of objective entity is defended by Aristotle’s theorem about the metaphysical identity of substance (A=A). Such an ontic entity entails no possibility to influence retrospectively the original ante-objective way of its revelation. Nobody can change the circumstances of her or his birth. What once appears in existence that is necessarily determined by the initial act of coming into existence “as” such and such thing. Objectivists prejudice works with the completely wrong idea that every ontic entity has the same way of existence as foundational ontological reality. The respect to ante-objective form of truth and Being distinguishes the hermeneutics from philosophical objectivism and from history of positive sciences. Perception of ontic substance does not contain the whole truth about the process how the substance came out from its original condition to the present state. The ontic version of *modus ponens* concerning the objective meaning could be useful in positive sciences, but it is unacceptable as a guide in hermeneutic research. Socrates was wise and therefore rejected technical thinking of his contemporaries as insufficiently true. His art of hermeneutics represents the primordial attitude how to listen to original divine truth of Delphi. Heidegger reminds philosophy of the fact that original place of interpretation lies not in proclamations, but in dwelling at the place where divine message is revealed.[[7]](#footnote-7) Following this reason, explication of objectivity proceeds from the objective substance to original events, which transformed metaphysic meaning of being in the objectively given meaning. It came into existence as an objective phenomenon in a twist of thinking known as *via Modernorum*. Thanks to this revealed and positively given objectivity, we can explain basic events that contributed to the birth of the objective being in the metaphysics. The objectivity took place in specific constellation of metaphysics as the first science that investigates ontic entities. Modern metaphysics produces a very special meaning of being. That kind of objectivity must be investigated in the aforementioned ontological perspective. Such an investigation entails description of preliminary approaches “how” such objective entity came into being of its own. The examination traces the historicity of ontological thinking that forms the ontic history of metaphysics. The origin of philosophy relates to epochal transition of truth as archaic and divine concealment (*a/lētheia*) into ontological unconcealment (*alētheia*). The historiality of such thinking needs *alētheia* of Muses in order to come into the principal dative (*dativus principalis*) of the first philosophy. The objective *veritas* came in the second step in the movement of “what” was established in form of positive fact. There was a certain direction of understanding that created an ontic philosophy as metaphysics. The original form of historiality (*Geschichtlichkeit*) of metaphysics as first science of modern being (and not archaic Being) constituted a basic condition for the apparition of objectivity in the history of Western thinking.

The research must begin with the interpretation of events that changed original view of archaic truth into metaphysical one. The appearance of truth in its original form relates to the totality of Being. This event took place in the act of seeing by soothsayers, in Greek mysteries and in the teaching of the first philosophers. The research of donation of Being follows the indication offered by the grammar of Greek language. The original donation of truth can be traced with help of grammatical dative. The dative is the case of the indirect object and it makes visible the ontological meaning. It is necessary to go through the basic formes of dative used by hermeneutics of objectivity. The original form of *alētheia* before the birth of philosophy has founding character in the mode of *dativus archegeticus*. That donation of Being (*tá ónta*) has generated the first known historial form of truth as divine *alētheia*. Archegetic dative relates to the Apollonian mysteries in Delphi and it occurs only rarely in this study. The divine donation made the starting point (ἀρχή + γεννάω) that influenced all derived forms of hermeneutic dative. The original dative of the mysteries (*dativus archegeticus*) has become the new donation of Being in the first philosophy. The divine archegetic dative works in the first philosophy in a concealed way through the principal dative (*dativus principalis*). According to Heidegger, the first philosophers of *phūsis* recognized fundamental events that created philosophical meaning of Being that Heidegger refers to in the term *Ereignis*. This fundamental and original donation (*principium*) constitutes the commencement of philosophy (Heidegger’s term *Es gibt*). The new form of dative occurs in transformation of the first philosophy in metaphysics of Plato and Aristotle. This type of dative shows donation of metaphysical being (*dativus metaphysicus*), and it determines the latter phenomenon of objectivity. A complete analysis of donation that established the objective metaphysic being come in the third part of study (*dativus obiectivus*; OBJ III, cap. 4). The transition between both forms of philosophical dative (*principalis*, *metaphysicus*) has the foundational character since it alternates between being and non-being. The presence of Being investigated in archaic thinking in form of archegetic and principal dative became in the metaphysics a non-being. The previous research of the first philosophy was changed into a mythologic kind of fairy tale. The movable substance, a typical example of non-being for the Eleats, received the privileged status as founding event in the metaphysics of Aristotle. We call this transition oscillating between being and non-being by Latin term *tertium ens*.

Plato moved the first philosophy into the realm of metaphysics. He created a new *Vor-blickbahn* that transformed the basic understanding of philosophy in accordance with the phenomenological “*Wie*” proposed by Heidegger. Ideal of knowing the individual being (*das Seiende*) replaced dominant character of seeing the whole of Being (*das Sein*). The science of ideas suppressed the archaic truth and logos. Parmenides of Elea and Heraclitus of Ephesus described the archaic way of seeing that made the foundation of wisdom. Jean-Pierre Vernant described essential characteristics of ancient seeing in archaic Greece.[[8]](#footnote-8) The agent received ability to see invisible reality as a divine gift or curse. It is a well-known gift of prophetic seeing given to blind soothsayers or rhapsodists. The prophetic vision corresponds to Odysseus’s practical ability to understand the whole of divine and mortal events keenly and to judge them wisely (*métis*). This twofold seeing of the world in its divine unconcealment gave birth to original historiality (*Geschichtlichkeit*).[[9]](#footnote-9) That event founded hermeneutics of oracles and the first philosophy in the next step. The manifestation of the founding event follows the act of the archegetic donation that divine powers give to mortals. The seer Calchas apprehended in original divine present the entirety of Being in its full complexity (τά of τ' ἐόντα τά of τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό of τ' ἐόντα, *Iliad* 1.70). Calchas vision incorporates present entirety of Being (*tá ónta*) in present, past and future. That holistic experience covers all temporal dimensions. This kind of vision deals with existence of cosmos present through divine un/concealment (*a/lētheia*) and it is not bound to the perception of a single being. Such a prophetic vision can be translated by the present medium of the verb “seeing” (εἴδομαι). The contemplation of Being in the ecstatic present is perceived beyond existence of single being as well as beyond the flow of ontic time. There is no isolated thing or event, since they do not exist, did not exist or not yet exist. The archaic donation of Being concerns space of archetypical events and their meaning that is covered by initiative of divine Muses. They guard and freely donate vision of Being in a form of “musical” knowledge. There is no existence of singular entities in music or prophetic present. The fullness of Being does not consist of existence of individual things. The birth and the destruction of individual entities follow the original and permanently present realm of the whole of *phūsis*. The archaic vision founded and carried original form of knowledge of the world. Prophet saw the whole of Being in direct and immediate way. Witness confirmed prophecy or oath because soothsayers, prophets had seen something that was truthful and divine. Witness in form of ancient “*hístor”* (ἴστωρ) explains truthfully, what the soothsayers had seen in the first place.[[10]](#footnote-10) Attested presence of ontic being and important events are determined by original totality of Being present *hic et nunc*. After the divination came the first philosophers to investigate the realm of Being through donation of principal dative (*dativus principalis*). Thanks to the goddess *Alētheia*, Parmenides saw the entirety of the cosmos in the original form of unconcealed existence. The first philosopher received the donation of Being as musically unconcealed and divine cosmic order. His seeing appears in music present of the verb “see.” Parmenides relied the entirety of *tá ónta* with that what is (τ' ἐὸν ἔμμεναι) according to original way how present Being reveals itself (ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι; DK 28, B 6.8). Thanks to his wise seeing the concealed Being became subject for the first archaic “*hístors*” of Being, i.e., the first philosophers. The truth as musical correspondence of Being and thinking manifests itself by specific presence of concealment (Lethe) and unconcealment (*alētheia*). The entirety of Being which is signified in present tense of the verb “see” found the first epochal correspondence of the present Being and the new way of historial thinking (τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι; DK 28, B 3). The philosophical epic of Parmenides confirms the fact that unconcealment of Being takes its origin in philosophical *alētheia*. Under the guidance of wise goddess Alētheia this citizen of the Greek colony in Italy described the event of archaic truth bound to fullness of divine Being. Donation in the form of principal dative created the new ontological perspective (Vor-blickbahn) how the actual presence of the individual being (*Anwesenheit des Seienden*) is given in its historial form (*geschichtlich*). The following thinkers preserved important parts of his mystagogic poem because they knew why it was important for the philosophy. The first philosophers of *phūsis*, writers of tragedy and Socrates followed archaic truth unconcealed in Pythian order of Being.

Plato completely changed the scenario of archaic wisdom based on the presence of Being. From now on, the ideal and perfect act of knowing summed up individually recognized entities. Transition from the whole of Being to the individual existence of something created a fundamentally new event of thinking. The first philosophy received new perspective of vision that was named afterwards as “metaphysic” way of understanding. Plato closed the thinking of the first philosophers. He sent their seeing of divine fullness into closed past of aorist (ἰδέσθαι). What the first philosophers had contemplated in the past, present and future, that works in the Platonism exclusively by the virtue of knowledge given by the verbal mode of the perfect tense. The ideal knowledge of an isolated entity gave the reason why it can be “seen” through indefinite participle in the perfect tense (εἰδός). The metaphysical being seems to be perfectly, i.e., ideally and permanently known, which was impossible in the first philosophy. Ideal knowledge founded the eidetic vision of the new philosophy. The idea shows itself as an individual being and therefore it is visible. Hence, metaphysics recognizes everything in the mythopoetic “light” of the highest and ideal being and through its brilliance. The original vision of cosmic order disappeared and knowledge of the highest and eternal idea took its place. Plato does not see the same cosmos as the first philosophers did. Since Plato, the philosophical research investigates the way how the totality of individual entities is knowable through the principal idea of the Good. The ideal of mathematical deduction reduced the archaic totality of the cosmos into a kind of non-being. Modern cosmos is contemplated in the view of mythopoetic vision related to the ideal perfection. Holistic vision of the first philosophers dealt with original way how the entirety of Being manifests itself here and now in the present *phūsis*. Philosophic research investigates since Plato, how the whole of individual beings manifests to human or divine intellect. Ideal totality of singular entities is identical with the modern worldview made by eternal character of ideas. The law of “*Divide et impera*” still rules the imperialism of the metaphysics established by Plato, a diligent lover of tyrants. The previous vision revealed the cosmic order in present time, and it was related to a political excellence of the prominent seers and the first philosophers. Science of sages became superfluous in the new paradigm of ideal seeing. The holistic vision of present Being became a closed past; the perfect knowledge of eternally present singular entities has come instead. Platonism created a new *Vor-blickbahn* to make sense of ideally manifested totality of individual entities. Previous act of seeing dealt with “physic” whole of Being that was present in a mystagogic, music, tragic, and philosophic way. Plato transformed the first philosophy into a new type of ideal knowledge. Present knowledge without archaic seeing is perfect all the time. The blind perfection closed previous age of archaic thinking that ceased to be true and valid. The hermeneutics consider the birth of metaphysics as devaluation of archaic truth (*dévalorisation de l’Alétheia*) which was carried out a century before by the first modern poet Simonides of Ceos (Detienne 1967, 124). Simonides founded the mnemotechnic for secularized poets; Plato created technically forged knowledge for dialectically competent thinkers. Plato’s dialogue *Ion* confirms transformation of philosophic knowledge that completed the secularization of poetic authority done one century ago. The original statement of prophetic, artistic and rhapsodic truth keeps ambiguity of veracity and deceit. The work of Hesiod preserves that original meaning of *alētheia*. Not the writer, but the Muses keep the original authority over truth and deceit.[[11]](#footnote-11) After Plato, the gift of prophetic seeing and wisdom given by Apollo and Muses are superfluous. The activity of knowing depends exclusively of mortal subject ever since. Detienne shows the transformation of goddess Apate, which determines the archaic form of truth and deception (*ibid.*, 134f). Ambivalence of truth and deception formed proclamation of prophetic, artistic and rhapsodic manifestations of *alētheia*. After the departure of Muses in the Lethe, modern writers as Simonides and modern thinkers as Plato became new masters of truth and deception. Totality of the world present in mysteries or poetry received the character of mythological past. Presentation of Being in the first philosophy changed into the exploration of being in metaphysics made through the mediation of ideas. The vision of Being became the mythic and closed story of previous Dark Age of knowledge. The former wisdom disappeared, finally and completely, from the history of victorious technical thinking. New donation of being concerns individual entities and it is made by recollection of ideas that prove themselves as the supreme gift (*dativus metaphysicus*). Metaphysic thinker does not need to be archaically wise anymore since he contests the validity and truth of the ancient donation (*dativus archegeticus, principalis*). Plato developed the personal ability of perfect knowledge, which promotes ideal knowledge of isolated entities. The first philosophers formulated very carefully the manifestation of Being through symbolic language. Totality of the cosmos entails the divine nature and musical character of truth. The first philosophy investigates divine mixture of truth and deception that must be well distinguished. Metaphysics does not need archaic seeing and description of the world any more. The subjective ability of knowing and new concept of truth as *veritas* replaced archaic wisdom manifested by prophetic vision or poetic word. Plato exorcised the divine power of Deception (Apate) out of modern philosophy. Goddess Apate has become human being through the divine man named Plato, which is certainly a very remarkable achievement. That sort of “divine” apostasy founded the age of modernity. Basic perspective of comprehension has taken up an ideal way of proceeding (*eídos*). The fundamental comprehension of being as an idea put every meaning in the framework of perfect “seeing” that coincide with everlasting present of eternal knowledge.

Metaphysics founded new school of thinking thanks to the manifestation of ideal existence of individual being that is eternally present (οὐσία). The new ontological understanding (*Vor-blickbahn)* founded the new worldview that makes the ontic being as foundation of sciences. Plato as a mathematical thinker contemplated the truth of the essence that reveals eidetic meaning of being. Since it is perfect, the eidetic knowledge is present for all times and for everybody. Theoretical vision of metaphysical substance differs fundamentally from original prophetic seeing of divinatory present according to Mnemosyne, from the epoptic vision of mysteries, or from the intellectual mediation of *phūsis* in the first philosophy. The change of truth as correspondence of knowledge to eternal ideas brought to life a new epoch of thinking. The vision of metaphysics goes to the idea that determines perfectly and ideally that what is “seen” as a concept. Platons Academy did not need wisdom of Delphi that guided Socrates and his predecessors. Archaic wisdom granted the insight into entirety of Being thanks to a gift of divine Apollo and Muses. Plato established meaning of an isolated being that is present permanently and ideally. The first Prometheus of modernity created a new kind of sanctuary for technicians of thinking in order to provide eternal knowledge cultivated exclusively by mortals. The ideal world of mathematics and individual ideas created fundamentally new definition of what is revealed, seen and recognized. Platonic thinker sees truthfully because his soul has seen the everlasting world of ideas even before his birth. He does not need to be alive and his soul already sees what is true. The pseudo-prophetic cleverness produced a new technology of thinking. It changed the archaic wisdom of Delphi and the teaching of the first philosophers into a divine comedy. The pantheon of ideas substituted for original pantheon where divine powers granted prophetic seeing to the mortals. The presence of the whole of *phūsis* exists no more and it ceased to be the first task of philosophy. The vision of non-existent ideas substituted for wisdom of archaic seeing and it abolished meaning of archaic *phūsis*. Goddess Apate received subjective form and she made her new dwelling in academic tabernacle of metaphysics. She steers the metaphysic history of modernity through abolished wisdom of the first philosophy. The dialectics became a new technology of thought and it makes the destiny of metaphysics. Socrates was a contemporary of Apollo’s oracle in Delphi and the prophecy of Pythia proclaimed his importance (*Apol*. 20e5‒21a8). Socratic wisdom followed divine truth according to Pythian oracle. Apollo said through Pythia that Socrates was the wisest of all people. The seeker of tragic wisdom had to find out how to interpret this divine oracle in an unconcealed way. His source of wisdom were mysteries, oracles from Delphi or visions of prophetesses as Diotima. Socrates searched divine wisdom in the name of all citizens in Athens. Socrates saw meaning of Being uncovered in Pythian mode of *alētheia*. Hence, he abolished in his philosophy every form of technical thinking related to approved knowledge and everyday practice. The technical prowess offers answers exclusively to question what makes an individual being or substance. Socrates’s questions put the value of substances at the second place. The thinking of first philosophers and therefore of Socrates looked for unconcealed access to divine Being. By appeal of Delhi became Socrates the last seeker of archaic wisdom. That kind of wisdom disappeared when modernity was born. Plato changed Socrates into a metaphysical philosopher who manipulates mythopoetic discourse and dialectical ideas in the similar way as contemporary sophists. The tragic destiny of Socrates celebrated by Delphic oracle shares the same destiny as authors of Greek tragedies. They rejoined vision of divine Alētheia proposed by the first philosophers. Having the same view of truth, Socrates would certainly have refused technical ideal of dialectics made by Plato. Plato did not live in present of archaic truth made par *dativus principalis*. Hence, Plato and Socrates were no contemporaries from the point of historiality of thinking and Being, although they lived historically at the same time. The archaic hermeneutics defend musical truth given by Apollo’s oracle. Philosophy based on interpretation of oracles is not equivalent to eristic exercises of sophists and to dialectical technology made by Plato. Therefore, Plato is no philosophical follower of Socrates. The tragedy of metaphysics consists in the fact that Socrates had no direct followers and founded no school. He was the last witness of the ancient wisdom, and therefore he remains the best of all philosophers for ever.

Platonism irrevocably modified the nature of wisdom. Academics became new lovers of subjectively made wisdom in the footsteps of Plato. Instead of manual-working Socrates, they preferred to keep easy existence of well-to-do people. Hence, they founded philosophical schools of their own. Hermeneutics consider simulacrum of “Socrates’s metaphysics” to be perfect and therefore divine creation of goddess Apate. Archaic Muses are truthful in a divine way and they speak until today by divine comedy produced by the metaphysics of Plato. That modern successor of Socrates became the best dialectician in the competition of well-known sophists of his time. Metaphysics represents Socratic wisdom in new type of artistic dialogue, since Platon created a quasi-divine simulacrum of Socrates. Oracle of Apollo and vision of Diotima were forged into the fictional masterpiece concerning apology of Socrates and the world of ideas. New philosophy circulated in the soirées animated by modern intellectuals. The first group of modernists originated before Plato in the circle founded by famous Athenian politician Pericles (†429 BC). The next generation led by Platon adopted new method of dialectical thinking. The second wave of modernists systematized the works of Plato and Herodotus in new fields of thinking called “metaphysics” and “history.” The worldview of *Antiquorum* based on oracles of Pythia was converted into academic teaching after Socrates’s death. The literary figure of Socrates as a modernist proposed by Plato made the metaphysic doppelganger of Xenophon’s portrait of Socrates. The first intellectuals were contemporaries (in Latin *Moderni*) of Delphic oracle, just as the last group of tragedy writers. Sophocles and Euripides were main representatives of tragic vision of *alētheia* and they were contemporaries of Socrates in Athens. His seeing of the truth and tragic destiny became after his death a prominent source of metaphysical knowledge. Dialectical version of Socrates’s apology has dissimulated divine truth of Delphi. Plato made out of Socrates the divine pedagogue of Platonism. The knowledge of modernity needs no seeing of original divine truth that investigated the real Socrates and tragedy writers. Academic adoration of platonic Socrates as the first modern “philosopher” completely wiped out his original vision of archaic truth. Plato changed Socratic seeing of *hic et nunc* revealed meaning of Being in metaphysical truth defined in form of mathematical idea. Pythian understanding of oracles became positive knowledge of Athenian intellectual and masculine elite. Archaic nature of seeing became obsolete in Platonism due to metaphysical knowledge referring to ontic being of ideas. The preceding tradition of the first philosophy treated the whole of *phūsis*. The first philosophers considered presence of isolated being to be very problematic issue. According to Parmenides the modern account of changeable entities is produced by so-called two headed people (δίκρανοι; DK 28, B 6.5). Their wrong understanding runs exclusively on the level of language through the dialectic and sophistry. They proceed in chaotic manner, running forwards and backwards (παλίντροπός ἐστι κέλευθος, B 6.9). The isolated being of modernists was not fully integrated in the cosmic order, it has no permanence in the past or in the future. The first philosophy preferred holistic vision of Being and *phūsis* to be the fundament of thinking. It explains the reason why the first philosophers did very cautious research of such an unstable entity. Science of such events and things was mostly reserved to technically founded knowledge. Plato reduced thinking to technical skill and suppressed vision of archaic cosmos in favor of everlasting realm of ideas. Knowledge of *phūsis* related to original form of *alētheia* disappeared from the philosophy of Athenian intellectuals and sophists.

Metaphysics sees individual things in the light of ideally given knowledge. There are no existing ideas in the reality; however they make modern foundation of reality. Moreover, the individual idea founds the whole of Being that is no metaphysics entity endowed with individual existence. Platonism produced at the podium of philosophy the first divine comedy that Muses discretely guided and orchestrated. The ancient order of Being changed into the presence of supreme being, namely idea of the Good. That ultimate mythopoetic substance exists in the form of unchangeable fullness. It makes real things visible in everlasting light. The radiation of ideas in the form of individual supreme beings put individual things into a perfect unconcealment (*alētheia*). The vision of modernity seemed to be a complete paranoia in comparison with millennial wisdom of ancient cultures. Platonism had to create a new concept of truth in order to survive. The idea of the supreme Good makes the first and most eminent theorem of the first science of being. The *theoría* of archaic mysteries became a theoretical knowledge based on mathematical deduction. Idolatry of archaic vision produced in metaphysics completely overrun original mathematics of Pythagoras and Archytas. The harmony of the cosmos introduced by Pythagoras reveals itself through *musica universalis*. It has the same philosophic meaning as mathematical harmony of celestial spheres proposed by Archytas. Plato transferred music harmony into the metaphysics of ideas. The new ontology of comprehension abandoned the act of seeing for the sake of the individual being. Each real thing is understood in the light of mathematically given knowledge. Apparently, nothing changed in the view of the first science. The idea presents divine and eternal knowledge of the cosmos. However, modern meaning of philosophy creates the mathematical unity of everlasting ideas that are distinguished of each other in the human mind only. The first philosophy until Socrates excluded separated single being from the realm of cosmic truth. The knowledge of individual entities cannot substitute for the whole of *phūsis*. Such a kind of “science” should be a kind of skill worthy of manually working people (βάναυσοι). The cosmos in its totality is no banality at all. It determines existence of individual entities and not the way round as it is in the case of modernity. The philosophers before Plato saw what was present completely and without limitation and they described truth of the cosmos in that kind of presence. Modern metaphysic thinkers as Plato had to be not even born and their soul already had the full knowledge of the ideas. After intellectual maturity, this knowledge is fully developed in the idealistic mode of anamnesis thanks to mathematical ability. Totality of ideas determines dialectical process how the perfect order of ideal meaning comes into existence. Metaphysic thinkers like Plato and ironic writers of comedies like Aristophanes started the age of secularization and irony by criticism of archaic and democratic wisdom. They caused separation of the modern *veritas* from the archaic *alētheia*. Modernists treated ironically the ancient universe of the first philosophers and tragedy writers. Plato created ironic hermeneutics of archaic wisdom based on the victorious dialectic and he made an alliance with oligarchic tyranny. Nietzsche confirmed that platonic ideas manifest nothing else but their famous producer.[[12]](#footnote-12) Sophistry of young intelligentsia in Athens became an “ideal” knowledge and it destroyed ancient search for wisdom closed by Socrates. Plato created the first “*herméneutique du soupçon*” (P. Ricoeur) to disarm and to annihilate archaic wisdom.

Heidegger found the original event (*Ereignis*) that converted archaic truth of the first philosophy into the metaphysics. The work *Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit* (1942) followed previous lecture *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* madein winter semester 1931/32 in Freiburg. Heidegger laid out fundamentals of metaphysics by investigating the transformation of ontological standpoint (*Vor-blickbahn*) described above. Plato’s Allegory of the cave in the seventh book of *Republic* described the movements of the prisoner who leaves the cavern. After obtaining new vision of the world, philosopher returns to the cave (*Rep*. 514a2−517a7). Fire illuminates the walls and that artificial light changes into daylight afterwards. The first kind of truth makes use of the shades on the wall that the firelight created. Then it comes to direct vision of things in the cave, then to the contemplation of the external world in daylight and, finally, to the vision of closed space in dim cavernal light after returning into the cave. The prisoner receives the first impression of truth as something unconcealed (τὸ ἀληθὲς, 515c2) by observing the shades of things that fire makes visible. Then he sees the things in the cave more truthfully, because the fire illuminates them directly (τὰ τότε ὁρώμενα ἀληθέστερα, 515d6‒7). At that moment, the prisoner sees more rightly (ὀρθότερον βλέποι, 515d4) because he can turn his head to the fire. He can compare the shades of things on the wall with their actual existence in twilight of the cave. Finally, the unconcealment of sunny world is accessible to him outside of the cave. The enlightened mind compares visible things to their ideal pattern, hence to the idea of supreme Good. Plato calls this brightest idea to be the ultimate source of truth and knowledge (517c3−4). Metaphoric sunlight illuminates everything in form of idea of the Good (ἀποδιδὸν τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν, 508e2‒3). Verb ἀποδίδωμι means to restore the things into their original state, to repay debts or to make up for committed evil (*restitutio ad integrum*). The metaphysical vision of the world makes the restitution of all entities in their ideal form. Metaphysics made restoration of philosophy no more according to original vision of Being that contemplated Calchas and the first philosophers. The allegory points out that idealistic perspective determine the right view (ὀρθότης), because it makes restitution of truth in an ideal form. The Platonic myth founded a new truth as correctness and correspondence. The reason why the world appears correctly results from the illumination of things through different kinds of light. Its source is given in a hierarchical order of revelation: first the artificial fire, then the mythopoetic sun, and finally both taken together. By illuminating things through the differently shaped light, Plato established the basic meaning of what exists, and how it exists. The truth in the metaphysics exists as new order of the unconcealment (*alētheia*) and concealment (Lethe). They are not taken together in accordance with the whole of Being, but in their ideal, correct and completely separate form. Plato observes all being in the light of ideas. Absolute measure of mathematical exactness reveals all things in virtue of ideal truth. Idealistic vision enables individual things to enter the space of permanently true revelation. New truth of things needs correctness that does not reside in archaic seeing, but in a new form of absolute knowledge (*absolvō*). Plato’s guardians and intellectuals in ideal polity must isolate modern truth from the archaic power of deception (Apate). Both sides of the truth ceased to exist together in a brave new world of metaphysics. Artificial fire in the cave enables the first step to the idea of Good revealed outdoors. The act of knowing compares earthly things to absolute and separate measure of fullness. The perfect tense of the verb “see” (οἶδα) expresses such fullness of correct vision. Ideal act of seeing takes depart from a perfect form given as substance. Plato transformed the way of archaic vision of the whole Being (see the phenomenological *Wie* of Heidegger) into a permanent beingness (*ens*) of “what” is seen as right and just. Metaphysics changed archaic vision of present cosmic order into permanently given form of individual entity. Idea presents itself in the form of impersonal entity (εἶδος, *essentia*). The essence became supreme measure and it covers through its presence every individually present being (οὐσία). Individual act of seeing originates in essentially given presence, and every individual substance makes its representation. The essence as eternal eidos creates everlasting meaning of *hic et nunc* observable *ousía*. This perspective of comprehensive vision (*Vor-blickbahn*) founded a new concept of truth. Each present substance points out to its essential representation in order to be measured completely and perfectly (τὸ ἀληθὲς, *verum*). Platonism turned the order of presentation and representation all the way round. Ideal essence is actually present and existing substance is but representation made by the idea. After conversion of seeing into knowing, the metaphysicist can compare existing things to absolute, essential and everlasting measure of correctness and perfection. Being the supreme creator of ideas, metaphysicist became completely blind to archaic vision of *alētheia*. It ceased to exist in modernity. Perspective established by Plato gives insight into the origin of *veritas* in the newborn metaphysics. Heidegger’s interpretation shows the basic form of *Vor-blickbahn* that changed the word into the simulacrum. New perspective reveals every substance from the point of truth as metaphysical correctness.

“Everything depends on ὀρθότης, the correctness of regard. By this correctness, the seeing become truthful as recognition. It goes straight to the highest idea and it ascertains itself in this orientation.” [[13]](#footnote-13)

Light of ideas guides the vision of enlightened Platonists after their exit from the cave. Intellect as mythological sun turns knowledge in direction of true being in its permanently unconcealed and present form. Mathematics became metaphysics and both of them determine modern knowledge. Ancient form of mathematics in the music art of Pythagoras took whole of the cosmos as a divine gift. Mathematically given worldview now moves the metaphysics to what is ideally (i.e., essentially) present in the grasp of every existing substance. The idea makes the source of being for perishable and contingent things. Plato carried out a radical transformation of archaic wisdom into a new form of first philosophy. The first philosophers and Socrates denied that understanding based on technical, rhetorical and political skill could be the ultimate measure of truth. Plato substituted for changeability of *tékhnē* its mathematically given simulacrum (*eídos*). The original unity of Being in divine present was translated in present tense of the verb “see”. It completely disappeared from metaphysic knowledge. The vision of archaic *phūsis* was replaced by mathematical definition given by axioms and by limited number of elements. Famous fairy tale of the cavern proclaims the glory of this science for the *vulgus philosophicus*. The idea of Good makes the real world visible. That travesty of truth replaced the holistic vision of Being and the cosmic order. Taken from metaphysic point of view, there is hardly any difference between platonic idea of the Good and music whole of Being; both of them are divine and everlasting. Hidden activity of Muses performed though the metaphysics suppressed that perfectly concealed difference between *Schein* and *Sein*. The goddess Apate staged technical ability of Plato up to the age of secularization defined by exit of divine powers from the modern world. The epoch of modernism began with decline of Delphi and ended with death of modern God in the age of nihilist postmodernism. The hermeneutics perform the criticism of metaphysics with regard to the historial donation of Being. The metaphysic dative annihilated the archaic donation of Being done through archegetic and principal dative. Study discerns aforementioned changes of truth from music and tragic form into the metaphysical worldview. New explication follows the unconcealed way of archaic truth that presided over the original birthplace of metaphysics. The truth represents divine power and manifests cosmic order as musical *alētheia*. Plato converted this archaic view into a metaphysical, ironic way of truth as *veritas*. Modern substance (τὸ ἀληθὲς, *verum*) is true if it coincides with the everlasting pattern of ideal essence. The correspondence is possible by the fact that intellect compares real things to the presence of mathematically shaped ideas. The perfect tense of the verb “see” sums up Plato’s understanding of philosophy. It reveals reality in perfect manner that corresponds to ideal knowledge. Platonism proclaims that exactness of ideal measure makes return to original state of philosophy. Ideally reshaped mathematics became a new form of the first science. That travesty of archaic truth was accomplished in perfect manner of *restitutio ad integrum* concerning the order of the cosmos.

The metaphysic twist of thinking needed a new pedagogy. Heidegger’s term *Bildung* established new meaning of παιδεία with regard to changes in the metaphysic worldview.[[14]](#footnote-14) Platonic allegory proclaims transition from the Dark Age to the light of modernity to be the fundamental task of a new philosophy. Metaphysics rejected the original vision of divine order. Plato turned the thinking from archaic *phūsis* to the realm of mathematical ideas. The Academy disregarded the divine power of archaic truth; it proposed a new program of education instead. Idealistic indoctrination has to rely on oppressive authority of state until today. A new era of academic care of souls follows metaphysical transition from the darkness of ancient philosophy to the light of ideas. The original meaning of the noun “turn” (ἐποχή) derives from the astronomical event of solar darkness. This event describes darkness in cosmic abyss (χάος) before creation of cosmic order. During solar eclipse everything becomes immobile, invisible and then the Sun comes out again. This natural phenomenon founded philosophical meaning of the word *epokhê* as the suspension of judgment and critical examination of knowledge. The disappearance of archaic philosophy and apparition of metaphysics brought about basic change in vision of truth. The transition of one form of truth into another has a historial character. It creates new ontological perspective in the form of Heidegger’s *Vor-blickbahn*. The transition from darkness of invisible *phūsis* to light of ideas makes the fundamental dimension for hermeneutics of objectivity. The hermeneutic exploration built on the astronomical *epokhê* takes the Platonic being in the aforementioned framework of “epoch-making” meaning. The first, most important and objectively untraceable figure of the Platonic being remains firstly in the original darkness of hidden Being. The transformation of the sense of being (*Sinn des Seienden*) makes a new epoch of thinking. During the period of transition, metaphysic remains in original darkness of historial form of hidden Being (*Verborgenheit des Seins*). In that crucial state of philosophy, it is impossible to distinguish the old view from the new one. Old forms of metaphysics are no more and there is not yet the new form. We use for this chaotic and dark state of “epochal” philosophy the concept “being of the third kind” (*tertium ens*). That entity came to being in shadow play of Plato’s mythopoetic narrative about the cave. Being of the third kind does not exist in metaphysics after its full manifestation in the light of a new form. Either something is, or it is not. Metaphysical thinking has no possibility of recognizing shadowy existence of being in the transitory mode of *tertium ens*. Aristotle’s book *Metaphysics* confirms epochal turn made by Platon. After establishing identity of substance (A = A), the Law of Excluded Middle is valid. Either something is A, or it is not A (A ≠ non-A), and there is no possibility of some ontic state in between.[[15]](#footnote-15) Aristotelian revolution dismissed outdated modernity of Platonism and it inaugurated new form of logical thinking. Aristote suppressed central theme of light and darkness in Plato’s philosophical myth. The Peripatetics and Academics offered to posterity the vision concerning a kind of metaphysics entity instead of the original fullness of archaic Being. Archaic order of Being disappeared due to modern *restitutio ad integrum*. It came to supremacy of individual substance or ideal essence. The philosophy proceeds through ideal, mathematical, deductive and axiomatic way (*more geometrico*). Plato and his followers defeated chaotic Titans of first philosophy, and Aristotle confirmed their victory. The epochal turn of metaphysics constituted the Golden Age of humanity under guidance of the idea of the Good. Archaic art of hermeneutics follows the steps of Socrates and it contemplates such divine comedy of Muses. They substituted mythopoetic world of platonic enlightenment for “mythic” epoch of Olympian deities. Mathematics became universal technology to produce modern thinking. Platonic Academy accomplished inauguration of dialectics and mathematics to be the first philosophy instead of millennial wisdom.

The origin of the metaphysics can be summed up as a permanent presence of ideally conceived being that is related to the anthropocentric turn of truth. Subject creates new philosophy since it does not need the faculty of archaic seeing. The tragedy of the West consists in the fact that metaphysic view of *veritas* substituted for previous forms of *alētheia*. The last form of *alētheia* dates back to the writers of tragedy. Polity of Athens found itself in profound crisis after Socrates’s death and after the departure of tragedy writers. The philosophy of *phūsis* and the wisdom of tragedy failed to offer a guarantee of true knowledge to Plato’s generation. Those members of Athenian oligarchy were followers of authoritarian regimes under charismatic tyrants as Alcibiades (†404 BC). The generation of modernists formed by Plato did not believe in archaic forms of democracy as Socrates did. Modernists took into account that truth made by the wisest of all humans was not able to save justice in the polity of Athens. The original search for truth in form of tragedy writers and Socrates disappeared. An educational theory based on philosophical fairy tales and on metaphysics of ideal simulacra came instead. Plato decided that deprecated wisdom of ancient times can be saved by technical perfection of mathematical thinking. The new actor or bearer (*subiectum*) must be schooled to secure the modern turn to ideal knowledge. Thinking is to be enlightened in new manner in order to keep up with the world of non-existent ideas. Modern subject must produce mythopoetic science of ideal meaning and values. The modern truth followed no more the cosmic Being reveled by divine presence of *phūsis*. Metaphysics needs technical imitation to reproduce the world of ideas in a new order of mathematics and geometry. The art of metaphysical imitation needs academically formed skills. Platonist is a producer of modern intellectual capital made of invented ideas. Dialogue *Timaios* describes the processes based on the mathematical imitation that replaced the vision of ancient *phūsis*. The academic demiurge makes mythopoetic production of the real world by imitation of everlasting ideas. There are no ideas in the visible cosmos; nevertheless their imitation creates in Plato’s archetypal narrative the real world. The idea fixes presence of being in essence (what is, *Was-sein*). Enlightened intellect recognizes that kind of metaphysic being (GA 9, 225). Modernity invalidated the act of seeing that determines appearance of a unique phenomenon with regard to fullness of Being. The modern subject became the new fundament of the first science. Heidegger points out that ideal understanding of reality brought about the first subjectivism of truth. New nature of correspondence makes part of technically competent subject. It regards individual entities in a proper way.

“In the change concerning the nature of truth came to transposition of the viewpoint where the truth resides. Still, the unconcealment makes the truth be characteristic trait of being in itself. As a correctness of the ‘vision,’ however, the truth becomes part of human attitude to the individual being.” [[16]](#footnote-16)

Masters of metaphysics produce and pedagogues reproduce everlasting knowledge (τὸ ἀληθὲς, *verum*) of contingent things. Both technicians observe the real world in light of permanently present ideas. Every substance manifests itself through modern truth as correctness and not in an archaic way. Former *alētheia* changed into *veritas* as platonic simulacra. The truth in form of mathematical and geometric proportion (*more geometrico*) makes essential part of modern objectivity. Reduction of individual things to common archetypes and deduction of ideal essence from those archetypes define the principle of modern production. Modernity has transformed banal technology into the basis of metaphysics. The product is truthful and good as it imitates the ideal world. Dialogue *Timaios* defends archetypal entities defined mathematically and geometrically. Demiurge transports ideal meaning of ideas into primary matter to create a hylemorphic substance. Platonic glorification of technical skill rejected by Socrates makes inevitable result of subjectively conceived truth in metaphysics. The imitation of mathematical realm enables modern demiurge to produce exacts copies from ideal original with the help of technology based on mathematical operations. Antiquity considered such kind of mimetic activity to be artistic production done in everyday banality. A divine or human artifact receives existence in the process of imitation that determines the basic way how the idea transforms the material substrate. The artificial idea formes the material to materialize the final product in an ideal permanence exempt of physical changes. The dialogue *Republic* points out that artisan who makes a bed must contemplate the idea of every product in the first place (πρὸς τὴν ἰδέαν βλέπων, 596b7−8). The demiurge copies this ideal pattern present as everlasting ideas into the matter. Artistic imitation made through diligence and skill makes part of ideal fullness of metaphysical being. The process of mathematical and artistic determination of matter by demiurgic subject is very important for the examination of objectivity. The modern subject became efficient cause and producer and fabricated things that reveal permanent presence of ideas in its turn. Heidegger analyzes in the lectures on Nietzsche the role of platonic idea in process of imitation (GA 6.1, 177−78). The technology follows capacity of modern subjects to make transition of subjective production to the external world (*Herstellung*). The prefix “*her­–*” signifies that the world imitated by modern subject manifests itself as an extension of human invention that makes a new center of the world. The idea obtains new presence in the world with help of technical imitation based on metaphysic representation. Art and technology recreated ideas in fabricated object and that transition of meaning confirms the subjective character of production. Heidegger analyzes metaphysical character of industrial products and nihilistic character of technology. They represent voluntarist aspect of being that reveals true nature of modernity in those days. The divine or human version of creation reflects upon presence of ideas in creative intellect. The reflexive imitation reproduces the everlasting ideality in an artistic or technical product. The art of modern production confirms ideal and metaphysical foundation of the world founded by creative subjects. The modern world as a Christian *creatio* or a postmodern *factum* represents the force of metaphysical simulacra. The world of fabricated products comes to its objective nature due to activities of the divine and human demiurge. Conversion of truth in metaphysical and later in objective correctness changed everything to be a property of modern subjects. They produce metaphysical as well as objective meaning of being. The will to power unveils the beginning of objectivity, and it reveals its nihilistic end as well. Plato’s philosophy inaugurated essential part of Western history that contemporary epoch of nihilistic thinking tries to accomplish. The initial power of metaphysics enabled modern philosophy to be technically competent academic knowledge. Now, that imperative covers all scientific disciplines that appeared in the course of history based on the metaphysic worldview.

An archetypal event that founded objective vision of the world cannot be an accidental transformation of archaic *alētheia* into metaphysical *veritas*. Heidegger created the dialectic of terms “*Anfang*—*Beginn*”toseparate the principle of first philosophy from the initiative of metaphysics. The birth of metaphysics brought about a new way of thinking that was no longer connected with the process of archaic concealment and unconcealment. This event presided the principal founding of philosophy (*Anfang*). Metaphysician permanently holds individual beings in the form of essence. New kind of subjective knowledge prefers the shining idea of the mythopoetic Good and it tolerates no shadow. This change of original dwelling of truth keeps fundamental importance for further development of objectivity. The truth and deception, both of them present at birthplace of objectivity, relate to fundamental change of archaic truth. The metaphysics and objectivity initiatively refer to the commencement created by principal activities of divine Muses. The donation of Being through the archegetic dative (*dativus archegeticus*) in the mysteries, and then through the principal dative (*dativus principalis*) in the first philosophy marked the birth of the metaphysics done through the *dativus metaphysicus*. Hermeneutics follow the principal movement of “musical” donation of Being. The original activity of truth in the mode Apollonian *ipse* led the metaphysics from historial concealment in the Socratic truth to the unconcealed history of metaphysic thinking made by Plato. We are not masters of divine truth in the mode *ipse* since it is not a human property. Modern subject manipulates subjective truth in the mode of *idem*. Ipseity of principal creation differs from the identity of secondary initiative beginning. Wise people follow original activity of archaic truth and they want to stay in fullness of such truth given in the way of historial *ipseity*. This archaic bond of Being and thinking relates to original harmony of concealment and unconcealment (*alētheia*) described by Parmenides. This nature of truth guided prophets, rhapsodists, writers of Greek tragedies and the first philosophers. Immortal Muses administer archaic truth and deceit as a kind of divine gift. Wise people of all races and nations can investigate that event of historial truth all the time. Platonic metaphysics translated that archaic connection of Being and thinking in the sphere of substances given in the mode *idem*. The prophetic vision of Being in the mode *ipse* is reduced to identitary knowledge concerning individual substances. Outlined research of objectivity must keep distance from such a divine comedy performed by metaphysics. The hermeneutics describe transformation of truth in archaic mode *ipse* into metaphysical mode *idem*. The search for wisdom follows original *Vor-blickbahn* in direction of substance taken up in Socratic question and not platonic technical answer to that question. Hermeneutics investigate original way how the objectivity entered the realm of Western metaphysics. Every appearance derives its existence from the original place, where historial effect started. The simulacrum of truth in the platonic cave was born because there had been Eleusinian mysteries and oracle in Delphi. This original view of truth moved into hidden Lethe, and ruins of Delphi became a tourist attraction. The entirety of Being and thinking considered tragically and musically went into the concealed historiality of principal commencement. The original Apollonian dative (*dativus archegeticus*) has founding character for the first philosophy. Historical and civilization role of Delphi was prolonged by the Socratic search prescribed by Apollo. Contemporary studies confirm concealed but fundamental importance of Delphi for the civilization in the Mediterranean area called *Magna Graecia*.[[17]](#footnote-17) The hermeneutics must methodologically follow semantic signs given by Apollo. The next chapter is dedicated to that task. Socrates made the same in Athens by asking right questions. Hermeneutics of objectivity must do the same, in order to reveal sophistic and ambivalent nature of objectivity. Identity of objectivity hides its original darkness done in the mode of archaic *ipse*. The beginning of objectivity is made out in the form of concealed activity of Socratic truth proclaimed by oracle in Delphi. Wisdom has character of ipseity because it follows the divine voice of Apollo Archegetes. The metaphysical identity of being is not the archaic ipseity of Being; hence, they do not share the same nature of truth. The divine comedy of objective thinking begins in the moment when Plato suppressed Socrates’s wisdom of Delphi. Socrates investigated the mystery of wisdom; Plato went back to his own technical skill. The wisest of all mortals became in divine comedy of Plato the first producer of metaphysics. Such a disfigured Socrates of Academicians has formed history of modern philosophy in a very regrettable manner. Plato’s modern cave myth erased the effect of Delphic mystery. Apollo spoke in the darkness of archaic adyton out of which Pythias made prophetic words. Donation of historial meaning received in mysteries, and in archaic forme of truth got lost. The metaphysics replaced Socratic search of wisdom by the academic mythology and pedagogy. Platonic Academy proclaimed allegory to be dutiful search for truth, in the same way as Apollo made authority for Socrates. Mathematical philosophy of Plato survived downfall of sophists and the school founded in the grove of divine hero Academos has made a new law of knowledge valid until today. The real wisdom of Socrates separated the truth of Apollo from the deception of modernity represented by Plato. The death of Socrates closed the last stage of disclosure of Being (*alētheia*) and finished the period of the first philosophy. Teaching of Plato dismissed the wisdom of the first philosophy, and it became a new technology of thinking. The permanent presence of ideas created the truth that suppressed the musical and tragic form of *alētheia* of Delphi as classic center of wisdom. The academic knowledge inaugurated ideological and educational concept of truth. Modern *illuminati* dwelling in the Plato’s cave consider that kind of truth to be most valuable treasure of knowledge. The hermeneutic explanation goes back to the divine *a/lētheia* described by the seers, rhapsodist, writers of Greek tragedies and the first philosophers. Essay investigates the devaluation of *alētheia* into the metaphysical correspondence and, finally, into the objective *veritas*. The interpretation does not investigate “what” is objectivity in the system of positivistic history of concepts. The examination done in that framework led the contemporary thinking in a vicious circle. Nietzsche and Heidegger confirmed that modernity cannot perceive critically its own predicaments. That blindness of modernity dates back to its birth done in the mythopoetic cave of Plato when the metaphysical trajectory of comprehension (*Vor-blickbahn)* came into being. The original meaning of the world is still passing through archaic views, even if the effect of divine truth cannot be seen objectively. Modernity cannot change the initial situation that introduced the metaphysic into history of thinking. The hermeneutics trace the history of metaphysics before the truth became a kind of ideal correctness.

## 1.1 Triadic Structure of Hermeneutics

After death of Plato, modernists could not defend the platonic simulacrum of Socratic wisdom for a long time. Platon’s student and his fundamental critic took the wisdom based on real relations in the polity, on real existence of living beings in the world of sensually perceived things. Aristotle followed Socrates and he took the example of experts dealing with human character and crafts (*hístor*). The wise person recognizes the true world because real events exist and they directly influence the understanding. The totality of Being was translated again through the perfect tense of the verb “seeing” and the correspondent perfect knowledge, nevertheless differently than the vision made by Plato. The metaphysical dative (*dativus metaphysicus*) explains the donation of being in the form of substantial change. There is no more the donation of Being (*Gabe des Seins*). Aristotelian view of substances took up Plato’s philosophy expressed through the aorist of the verb “see” which became the perfect knowledge of the ideal substance. The investigation in the *Metaphysics Z* describes the manner how the substance comes to its being. Aristote defined the substance according to the donation which produces the actuality of the individual being (τό τί, *quo est*). The metaphysically conceived being comes out in the further indivisible, here and now existing thing (τόδε τι, *quod est*). The difference between “τό τί—τόδε τι” is of a fundamental character. It changed the meaning of the original donation determined by the principal dative of the first philosophy. There is no more the archaic presence of Being (*tá ónta*). It became the act of existing substance that keeps individually given presence of being (*ousía*). Aristotelian predication of the real substance suppressed the presence of ancient *phūsis*. The new metaphysics made the recapitulation of the whole of Being in the existence of an individual entity given now and here. The real thing became the distant and closed past (τό τί ἦν εἶναι, *quidditas*) that is kept in the metaphysical predication. The “being of that entity which was” (τό ἦν) takes up the presence of individual existence (*ousía*) into the thinking as a kind of imago related to the presence of the real thing (*parousía*). Identification “*ousía—parousía*” in the Aristotelian metaphysics means that the real thing has gone in the past mode in order to be present in a new way. There is but ideal insight of the actual being that is represented in the mind of metaphysicians. Aristotle recognizes what is real and therefore it is acknowledged as true. Nevertheless, both manners of presence cannot exist in one unity of the forever present Platonic substance as an idea. This new way of the correspondence unmasked the mythopoiesis of Platon’s idea as a wrong version of the truth. In the gigantomachy concerning the substance, Aristote took sides against Plato. He condemned platonic idea as a wrong kind of the unclosedness (*alētheia*) and he gave full approval to the real substance. The first substance is fundamental for the thinking and that fact makes the real substance “categoric.” It became an effective past in the present act of knowledge. What has passed into the past, this cannot be changed anymore. The real thing is given for the thinking in the mode of the immutable past. It exists completely in itself and in the presence of its own. The idea of the Good does not exist really because there are only good things and good actions. They exist by themselves and for themselves as real substances. The treatise *Posterior analytics* declares clearly that there is no universality in the existing individuals (τὸ μὲν καθόλου μὴ ἔστι τι παρὰ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, *Anal. Post*. 85a31). In the Aristotelian version of *dativus metaphysicus*, there is a clear-cut distinction between the existence of two separated phenomena. The first substance in the form of causally and effective substance exists in the past (οὐσία) as far as the predication is concerned. Such an existence of the first substance differs basically from potentially recognized and fully present meaning of the second substance. The real being exists as “this thing here” (τόδε τι) and it has actual existence of its own (*actus essendi*). Instead of the real thing given here and now there is a universal essence present in the thinking. The real substance went into the past invariable mode and it works in the mind exclusively in the virtue of the efficient and formal causality (*causa efficiens, formalis*). It is therefore evident that the recognized essence defined in the concept has another manner of being than the substance in the reality. The donation of being which founds the real existence as the first substance is categorically separated from the secondary act of recognition. Knowledge of the first substance appears in the thinking in the universal nature of essences. This new form of the metaphysical dative founded the categoric division of the reality in the first and in the second substance. There is a basic difference between the Parmenides’s present of the entirety of Being on the one side, and between the Platonic presence of the idea and the Aristotelian existence of the individual substance on the other side. The last chapter has shown that the truth of the cosmos is present in the archaic thinking in quite different manner. The existence of the single substance was suspended in archaic *epokhē* to create the presence of Being. Plato transferred the fundamental dative of the first philosophy (*dativus principalis*) in the realm of individual ideas. The highest being produces the lower order of reality due to the mathematically defined measure. Aristotelian metaphysics created a new form of the metaphysical dative. The existence of individual real thing occupies the first place in the metaphysics since it acquired the unchangeable character in the past. Kept in such a permanent way, the first substance determines the second substance in the thinking. The first substance as original cause of the natural movement determines the intellectual knowledge as a secondary effect through the donation of being (τό ἦν—εἶναι). The physical effect of the first substance manifests makes the intellectual recognition to be a kind of specific consequence. The unique and past existence of the first substance in the reality (τό ἦν) changes thanks to the metaphysical dative (τό τί) in the iterative infinitive of the second substance done in the thinking (τό τί—ἦν—εἶναι). The movement of the real substance creates a new type of the ideal hierarchy in the thinking that is composed of potential and general substances. Aristotle followed Plato’s general pattern the metaphysics of the substance and abandoned the Socratic search of the truth in the realm of the first philosophy. Aristotelian totality of metaphysical being (τό εἶναι) does not have the character of an actual event which is given by archaic donation of Being and by the gift of the prophetic seeing. The substantial infinitive “τό εἶναι” means in fact “subjectively determined existence of an ideal thing that is permanent.” Such existence in the form of Aristotelian *quidditas* has nothing to do with the original Being of Parmenides. The new parousia of individuals has essential character which is given by the uncertain present infinitive (*verbum iterativum*). The hermeneutics must exactly discern which type of presence the substance keeps due to that indefinite and iterative verb “to be.” The being that comes out in such manner determines new form of metaphysics in a hidden way. The causality of the real substance transmits the power of the beginning in the mind. Metaphysics recognizes the effect of the first substance in the order of the new ideality. Nevertheless, the founder of the new form of metaphysics refused to establish the first science on the idea understood technically and mathematically. In the Aristotelian philosophy, universality depends on the presence of the second substance that takes the vacant place of the first substance. The realm of Being is given exclusively in the thinking and it is produced in an iterative way. Such a concept stands in contradiction to the former whole of Being (*tá ónta*). The metaphysical presence of the substance can be confirmed any time through Plato’s and Aristotle’s technology of iterative knowledge. The second substance defines the essence as the presence in the field of the possible produced by universal concepts. The Aristotelian science makes technical production of possibilities. It corresponds to the assembly line that is in operation to create true copies of the *quidditas*. The metaphysics became a new skill based on the imitation and the reproduction of real beings with the help of the right technology of thinking. The engineer, the craftsman and the artist know perfectly what they do if they are skillful enough. The material and the production complete the technical ability that the subject keeps in itself. Hence, the second actuality of technically reproduced things is perfectly present in mind of skillful logicians and metaphysicians. The transition of unique causality of the first substance in the iterative logic of the second substance determines the new kind of the metaphysic dative. The actual presence of the individual being (*quidditas*) became causally efficient in the mind. It is therefore perfectly known by Aristotelian subject because the present of the first substance is reproduced in a metaphysical and iterative way (*essentia*) in the mind. The presence of an essential concept replaces in the thinking the emptiness made by the absence of real substance. The represented substance does not exist in the intellect really, but only potentially.

Aristotle rejected the mythic presence of Platonic idea since he promoted another kind of knowledge as true reproduction of *quidditas*. The difference “production of possible — reproduction of the real” is of capital importance for distinction between the logic and the metaphysics of Aristote. The second substance defines the essence as a present mental state on the level of pure possibility reproduced by the universal concept. The essay investigates this problematic status of the Aristotelian concept derived from the Platonic idea by the term “being of the third kind” (*tertium ens*). Metabolic production and kinetic movement of real substances in Aristotelian *phūsis* are not the same thing as ideal reproduction of these original events in the mind. The causality produced by first substances in the reality validates the fact that the first substance is adequately represented in the mind. The essential meaning is predicated in the categoric way since the first substance became a perfectly recognized past. Aristotle rejected the mythopoetic concept made by Plato’s divine comedy. Philosophy returned on the firm ground of the first substance, and thereby it rehabilitated partially the original form of the wisdom. Real things exist outside of human mind. They are perceived first by the senses, and then they are recognized in the intellect. Taken in the order of new metaphysics, the actuality of real substance corresponds to the Platonic idea. There is nothing to add to the fullness of actual existence (Platon’s ideas, Aristoteles’ first substance). The ontological fullness of individual substances or ideas determine the reality in the first step and it produces human knowledge in the second step. The previous chapter presented the manifestation of the ideal being through technically outlined metaphysical dative.

New metaphysics is based on the dialectic of the first and the second substance and therefore it refused Plato’s mathematics as the first science. The first science of Aristotle follows the original track of Socratic wisdom given in the double question dealing with the Beauty and the Good: What is this active Beauty given here and now (τί ἐστι τοῦτο τὸ καλόν, *Hippias maior* 287d3)? What is this existing Good in itself (αὐτὸ μὲν τί of ποτ' ἐστὶ τἀγαθὸν, *Rep*. 506d8‒e1)? Aristotle said in the new version of metaphysics that Socratic questions concern existing substances in the world. The first substance exists through itself, and not the idea of Good (αὐτὸ μὲν τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τἀγαθὸν, *Rep*. 506d8‒e1). Platonic idea does not exist in a way as the first substance does, and the metaphysics have to be built anew. The science revealed through the second substance refers to the cosmic order of the first substances and not to the diacosmic hierarchy of substances as ideas. The first substance makes the basis of the metaphysical donation and her essential being is summarized as the second substance. The metaphysic dative works through the term *quidditas* that gathers the whole of individual beings primarily in the intellect and by means of apophantic predication. Aristotelian metaphysics translated Socratic questions about the totality of Being into the questions dealing with the existence of the first and second substance. The proximity of the first and the second substance in the notion of truth as a correspondence dismissed the former presence of truth as *alētheia*. Aristotelian Socrates studies real substances and his answer is formulated in the order of the metaphysics and not that of the mathematics. Logos founded on the level of universal language makes one with intellectual meaning that is formed in the mind. Truth is given in a definitive and unequivocal way (*univoce*) since the chain of determination is complete. Recognition of the second substance is a direct consequence of the unique existence and causal effects of the first substance. New metaphysics goes from things in the reality to their general essence in the thinking and in the language. Platonic appearance of the idea disappeared and was substituted with the universal meaning of really existing individual substances. According to Aristotle, the meaning of the second substance represents but secondary appearance endowed with universal meaning. The meaning of the second substance makes but a secondary appearance, which has, however, the universal nature. Perfectly recognized forms represent the new presence of *eídos* in the thinking. The intellect is connected with the being of the thing with the help of a metaphysical dative based on principle of causality. The first substance manifests donated being indirectly (i.e., in relation to the thing bygone) and through the process of twofold knowledge. The senses transfer the effect of the thing causally and therefore adequately truthfully. The respect of the original cause and the original efficiency of the first substance gives a fundamental reason, why the senses cannot be misled in their acting. The mistake originates in following syntheses of knowledge made by subjects. The presence of the archaic Being remains the fully concealed event for Aristotle as well as for Plato. Apollo’s truth disappeared into Lethe when totality of Being as *ipse* became the identity of the first and of the second substance. The vision of Pythias and writers of Greek tragedy as *alētheia* revealed through prophetic seeing and democratic thinking referred to the unity of the cosmos that exists beyond the modern subject. After the metaphysical turn done during the Greek tyranny, the unity of *phūsis* is made by collation of individual substances. They are put together in the modern subject and the former event of Being has become the metaphysical construct.

The metaphysics changed the relation between thinking and Being because it changed the form of the truth. The causality of the real substance done in the past became concept in the universal field of the language. The donation of meaning through *quidditas* founded present knowledge expressed in the categoric statements (ἀπόφανσις). The vision of Being as Socratic divine truth became the apophantic correctness as correspondence between the first and second substance. Everybody skilled enough can do it by oneself, no divine truth of Delphi is needed. Such kind of secularized and subjective existence of the metaphysic being (*das Sein des Seienden*) became a basis for the first science about the substance *qua* substance. The dialectic of Plato became the logic of Aristotle. He reevaluated the artistic wisdom of philosophers and poets in his school founded in the Apollo temple at place named Lykeion. Socratic search for the truth among the politically engaged citizens of Athens (σχολάζω) became the scholasticism and compulsory education in the academies of all sorts. The transformation of archaic *skholē* in the objectively manipulated school system confirms the victorious irony of the modern age. Aristotelian and Platonic first substance (the idea or the real thing) underwent the process of reproduction by different forms. Academic invention makes multiplication of individual essences. That kind of intellectual reproduction of the first substance is performed as scholar liturgy and official duties performed by scientists. The original meaning of the word “participation” (μέθεξις) is taken from the active participation in performance of the tragedy and in the political life of the city. The skilful thinkers forged a participation to the ideas (Plato) and the metaphysical participation (Aristotle) to the second substances. This simulacrum of archaic participation to the mysteries produced a new form of the metaphysical capital. In this way, a divine comedy called “metaphysics” was created. The academics are the happy owners of the new enterprise, and the pedagogues have a preferential right to purchase the options. The academic association unites the theorists of the first science and the practical engineers dealing with logical statements. These two groups of competent intellectuals do the scholastic business which is primarily concerned with the preservation of their profession and the well-being of the group in question. The instinct of self-preservation was motivated by new conception of “care of the soul” that relates to Socrates in the context of such divine comedy. Platonic pedagogy founded a new vision of truth, since the academic participation in the “care of soul” is marked by the technical skill of the craftsmen (βάναυσοι). Their activity has quite a technical character from the point of the archaic view of the truth. The activity of goddess Apate contributed to the fact that academic activity has a golden bottom in the West. In the order of universal statements concerning individual entities, there is no possibility to grasp in the mode of direct vision (θεωρία) even the first substances. However, their effects could be directly observable by the senses. Apophantic predication deals with the meaning of the second substance while the first substance is given in the preterit tense. The vision of truth is given as a causally understood correspondence between the first and second substance. It created due to double distance from the archaic view of the truth. Writers of tragedies and the first philosophers looked for the original presence of the divine world that was lost in the first wave of modernity. To the certain extent as well, it was the case of real things which became recognized merely in the form of active causal past. This is not a tragic event if we know of it. But it becomes tragic if philosophy forgets the basic effect of the metaphysical dative or repressed it from the critical thinking. The mortals do not create the world by their thinking, they know it in the form of intellectual extension. We are limited to the present effect of the world as the whole. The original vision of the whole of *phūsis* through *dativus principalis* was wiped out from the academic philosophy. Aristotle’s approach was wise enough to preserve at least the metaphysical dative dealing with the existence of real substances. Aristotelian metaphysics must very carefully and therefore categorically discern different meaning of being a substance.

New meaning of being came after disappearance of the principal dative of first philosophy. Aristotle linked the metaphysical dative with the essentially close relation between the first and the second substance. It is only the second substance that is present in human acts of cognition. It is produced by the senses and the intellect. The real substance was sent to the court bench (κατηγορέω). It is accused of actual non-being and therefore is investigated on account of its transitive modality. Metaphysics postulates fundamental succession from the first substance as a past cause to the second substance as a present universal consequence. This ontic succession is expressed by the categorical mode “before” (*per prius*) and “after” (*per posterius*). The work *Categories* established the Western science and its posterior objective variations, since it describes the basic propositions dealing with substances. The categorical definition of the first substance and the resulting verdict on its universal meanings given in the book of the *Second Analytics* determines the destiny of Western science. The principle of both writing is based on the truth as correspondence between the first and the second substance. The predication follows new form of categorical logic and scientific demonstration (ἐπιδείξεις, *demonstratio*). Abstraction of meaning from the first substance by means of induction and deduction became the starting point for the science. Aristotle abolished the former teaching of the sophists. The logic became a new agora of modernity after the downfall of classic wisdom. The representative ability of language puts things in their common substantiality. Thanks to the ability of language, we do not see the thing itself, but we perceive its general eidetic essence. The common sense of the world (*res publica*) became the question of technical ability to make a correct kind of categorial syllogism. In the Greek tragedy, prophetic sentences and wise declarations played this mediating role. The political community saw the presence of divine meaning through the gathering of the citizens in the agora. The last writers of tragedy considered technocratic cutting out of archaic truth from the community of wise citizens (σπαστέος, *castratio*) to be a brutal failure of their contemporaries. Sophocles, in his drama about the technocratic tyrant Oedipus, condemned the modern castration of original truth and thought (OBJ III, ch. 7). The divine comedy of modernity is built upon Oedipus’s castration complex, which every metaphysician and logician persecute in the divine form imposed by punishing Furies. The musical and archaic interpretation of hermeneutics follows the pattern of Greek drama as catharsis, therefore it has a therapeutic character. The interpretation of objectivity considers the meaning of Being in the mode of divine donation described by writers of tragedies and the first philosophers. The first modern secularization changed the whole of *phūsis* into a metaphysically recognizable cosmos, which is given through ideas or the first substances. The thinking of modernists was dominated by mathematics and physics. Both sciences created a new sense of what is present and what is therefore scientifically binding for true reasoning. The metaphysical dative rejected the archaic and tragic wisdom. Metaphysics knows the hidden presence of the wholeness of Being only indirectly, that is, in twofold paradox of non-existing Being and the bygone presence of the first substance. Both founders of metaphysics examine the world of *phūsis* in general statements about the substance. The metaphysical presence is given as the idea that builds up mathematically conceived cosmos (Plato); or, as the first substance that constitutes the totality of the movable *phūsis* (Aristotle). The tragedy of metaphysics consists in the fact that single entities make the foundation of philosophy. This problematic presence of substance must be unconcealed in the field of archaeological vision and interpretation. The isolated substance was quite secondary for the archaic wisdom; moreover, it is absolutely ambiguous. The truthfully considered presence of Being (τά τ' ἐόντα of Calchas) cannot be fallacious, in opposition to ambiguity of single substances. The wholly separated and therefore wholly past immaterial and eternal *quidditas* constitutes the first cause of motion (*Causa prima*). For the love of wisdom, the other cosmic spheres imitate the eternal example of the immobile Intellect (κινεῖ δὴ ὡς ἐρώμενον, *Met*. 1073b2). Aristotle’s writings on first philosophy explore such a kind of cosmologic event.

A total of fourteen of these treatises on the first substance and its effects were placed just behind Aristotelian discourses on the *Physics* (μετὰ τὰ φύσικὰ βιβλία). Thanks to the action of the Muses, Andronicos of Rhodes named these writings by a generic name “*Metaphysics*.” Until the birth of the metaphysics, the archaic revelation of the wholeness of being became an unscientific event, which was tied to mythopoetic stories about gods (θεολόγια). The previous philosophical writings about the whole of Being (περὶ φύσεως) and Socrates’s wisdom became the first exhibits in the academic museum of victorious Aristotelianism. The new type of knowledge given as *veritas* cannot capture the original Pythian conception of truth which Socrates sought all his life. Plato and Aristotle replaced Socrates, who was glorified by the Pythia, by becoming his metaphysically adequate interpreters. Plato transformed Socrates into the idea of the Good, which makes the basis for mythology of ideas. Aristotelian simulacrum of Socrates reveals the immobile and eternal theorist, who meditates on his own thinking in the eternal *skholē*. The metaphysical Socrates performs a new type of divine comedy made in the form of divine absurdity. The ironic Epicureans made the figure of the “idle God” (*Deus otiosus*) from the theoretical activity of the detached first substance. The God of metaphysics, from the point of view of hermeneutics, represents a simulacrum of Socrates in never-ending flow of historical figures (*Socrates redivivus*). The divine comedy created the modern simulacrum of Socrates either as a frenetic *Causa prima* or as an immobile First Theorist. The mythopoetic fabulations of Academy and Lyceum established the monumental history of metaphysics and then its antiquarian version.[[18]](#footnote-18) The banalization of Platonic and Aristotelian Socrates set in motion the death of the God of philosophers that was brought to an end in the nihilistic postmodernism of the 19th century. The idol of Socratic wisdom became an honorable antiquarian decoration on the academic banquet of eternal Truth. Delphic mysteries were replaced by a parade of simulacra proclaimed from the academic pulpits full of scientific banalities and technical dexterity. Socrates was neither a mythical hero, nor a banal thinker, nor a technically adapted academic sophist. The herald of Apollonian mysteries could not establish metaphysics because he followed the truth of Muses. The oracle of Pythia contains the historial and divine truth because no metaphysician can be as wise as Socrates was. Therefore, hermeneutics engaged in the field of objectivity must follow the path of Socratic questioning. Metaphysical technicians cannot see the world according to the first philosophy. The truth of commencement is not identical with the truth done by beginning of metaphysics. Archaic wisdom and academic skill has a different object of research and they observe the different world. The sum of substances iteratively grasped by technical skill has the potential character and nothing more. The tragedy of metaphysics and the corresponding sciences resume the kind of knowledge that is no longer archaic and theoretical. Metaphysics abolished the original form of wisdom and considered this loss as unimportant. The realm of archaic Being observed by the first philosophers, it disappeared from metaphysical thinking. The original presence of the whole of Being became the closed and repressed past, which no longer belongs to the history of victorious academic philosophy. In tragedy, too, truth and deception appear in the mode of the musical *alētheia*. The knowledge of tragedy refers to the disclosure of truth and deceit performed by divine Muses. The state of the world and human affairs appear primarily through the tragically hidden form of the archegetic dative. The seers like blind Teiresias in Thebes announced cryptically the presence of the archegetic dative in the times of modern Oedipus. The theoretical knowledge of politically active spectators of tragedy was able to disclose this truth and untruth. The citizens interpreted it correctly through the catharsis given first by seeing and then by knowing. The first philosophers proclaimed the whole of the world in its divine nature as well. Aristotle refused to explore scientifically archaic donation of Being as Parmenides did. This original event is neither a sensually perceived phenomenon nor intellectual immaterial substance. The highest Mover is separated from the other cosmic spheres, just as Plato’s idea of the Good is separated from the lower ideas. The manifestation of Being disappeared from the theoretical thinking of the new philosophy. The archaic disclosure of Being and thinking was no longer metaphysically true. Metaphysics takes the first object to be either the eternally present mathematical idea or the physically and causally acting eternal ensemble of substances. The presence of Being is permanently “re-presented” and therefore “re-pressed” by the knowledge of ideal and real substance. The substantiv infinitive of Aristotelianism (τό εἶναι) is iterative in a perfect Platonic manner of *eídos*. In metaphysics, the original whole of the world is merely deduced, and therefore it is given *ex post*. The lost unity of Being and thinking is replaced by mythopoetic tales of divine Socrates as a decorative and immovable First Substance. Plato accomplished the first secularization of Socrates’s deeds. The secularization of Pythian theoretical view was accomplished in the Aristotelian physics. The deification of Socrates into a simulacrum of *Deus otiosus* or *Causa prima* reveals the hidden way in which the goddess Apate and wise Apollonian Muses perform the metaphysical travesty and castration of Socrates’s truth.

Such considerations have shown that proposed research conceived as archaeology, catharsis and political therapy cannot start the interpretation at some positively given values of objectivity. The archaeology of objectivity begins in the Delphic adyton, since we must begin the investigation in the primordial darkness of Being and thinking. The blindness of metaphysics following tragic Oedipus has an epochal dimension. The return to the commencement transforms the darkness of Plato’s modern cave into original darkness of the Delphic cave. Heidegger showed that Platonic Allegory of the cave represents a deformed vision of Being that contains *in nuce* all subsequent possibilities of metaphysics. The ideal substance founded a new epoch. Metaphysical substance stepped out of the darkness of the Platonic cave into the light of the intellect. The eidetic transparency given by the idea of the Good determines a new revelation of metaphysical being. The Allegory of the cave has shown that the idea as mythopoetic fullness has become the clearest and most permanent manifestation of what the reality is in itself. This ideal parousia of the substance establishes the metaphysics, because it forms its everlasting presence in human intellect. This epochal limitation of objective judgments means that the hermeneutics must bring the metaphysical knowledge back to the original event of truth described by the first philosophers and the writers of Greek tragedy. In the shining of the idea, it came to the annulation of the former philosophy and the original figure of truth was no longer seen. Parmenides’s original present of seeing and the *alētheia* of the first philosophers stands outside the metaphysical knowledge of the first and the second substance. This original present of Being and thinking became a forgotten and repressed past in the metaphysics. It is necessary to move on academically, because otherwise there is nothing to see. The epochal turn of metaphysics made the eclipse of the original *phūsis*. The cosmos explored by the first philosophers was changed into the perfect light of mathematically defined idea. The hermeneutics led by the eclipse of Delphi is not academically castrated; therefore it insists on archaic correspondence between real Being and the first thinking. As the phenomenon emerges from concealment into unconcealment, it is recognizable. Following the pattern of Heidegger’s interpretation of the cave allegory, we have found the original way of thinking that transformed mysterious and musical seeing and thinking into metaphysical knowledge. The emergence of metaphysical insight determines the fundamental way in which objectivity reveals itself in subsequent transformations. This “place” or “event” does not exist objectively. According to the cited *Metaphysics Z*, the event of the donation that founds the *quidditas* became the unreachable past. The real substance is predicated truthfully, thus it is adequately present in the second substance. The metaphysical *quidditas* shows that the first substance disappeared in the act of the donation of meaning revealed through the second substance. All the more the archaic wholeness of Being observed by the first philosophers became the non-being, as well as prophecies and visions done in the divine present. Even the thing existing outside of ourselves cannot be grasped by the intellect as it exists in itself and by itself. The present knowledge arises as a consequence of original cause passing away, into the past mode of existence. The actual being revels itself for the thinking only in the preterits and therefore it is adequately true. It has been mediated by the causality of the first substance to become the meaning of the second substance. Its universal presence arises in the mind and the predicating language translates its verbal meaning. Metaphysics explores only the positively given phenomenon of the actual substance or the ideal essence, which is revealed in the field of the perfectly formed eidetic knowledge. After the transformation of the trajectory of preliminary comprehension (*Vor-blickbahn*) into the modern form of knowledge, the modern philosophy has no possibility to investigate the ancient wisdom. According to Parmenides, the non-being is neither thinkable nor predicable. The new form of philosophy given by the knowledge of metaphysics is categorically blind to the original event of Being. It has founded the age of modernity by its retreat. The musical truth became untruth and the poets became harmless fools performing in the tragicomic symposium of metaphysics, mathematics and logic. Nevertheless, the ancient truth cannot disappear, even if metaphysics behaves like an academically educated fool. The activity of Muses and Delphi is divine and therefore cryptically present through the teaching of the first philosophers and through the academic parody of Socratic wisdom. Plato’s Allegory of the cave founded the modern wisdom as a blind technical knowledge. The philosopher steps out of the cave into the world of ideas. They shine like the original sun through the idea of the Good. This event of epochal exit from darkness into light of metaphysic reason establishes the age of modernity, separating the new form of truth (*veritas*) as metaphysical rationality from *alētheia* of the first philosophy. The event of the real solar eclipse was no longer important for the thinking. It was replaced by the academic fairy tale about the eternally shining idea of the Good. The mythical story about the intellect being a sun contains all the following transformations that entail concealment and unconcealment of metaphysical being. The modernity prefers the miraculous light of solar intellect to the reality. The Sun sometimes darkens, but it can never happen to eternal metaphysical truths. The avenging Furies, in the name of the divine order, must punish the arrogance and stupidity (ὕβρις) of modernists. The punishment of modern hybris has tragic character according to Aeschylus’s saying “through suffering to wisdom” (πάθει μάθος; *Agamemnon*, v. 178). Divine Muses send demonic Furies from the underworld as a sign given to the chaotic mortals walking on the *via Modernorum*. Erinyes are deities of Vengeance, who dwell in the original abyss, in the darkness of Being. For the first philosophy, the darkness of the Delphic cave represents the origin of knowledge (*ortus scientiarum*). The punishing powers cannot be reconciled, since the wisdom of Apollo and Socrates have disappeared. In the epoch of metaphysical nihilism, there is no more the Areopagus of wise citizens representing the philosophical community. The banal technicians servicing global tyrants are not able to form this *res publica* of aristocrats because they lack the true insight into the whole of Being. Wise people as Socrates can understand the oracle in the mode of the archaic correspondence reality and thinking. Objective scientists now occupy the place of Pythias tripod. They determine the objective history of rationality, and not the historicity of wisdom.

This tragic way of truth carries methodological significance for the study of objectivity. It demonstrates the hidden bond between historiality, historicity and history (*Geschichtlichkeit, Geschichte, Historie*). The triadic structure of truth is linked to the transformations of the principal and metaphysical dative. This connection suggests the proceeding of thinking that is necessary for following the truth of objectivity. The Greek word “commencement” (ἀρχή, *principium*) covers the dominion exercised from the place of the original event as well. The commencement determines the character of that which was established by its principal activity and power. The triadic structure of understanding is radically critical according to Nietzsche’s criticism of monumental and antiquarian history. The epochal transformations of the meaning of substance created the history of metaphysics and they form the basic root (*radix*) of the objective form of the divine comedy. The transformation of archaic *epokhē* into the epochal tragicomedy makes the hermeneutic sense of modernity. The archaic truth of Muses made possible the emergence of chaotic truth of mortals that created the mythopoetic tales of their own art. The new way of Socratic interpretation follows neither divine *a/lētheia*, nor tragic *alētheia*, but objective *veritas*. The archaic truth prevails through the concealment of real philosophical reason and through the punishment of modern reason. Hermeneutics have to explore ignorance and paranoia of modern metaphysics that is visible in each epoch of modernity. Muses must take the action when the mortal arrogates to himself divine rights in the mode of *a/lētheia* and behaves as the goddess Aletheia unveiled by Parmenides. The wise mortal seeks the truth in the path of Socrates and he does not let himself blend with the light of blind intellect. Such hubris is punished by Muses in a particularly harsh way, that is, by madness (μανία), which is transmitted from one generation of modern metaphysicians to the next (ἄτη). According to the first writer of tragedy, modernity is unwise (ἄφρων) because its knowledge has the character of tragic hate, corruption and darkness (μύσος). These are brought about by the divine powers of Vengeance.[[19]](#footnote-19) The divine daimonion worked in Socrates as inner voice through Apollonian semantics of truth (*Apol*. 40 c3–4). This inner voice warned him at crucial moments and kept him from carrying out a dangerous intention. That theoretical attitude of living Socrates was deified into the figure of its metaphysic doppelganger. He is always true in one metaphysic way, since he is led by logically binding necessity. This mythopoetic Minotaur still walks the labyrinth of metaphysics under the guidance of Aeschylus’s Erinyes. This demonic creature inspires holy academic reverence and horror in all students of philosophy (σέβας ἀστῶν φόβος τε ξυγγενὴς τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν, *Eumenidae*, vv. 690–691). The irrational figure of Socrates-Minotaur was created by incestuous connection between modern mathematics and travesty of the first philosophy. This intellectual monster was put on the pedestal by metaphysically educated Furies. They make the hidden foundation of modern philosophy, thanks to their disguise in the form of radical subjectivity. Such knowledge is tragically blind and proceeds through the objective Oedipus complex. In the epoch of modernity, Muses sent the punishing Furies to guard the order of Dike and the presence of Aletheia proclaimed by wise Parmenides and his successors. Platonists, under the leadership of academically capable Furies, tragicomically dispelled the darkness of previous ages of ignorance. Thanks to the deceptive, yet victorious figure of ironic truth proposed by Aristophanes and Plato (εἰρωνεία), modernity spread that ironic worldview and the ironic truth as well. This ironic worldview creates what is essentially proper to modernity. Metaphysical irony underlines the concept of objective humanism that influenced the history of Western thought. The nihilistic figure of irony has appeared at the end of metaphysics when even the perception of isolated being passes into the oblivion. The contemporary humanistic troglodytes extinguished even the paranoiac concept of modern metaphysics. They declared this new form of darkness to be dominion of freshly illuminated deconstructivist reason directed by the metaphor. The blind academics follow the path of political tyranny, since it is their archetypal destiny. The demonic powers of unreason and chaos have taken since the 20th century the global and totalitarian character.

## 1.2 Metaphysics and *tertium ens*

Hermeneutics examined the eclipse (ἐποχή) of archaic truth in the metaphysics of Plato and Aristotle. The first methodological step erased the metaphysical meaning of objectivity by relegating it to the original darkness of commencement where the objectivity had been before the emergence of metaphysics. The hidden commencement of metaphysics is given in the mode of Pythian truth and deception. This original form of *epokhē* establishes the basic understanding to investigate the hidden nature of objectivity. The previous interpretation determined the way how it came to epochal turn of truth that enabled the birth of metaphysics. This event was described by Plato’s Allegory of the cave that initiated the thinking of Athenian modernity. After stepping back into the original darkness, objectivity is no longer present in an ontic way of thinking. Being submerged into archaic form of meaning, objectivity lacks any modality of ontic revelation. Apollonian semantics leads hermeneutics back into the dark cave of Greek mysteries. The archaic *epokhē* blocks metaphysical and objectivist view of the world to offer the fundamental path (ὁδός) of thought. The Sun goes into the darkness of the eclipse and then it rises anew. The donation of principal truth determined the thinking of the first philosophers (*dativus principalis*) based on archegetic and tragic form of the dative. The first phase of the search for wisdom discloses ontological meaning of metaphysics. The irrationality of objectivity explored by archaic exegesis have a principal character connected to the commencement (*principium*). The principal darkness of metaphysics enables the examination to make another step into ontic disclosure that runs through effects in the positive history of thinking (*initium*). During the principal phase of the eclipse, the metaphysical substance has no possibility to exist in an initiative way. In this original form of existence, there is no metaphysics that can work out the historicity of effects (*Wirkunsggeschichte*) and even less that of some positive history of objectivity. Taken in the archaic presence of Being, the substance formed by metaphysics has no truth of its own. The clocks are no clocks at all, because there is no ontic perception of time. Historiality of Being provided no path of pre-comprehension (*Vor-blickbahn*) directed to the clock “as” (*Als-Struktur*) the clock according to the ontic understanding (ch. 1). The absolute presence of the wholeness of Being (Calchas’s τά τ' ἐόντα, Parmenides’s ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι, B 6.8) is separated from individual things and events. The actual presence of the real substance is given neither in the past nor in the future. The unconcealedness of the present Being forms the archaic unity of the cosmic order. Mortals receive the insight into this divine event as prophetic gift. The historial presence of Being stands outside the flow of ontic time that Aristotle accorded to physical changes of the first substance (ch. 1.3.3). Hermeneutics stay in the darkness of the Delphic adyton in order to dwell in the original presence of Being. Such position can reveal archaic meaning of metaphysical being. The archaic view follows musical truth and deception, *conditio sine qua non* for the unconcealed manifestation of original meaning of the substance. Metaphysical value of isolated being received its own beginning thanks to hidden historial nature of metaphysics (*Geschichtlichkeit*). Hidden action of the musical truth brought about the Platonic substance in the form of idea. The first creation of modern philosophy emerged in the non-existing cave of troglodytes when their most distinguished exemplar started to think in a radical mythopoetic and therefore philosophically ideal way. His product of thinking became a new substance as ideally determined phenomenon in the history of modern thinking. The possibility of metaphysics is given in the hiddenness of musical *alētheia*. Heidegger’s term *Lichtung* designates the interplay of truth related to the event of epochal concealment and unveiling of Being. The term “clearing” is already mentioned twice in the work *Being and Time*. It presents an existential modification of the scholastic term *lumen naturale* (SZ 170). Existence in the primary mode of *Dasein* sees the world as everyday business, but it does not understand the ontological way that reveals the presence of Being in the world.[[20]](#footnote-20) The original sense of Being exists in eccentric position, outside of objective view that is present as scientific or everyday business (ch. 1). The assumption of my own finitude bring about the decisive turn. New ways of existence comprehend the meaning of Being in the openness of the world placed outside the objectivity (*Erschlossenheit*) and in the mode of existential openness of *Dasein* given outside the subjectivity (*Entschlossenheit*). The existence as *Dasein* understands itself in a new way since it lives with the others and in the world anew. The new unconcealment of the world radiates through *Dasein* in the existential openness that manifests the meaning of Being. But the phenomenon of *Lichtung* is still interpreted in the book *Being and Time* on the basis of Kant’s transcendental subject. After the interpretation of Allegory of the cave, the term *Lichtung* received a new explanation beyond the analytics of *Dasein*. The final figure of the term shows the reflection *Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens* (1964). Heidegger reminds that the hidden character of the truth is not founded by a subjective way of understanding. The metaphysician is no longer wise in such a divine way. He obtained from Plato the ideal and technical insight into the world of substances. From Aristotle he took the technique of logical thinking related to the categorial predication of substances. The new path to the archaic unity of Being and thinking goes through Parmenides’s epic. The goddess Aletheia shows the definition of *Lichtung* in connection to the origin of the unconcealed Being.[[21]](#footnote-21) The term “clearing” (*Lichtung*) represents a new mode of historial understanding of Being. Heidegger describes the existence of mortal, who is able to interpret the coherence of thinking with the present event of Being. The subjective *lumen naturale* manifests the original presence of things only secondarily. That is the reason why it does not belong to the original phenomenon of *Lichtung*. The basic meaning of the word “clearing” points to a free, light place in the forest, which, thanks to the free space, manifests not only the things, but also the display of light and shadow. The clearing in the forest limits the space of a revelation because it determines what remains permanently hidden and invisible in contrast with the play of light and shadow (GA 14, 80). The epochal effect of *Lichtung* presents the unconcealment and the concealment of substances. Both original forms of truth stand outside of the subjective nature of truth presented in the metaphysics.

“Philosophy, however, knows nothing about the *Lichtung*. Philosophy describes the light of reason, but does not pay attention to the disclosure of Being. The *lumen naturale*, the light of reason, illuminates only the positively open space. It concerns the *Lichtung*, but it explains it very scarcely since it needs the clearing in order to illuminate what is present in the clearing. This is true not only of the *method* of philosophy but predominantly and first of its *matter*, namely of the presence of what is present.” [[22]](#footnote-22)

The hermeneutics must follow original *epokhē* in relation to metaphysical philosophy according to Heidegger’s pattern. The archaeology of substance follows the unconcealment of substance in the musical presence of Being. The view of the first philosophy goes from the hidden Being of *phūsis* to unconcealed phenomena in the visible world. The archaic thinking recognizes the wholeness of Being not only in divine disclosure, but also in a certain form of concealment, which is bound to the original revelation of musical and tragic truth. The hermeneutic wisdom given by Apollonian Delphi precedes the epoch of metaphysics constituted in the mythological cave of troglodytes. Their crafts and thinking are illuminated by permanent light of subjective intellect. The hermeneutic archaeology must find the place of *Lichtung* with regard to the Pythian tripod. Apollonian semantics shows the hidden phenomenon of historiality, historicity and history. The archaic thought dwells with Apollo as the ruler of Muses and Erinyes in the dark adyton of the Delphic cave. Here rules the original state of truth, in which the being of substance came into historicity of philosophy (*Geschichte der Philosophie*). That event hidden in the *Lichtung* begins at the moment of the archaic *epokhē*, when the event of the darkness of Being and its coming out into the light took place. The archaeology of objectivity returns to that place in order to follow and to display the path of archaic thinking. It is presented by the archegetic dative presented by Apollonian mysteries that were followed by the principal dative of the first philosophy. According to Heraclitus, the Apollo’s anax in Delphi neither declares nor conceals something, but it gives a sign (οὔτε λέγει οὔτε κρύπτει ἀλλὰ σημαίνει; DK 22, B 93). Apollonian semantics offers access to the event of Being, which shows methodological way of thinking. Wise colonists who founded the political community called *Magna Graecia* read those signs correctly. Thanks to this semantics, the first philosophy was born in the Ionian and Italic colonies. Similarly to Socrates, we can grasp intellectually the event of Being, which semantically reveals for the wise mortals the event of archaic truth. The original eclipse takes place in the cosmos, and the first philosophy followed its divine order. Therefore, it proceeded from transition of the light hidden in the Apollonian darkness into a partial disclosure of *a/lētheia* as Heraclitus’s sign that is understood in the realm of visible phenomena. The modernity constituted itself as the ideal antithesis of Great Greece, which was established under the auspices of Apollon the Archegetic (Ἀπόλλων Ἀρχηγέτης). Academy and Lyceum methodically accomplished the exorcism of Apollonian truth. From the point of view of hermeneutics, the event of truth revealed in archaic *Lichtung* indicates an epochal turn of Being. It came to the founding of the metaphysical being. This passing of truth was completely displaced in the mythopoetic turn of Platonic metaphysics and by Aristotle’s Principle of the Excluded Third. In the ambiguity of *Lichtung* appears the truth of Being revealed in its historiality (*tá ónta* of Calchas, *phūsis* of the first philosophy). The principal authority enables the fundamental disclosure of truth and deception in such a unique way (*ipse*) that it cannot be transferred into the metaphysical concept of truth (*idem*). The ipseity of archaic *a/lētheia* cannot be revealed by the modern *veritas* based on the identity. Under the influence of academic Furies, the modernity created the myth of a new “divine man” (unfortunately a “divine woman” of postmodernity as well) that makes prophecies from the academic cathedra of logic and metaphysics. Therefore, they cannot be misled into error. The interpretation of the platonic cave has shown that the truth of metaphysics is primarily linked to the revelation of the idea as an individual substance. The mythopoetic castration of Apollonian wisdom in the metaphysics, however, does not mean that the archaic and tragic truth completely disappeared from philosophy. The generation of objectively blind experts can watch tragic drama even in the original Greek amphitheater without comprehending Apollonian meaning of the tragedy. Nevertheless, the tragedy is still here to be performed. Since Apollonian mysteries founded the world of tragedy, they cannot pass away, and their truth works until today. Both founders of metaphysics experienced the decline of the tragedy and the world of Greek mysteries; therefore, they were but partially wise in the original Socratic way. The archaic truth is present in metaphysics only indirectly, in the form of Apollonian *semaíon*. It indicates the way for the hermeneutics of objectivity. Plato and Aristotle bound the destiny of philosophy to substances by following the metaphysical dative (Allegory of the cave, “τό τί ἦν εἶναι”). However, Apollonian and semantic presence of Being indicates that the substance is not given by itself in the metaphysics. Each ontic phenomenon comes to its ontological *alētheia* thanks to the epochal transformation of archaic *Lichtung*. It cames from *a/lētheia* that is created by Muses. In the archegetic mode of *Lichtung* are present all transformations of metaphysics and all its historical figures, since they are hidden in the divine presence of *tá ónta*. The history of metaphysics in the recountable timeline shows but ontic presence of facts that are bound together as accomplished transformations of meaning. Thereby the history of thinking indirectly shows the epochal wandering of metaphysics. It came into the visible realm as the phenomenon through the eclipse of the original presence of Being. In the presence of truth as un-concealment (Ἀ-λήθεια) is evident that original concealment of Being can be recognized exclusively in an indirect way.[[23]](#footnote-23) The emergence of metaphysics in the Allegory of the cave shows indirectly the historial activity of Being. It develops a new form of the unconcealed presence (*Lichtung des sich verbergenden Bergens;* GA 14, 88) that refers to the kind of permanent concealment. There is a twofold movement of the epochal un/disclosedness of Being. Through the *Lichtung* it comes to the unconcealment of Being (*Entbergung*) into the historial manifested meaning. Nevertheless, the original act becomes a hidden event at the moment of the revelation. Plato’s idea indirectly shows this hidden effect through his sophistic distortion of the first philosophy. Metaphysical fabulations have taken place ever since. The darkness of the Platonic cave disappears since it is illuminated by the light of metaphysical substances. The invisible Being appears as individual and visible being. The ordinary form of such understanding is determined by the artistry of troglodytes. The fire in the cave symbolizes the ordinary technical *Lichtung* determined by the play of shadows and things. Through the exit of academically enlightened Socrates from the cave and his return in the role of a metaphysical educator, a new apparition of being is created. In the new form of the first philosophy, the slogan “*Ex oriente lux”* is no longer valid. The sacred fire made of the idea of the Good blazes permanently in the sanctuary of divine Academy. The former event of Being was not replaced by some kind of historial *Lichtung*, but by the mythopoetic light of ever shining solar intellect. Unfortunately, goddesses of Vengeance and not Muses are the only attendants of archaic darkness hidden in such an illusionary center of metaphysics. In the field of archegetic revelation given by the term *Lichtung*, the objectivity emerges in its archaic truth as concealment and unconcealment. This emergence is transmitted through the divine truth and deception granted by Muses (*a/lētheia*). Apollonian semantic gives access to this original manifestation of metaphysical un/truth. The metaphysical dative replaced the Apollonian *semaíon* by the full presence of substance. Explored at the end of wisdom by Socrates, the archegetic presence of Being became in the metaphysics a presence of substance given here and now (τόδε τι). Metaphysics came out as artisanal banalizations of the first philosophy during the reign of modernist golden youth of Plato in Athens. They profaned ironically and comically the wisest of men into an academic idol. The perfect seeing of the idea as a new simulacrum displaced the seeing of the first philosophers and Socrates. Their wisdom is gone into the darkness of the mythic past. Platonic metaphysician knows even before his birth exactly what is true. The mythopoetic of ideas established the new identity of modern *illuminati* and postmodern *Aufklärer*. Every good technician knows what to do when he examines this or that substance. The technician of ideas does not care for the semantics of hidden Being anymore. The ancient order received the past character of a mythical non-being. Archaic semantics was replaced by Aristotelian logic. For metaphysics, the original un/concealment (*a/lētheia*) of Being became an unattainable event. The metaphysical technician is absolutely lost in the Apollonian darkness of Being. In the darkness of the Delphic cave, the modern troglodyte would be deprived of its metaphysical solar intellect. Troglodytes created a new light for the wanderings of enlightened modern mind. The fear and arrogance prescribe the academics not to enter into the dark Apollonian “heart of truth” (*Parm*. B 1.53). Delphi represents the connection between the original mystery and the interpretive work of the priests in order to interpret the phenomenon of truth as an unconcealment. It is logically and metaphysically correct that the original seeing of divine phenomena and their interpretation passed into the epochal Lethe where all the great mysteries are hidden today. The rationality is revealed by the technical light in the Platonic cave with the help of solar intellect. It forms the most valuable capital of the banal modernity controlled by academic and technical instinct of self-preservation. The irrational history of Platonists and Peripatetics shows the frenetic expulsion of the original Delphic darkness. It has been accomplished step by step (μέθοδος) in the different epochs of metaphysics. The repression of Being runs due to the radiation of ideas to be a new sun of intellect. The castration of original truth established the main activity of the modern journey to the golden fleece. The venture is undertaken by zealous followers of the mythical hero Academos. The idea is always shining through mathematical harmony. The path to truth is guided by scientific databases, which are managed by big corporate societies. Therefore, it is not necessary to go into the dark cave of wisdom. Being is no longer given in the original form of revelation. Metaphysics has shifted the original *Lichtung* to the perfect shining of ideas. The epochal manifestation of being occurred in the metaphysics was done by constituting a specific light coming out of the Platonic idea and later through the Aristotelian first substance. Archaic Being was no longer un-hidden in the original visionary and musical interplay of truth and untruth managed in the archegetic way of Apollo. The history of thinking got an ideal character.

By the foundation of a new philosophy a new history was created, which was established as the civilization of the modern West. Its first historian was not the wise Herodotus, but the pragmatically thinking army leader Thucydides (†ca. 411 BC). This follower of Herodotus and Platonic contemporary of Socrates introduced the first substance of history in the form of human nature, which created a new subject of history (Umlauf 2010, 84–90). In metaphysics, the being is given as “this here,” i.e., in the incomplete form of truth. Modern illuminate sees the Platonic idea or the Aristotelian substance through the perspective (*Vor-blickbahn)* of new philosophy as the first art of academician mythopoetic tales. When we pass into the fairy-tale cave of troglodytes, we observe the brave new world through the ideal insight into the eternal and fully present substance. This observational technique was founded by the mathematician named Plato and it was reconstituted by Aristotle’s physics of the first substance. The principal power of Muses presided the hidden archegetic commencement (*Ereignis* of *a/lētheia*), present in the historicity of the first philosophy (*Lichtung*). The objectivity came to unconcealed truth (*alētheia*) in the last form of metaphysical *veritas*. Afterwards, the history of objective metaphysics established the positive history scientific thought in the mode “subject—object” (*facta humana*). The divine comedy of modernity was created in a fact-checking way, by exchanging wisdom for the technique. The wisest of all men was declared to be the founder of such a travesty. The principal search for original wisdom is guided by the semantics of the archegetic dative and by the musical concept of truth. Plato and Aristotle as founders of modernity misinterpreted the archegetic and Pythian truth hidden at the commencement of philosophy under the guidance of goddess Apate. Modernity led secretly by Apate organized deceptive exultation of substance (*eídolon*), since it followed the path of the ideal simulacrum (*eídos*) introduced by Plato. Plato and Aristotle still considered the musical character of the archegetic dative with regard to the ideal or real being of substance, because they were contemporaries of Socrates and Delphi. Their speculative thinking given in the final epoch of tragedy reflected (*reflexum*) as in the twisted mirror (*speculum*) something archaic from the original Apollonian form of *Lichtung*. Therefore, in the reflexive and speculative manner, the beginning of metaphysics still keeps the archaic sense of truth as the initial event of wise thinking (*factum*). The first two metaphysicians still acknowledged that the effect of the archaic commencement must be kept in the individual substance or idea; however, it is done utmost marginally. But this initial impact of wisdom remains completely hidden in the further transformations of metaphysics. The thinking of metaphysics refers solely to the present being as eidetic substance. The metaphysics of the West changed the original wisdom into an objective technology of thinking. The theoretical wisdom of the tragedy became a reflexive speculation of postmodern Cartesian subject. After the disappearance of metaphysics, all that remained of the effect of Muses was a postmodern museum whose collections are digitized into the binary difference between one and zero. The vision of wise Socrates became the knowledge of metaphysics. The reflection of substance ended in the self-reflection of the narcissistic subject. In the epoch of deconstruction, victory of that subject characterizes the Western civilization, which ironically held up the true mirror (*speculum*) to itself. The speculative character of metaphysics must be explored in detail. The revolt of academic hubris against the archaic wisdom forms the identity of Western civilization and the very essence of objective thought. The titanic revolt of moderns did not end with the gift of fire as Prometheus did, but with global warming and the age of Anthropocene.

Metaphysics appeared by the hidden activity of Being (*Gründung*) through the human will to dominate the thinking. In the same time, the tyrants started to dominate the political space of Greek cities. The modern subject establishes a new foundation (*Grund*) through the determination of being. The original Being has passed into Lethe, just like archaic democracy. The anthropological turn replaced the archaic *phūsis* by the new phenomenon, since the individual substance acquires the status of the fundament. The being “as” being (see “*Als*” of Heidegger) exists because the modern subject carries in itself the substantial nature of substance (*Seiendheit*) in the form of permanent grounding event. Socrates as metaphysical transvestite established the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle since he was honored to be the first carrier of the brave new world of modernity. Heidegger’s work *Der Satz der Identität* interprets the relationship between metaphysics and the event of Being. Heidegger investigates the founding event of truth (*Gründung der Wahrheit*), which is totally hidden in the present epoch of objectivity and technology. The event of Being revealed as the foundation of metaphysics (*Gründung*) is hidden and the metaphysics repressed connection to the original event of Being. The ontological event of the original foundation is not the same as the subsequent foundation made in the metaphysics. Its carrier makes the new identity of fundament given as substance (ὑποκείμενον, *subiectum*). The metaphysics in the mode of ontologic founding (*Gründung*) dates back to the first philosophy, and it must be distinguished from the positively made fundament (*Grund*). The new fundament enables an objective predication and a categorization of subjective considered being as the basic meaning (*Grund*) of metaphysics. Founding subject of metaphysics is the idea, the substance, the demiurge, the theologically conceived *Causa prima* or the objectively determined subject. Metaphysics holds this substratum in the form of a solid terrain under the feet. Due to subjective reasoning, substance receives ontic foundation. The metaphysically conceived sense of being can be built upon it. The archegetic activity of foundation made the main event through which the world of visible phenomena became to be understood. The individual events or things were the mediators in the form of Apollonian signs described above by oracle of Heraclitus. The archaic world was carried by the totality of *phýsis*, which showed itself through a single event or thing as a sign of the Other. The archegetic identity stood on the principle of the Apollonian Otherness in the mode *ipse*. Identity of individual things or events reveals through the whole of the cosmos. Metaphysics changed the original ontological sense and truth in the mode *ipse* into an ontic subjective occurrence in the mode *idem*. Modern identity holds what was founded and what is positively given as a substance. The parousia of being manifests itself as a present *positum*, i.e., as the first substance revealed by metaphysical knowledge. It is produced by modern subject out of itself (*factum*). Hermeneutics must interpret the semantics of the metaphysical *quidditas* through Aristotelian *modus ponens*. The metaphysical knowledge made in the mode of *idem* shows itself in the “subject—object” relation. This basic kind of *modus ponens* reveals the metaphysical meaning of the substance as permanent identity. The modern myth about the eternal return of the substance begins *in illo tempore* in the Plato’s cave full of common troglodytes that were illuminated by the ingenium of academic and pedagogic Socrates. The original event of the archaic meaning revealed in the present field of vision and wisdom became a standardized and universally applicable technique of logicians and metaphysicians. The metaphysics is based on fundamental importance of the subject as identity of the substance (A = A). The archaic interpretation of Being follows the pattern of the first philosophy. Le commencement of the phenomena determine the subsequent proceedings. Examination cannot therefore go in the mode *per prius* to Aristotle’s categorization of the ontic meanings of being. Modernity in Athens ironically and victoriously displaced the foundational event of archaic thinking. The truth of metaphysics concerns the identity relation between the first and the second substance. The presence of the whole of Being is impossible to see in the technical thinking. In Aristotelian metaphysics, even the reality of the first single substance exists only in the past mode. The hermeneutic approach to the metaphysically conceived first philosophy follows the musical ambivalence of truth and deception. Archaeology searches for the objectivity with the method of archaic *epokhē*, since it has to find a new way to the original revelation of the objective form of being in the steps of Calchas, Parmenides and Socrates. Settled in the adyton of the archaic thinking, the hermeneutics follow the event of the eclipse of the metaphysic being in the modernity and postmodernity. Delphi and Apollonian mysteries passed into the total concealment of Lethe; but the Socratic search for truth remained in power in the mode of historial un/concealment (*a/lētheia*) even in the age of metaphysics. Delphic mysteries reveal truth and deception as the grounding event of metaphysics. The openness of *Lichtung* as the original form of revelation makes it possible to find and to interpret the path of foresight and comprehension (*Vor-blickbahn*) quoted above. The substance is revealed in the archegetic form of truthfulness. The Pythian prophecy is interpreted truly by the wise man and erroneously by the fool. The unconcealment of metaphysics and therefore the duplicity of objectivity is revealed in original historial modalities given from the *Lichtung* that is objectively invisible. The preceding analysis of Allegory of the cave has shown the first metaphysical figure of truth. It is based on the transformation of Being into metaphysical non-Being present as existing idea. The act of the principal openness of Being (*Es gibt*) shapes every metaphysical being as a kind of substance. It is in the real cave present in the Pythian and musical way, visible and invisible. Everything that is revealed in this way, is given in Pythian and musical way, that is, in the ambiguity of the un/truth. This founding event in the mode *ipse* (τὸ χρεών, *der Brauch*) includes, for example, Anaximander’s saying, which preserves the original presence of Being that is taken from the direction of the initial event (GA 5, 368). This original hiddenness establishes the openness towards the unconcealed truth (*das Offene*). The Pythian hermeneutics contemplate with Socrates and Heidegger the phenomenon of objectivity from the direction of the hidden Being (*Anfang*) towards the revealed ontic being (*Beginn*). The hermeneutic *epokhē* follows the Pythian wisdom of Socrates; therefore, it must withhold the judgment of Plato’s metaphysical *tekhné*. Original events of the objectivity revealed by the metaphysics must follow the message of Delphi. Musical *a/lētheia* establishes the archaic *Lichtung* in the mode of the Apollonian semantics. Its original source is the darkness of the commencement (*principium*), where the mortals have no direct access. This ecstatic position of wisdom is therefore placed beyond technical thinking. The commencement of historicity indicates the source of original knowledge (*ortus scientiarum*) that establishes metaphysics. The historical optimism of modernity is based on the tragic fact that it placed itself in the divine place of Apollonian and Socratic daimonion. Enabled by the power of that subjective *factum*, the modernity became demonic and paranoiac. Metaphysics and objectivity speculatively see in the mirror its own reflect made as Socrates’s academic simulacrum. Euripides shows in the tragedy *Bacchantes* the tragic figure out of divine, that is, musical worldview. King Pentheus asks the youth messenger, who announces the arrival of the god whether he saw Dionysus in a dream or with his own eyes. Dionysus, in the guise of the young man, answers in Pythian and truthfully way: “I have seen what was given to see” (ὁρῶν ὁρῶντα, v. 470). Modernity takes a tragic end as the first modern king of Thebes. He objectively and impassively observes the Dionysian mysteries in the manner of a fool. Under the influence of the punishing Furies, the chorus of maenads led by his own mother Agaue tore him to pieces. Devastation of thinking in the schools of the tragically blind modern thinkers was correctly seen by Plato’s contemporary Sophocles in the drama about the tyrant Oedipus (OBJ III, ch. 7). The meeting between Socrates and Plato took the same tragic meaning shaped by the blind seeing. Scholasticism repeats this scenario on *via Modernorum*.

The work *Der Spruch des Anaximander* (1946) explores another important moment for the hermeneutics of objectivity. The term “abandonment of Being” (*Seinsverlassenheit*) describes the event of the epochal concealment of Being at the beginning of metaphysics. The interpretation of Anaximander’s saying conceives Being in its own *Lichtung*, when the vision is guided by display of unconcealment and concealment.[[24]](#footnote-24) The initial status of Being withdraws into the hiddenness (*Anfang*) and it manifests at the same time the unconcealedness of the metaphysic being (*Beginn*). The movement of this un/concealment (*a/lētheia*) establishes the truth and the untruth of metaphysics on the archegetic level. The movement of thinking takes a course from the original hiddenness of the commencement to discover the actual being. The original Being retires into the Apollonian hiddenness to enable the disclosure of ontic being (*Sichverbergen der Lichtung des Seins*). Prophetic mode “what is, what will be and what was” (*Iliad* 1.70) represents the original semantic sign for hermeneutics. The transition to the primordial event in the framework of *phūsis* represents the basic form of historicity (*Ereignis*). This timeless movement of the creation is known in all cultures either in myths or in philosophical explanations of the movement by the emanation of the ideas or by the causality of the substance or in the cosmological theory of the Big Bang. The origin is conceived by the hermeneutics of objectivity in terms of metaphysical substance. The being present here and now (*ousía*) is revealed in *Lichtung* thanks to the original effect of Being and by virtue of musical truth. Mysticism knows this transition as the original movement of the divine presence or glory, which cannot be met face to face (*Exodus* 33:18–33). The hermeneutics follow this event with the help of a philosophical dative (*dativus principalis*). The interpretation goes from the contemporary nihilism to the original event of historicity to trace and to reveal (ἀποκαλύπτω) the history of metaphysics and the history of objectivity. The apocalypse sees the founding event of the archegetic dative through the synoptic vision of prophets, writers of tragedies and the first philosophy. For this reason, the interpretation does not go from the end of modernity to its beginning, because it would have to validate all modern errors. The research starts from the wisdom of Socrates at the beginning, and goes to the present decline of objectivity. The effect of the initial commencement (*Anfang*) is hidden in Apollonian and semantic manner at the beginning of modernity (*Beginn*). The untruth of metaphysics is fully displayed in present decline of modernity, when the effect of the repressed untruth of metaphysics (*Anfang*) appears as an apocalyptic form of objectivity. The hermeneutics must be apocalyptic according to the archaic meaning of the word. Examination finds in the visible effect of modernity in the totalitarian regimes and the world wars of the 20th century, in metaphysical nihilism and deconstruction of all meaning. They represent the visible effect of the hidden beginning of metaphysics. Plato supplanted the wholeness of Being with ideal clarity and mathematical technique. Aristotelian version of the metaphysical dative displaced the original hiddenness of Being by the effect of the first substance that went into the past mode. Essay has to take a methodological step backwards on the pursuit of truth, from the Platonic Socrates to his original questioning. The methodology goes to original *Lichtung* of metaphysics to observe the hidden transition of historial Being, which cannot be taken up in ontic way. The archaeological interpretation of objectivity describes the birth of objectivity through the ambiguity of original truth and deception. This donation of truth through the Pythian and tragic form of the archegetic dative had a fundamental character for the thought of the first philosophers (*dativus principalis*). The mystery of Apollo and Muses founded the metaphysics in the musical truth given by retreat of Being in the historially formed Lethe. The semantics following the hidden activity of Apollo Archegetes must proceed from the modern duplicity to the archaic truth. After the retreat of the truth into the hiddenness of historial oblivion, we observe but the metaphysical simulacrum of the archaic truth.

The metaphysical dative is bound to the fate of substances. The archegetic *phūsis* inaugurated by the principal dative became entirely non-being and thus unknowable for metaphysics. This original form of the unconcealment of Being and of non-Being (*a/lētheia*) presents the *Lichtung* of metaphysics in its historial form. The birth of metaphysics is bound to the absence of the commencement (*principium*) that was present in the first philosophy. The epochal eclipse of Being in the thought of metaphysics established the history of substance, which is indicated by Heidegger’s term *Seinsverlassenheit*. Therefore, the second beginning of the first philosophy (*Beginn*, *initium*) is established by metaphysics and by its historical effect. The initial event of Being (*Ereignis*) acts through the history of metaphysics in a historial, that is, objectively hidden way. The principal departure from metaphysics to the historical truth makes the metaphysic being to shine out from the place of its original beginning (*Lichtung*). The existence of substance is firstly revealed in an archaic way in the hermeneutics and secondly in an objective way in the metaphysics. Metaphysics can no longer go to the non-substantial and purely historial commencement. This event has become a pure non-being in the thinking of substance. We cannot go from the existing thing to the non-existent state of affairs. Hermeneutics is not metaphysical because it sees modern mythopoetic from archaic and tragic point of view. There are two methodologically different proceedings to research the nature of objectivity. We can consider the metaphysic being in the trajectory made from the direction of the archegetic wholeness of Being (τά τ' ἐόντα, *Iliad* 1.70). Or we can start the investigation of metaphysics from the direction of the ideally invested substantiality. In the first case, the substance has archaic ipseity, which is given by the Pythian conception of truth. In the second case the substance has metaphysical identity given in the apophantic logic. The different point of view concerning the ipseity and identity established the twofold concept of understanding and therefore the twofold value of truth. There are two different ways “how” (see the phenomenological “*Wie*” of Heidegger, ch. 1) the objectivity is manifested in its nature. This twofold manifestation of objectivity from the direction of the Pythian cave or from the Platonic idea will be analyzed in the following chapters. So far, we have located the origin of objective knowledge (*ortus scientiarum*). Wisdom distinguishes with Parmenides the way of Being and the non-passable way of non-Being. Either we stay in the Delphic cave and describe as wise people the tragic destiny of Being in the thinking of the West. Or we follow the fairy tale of the intellect as modern sun. Then, we stage together with the blind academic *illuminati* a modern tragicomedy controlled by Furies. Interpretation must take the methodological turn demanded by Heidegger in the treatise *Das Ding* (1950). Heidegger makes a return from metaphysics to the initial place of truth. He explores in the first philosophical texts the place or event through which truth becomes visible. He takes attitude from the hidden happening of actual Being. To interpret the entity called “pitcher” truthfully means that we interpret the objective recognition of this thing through the first science of Being. The existence of the jar is gradually revealed in its original *Lichtung*. The thing is described through the revelation of the truth as unconcealment of the present being and even as unconcealment of the presence of hidden Being. The description of the thing on the table is thus interpreted according to the original path of the archaic truth.

“When and how do things come into being as things? They do not come *through* the activity of humans. But they also do not come *without* the vigilance of the mortals. The first step to such vigilance is the step back from the only objective, i.e., explaining thinking in the manner of thinking in a principal friendly way.” [[25]](#footnote-25)

Heidegger performs an anabasis to the commencement in order to truly interpret the metaphysical and scientific concept of truth. Guided by Apollonian mysteries, the hermeneutics of objectivity must perform the fundamental operation of friendly thinking (*andenkendes Denken*). An important section in the *Beiträgen zur Philosophie* separated the objective science from the original philosophical investigation of the Being. Explanation must step back to the original event that shapes the archaic thinking.[[26]](#footnote-26) Hermeneutics take a step back to the essence of metaphysics because the friendly thinking is neither modern nor objective. According to Heidegger, objective science cannot grasp the original meaning of the world because it does not think in the proper way. This new way follows the path of archaic thinking described in the treatise called *Was heißt denken*. The initiative thinking guided by the principle truth of the beginning is addressed by the original event of Being. The hermeneutics following the way of the Socratic wisdom interpret the hidden semantics related to the commencement. The original event addresses the friendly thinking directly. This distinguishes the archaic seeing from the modern mythology of the golden Athenian youth under Plato’s academic leadership. After Socrates’s death, the Athenian youth proclaimed the Golden Age of reason by destroying the friendly thinking (*Andenken*) related to Delphic mysteries. Done in this way, the real Socrates became completely absurd kind of a modern comedian. We have shown that the contemporary writers such as Euripides and Sophocles followed Socratic defense of archaic truth. That is why they were among the severe critics of that tragicomic group composed of contemporary Athenian intellectuals and sophists (*moderni*). Objective thought, by its very nature, is neither original nor tragic because it does not see the truth and falsehood to be present at the beginning of its path. The eclipse of Pythian disclosure of Being (*a/lētheia*) in the epoch of metaphysics revealed the ideal Platonic substance. Aristotelian technique of logical statements changed the truth of the shining idea into iterative and therefore verifiable procedures of logic and science (*veritas*). The sequence of the above-mentioned three figures of truth in the mode of historiality, historicity and history has Apollonian semeiotic character. Such an investigation of divine *semeíon* is guided by the Pythian truth revealed in Delphi and by Muses. The interpretation must follow the effect of foundational events that Heidegger expressed with the term of the principal commencement (*Anfang*). The substance dwells in the mode *a/lētheia* in the original field of *Lichtung*. That is the place from where the historicity of the beginning of metaphysics (*Geschichte der Metaphysik*) can be interpreted. The initiative of hermeneutic archaeology is not determined by actual substances. Original music nature of truth and deception entails all historial possibilities of philosophical thinking. The first thinkers searched for the truth of Being and afterward they took up the investigation of the individual being. The friendly thinking interprets the effect of the hidden commencement; therefore it cannot remain on the level of metaphysics. The tragic wisdom performed in the archaic unconcealment ist true according to the archegetic dative (*dativus archegeticus*). Its determining form is given for the hermeneutics of objectivity by the semantics of the mysteries and by the challenge of the first philosophy, which was accomplished by Socrates. That is the way how the initiative way of thinking of wise mortals is given. Due to the irony of the Athenian moderns, the semantics of Being changed into a drama of divine comedy enacted by Muses. The next act is performed under the influence of Furies as a postmodern tragicomedy and nihilism of contemporary thinking. The change of the archegetic semantics into a subjective mythopoetic made Muses to send goddesses of Vengeance in order to correct unwise mortals. Aeschylus and other writers knew very well the dark nature of chaotic Erinyes.

There is a fundamental difference in the definition of man according to the archaic wisdom or according to metaphysical humanism. The mortal with the tragic vision regards the dark and mysterious place where the truth of Being is hidden in the original ambiguity of *a/lētheia*. Heidegger describes this form of awakened existence in the term *Da-sein*. Human mortal as *Da-sein* observes the world from the viewpoint of Being. The postwar treatise *Über den Humanismus* (1947) declares that we are the guardians and keepers of the original truth of *Sein* in the movement of “*Ek-sistenz*.”[[27]](#footnote-27) The destiny of mortals formed by historicity of *Da-sein* is open in the mode *ipse* to the epochal transformations of thinking. The Allegory of the cave has shown that the emergence of metaphysics has brought a fundamental concealment of the original way through which Being is revealed. Modernity is still determined from the hidden *alētheia* coming from actual Being. However, the archaic truth dwells in the permanent Lethe after the departure of writers of tragedy and Socrates. After the eclipse of archaic Being, the substance is visible in its metaphysical truth. The turn of truth founded the new form of “ek-sistence.” In the epoch of metaphysics, the musical truth of Being (*a/lētheia*) manifests itself through the full absence. Apollonian semantics disappeared, since Socrates was the last thinker that interpreted philosophy in the archaic way. Heidegger denotes the transformation of truth into metaphysical and nihilistic simulacrum by the term *Irre*.[[28]](#footnote-28) Double term “vagabondage” and “craziness” describes the darkness created by the thought and practice of modernity. The lecture of year 1930 entitled *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* conceives the term *Irre* as an expression of man’s freedom (*Freiheit*), which emerges from the hidden truth of Being. The wandering of thinking in the epochal mode of *Irre* forms the essence of the contemporary epoch. Metaphysics forgot the question of Being and the contemporary age of technology forgot even the metaphysic being.[[29]](#footnote-29) The similar term *Irrtum* shows the same effect of truth that makes tragic wandering in the Western metaphysics. The truth of Being disappeared completely from the trajectory that characterizes today’s worldview and contemporary history (*Entzug, Entbergung*).[[30]](#footnote-30) The modern neglect of the question of Being reveals the original meaning of the Western technology. The wandering of modernity with regard to the hidden Being is conceived as a component of the present tragic existence of mortals. We will explain the different forms of this wandering in the mode of *Irre* and *Irrtum* in relation to important transformations of metaphysics. Wandering of metaphysics and humanism is described by the term “divine comedy,” which characterizes the basic form of metaphysics made by Plato and Aristotle. Goddess Apate established that first form of divine comedy. The expression “tragicomedy” shows the error and the fallacy of objectivity in the epoch of postmodernism and nihilism when thinking has been under the direct influence of the punishing Furies. The oblivion of Being manifests itself in the epoch of metaphysics as a scientific technique. It has the character of will to power, which transforms the Western subject into a nihilistic figure. The meaning of being becomes merely an accident of demiurgic superman described by Nietzsche. The will to power creates the founding event (*Grund*, *subiectum*) in the present epoch of nihilism. The revelation of the substance is determined by the presence of the object before the subject (*Ge-Stell*) that is endowed with the will to power. The treatise *Überwindung der Metaphysik* (1938/39) came out shortly before the Second World War. According to Heidegger, the meaning of metaphysic being comes out in the conception of truth as *veritas*. That kind of truth determines in a nihilistic way the modern fate of hidden Being in the form of the *Ge-Stell* and subsequently creates the nihilism of technology.[[31]](#footnote-31) This destructive form of metaphysics was introduced by the Industrial Revolution since the end of the 18th century. The substance is transformed into energy and this energy forms a supplement of demiurgic will to power. Both kinds of objective and subjective energy correspond to each other in the truth of metaphysical nihilism. Initial quotation of Nietzsche has shown that kind of correspondence (ch. 1). Hermeneutics of objectivity define the epoch of the postmodern subject with the help of Heidegger’s term *Seinsvergessenheit*. Heidegger uses both terms (*Seinsverlassenheit*, *Seinsvergessenheit*) in such a way that they are interchangeable to a large extent. Both terms describe the fundamental hiddenness of Being that abandoned the field of metaphysics investigation. The emergence of metaphysics allowed the nihilism of will and technology to take effect. The hermeneutic archaeology separates the epoch of the original wandering of metaphysics under the leadership of goddess Apate from the subsequent epochs controlled by the demonic forces of chaos. The retreat of Being into the Lethe introduced the first metaphysics of substance as the first form of retreat (*Seinsverlassenheit*). But the conscious forgetting and displacement of Aristotelian first substance in modernity and in objectivity created the new epoch of wandering. The postmodern subject exists in the historial mode of forgetting that concerns the original being of Aristotelian metaphysics (*Seinsvergessenheit*). The original form of hiddenness of Being is connected to the ancient tragedy and it was philosophically initiated in Plato’s and Aristotle’s metaphysics. Then it was kept by the classical metaphysics until its decline at the end of the 13th century. The epoch of objective modernity began in the 14th century by the Scholastic school called *via Modernorum*. The classic substance was replaced by the will to power produced by postmodern subjects. After forgetting the question of Being in metaphysics as the first philosophy, the Latin scholasticism came to forget the original meaning of Aristotelian substance. The thinking of the postmodern epoch is no longer dramatized under the influence of Muses as divine comedy. The objectively non-existent goddesses of Chaos took over the direction of the nihilistic epoch. The tragicomic truth of metaphysical being had been instituted by the objective oblivion. The new epoch is therefore fundamentally different from the original divine comedy, which had been founded by Plato during the influence of the last tragedians like Sophocles. Since Late Antiquity, a different version of the metaphysical dative prevailed, which was based on the recognition of the postmodern subject and its will to power. The epoch of Cartesian postmodernism and contemporary nihilism follows the path of the moderns. The Enlightenment postmodernism of the 17th and 18th centuries ends with the metaphysical nihilism of the 19th century and the contemporary deconstruction of any meaning, even the objective one.

Plato consciously wrote the philosophical fairy tale for guardians of the non-existent ideal polis. This modernist was initiated into the Greek mysteries and he knew classic vision of truth. Plato deliberately created founding myths for academically formed *Magna Graecia*. Neoplatonists made use of Platonic pedagogical myths in the next centuries, mainly the mythological cosmogony in the dialogue *Timaeus*. Platonic simulacrum established a new *Lichtung* of truth and deceit that produced the metaphysical *Irrtum*. Metaphysical constellations depend on historial form of truth as musical *a/lētheia*. Terms *Irre* and *Irrtum* show the development of metaphysics from the point of view of hidden commencement (*Anfang*). The analysis of objectivity begins with the archaic figure of *Irre*. The effect of original commencement reveals itself in *Lichtung* when the old definition of metaphysics changes into a new one. In the realm of *a/lētheia* and *Lichtung*, the truth of metaphysics exists as light and shadow, as truth and deception. The darkness of hidden Being and the twilight of future possibilities of truth (*veritas*) makes initial indications of any metaphysical meaning. The archaeological interpretation follows the archegetic semantics of Apollo. Examination searches for the possibility of the objective philosophy which is accomplished by a new subject of thinking. This approach proposes the exploration of fundamental *Irrtum* related to the manifestation of metaphysic nature of being. After the foundation of metaphysics, substance took over the archegetic authority. New meaning of substance carries the foundation of metaphysics in the mode of subjectively given reason. Before metaphysics, events of the divine foundation and the corresponding gift of the archaic understanding founded the personification of Being in its ipseity. The first philosophy changed into the identity of the substance, which is iteratively and essentially given in the mode of the Platonic and Aristotelian *veritas*. The metaphysics reveals its essence through the history of gigantomachies concerning the substance. The hidden presence of Being becomes in metaphysics the being of the substance understood through the *genitivus subiectivus* and *obiectivus*. The subjective and objective genitive abolished the original event of the archegetic dative related to the totality of Being. The displacement of the archegetic, principal and even metaphysical dative by the subjective and objective genitive shaped every historic figure of metaphysics in the mode of *Irrtum*. The procession of these simulacra provides a history of modern thought in the technical mode of *Ge-Stell*. Being already situated in the realm of simulacra, metaphysics does not see the ipseity of Being un/concealed in the archegetic dative of Apollon and in the principal dative of Socrates. The objectively enlightened troglodytes cannot go back to the Delphic cave where the primary ipseity of divine truth dwells. Therefore the First Academy deified Socrates in the mode *idem* as separated *Causa prima* to be the Immovable Theorist of new cosmos. The moderns cannot see themselves in the ancient form of *alētheia* because they rejected the original truth based on the Pythian *epokhē*. The musical truth of metaphysical simulacra can be observed through the darkness of the Pythian cave that keeps the original place of truth.

At the beginning of every new figure of metaphysics, there is archegetic form of *Lichtung*, where the substance dwells in the musical un-concealment of truth and deception (*a/lētheia*). Thanks to the commencement of the archaic truth, this form of non/substance is not yet evident in its positive and veritative truth. It exists in the musical form of initial being of metaphysics that is called “being of the third kind” (*tertium ens*). This founding event has been set forth both by the former analysis of Platonic cave myth and by the interpretation of Aristotelian *quidditas*. Both forms of metaphysical dative are bound to hidden effect of the principal dative, which is connected with the archegetic wisdom of divine mysteries. The presence of the first substance as “this thing here” (τόδε τι) forms in Aristotle’s metaphysics the founding event of a new philosophy. Correspondence between thinking and things go back to the existence of the first substance. Without this Aristotelian un/presence of the actual substance for thinking, modern metaphysics would not have triadic conception of truth related to subjective will of power. The epoch of objective oblivion of metaphysics being (*Seinsvergessenheit*) is constituted by the modern triad of positive truthfulness (*verum*), evident certainty of autonomously enlightened thought (*certum*), and subjective righteousness (*rectum*). This new hermeneutic triangle establishes metaphysical thought and modern worldview. Therefore, it has foundational character in the epoch of modernity. The power of new principle brings about various kinds of activities. They are revealed through intellectual projects that founded all versions of metaphysics. Metaphysics emerged after the abandonment of philosophical wisdom. That event established the divine comedy of modern thinking directed by divine force of Apate. The hermeneutics must follow the path given by battles concerning the metaphysical and objective nature of substance. Modern gigantomachy runs in the tragicomic mode directed by academically educated Furies. They received totally subjective form that founded modern objectivity. The original form of the Aristotelian metaphysical dative works through objectively given hiddenness (Lethe). Muses are immortal and they worked in concealment through the modern Musaion in Alexandria. The identity of substance is given by the logical *modus ponens* that makes the fundament of every further epoch in the mode of *veritas*. Every epoch of metaphysics keeps in the first phase (*Beginn*) something of the original commencement (*Anfang*). Birth of metaphysical *alētheia* takes place in *Lichtung* of archegetic *a/lētheia*. Plato, being an initiate into the mysteries, knew well that Socrates came out of the dark cave made by Delphic oracle, to proclaim archaic form of truth. Nevertheless, the fate of the West became the metaphysics, in which disappeared the initial phase of Socratic *Lichtung*. It relates to the origin of truth as *a/lētheia* since it presents the commencement of metaphysics. The metaphysics cannot see this hidden event given as the retreat of Being (*Ereignis*). The technicians of thinking perceive the world through the new history of philosophy. The metaphysical substance shines perfectly and eternally in the light of the triple identity and truth as *verum*, *certum* and *rectum*. Modern subject observes the world through the light of the ideal sun, since the intellect of modern *illuminati* is guided by eternal mathematical truths. Real eclipse of the Sun (*epokhē*) and the exit from the dark cave of mysteries no longer characterize the thinking of the moderns. The modern identity of being is founded by enlightened intellect. The tragedy of modernity lies in the fact that it always sees right and can never be wrong. Therefore, under the guidance of goddess Apate and Furies, the *illuminati* perpetually repeat the identity of the same error. The identity began to work in the positive history of the thinking (*Beginn*) because of metaphysically conceived substance. The contemporary metaphysical nihilism establishes the meaning of being by demiurgic will to power which makes the radical subjective identity of the world.

The hermeneutic archaeology takes a step back to the archaic commencement, where the objective triad of modern truth retreats into the archaic form made of hermeneutic triad. The Socratic truth and falsity follow the path of Being revealed through Delphi. The ipseity of truth cannot be translated through positive history of philosophy that concerns but individual being as a substance. Apollonian historicity ended in the history of Western philosophy founded by Socrates and wisdom of tragedy writers. The age of Greek tragedies dealing with divine powers having been closed, divine comedy of metaphysics, and finally human tragicomedy of objectivity began. Every new variation of metaphysics begins with the fact that the old meaning of substance is deprecated and the new version of substance must come to replace the old one. The meaning of the substance is extinguished in the iterative act of modern *epokhē.* The musical deceit of every metaphysical turn stands in the mode of *Irre* and *Irrtum* directed by Apollonian *a/lētheia*. The positive thinking cannot be aware of its commencement given as a specific form of non-being (*tertium ens*). At the original beginning of every form of metaphysics (*Ereignis*, *Anfang*), the metaphysic being “ek-sists” archaically and musically in the historial realm of *Lichtung*. It has archaic ipseity determined by the parousia of Being. The substance does not exist in this historial and Apollonian mode, because it is not that kind of Being. Real Socrates followed this path of Pythian “substance”. He considered every positive form of technically given substance a kind of non-being as well as Parmenides. The music and Pythian mode of substance are hidden in the “*ek-sistence*” of metaphysics, i.e., in the presence of archaic truth and untruth. Hermeneutics perceive this non-being of metaphysics through archaic *semeíon*, and that semantics goes back to the tragic and Socratic interpretation. Following Heidegger’s term *Bildung* (ch. 1), we define semantically and musically un/concealed meaning of metaphysics in its proper *Lichtung* as being of the third kind (*tertium ens*). The existence of such a being has merely archegetic and not substantial nature. Metaphysical substance is given as a sign for the wise seeing that is able to read the events of thinking as divine signs. Apollonian truth indicated by *tertium ens* does not exist for Aristotle and his followers. The Principle of the Excluded Third forbids this kind of proceeding. The historiry of modern philosophy hesitates between the metaphysical determination of the Platonic substance given as an ideal essence and Aristotelian first substance. The hermeneutic archaeology defines the progress of metaphysics as series of repated ignorance caused by lack of philosophical erudition (ἀπαιδευσία, *Met*. 1006a6). The metaphysical king is naked but he wears all the time the new clothes and they suit him very well. Parmenides describes the palintropic journey of the two-headed sophists moving back and forth. Modernity is repeatedly built up by the transitions from one figure of metaphysics into another. The archetype of transition makes the Platonic cave illuminated by the different sources of light. The fairy tale of Academy was changed into Aristotelian metaphysics determined by the light of the real substance. The wandering (*Irre*) between twofold way of metaphysics constantly produces the being of the third kind that makes the metaphysical *Irrtum*. The new doctrine constantly replaces the outmoded *apaideusía* of the preceding forms of metaphysics. Everybody knows that technological progress cannot be stopped. The philosophical schools of modernism, postmodernism and contemporary nihilism produce an infinite series of mythopoetic simulacra according to an assembly line of objective *apaideusía*. The former and doubtful *tertium ens* become a new true substance. This paradigm shift provides metaphysics with a new foundation to go ahead. Each school of *Modernorum* explains after Plato’s and Aristotle’s pattern that the old knowledge represents the outdated ignorance of *Antiquorum*. It must be replaced under guidance of academically enlightened Furies. This objective evolution of metaphysical ignorance forms the hidden Pythian essence of modernity. Moderns love novelties as well as evolutionary or revolutionary changes. The revolutionary chaos of thinking caused by divine Apate or the demonic Furies has a tragic character. Modernist frenzy of demoniac thinking (*resolutio*) continually produces a new return of the moderns to the beginning of the original metaphysical error (*revolutio*). Modernity is resolutely a revolutionary business, since the original simulacrum of truth is modified through the never-ending change. *Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose.* The paradigm shift of evolutionary or revolutionary conceived metaphysics forms the properly rounded heart of every modern epoch if we paraphrase the well-known archaic wisdom (*Parm*. B 1.53). Every epochal turn of metaphysics produces a new substance as *tertium ens*. The new generation of *illuminati* is being engaged in divine comedy of modernity or objective tragicomedy of postmodernity. They develop being of the third kind in true light of their metaphysical reason. The eclipse of the old form of the *tertium ens* and the beginning of new meaning of substance contains musical truth and untruth of every epoch-making form of metaphysics. The being of the third kind refers semantically to original phenomena of archegetic truth guarded by Delphi and by the Muses. The *illuminati* are guided by the metaphysical light of their own intellect and they proudly follow the path of modernity. The tragedy of the Ancients is repeated in the tragicomedy of the next modernity. Technology of thinking is subjectively based; therefore it constantly produces a new meaning of being. The enlightened truth of next modernity eliminate the darkness and ignorance of previous epochs. The truth connected with the event of beginning of new form is no longer comprehensible and it becomes a dark untruth. The movement of tragicomic *apaideusía* establishes new and more modern history of metaphysical truth, evidence and correctness. Regarded from the standpoint of archaic semantics, the preceding and the new figure of substance represent the series of infinite simulacra of Apollonian ipseity of Being and Socratic thinking.

Standing outside of this progressive paralysis of wisdom, hermeneutics seek the original figure of truth to be able to see the effect of divine powers of Deception and Revenge. The archaeology of objectivity takes a methodical step back from the objective sophistry to the founding event of any new figure of metaphysics. The new *Vor-blickbahn* must be introduced in form of original Socratic *epokhē.* The twofold movement of *a/lētheia* as un/concealment determines the starting point of modern philosophy done in its ever-new beginning. Hermeneutics must extinguish in methodological *epokhē* all forms of objectivity in their positive nature. The archaeology of objectivity gradually describes the transformations of metaphysics between the twilight of the Platonic cave and Heidegger’s *Lichtung*. In the darkness of commencement and historial *alētheia*, a new substance is present as a new beginning. This metaphysically non-existent being is still in the realm of original Socratic and Pythian truth and deception. By introducing substance as *tertium ens*, new forms of Apollonian signs emerge. The history of objectivity reveals itself as initial truth and falsity to offer a new path of ontological comprehension (*Vor-blickbahn)*. The interpretation left the secondary basis (*subiectum*) of modern thinking, which is held by the objectivists of all kinds. Every new simulacrum of the substance starts from (*exsistit*) the original darkness of the Platonic and Aristotelian substance. The semantic trace of the archegetic historicity is given as “*ek-sistence*” of the being of the third kind. Ipseity of substance as the *tertium ens* entails the foundation of every epochal form of metaphysics (*Gründung*). That original *Lichtung* of metaphysics establishes the history of metaphysics as infinite sophistical copies of substance (*eídolon, Grund*). Historial ipseity of metaphysical substance is revealed as a sign of the divine comedy performed by Muses or the postmodern tragicomedy performed by Furies. Due to the double form of comedy, it is possible to grasp the hidden influence of the archegetic dative. In wisdom of the first philosophy, the validity of any metaphysical simulacrum is given as original *Irrtum* made under the influence of Apate. The historial form of *Seinsvergessenheit* is shown in the situation when the Aristotelian logic given by the identity of the substance and by the proposition about the Excluded Third lacks its validity. The metaphysical dative channeled through Aristotelian form of the first or the second substance is annulled by the new form of the substance as *tertium ens*. The new presence of being is still untrue for thought since the new metaphysical meaning is not yet accepted as valid paradigm. But it is no longer true in the original sense of already outmoded figure of metaphysics. The objectively materialized substance carries in itself the trace of archaic truth at the moment of transition from the initial phase of musical concealment (*Anfang*) to the veritative unconcealment (*Beginn*). This Pythian or musical figure of truth shows itself in the light of Apollonian semantics. Such an interpretation reveals the truth and falsity of each new form of metaphysics. After the paradigm shift is accomplished, the archegetic ipseity of non/substance given as *tertium ens* in the mode of *a/lētheia* flows into the identity of a new substance. The truth of metaphysics is determined by the identity of substance and by the Law of Excluded Third; nevertheless, the original unconcealment of substance is given as *tertium ens*. After the dark transition (*epokhē*) of *tertium ens*, the rule of the new and shining form of metaphysical being is instituted in the logical identity guarded by the Excluded Third. Academic basilisk stands anew as a guardian of the Hesperides garden, so that nobody came back to pick up the outdated wisdom. The unconditional validity of logic for every form of substance constitutes the ruling paradigm of metaphysics. In the divine comedy of modernity presented through positive history, the new substance appears as firm and unquestionable foundation of modernized metaphysics. Hermeneutics consider metaphysics tragically and musically, because it contemplates mythopoetic procession of substances. This carnival of vanities creates evolutionary and revolutionary history of modernity. Through the movement of the mythical thought given in the circle of the eternal return of the same, new acts of one and the same divine comedy arise again and again. They are staged in secret by Apollonian Muses. The musical truth reveals the never-ending changing of metaphysical truth and untruth. Archaeology must interpret initial figures of metaphysics at the beginning of their impact. At the start of each phase, a new form of substance still keeps the vestige of the archaic commencement given by musical truth and untruth. The forms of *tertium ens* carry in themselves something from the archaic *Lichtung* that sends metaphysical simulacra into the history of objective thought. Each updated form of *tertium ens* carries in itself something from the original Socratic question about the truth of what really matters in the world of naked appearances. Musical and therefore hidden presence of Muses send the metaphysical thinking in the form of mythopoetic simulacra into the positive history of objective thinking.

Instauration of the metaphysical dative caused the transition from historicity of the first philosophy into the history of metaphysics. Each turn changed the basic definition of the substance. The conflict between Platonism and Aristotelianism is accomplished so far by the reign of nihilistic form of objectivity. The objective vision of the world emerged in the environment of modernist schools in the Late Antique, in the Persian Falsafa and in the Latin scholasticism. Finally, it was canonized in the schools that called themselves by the Latin terminus the *Moderni*. Thereby the substance in the objectively given form of being was revealed at the beginning of the 14th century. That kind of knowledge became globally effective power in the West. The methodological suspension of metaphysics in virtue of hermeneutic *epokhē* means that we interpret the emerging substance from the point of view of the original condition that issued the visible substance. The process of revelation regarded in this way does not exist objectively. The tragedians wisely saw that the first modernists of Plato’s type were fatally blind to all kinds of divine signs. The postmodernists began to be blind to the reality given as Aristotelian first substance. The positive science and philosophy dwell in the eternal light of metaphysics; therefore they cannot see their own blindness. The objectivity investigates only the presence of the substance. Every new substance covers the obscurity of Apollonian signs by its false clarity. The original truth and deception of objective simulacra can be found only at the very beginning of this or that epochal incarnation. Therefore it is necessary to find a new way to expose the substance in each important philosophical school in the form of *tertium ens*. The history of modern philosophy semantically shows the archegetic influence through the transformations of being of the third kind. The classical connoisseurs of Aristotle’s metaphysics considered the way of the *Modernorum* to be sophistry, cardinal error or even madness. The anti-modern exegetes of metaphysics followed the footsteps of Aristotle in Late Antiquity, in the Falsafa and in Scholasticism. The wise philosophers excluded any possibility of t*ertium ens*, that is, any objective form of being. Nevertheless, the being of the third kind found its way into the history of philosophy and became the fundamental instrument of modernity. The interpretation shows the reasons why the thinking of scholastic *Modernorum* won, even if it contained gross metaphysical errors. Every metaphysics necessarily strives for objective correctness, because in the thinking of pure logic any error is excluded. The period of the so-called second beginning of Scholasticism is usually dated from Duns Scotus onwards. It reveals something forgotten, also the transformation of metaphysics into objectivity. This transformation arose in the environment of Neoplatonist philosophy. The thinkers of the Islamic Falsafa creatively received and modified the teaching of the first modernists. The Christian scholastic of the Latin West, in turn, adopted and revised the writings of Falsafa.

The hermeneutic path investigates the interpretation of metaphysics in the spirit of Heidegger’s thought, which approaches with friendly thought to the event of Being. The hermeneutic semantics and archaeology consider Falsafa and the Scholasticism through a new perspective (*Vor-blickbahn*), which is established outside of ever-changing substances. In the emergence of the objective being (*Beginn*) in new metaphysics, the previous state of being (*Anfang*) can be seen. The interpretation begins in the objective darkness given by the forgotten and repressed beginning of objectivity. This Socratic perspective orients the path of vision to selected texts. They show something that cannot be seen directly. The beginning of modernity must be seen from the eccentric position of the truth given outside the objective correctness. The hermeneutics is located in the realm of truth given as Pythian *Lichtung*. We must read metaphysical texts as philosophical oracle, which prophesies the truth and untruth that concern being of the third kind. The wisest of all men, Socrates performed similar semantics all his life with regard to Delphic oracles. The ipseity of the searching Socrates passed into the metaphysical identity of its academic simulacrum. Academic Socrates follows no divine signs, since he is objective blind as Oedipus; therefore he proclaims the truth of subjective made facts. The methodological justification of the archaic path of vision and the path of wisdom were provided by Heidegger’s terms *Irre* and *Irrtum*. Objectively (i.e., ontic) given thing is fundamentally different from the ontological way through which it is established in its being. This way of interpretation respects difference between the archaic wisdom of the first philosophy, the divine comedy of the first metaphysics, the tragicomedy of the postmodern metaphysics and the end of thinking in the nihilistic form of deconstruction and language games. The critical interpretation explores the first phase of revelation when the metaphysical substance became a *tertium ens*. This is the classical approach of Delphic oracle, when Apollo and the Muses simultaneously reveal state of affairs in their truth and untruth. The fool and the wise separate themselves in a way how they interpret the oracle. Divine Muses master the art of guiding the wise people and confusing the fool ones. Dante produced his masterwork “*The Divine Comedy*” under the guidance of Muses and hermeneutics try to reproduce it by its own art. The Florentine poet plays a significant role in divine comedy because he saw modern metaphysics in its beginning and in a musical way. The study investigates meaning of philosophical comedy and tragicomedy through the emergence of objectivity. The archaeology interprets the way how various forms of *tertium ens* led to the creation of this or that concept of objectivity. Each new form of eidetic clarity repressed the original meaning of the disputes which were present at its beginning. Dissolution of preceding forms of the *tertium ens* relates to un/concealed presence of the substance. Since Aristotle, it has been an eminent way of the presence of an individual being. The explored forms of *tertium ens* do not exist objectively at all, because they have no possibility of ontic existence. The signs have no substantial identity because they “ek-sist” (*exsistere*) only in the mode of archegetic ipseity. This ipseity represents the event of musical historiality for the wise people that are able to see all objective forms of substance as tragic and comic simulacra. Every epoch of thinking reveals anew the meaning of being since it successfully hides and displaces the preceding forms of *tertium ens*. The light of the objective solar intellect drives away the darkness of ignorance in a revolutionary and evolutionary way. The eidetic clarity builds up the objective mode of foundation to engage victorious subject of modern *illuminati* in the next battle. The awakened modernists of all kinds led the Western civilization to the bright mornings of contemporary age of Anthropocene. The objective knowledge founded in subjective will to tyrannical power automatically gets full power over that what is known. The forms of *tertium ens* present in the mode of *a/lētheia* passed gradually into oblivion in the realm of hidden Being. Its superiority prevails through metaphysical *Irrtum* and through the modern forgetfulness of original metaphysical being (*Seinsvergessenheit*).

The methodical thinking of hermeneutics proceeds differently than the objective science of facts. The positive science knows but indirectly the effects of twists in the realm of metaphysical truth. They change of the basic set of rules and proceedings that determine a certain section of science as its paradigm (Thomas Kuhn). During the paradigm shift whole blocks of knowledge disappear, e.g., alchemy becomes chemistry. Hermeneutics explore the truth and untruth of being on the level of paradigmatic change of metaphysics. The previous chapter has shown that modernity is directed by demonic powers and not by critical thinking that distinguishes between musical truth and metaphysical correctness. Rational modernity accomplished objective displacement of older forms of metaphysics with the help of a subconscious mechanism, which describes Freud’s term *Verkehrung ins Gegenteil*. The definition of this term in the work *Triebe und Triebschicksale* (1915) encompasses *in nuce* the entire history of modernity.[[32]](#footnote-32) The postmodern sadism of Renaissance humanists repressed the previous forms of metaphysics made by *via Modernorum* of late scholasticism. The sadism of the first humanists was replaced the contemporary masochism of deconstruction, which is practiced in the epoch of metaphysical nihilism and perplexity of digital Wikipedia run by global oligarchs. Archaeology, in agreement with Heidegger and Freud, asserts that the repressed part of truth in history has been secretly working, and predominantly in a destructive way. This repressed *Irrtum* of metaphysics is of archegetic nature. Modernity runs according to the coercive mechanism (*Zwangsmechanismus*) of academically trained and radically subjective Furies described above. The hermeneutic path to objectivity begins with the hidden and then repressed historicity of Aristotelian metaphysics. The tragicomic cortege of various sorts of *tertium ens* founded the positive history of thinking. The history of philosophical schools can be described within the framework of the known history of the Middle Ages, e.g., on the basis of known sources. For the reasons given above, the present hermeneutic research is a methodologically suitable candidate for the ante-objective interpretation of selected philosophical texts and authors. Gigantomachy follows the transformations of metaphysics with regard to conflicts about substance. The interpretation of this controversy investigates different definitions of the substance as a being of the third kind. Such a struggle could be carried out only by the best schools of thought, which evaluated anew the status of substance. The critical analysis of such disputes therefore determines following points: first, the important historical period; second, the selection of important texts and authors; third, the philosophical problems. This framework determines the basic question about the epochal manifestation of the objective substance as *tertium ens*. The introductory part deals with the interpretation of Aristotle’s categories in the subversion of Neoplatonic interpreters between the 3rd and the 7th century. The followers of Porphyry created a new figure of metaphysics. They developed *tertium ens* as a compromise between the categorical and the transcendental determination of substance. The Neoplatonists from Plotinus’s school changed the conception of substance, of the body, and of space and time. Late Antiquity carried out a fundamental transformation of metaphysics, which led to the emergence of objectivity. Following two volumes examine medieval and modern nature of objectivity. Its prehistory runs through the *translatio studiorum* from Late Antiquity to the Byzantine-Arab world of monotheistic religions. This *translatio* passed through scholasticism into postmodernity. The shift of schools took place in the form of the hidden history of the *translatio problematum*. The first figure of objectivity emerges through two fundamental figures of metaphysics in Persian Falsafa. Avicenna and Averroes developed Alfarabi’s legacy. He was the first modern thinker that reconciled Aristotle’s substance with Plato’s idea in a new way. Latin scholasticism took over the struggle of Plato and Aristotle, which was transmitted through the fundamentally different metaphysics of Avicenna and Averroes. In the Latin West, the Schools of the First and Second averroism directly followed the gigantomachy of Late Antiquity and the Islamic Falsafa. The last round of this battle for substance fought in the Latin West in a school called *via Modernorum* finally created a new substance that keeps fully objective meaning. The hermeneutic triad of historiality (*Geschichtlichkeit*), historicity (*Geschichte*) and history (*Historie*) explores the changes of metaphysics in its beginning. The interpretation started in the framework of historiality related to *a/lētheia* that makes destiny of the metaphysics in its original *Lichtung*. The changes in the music way of truth and untruth done in the archegetic and principal dative gave birth to metaphysics. It came into being due to its distorted relation to the principal dative of the first philosophy. The activity of Being in its commencement determines the epochal turns of the historiality related to philosophical thinking. It is the way how metaphysics came into existence in its proper historicity related to the philosophy (*Geschichte der Philosophie*). The last step deals with positively manifested objectivity in the history of philosophy and science. The hermeneutics of objectivity based on Heidegger’s phenomenology tries to resolve the basic question “how” the objective substance was constituted in the *Lichtung* of being and non-being (*tertium ens*). This concealed place of Being leads certain forms of unconcealed metaphysics into the positive history of philosophy.

## 1.3 Prehistory of Objectivity

The beginning of objectivity can be dated to the year 268, when Porphyry left Plotinus’s academy in Rome for Sicily due to fundamental disagreements concerning the interpretation of Aristotle’s philosophy. In the house of the Roman patron Probus in Marsala, he wrote two extant treatises on Aristotle’s *Categories* (*Isagoge*, *In Aristotelis categorias expositio*). Both treatises, together with the commentary on the *Categories* dedicated to Gedalius, which has not been preserved, inaugurated transformation of substance into its objective form. The devaluation of the first substance caused a gigantomachy between Aristotelians and Platonists in the school of Plotinus. It was the main reason why Porphyry had to leave Rome. Porphyry’s dispute with the Neoplatonists concerned the status of the categories presented in the sixth book of *Ennead* (*Enn*. VI.1–3). Plotinus did not comment directly on Aristotle’s writings. He proposed categorical predication according to the dialogue *Sophistes* to resolve the categories as highest genera of being. The *Enneads* reduced ten Aristotelian categories to Plato’s doctrine of five main genera (μέγιστα γένη, *Soph*. 254d). Their status is further examined in terms of empiric substance as lower genus in the realm of coming into existence and passing away (γιγνέσθω γένη οὐ πρῶτα, *Enn*. 6.2.15.18). The highest genera became an independent entity and they are contained even in singular things to some extent (τὸ γένει ἓν ὡς ἐν πολλοῖς ὅλον, *Enn*. 6.2.12.12). The single thing cannot exist without participation in the genus due to lower generic status; but the genus can exist without the individual thing because it exists *per se*, by virtue of the act of its own subsistence (καθ' αὑτὸ). The material substance represents a lower genus of being and the category of substance belongs to it only due to homonymy and analogy (κατ' ἀναλογίαν καὶ ὁμωνύμως, *Enn*. 6.3.5.2–3). In Plotin’s doctrine, empirically perceived substances represent merely a bundle of accidental determinations. Such a categorization made Aristotelian substance a changeable phenomenon without a positively defined true value (οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ ὅλον ἀληθὴς οὐσία, *Enn*. 6.3.8.32). For Plotinus, the empiric substance represents merely a pseudo-substance. There can be predication about it from the point of view of changeability and non-changeability (δὲ ταῦτα περὶ τῆς ἐνθάδε οὐσίας λεγομένης, *Enn*. 6.3.5.1–2). The predication of the highest forms of being goes primarily to the eidetic being of substance, which is placed outside matter and empirical cognition (τὸ πρῶτον ὡς πρὸς τὰ μετ' αὐτὸ λέγεται, *Enn*. 6.3.5.3–4). Only secondarily, the predication goes to the lower substance as a composition of form and matter, which exists in the realm of coming into existence and passing away (δὲ ταῦτα περὶ τῆς ἐνθάδε οὐσίας λεγομένης, *Enn*. 6.3.5.1–2). In gigantomachy that followed, this devaluated value of material substance played a very important role. It laid the foundation for the modern cognitive perspective (*Vor-blickbahn*) as a starting point of modern metaphysics. The negative value of Aristotelian substance can be found in all modern forms of objectivity, including a devaluation of the hylemorphic substance existing in the reality. Neoplatonists conceived the hypotheses in Plato’s dialogue *Parmenides* as the highest genus of being; therefore, they gave them not only hypothetical but also categorical status. The categorical definition of Aristotelian substance thus underwent the first serious crisis.

Aristotle relates the doctrine of categories to the definition of genus (*Cat*. 11a38; *De anima* 412a6). Aristotelianism, however, clearly separates the order of the singular existence and the order of universal signification. The actual thing in the reality receives a universal meaning in the cognition. That mediation runs through categorical meaning. The reason for this proceeding is the above-mentioned influence of the metaphysical dative (ch. 1.1). The donation of being as existence of the actual thing is given *per prius*. The knowledge of the first substance is a consequence of this primary process, therefore it created *per posterius*. The real thing goes to the past and it let the metaphysical *quidditas* accomplish the cognitive act in the mind. Moreover, Aristotle’s eponymous writing caused the ambiguity regarding the categories. The treatise uses this key term only three times, without any further specifications (*Cat*. 3a37, 10b19, 10b21). For hermeneutics of objectivity, the division of predication in the *Categories* with respect to substance (καθ' ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται) into four classes of signification possesses a key position (*Cat*. 1a20–b9). Later interpretative tradition blended these four classes together in various ways. The first and most important determination of categorical predication concerns the universals that are predicated essentially or accidentally with respect to the original subject. It is given *a priori* in relation to the categorical statement. Universal meaning cannot be directly and immediately contained in the real thing about which it makes a statement (ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ οὐδενί ἐστιν, *Cat*. 1a21). We take the term “never” or “in no case” (οὐδενί) in its original, categorically given meaning. Aristotle fundamentally and unambiguously separates two levels: the predication of universals given in the cognition and the actual existence of the thing in reality. The signification of the substance is universal exclusively within the framework of the common meaning (τὸ καθόλου, *Met*. 1028b34). There are a limited number of words and definitions at our disposal, whereas the number of things is unlimited (*Refut. Soph*. 165a6). The thing exists quite autonomously in the unique actual being and by itself (*per se*). The fact that someone thinks this existing substance and classifies it through intellectually given generality does not impact the original thing at all. The metaphysical dative due to past character of the predicated *quidditas* (τό τί ἦν εἶναι), symbolizes the secondary character of predication. It is tied to ontological primacy of the first substance. It was changed into immutable past and as such it stands in relation to the present predication. Unique actual existence of the simple substance in the real world presents the starting point of predication. The real substance cannot be contained in any predication (ἣ μήτε καθ' ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται μήτε ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ τινί ἐστιν, *Cat*. 2a11–13). The first substance forms the separated and compact thing (τόδε τι). The categorial predication addresses this original subject to be the principal matter of the statement (ὑποκείμενον, *subiectum*). The first substance as a detached unity constitutes the basis of the categorial meaning (ὑπάρχω). The real being is fully and absolutely given in its existence as it is, because this state of existence belongs to it in the original “hyparchical” mode. This founding act of being as a given thing is done here and now, the thing exists in its original totality and simplicity. Nothing can be added to it or taken away from it from the mind. Categorical predication is not given in the first substance in the sense of some insistent being. This is not permitted because of separated hyparchical existence of the first substance. The first substance in reality makes foundation of metaphysical being signified in virtue of the *dativus metaphysicus*. Without the hyparchical first substance, neither thought nor universal preaching are possible. The absoluteness of the reality exerts fundamental influence on the subsequent predication; therefore, for this fundamental reason, no categorical statements can be made on the level of the first substance in reality. The direction of donation of meaning goes from the real substance to the potential essence. This progression has a decisive influence on the predication, because categorical statements cannot be made at the level of the real substance. The first type of determination of substance represents the real thing. Universal predication is related to it by an act of secondary cognition. The existence of the first substance is therefore archaic in the mode of *quidditas* (τό τί ἦν εἶναι, ch. 1.1). Real substance is hyparchical and given in past with respect to the present predication. The categories, therefore, cannot be predicated at the level of the first substance (οὔτε καθ' ὑποκειμένου λέγεται, *Cat*. 1b4). The first substance holds the primacy in the order of being (οὐσία δέ ἐστιν ἡ κυριώτατά τε καὶ πρώτως καὶ μάλιστα λεγομένη, *Cat*. 2a11–12). The first type of determination of the substance represents the real thing to which the universal predication is related only by the cognitive act. The first substance is therefore archaic in the mode of *quidditas*, because it is hyparchical and it is given in the past with respect to the present predication. The categories, therefore, cannot be predicated at the level of the first substance (οὔτε καθ' ὑποκειμένου λέγεται, *Cat*. 1b4). Aristotle gives as an example of the first substance the real being of man and horse (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἢ μόνων τῶν οὐσιῶν ἐστὶν ἢ μάλιστα καὶ πρώτως καὶ ἁπλῶς, *Met*. 1031a12–13). One must fundamentally separate the hyparchical first substance from the signification of the first substance given as universal essence. The two appearances of the first substance (i.e., in reality and in thought) are fundamentally different. The procedure of predication, according to the necessity given by the causality of the first substance, shows the difference between the unique and actual *ousía* in reality and the universal and only potential *parousía* given in the mind as a concept. The essence cannot have the hyparchical existence of the first substance, thanks to this fundamental difference. The predication starts from an unsurmountable and therefore categorical difference between the first and second substance. The meaning given by a word is not contained as an autonomous substrate of physical changes and movements (ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ οὐδενί ἐστιν, *Cat*. 1a21). Scholasticism knew this thesis under the name “*destructio primis*” according to the paraphrase of the *Categories* (*Cat*. 2b5–6).[[33]](#footnote-33) The real substance is the first in the order of being and it is given *per prius*; therefore, it fully determines the following statements given *per posterius*. The simple and actual being of the first substance is separated from the significations made in the framework of language. All significations are expressed in the mode of categorial imposition, and in virtue of the second substance. Therefore, the second substance is given in the table of categories in the mode *per prius*. Nothing can be added to the order of universal signification to the first substance, that is uniquely and really actual. Therefore, it is only through the predication at the level of universal categories that a concept of truth and falsity arises, which is bound to the copula of the judgment. Secondary predication creates its own hierarchy of universally given signification. Again, this proceeding separates the second substance fundamentally from the first substance, which is actual and singular. The imposition creates in language the second substance given as the first category of universal predication. Beyond the second substance given in the context of a categorical predication, there is no univocally conceived meaning of being (οὐδέν ἐστι κοινόν, *Met*. 1070b2–7). The higher form of unity given above the second substance would presuppose a separated being of Platonic ideas and the highest genera of Plotinus.[[34]](#footnote-34) The categorial status of universal meaning depends on the distance of the species or genera from the first substance.

The predication *per prius* and *per posterius* is guided by two principles. The species, from the point of view of related signification, has a closer relation with respect to the first substance than the genus (μᾶλλον οὐσία τὸ εἶδος τοῦ γένους), because it is closer to the first substance (ἔγγιον γὰρ τῆς πρώτης οὐσίας ἐστίν, *Cat*. 2b7–8). The imposition goes from the first substance to the species and then to the genus. The supposition of universal meaning goes from the genus to species and at the end it deals with the first substance. A key importance for hermeneutics is given to the following section of the *Categories* that holds fundamental insight into the unity of being in the mode *per prius* and *per posterius*. The following distinction keeps the last stage of original unity concerning a critical thinking that makes difference between real thing and general meaning.

“In the derivative sense, the substances designated by this word (δεύτεραι δὲ οὐσίαι λέγονται) are those, in which species (ἐν οἷς εἴδεσιν) the first, existing hyparchical substances, are predicated (πρώτως οὐσίαι λεγόμεναι ὑπάρχουσιν). The substantial meanings given as genera include the species (ταῦτά τε καὶ τὰ τῶν εἰδῶν τούτων γένη).”[[35]](#footnote-35)

The quoted section shows the path of *Vor-blickbahn*, which is directed to the categorically predicted universe of substances. Two different forms of univocal predication must be distinguished, namely the hyparchical and the universal. The predication of the univocal hyparchical meaning comes first. It is fundamentally given from the direction of the first substance (πρώτως οὐσίαι λεγόμεναι). The first substance generates every categorial predication because it exists by itself and for itself in the original mode of being. In the first place, there is the first substance. The past character of this donation is expressed by the predication according to the metaphysical dative. The predication is determined by the hyparchicaly given substance, thus according to the principle of reality. The primary categorial substance *per prius* refers to the actual substance in the reality. That primary meaning is first expressed in the categorical predication by the species (ἐν οἷς εἴδεσιν), because they contain the immediately given categorical meaning of the first substance. The metaphysical dative applies anew, but this time in the mode of universal predication made in a “hyparchic” way. It is the most important way of metaphysic predication. The past character of the first substance is transmitted in the order of universal signification from bottom to top, from species to the genus. The categorically made signification refers primarily to the first substance in the mode *per prius* (πρώτως) given directly from the first substance by imposition of the first (i.e., hyparchical) meaning. This perspective of understanding (*Vor-blickbahn*) applies to the first categorial signification of predicated being, therefore it keeps fundamental importance for hermeneutics. The species is closest to the primary substance from the point of view of the origin or foundation of the categorical meaning (ὑπάρχω), because it is closest to the original unique first substance in the order of causality and cognition. The categorical predication is given in the univocal mode *per prius* with respect to the existing substance. The predication has categorial (i.e., hyparchical) meaning only if it is primarily determined by the existence of the real substance. The first and most important perspective of predication done by the imposition relates to the first substance. It passes away in the mode of the metaphysical dative to be kept in the first and metaphysically most important way of predication. We name this Aristotelian conception of the categories with the term “disclosure of being from the front.” From the point of view of universality, however, predication proceeds exactly the other way round, which is proved by the second sentence of the citation. The genera integrate in themselves the species, which is emphasized by a rather complicated saying (τὰ τῶν εἰδῶν τούτων γένη, *Cat*. 2a15–16). From the point of view of the predication given on the level of universality, and related to the signification of the second substance, there is an opposite predication *per prius* and *per posterius*, as the hyparchical one. The former proceeding applies to the existing primary substance. Imposition of meaning is given by disclosure of meaning from the front. The latter proceeding makes the supposition of meaning by disclosure from behind, from the last univocal meaning given at the level of the second substance. In predication made as supposition, the first substance is not employed in a hyparchical way, but according to the universal meaning. That is why the second substance figures on the table of categories in the mode *per prius* as genus. The genus is more universal than the species from the point of view of univocally predicted meaning; therefore, it stands first in the order of generality. The status of the supposition is therefore reversed to the hyparchical imposition of meaning. The second access to metaphysical meaning follows the categorical predication, which is signified by a universal and potential concept given in the mind. Thus, the supposition of universal meaning differs from the predication of hyparchical being done in the mode of imposition. The latter is determined by the actual and singular thing in reality. In case of supposition, genus is now predicated in the mode *per prius* because it makes the final stage of univocal predication at the level of the second substance. Beyond the unity of signification in the framework of the genus is nothing more than homonymy and analogy. Such a kind of unity does not secure the categorial signification related to the real substance. The second categorically given signification proceeds *per prius* from the generic meaning to the specific one. Now, the view of the metaphysician is not determined primarily through the signification coming from the first substance. It is based on the universal being conceived as generically given universality. In that case, the second substance as genus makes the last univocally given category of meaning. The genus is the first and highest universal form of univocality, which in the mode *per prius* establishes the categorial determination of the species as the lower universal form of meaning. We name this trajectory of univocal universality with the term “disclosure of being from behind.” The trajectory of comprehension goes to the meaning from the opposite direction than in the case of hyparchical predication done by the imposition. The less universal kind (secondary place of species) is being exposed from the more universal genus (primary place of genus). That mode *per prius* and *per posterius* signifies the categorial meaning inserted in the framework of generic meaning. The introductory chapter on the perspective of understanding (*Vor-blickbahn*, ch. 1) is of fundamental importance. Modernity “observes” a mythological “substance” as *tertium ens* whose categorial meaning (*Gehaltsinn*) must be carefully discerned because of a double approach to understanding made in relation to metaphysical meaning (*Bezugssinn*, ch. 1). Aristotle clearly distinguishes both kinds of perspective from each other, as shown by his theory of cognition in the work *De anima*. The intellect in the soul is empty and it makes a blank sheet (*tabula rasa*). We could recognize nothing without causal effect of the first hylemorphic substance that impact directly our sensorial organs. Therefore, the ontological primacy of the first substance, as it is predicted in the hyparchical imposition, applies first and fundamentally. The real thing imposes itself causally on the sensual and subsequently intellectual cognition, because it exists outside of ourselves and its being is given in itself and for itself. At the level of the first substance, no universal and categorical relation is possible. The cognition cannot add anything to that which exists in and of itself in the reality. The orientation of mind that categorizes and signifies the world, goes to the primary substances. It is defined by the scholastic terminus *impositio*, which expresses the fundamental sense of hyparchical predication. The reverse process runs on the level of generality from the genus to the species. It is expressed in the Latin scholasticism by the terminus *suppositio*. Insofar the universal and the univocal meaning is already given, then it can be separated and determined from the point of view of the greater and lesser universals. The genus incorporates the species. This division of universals was known to scholasticism as the “Tree of Porphyry” (*Arbor Porphyriana*). The imposition and the supposition do not share the same path of proceeding. That fact played a key role in the school of *Logica Vetus*. The imposition of meaning from the first substance fundamentally determines the metaphysical perspective that creates a true knowledge. The categorial supposition, on the other hand, does not predicate the real thing, but the general meaning. The meaning as supposition can be dialectically divided and composed because it is given only in the mind. The meaning as imposition cannot be divided because it is generated by the necessity of the metaphysical dative. It univocally and directly connects the unique meaning of the second substance with the hyparchical being of the first substance. By revealing the meaning of substance from the front, it is true that the corpse is not a human being; the meaning “*homo*” is not guaranteed by the predication from the first real substance. The living human being is not a dead corpse. The essentially given meaning guarantees in itself only the equivocal logical abstraction and not at all the univocity of the metaphysic meaning. True knowledge is given in the hyparchical trajectory dealing with the real world. This insight within the framework of the imposition is guaranteed solely by univocal metaphysical predication *per prius*.

The difference between categorial imposition and supposition in *Cat*. 2a14–16 establishes the original *locus* of truth for subsequent epochs of metaphysics. The difference between categorial imposition and supposition constitutes the original *Lichtung* of Aristotelian metaphysics. From that point, the meaning of being can be considered in two ways in order to come to the principles of the Excluded Third and the Non-Contradiction. Either the cognition proceeds from the autonomous world of Neoplatonic substances and forms; or, we predict the meaning of the real world given univocally with respect to things existing in the reality. The metaphysical *Vor-blickbahn* is oriented according to the imposition, with respect to the first substance (disclosure from the front). The logical signification is made by the supposition (disclosure from the back). It makes use of already given universal meaning of the second substance that is available by means of an imposition. In the metaphysics, the existential and causal necessity of the metaphysical dative applies first. The creation of categorical meaning from the first substance given in a hyparchical way establishes the fundamental determination of Western science. Aristotle proves at the end of the *Second Analytics* that our cognition is not capable of creating a full-fledged cognition of reality that is based only on human cognitive faculties.[[36]](#footnote-36) The intellect is actualized from outside, since the source of cognition lies in sensory experience (ἀπὸ αἰσθήσεως). Hermeneutics sum up this perspective of cognition, which is tied to the above-mentioned hyparchical categorical position of substance, under the term “disclosure of being from the front.” The actualization of cognition and the subsequent categorial predication are determined from the real substance. The writing *Second Analytics* claims that we recognize the first substances thanks to their efficient causality. The real causality concerns only the real things which are given in the uniqueness of the first substance.[[37]](#footnote-37) The categorization of the recognized meanings takes place within the framework of predication related to the primary substance.[[38]](#footnote-38) Henceforth it is clear that the term “first substance” used in the predication has a double categorial meaning given by the hyparchical imposition and the universal supposition. The imposition of meaning comes first and it is determined solely by the first actual substance (πρώτως οὐσίαι λεγόμεναι ὑπάρχουσιν, *Cat*. 2a14–15). There are two trajectories of understanding in the case of categorial predication, both made in the mode *per prius*. They are expressed by ambiguous status of the quoted saying (πρώτως οὐσίαι λεγόμεναι). If we follow the trajectory given by the primacy of real substance, then the species will be the first categorical concept. It is positioned in the closest way to the first substance. The species constitutes the universal meaning of the existing substance as the first point in the series of categorically expressed meaning. This meaning cannot be divided, because it is the first unique statement about the first substance. The second view relates predication to the categorical meaning (πρώτως οὐσίαι λεγόμεναι) that is viewed from the standpoint of universality. The view made in the mode of universal assumption now determines predication according to the primacy of the second substance, which is the highest generic unity of univocal meaning. It is divisible by virtue of its generic univocity. This necessarily means that the second categorical meaning will take the greatest distance from the hyparchical first substance. In the first case, we understand the unity within the genus in a hyparchical way, that is, by illumination of meaning done from the front. Now, the perspective is given from the primacy of the second substance, i.e., by illuminating “the first” predicated substance from behind. On the level of general determination, the genera come first, because they are first unit of univocal universal meaning in relation to the second substance. The genus now forms the first univocal general signification given *per prius*. It is predicated with respect to the subordinate species given *per posterius*. There is a fundamental difference between two kinds of categorial signification given *per prius*. They differ fundamentally on the basis of the twofold *Vor-blickbahn* that creates two different kinds of predication. The thing exists in the reality (first substance). The first categorial mode *per prius* is given by the imposition of meaning from the first substance. The categorial predication, which establishes the metaphysics and the science, takes the hyparchical substance to be the basis of the predication. The second categorial mode *per prius* is given by the supposition of meaning from the second substance as universal genus. The universal predication founds the logic and the general signification. The universal and potentially given essence in mind (second substance) makes the basis of the supposition. Both proceedings of disclosure of being must be firmly kept in mind during the process of predication. This distinction makes the fundament of categorical predication and it underlines *ipso facto* the meaning of all Aristotelian metaphysics.

The ingenious analysis critically distinguished two arts of signification. Now, it is completely true that genera and species make categorical propositions concerning the substance (τὰ μὲν γὰρ γένη κατὰ τῶν εἰδῶν κατηγορεῖται, *Cat*. 2b20). The genus is the ultimate instance of univocal predication with respect to the universal unity, because it gives the meaning of the second substance in the maximal univocal universality. The species is the ultimate instance of univocal predication in relation to the first substance, because it provides the second substance with the minimal but most precisely made univocal meaning. This precise meaning determined by the imposition is at least universal, because it corresponds to the uniqueness of the first substance in the highest degree. Only the genus and the species answer together, however, very differently, the same question: “What is this horse?” (κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἵππου, *Cat*. 2b25). Aristotle endorsed against the Platonists the autonomous status of categorial predication based on the primacy of genus as the highest univocal term. But the generic term must be taken as “the last” or “the first” point in the hierarchy of univocal meaning done in the framework of the predication *per prius* that is determined by the supposition. That kind of predication absolutely refuses to recognize the genus as ontologically highest entity as it is in Platonism. This is the principal reason why the univocal predication of generic meaning is not possible in the same way in Aristotelianism and in Platonism. Aristotelian meaning set in the framework of genus does not entails in any case the ontologically highest genus of being as in Platonism. The categorical transition from the genus to the species is possible because the difference between genus and species is characterized by another difference of species from the genus as well. The genus is not a simple form of signification because, from the point of view of the ultimate generality, it contains within itself the specific differences. They establish another univocal predication within the framework of the species. The specific determinations must be preserved at the first place. The genus represents the highest general element and is thereby in the most far away from the existing single thing; therefore it needs a subsequent differentiation of the univocal signification by specific difference and species. That is why a univocal predication of generically signified being is not possible in the same way as in Platonism. The fundamental reason why the unity of being cannot be defined exclusively within the framework of the genus is the fact that the specific difference and thus the species should not have a substantial identity made out of the imposition. The specific meaning makes the univocity done in a hyparchical way that safeguards the foundational character of metaphysical predication. These hyparchical meanings would be included univocally in the being of the genus (*Met*. 998b22–23). The work *Topics* explain the autonomy of specific difference with a reference to the predication *per prius* with respect to the species and *per posterius* with respect to the genus (*Top*. 144b10–11). Aristotle claims that the ultimate univocal unity of the first science cannot be based on the division of being in the style of Platonic highest genera. Being cannot be the highest genus because real things are taken in predication only at the level of an abstract signification. It means in the case of Aristotelian genera that they are at a maximum distance from the first substance. The generic unity in the style of the highest genus of Plato would nullify both the multiplicity of being and the possibility of true speech related to the reality of the first substances. If ideal entity was the highest genus as in Plato’s last dialogues and in Plotinus, then outside of its univocal categorical predication only non-being would exist. Moreover, the position of these metaphysically misguided Eleats is incapable of explaining the motion, emergence, and demise of substances, which Plato’s last dialogues acknowledged. Aristotle refused to take into categorical predication the concept of being as the highest genus, because this would invalidate the hyparchical primacy of the first substance. For the same reason, he cannot accept the categorial determination of the substance from the mathematical abstraction. The main argument of *Metaphysics* against the claim of mathematics as the first science rejects autonomous existence of the mathematical substances separated from each other (*Met*. 1076b13–16). The mathematical substances are not really separated from each other, that’s all. The number is not the first substance; therefore, the mathematical claim of predication given *per prius* is fundamentally false from the metaphysical point of view.[[39]](#footnote-39) Primarily only the real things exists; therefore predication must go *per prius* to the second and universal substance given either as species or as genus. This assertion has fundamental significance for the concept of science in the *Second Analytics*. The key quotation from the *Metaphysics* shows that Platonic predication of generic second substance as the last unity does not form a sufficient unity of meaning. It makes a homonymic predication at the level of the *ens commune*.[[40]](#footnote-40) The science about the real things cannot begin with the abstraction and essential definitions, because it categorizes general meanings with regard to the real substances. Only actual first substances act causally among themselves in reality. Logical or mathematical meaning given *per se* in the mind makes a different class of signification. It exists only in the mode of supposition and therefore does not concern the hyparchical predication based of the real causality. The metaphysics meaning concerns the level of imposition from the first substances. Here again the logic of the metaphysical dative applies, which excludes the Platonic view of reality. On the one hand, it is true that the real *ousía* by itself does not constitute a conceptual *parousía*. On the other hand, the donation of being was accomplished in relation to the things that exist and act in real terms. Therefore, it is possible to make truthfully adequate universal scientific statements. The writing *Second Analytics* proposes the scientific explanation that combines the effect of the first substance in reality (*passio*) and the universal recognition of the second substance as the first category of hyparchical predication. As we will see further, this basic principle of determination made by hyparchical causality of the first substance (principle *ex inmediatis*) was suppressed in the modernity. That fact played a key role in the emergence of modern objectivity. The middle link of deductive scientific proof (*medium*) universally and univocally signifies the original unique causality given in the real world. By mediation of causality, the unique effect of the first substance in reality becomes a univocal component of the universal evidence. Thanks to the imposition of real causality through the *medium* of scientific deductive judgment, the thinking refers to the real world which is causally given outside of the mind. The connection between the first and the second substance runs through the real and recognized effect accomplished in the world. Truth is founded as a universal cognition and univocal predication that relates to the real world of the first substances. The scientific proof runs univocally and universally in the order of the categorical predication related to the reality. The actual being exists as a first substance, which causally acts on other substances. Then we can state this unique causality as necessary in the categorial predication given in the framework of the deductive syllogism. Thanks to the hyparchical first substance, it counts as a truthful statement about what it is that it is, and about what it is not and that it is not (*Met*. 1011b26–29). Aristotle successfully defended the statute of the first and second substance for scientific knowledge of the world, because he connected both predications in the right order. Then he can start the search for metaphysical unity of being. The first substance determines the direction of the categorical predication by its separate being in reality. Such real thing establishes the corresponding meaning in the intellect. Plato’s idea or Plotinus’s highest genus does not exist really, since only actual things exist. Truthfully, we express ourselves in terms of the real thing; our mode of speech is not identical with this thing. From the point of view of hermeneutics, the most important signification of being is given by the disclosure from the front, that is, from the direction of the first substance. It forms the class of universal propositions related to the actual substance and to the actual causality. Neoplatonism, on the contrary, recognizes the world according to the autonomous forms and the highest genera, which indicate the comprehension of substance from behind.

In Plotinus’s school, the dispute about the interpretation of the *Categories* had to break out quite inevitably. The difference between imposition and supposition means that predication is given in one way with respect to the first substance and in another way with respect to the second substance. Porphyry, unlike the Neoplatonists, grasped very well the fundamental meaning of predication *per prius* and *per posterius* expressed in the *Categories*. The defense of the original Aristotelian meaning concerning categorical predication points to a key section in *De interpretatione* 16a3–8 (OBJ II, ch. 1.1). The passus makes the canonical text for the signification that is separated from the existence of real thing. Porphyry understood well that the definition of the second substance is possible solely by predication within the framework of ten categories, because these refer to the first substance given in reality. The hyparchical function of the first substance disappeared from Neoplatonism and was replaced by the generic definition of being. Porphyry criticizes especially the Neoplatonic ontologization of the categories (Evangeliou 1988, 93–97). Porphyry claims that the Aristotelian *Categories* deal with the mode of signification on the level of language (φωναὶ σημαντικαὶ); the categorical statements tell truthfully about things that actually exist.[[41]](#footnote-41) The categorial way of signifying thing is separated from the first substance thanks to the meaningful mode of speech. Porphyry objects to Neoplatonists that we cannot approach real substance in the categorical mode *per prius* made from Platonic hypostatized forms. Such predication satisfies the demands of supposition only in the mode of plurivocity. In this case we are merely expressing our internal meaning in terms of universally given essences. Only categorial predication given from the first substance in the mode of imposition ensures univocal meaning as a necessary condition for a truthful statement. Porphyry defended against Plotinus the thesis that the word “category” does not denote the generic determination of the type of substance, quantity, quality, relation and movement. It was the position of the *Enneads* (*Enn*. 6.2.21.24–59). The excellent connoisseur of the *Categories* adheres uncompromisingly to the original sense of Aristotelian predication. The difference between genus and species shows that the categorical statements possess their internal hierarchy because the species is closer to the first substance than the genus. Porphyry kept the direction of predication from both sides, that is, by exposing the being from the front and from the back, from the first and from the second substance. At the same time, he built a system of universally given categorical signification understandable to Neoplatonists. It was a fatal decision. Therefore, in the second step, he worked out a predication *per prius* from the universal meaning, that is, through the disclosure from behind. An important section in the *Isagoge* uses a specific form of *modus ponens* and *modus tollens*, by which Porphyry proves a mutual dependence between the genus, the species, the difference and the proprium (*Isag*. 13.23–19.3). In negating or affirming the superior member of the predication, Porphyry examines what consequences the existence or nonexistence has for the subsequent determination of categorically subordinate predicate (Taormina 1999, 23–25). We find the same approach in Porphyry’s second commentary on the *Categories*. He used the method that was probably inspired by Plotinus. See above-mentioned relation of dependence and independence between the singular thing and the genus (*Enn*. 6.2.12.13–14). Following the *Isagoge*, let us take the predication *per prius* in the context of the species. The trajectory is given in a hyparchical way because the emergence of the universal meaning is determined by proximity to the first substance. The second substance indivisibly carries its meaning because it univocally derived from the real meaning of the first substance by the metaphysical dative. The predication follows in the imposition of universal meaning in the second substance called “Socrates.” The imposition is given in the metaphysical *Vor-blickbahn* by the disclosure of the meaning of being from the front. The first divisible universal meaning must be determined specifically because the species stands as the first to the real substance in order of the imposition, that is, to the real person of Socrates.[[42]](#footnote-42) The predication of Socrates is determined by the specific difference given first from the species and then from the genus. Without the hyparchical first substance and the impositional and univocally predicated second substance of Socrates, the species “man” would never have come into being and there would be no individual meaning (ἀνθρώπου δὲ μὴ ὄντος οὐκ ἔστιν Σωκράτης). When the fundamental step is done, from now on the Platonic division can begin on the level of species and genera. The meaning of the second substance is given in a hyparchical and univocal way, that is, by the imposition of signification from the first substance. Socrates is predicated as an individual (*individuum*) in the order of final determination of universal meaning done by dialectical division of universals as *Arbor Porphyriana*. Such a division is possible only if the genera and species are determined by the imposition. The universal specific individual has nothing to do with the first real substance of Socrates on the level of existence. The individu owns its signification as second substance to the species. In the case of the second substance, it is not a question of the division of universal meaning, since we deal with the imposition of the univocal meaning from the first substance. Porphyry now follows the Neoplatonist division of universal meaning within the framework of the supposition given by the connection “*individuum—species—genus*.” Following the Aristotelian schema of categories, everything is in order. In the mode of universality taken *univoce*, it is true that the negation of the species (“man”) constituted by the imposition causes the non-existence of predicted *individuum* taken as supposition (“Socrates”). In the mode of hyparchical predication given by imposition, the species is closer to the first substance than the individual defined by it (*Cat*. 2b8). The atomic unity of meaning arises only at the end of the series of division of universals thanks to the last specific difference that separates the species from the last further indivisible universal individual thing. The individual is therefore not given like the second substance by the imposition and it can never be done like this. The individuum is created in the end, by the division of the universal and only as a supposition made meaning. The order in the creation of meaning runs from the species to the individual. It clearly shows why even in the non-existence of the universally defined individual its species can exist. There can be species “man” but no individuum called “Socrates”. In Porphyry’s scenario, the species occupies the key position of the middle link (*medium*) in the existential judgment, which is confirmed later by the Falsafa and by the Scholasticism. It is necessary to follow the path of metaphysical dative in the categorial predication. If the species is given in the mode of imposition (that is, in the *univoce* made hyparchical mode of metaphysics), then in the order of universality the genus and the proprium necessarily exist on the similar level of univocal meaning. The species and individuum, being entirely separated from the original meaning of hyparchical predication, acquire in modern scholasticism a central importance in the development of objectivity. Fatally, the species acquires the status of the first substance. As we will further see, this reasoning led to an eclipse of the first substance in the modern metaphysics. This eclipse reached its climax in Duns Scotus philosophy (OBJ III, ch. 5.3.2). However, Porphyry knows that this Neoplatonic approach to general things would make a being to be the highest genus. It is the real thing, in its unique existence, that determines the categorical propositions (*Cat*. 2a11–12). Therefore, the imposition of meaning from the first substance may not disappear completely. The signification of the second substance would cease to exist if the hyparchical relation to the first substance disappeared. The existence of Socrates as first real substance determines through the metaphysical dative the universals of genera and species (οὐχ ὁ Σωκράτης ἂν εἴη οὐσία πρώτη ἀλλὰ τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἴδη, *Porph. In Cat*. 90.25–26). Porphyry therefore immediately adds the second side of the equation. The first indivisible, real substance establishes predication because the *modus tollens* holds, which proves its priority (ἄτομος οὐσία, *ibid.* 90.31). Porphyry regards this atomic second substance given in the mode of imposition as the first *praedicabile* in the sense of the general concept (καθ' ἕκαστον ἄνθρωποι πάντες). This atomic substance taken in the mode of imposition exists in the categorical predication as a second substance. Then it holds that the atomic and further indivisible second substance forms the source of the categorical signification for the species “man” thanks to the imposition of the univocal meaning (ἐξ ὧν καὶ ὁ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενος ἄνθρωπος ἐπενοήθη, *ibid.* 90.32–33). Porphyry emphasizes that he means by this the Aristotelian first substance because it serves as the cause of the general predication as such (αἴτια τοῖς κοινῇ κατηγορουμένοις ἐστὶ τοῦ εἶναι, *ibid.* 90.30–91.1). The application of *modus tollens* indicates following fact. When the indivisible substance given in the hyparchical mode (ἄτομος οὐσία) as the first substance is eliminated, predication would become impossible as to the imposition of metaphysical meaning from the first to the second substance. The indivisible substance thus becomes the “first” given being, which is both real and categorically determined. There is the double way of hyparchical order that must correspond to each other. The first hyparchical substance necessarily (i.e., in a way of truth as metaphysic correspondence) founds the hyparchical way of predication that creates the second substance. This twofold indivisible substance is given in the new correspondence of metaphysical being and metaphysical thinking according to the third Parmenides’s fragment (ch. 1.2). Therefore it forms a causal and semantic basis of categorial predication. This twofold “atomic” primacy of the first hyparchical substance and the second specific substance is found in both commentaries of Porphyry. The transmission of meaning is based on the hyparchic position of the first substance and it covers exactly the fundamental intention of the *Categories*. The first imposition of meaning is determined solely by the actual and therefore hyparchically predicated first substance (πρώτως οὐσίαι λεγόμεναι ὑπάρχουσιν, *Cat*. 2a14–15). Porphyry thus criticized the school of Plotinus, who advocated autonomous existence of universals. His argument showed that Neoplatonic vision of the world is a nonsense because it created a signification of the first substance *ex nihilo*. The Aristotelian interpretation ensured the meaning of the real atomic first substance for the imposition of the univocal atomic second substance. Thereby it ensured the possibility of metaphysical (and not only logical) predication to keep truthfully (i.e., in Aristotelian sense) the next generic and specific division of universals. Then it is no longer a problem of composing a predication within the framework of the universal meanings given *per prius* and *per posterius*. See the second part of the statement of the *Categories* that genera and species predicate of substance in a categorical way according to the universal meaning of species (τὰ μὲν γὰρ γένη κατὰ τῶν εἰδῶν κατηγορεῖται, *Cat*. 2b20). Porphyry establishes in the second step of the supposition based on the division of the generic, i.e., the universal meanings of being, which later becomes known as Porphyry’s tree (*Arbor Porphyriana*). Key importance for the further development of objectivity keeps the definition of the genus, the species and the individual in the *Isagoge*. The universal predication *per prius* establishes from the genus the predication *per posterius* towards difference and species and finally up to the individual. The species has a central position in the framework of predication by its proximity to the first original substance. It determines the general meaning concerning the last single abstract thing, which is given by division of the universals (*individuum*). At the same time, it is in direct connection with the last univocal unity of being, which is given in the frame of the genus, from where this universal division starts.

A key role will be played in the scholastic creation of objectivity by the ambivalent statute of indivisible substance (ἄτομος οὐσία). The preceding interpretation proved that Porphyry distinguished indivisibility of substance basically in three registers: the first substance, the second substance, the individual. The first indivisibility is real, the second categorial and univocal in the framework of imposition, the third dialectical and suppositional in the framework of universal division of generic meaning. That last item, Neoplatonists mastered it very well. From the perspective of gigantomachy concerning substance, this ambivalence of atomic substance makes the core of the whole orientation and aim (σκωπός) of Porphyry’s interpretation of the *Categories*.[[43]](#footnote-43) The hermeneutics back above all the hyparchical sense of predication from the first substance because it forms the original Aristotelian sense of the *Categories* and *Metaphysics*. From the present interpretation, it is clear that if we put aside the hyparchical predication from the first substance done as an imposition, the meaning of indivisible substance is no longer related to the first substance. It does not entail the hyparchical position of the second substance. The logic sees only the meaning built on the supposition. In such a case, there is another kind of indivisibility very different from the one made by the species predicted in a hyparchical way. The generic indivisibility is made dialectically between the species and the final universal meaning created by the movement of the last *differentia specifica*. The universal meaning done in such a generic way stands as the last member of division and it cannot be further divided (ἄτομος οὐσία, *individuum*). This individuum made by supposition on the level of dialectical division began to play the fatal role, because it supplanted the role of the second substance, and later, it even replaced the first substance. Hermeneutics must find out the *peccatum originale* of modern metaphysics done in the form of historial *Irrtum* of Heidegger. Let us refer to the fateful quotation from the *Isagoge* in the Latin translation of Boethius, which, after Plato’s Allegory of the cave, establishes the first *Lichtung* of Western objectivity. We keep in mind the twofold path of predication (*Vor-blickbahn*), just as Porphyry, Boethius and Heidegger did. This trajectory of comprehension is now given in the disclosure of the atomic substance from behind, thus in the mode of the dialectical division of the universal meanings produced by the supposition.

“The individual is under the species and the species under the genus. The genus forms in a certain sense the whole (*totum enim quiddam est genus*) and the individual makes its part (*individuum autem pars*). But the species effectively forms the whole and also the part (*species vero et totum et pars*). The species forms the part with respect to something different (*pars quidem alterius*), whereas the species as a whole does not relate to something different, but to the individual part of the species (*totum autem non alterius, sed aliis*), because the species as a whole consists of parts.” [[44]](#footnote-44)

The disclosure of meaning (*Bezugssinn*) is now given from behind, i.e., from the genus as the last univocal unity of meaning. The genus makes the complete whole of meaning in universal predication; species and individuum form a part of it. The species and individuum taken in the suppositional meaning are subordinate to the genus (εἶδος ὑπὸ τοῦ γένους). The definition starts from the last and further indivisible individual as a universal part of the higher universal whole, which is the species (τὸ μὲν ἄτομον ὑπὸ τοῦ εἴδους). The species plays a key role as the first member of imposition, which we have already stated. There is double *Vor-blickbahn* concerning species as the whole and the part (τὸ δὲ εἶδος καὶ ὅλον καὶ μέρος). Taken from the direction of the genus, the species is merely a part (supposition); but in the direction of a singular thing, it makes an independent meaning, which is given by the proximity to the first substance (imposition). The species represents a lower wholeness than the genus from the point of view of supposition, because the genus predicates the univocal generic meaning for both the species and the individual. The dialectic primacy of the genus clearly shows the *modus tollens*, which is now used in the mode of disclosure of being from behind, that is, by the supposition. Through the separation of the lower specific differences (rational, irrational), the genus “animal” will continue to exist, but not the species “human.” This universal meaning only arises through the movement of the generic difference directed downward, to the species. For Porphyry, however, the species is not separate from the individual (ὐκ ἄλλου) as the genus from the species. It makes sense “in the” or “in view of” the otherness of individuals, since they make parts of the species (ἐν ἄλλοις). This is correct because the individual has a specific meaning that cannot be further divided. The generic meaning can be divided, but the specific meaning cannot, since they refer the first substance directly. A univocal universal meaning that is metaphysically valid, it exists at the level of the species, since it entails both the supposition and the imposition. Taken from the perspective of supposition, the species constitutes the last level of the final indivisible meaning. Taken from the perspective of imposition, species constitutes the first level of indivisible meaning. In the mode of imposition, the species is primarily determined from the first substance; in the mode of supposition, it is secondarily relates to the superior genus. The individual taken in the mode of imposition has no possibility of autonomous meaning. This *impositio*-meaning does not exist even for the genus. There is no generic meaning that can be divided dialectically. The individual, moreover, does not exist autonomously in the mode of supposition because forms a part of the species (*partibus enim totum est*). If the individual lost its univocal meaning derived from the species, then it would have nothing at all of universality and it would cease to exist in thought. The nothingness cannot be divided because, according to Parmenides, the non-being cannot be predicated. Therefore, the species forms a part in relation to the individual as something else that is subordinate to the species (*pars quidem alterius*). The species differs from the individual in relation to the whole, which is divided into further individual parts. The division of the species downward caused that the individual is separated from the species by the last difference, but not by a different meaning. Then the dialectical determination of the universal meaning must necessarily stop, because there is nothing universal and specific anymore, which could be divided further. Therefore, the species as a totality of meaning with respect to the individual is not given as to something different (*totum autem non alterius*). The species is superior with respect to the individual, since it can be differentiated into the lower class of specifically given individuals. Therefore, the atomic individuals differ from the species by the fact of this last differentiation, but not in fact of some different signification. The *individuum* is specifically given and it can be done in no other way. The suppositional definition of their individual identity is the same as for the species. The species have a different kind of identity from the individuals (*totum*, ἄτομον μέρος), because at this last level of division of universals the individuals differ only among themselves (*aliis*, ἐν ἄλλοις). The last unity of meaning is specific. Behind it there is but the indivisible atomic unity of the universals and none further divisible specific meaning. Therefore, the quotation continues with the fact that the individual forms a part of the species, which is the only one that forms the final unity of meaning (τὸ δὲ εἶδος καὶ ὅλον). Therefore, the individual has the categorical character of the species, but only partially, because it is separated from this totality by the last difference of meaning. The Greek original is absolutely clear with respect to the ambiguity that influenced the Latin translation and then all modern traditions. Individuals are part of the species (ἄτομον μέρος) and only in this way they can be defined as the last unity of individually determined specific meaning (*totum*). The species constitutes the final meaning with respect to the individuals, because it establishes the supposition of the holistic specific meaning (τὸ ὅλον) that covers all individual atomic units (τοῖς μέρεσι). Modern metaphysics took this last division of individuals and on this basis determined a new categorical relation between the totaly wrong “first substance” (*individuum*) and the second substance (*species*). The next volumes show how this relationship between the individual and the species grounds the objective sophistry in modern categorical predication and metaphysics known as Heidegger’s "*Irrtum*."

Porphyry, Boethius, and their classical successors in the Latin West maintain that individuals as universals acquire an abstract being only in terms of dialectics, since their signification proceeds from the superior species. In and of themselves, individuals have no possibility of univocity because they form only a part of the species. Porphyry takes the individual as a whole (*totum*) in a very specific sense. The universal meaning of the species is separated only from nothing. By the last individually made division, the individuals differ only among themselves (ἐν ἄλλοις). Individuals differ only among themselves and in no other way. This division corresponds to the notion linguistic of “*valeur*” that Saussure took as a basis to establish the system of structural differences, as it was mentionned in the introductory part of the book. It is the weakest degree of categorial meaning given *univoce* by the supposition that exists only in the intellect. Without the imposition done by the species, there would be no univocity of *individuum* at all. On this nihilistic basis arose the epochal aberration (*Irre*) of modern metaphysics. The original interpretation of the *individuum* (τὸ ἄτομον) according to the *Categories* and Porphyry’s interpretation completely disappeared in the further interpretation made by Neoplatonists. The indivisible universality after the last division is only individual and it does not include anything more. This individual can be neither essence nor kind of substance. The essence presupposes a definition of the autonomously given meaning according to the supposition by the genera and species. The second substance has, moreover, the univocal meaning given by the imposition from the first substance. The individual as atomic signification merely represents the dialectical division of pure universal meanings. The individual given in and for itself means almost as nothing. Therefore, in the order of universal supposition, it stands farthest away from both the first substance and the generic universality. Its universal meaning arises only at the very end of division, after completely accomplished differentiation of the generic and specific meaning. Then it is clear that from the point of view of a universal predication from the highest common unity of signification (*totum est genus*), the meaning of species and individuum is further and finally farthest from the universal meaning of the second substance given univocally as a genus. The individual includes only the minimal universality, because it closes the division of specific meaning. From the point of view of hyparchical predication, the individual is almost non-being. It exists only in the mind it makes a part of the species. In the predication of universals based on the division of universal meaning, individuum stands at the end of all universality. With respect to the genus and species, the individual is distinguished by the fact that it cannot be further divided into subordinate parts, which constitutes its otherness with respect to the divisibility of genera and species. After the individual, nothing more comes and the pure non-being can neither be thought nor predicated. The individual cannot in and of itself constitute a universal meaning, which is originally given generically and specifically. It is based on these meanings to be at the end of the dialectical series. Let us recall the fundamental meaning of this thesis. Hermeneutics consider modern determination of the individual in the mode of epochal *Irrtum*. The atomic unity given by the final division of universal meaning (τὸ ἄτομον, *individuum*) involves but a minimal meaning taken from the categorical signification of the second substance (*totum*) in the order of the supposition. Aristoteles fundamentally modified Platonic division of the highest genera of being (διαίρεσις). Porphyry proceeds accordingly, since the division of universals run only in mind and not in reality. It concerns univocally predicted second substance given as the highest genus in the context of supposition. The genus is linked by supposition to the first substance, but this way of preaching needs the imposition to be univocal. Therefore, the genus is tied *per posterius* to the imposition of meaning through the species, which *per prius* predicates the hyparchical being of the first substance. Thus, the highest genera of the Neoplatonists were degraded as mental products of the mind.

Neoplatonists cannot accept the categoric and hyparchical predication in the schema “first hylemorphic substance in the reality — universal species in mind.” For them, the hyparchical predication from the first material substance had no sense at all. See the above-mentioned position of the hylemorphic substance in Plotinus. Aristotelian division of universal meaning is based on the categorical predication in the context of the imposition and supposition. It differs fundamentally from the Platonic *dihaíresis* in the dialogue *Sophistes*. Plato divides the ideas as supreme genera in their autonomous substantial being. The individual, in Porphyry’s interpretation and division, contains universality in altogether small measure; hence, it stands only at the end of the universal predication. Defined by the fact of solely indivisibility, individual forms the lowest level of universal, metaphysical and univocal meaning (*totum*). According to the *Isagoge*, the individual forms only a part of the whole (genus and species); therefore, it has no independent categorical signification on the level of metaphysical univocity as it is the case of universals (*genus, species*). These second substances entail the unity of univocal metaphysic meaning (*totum*). The universality of the individual entails the meaning of the species, because the individual forms a specific part of it (*totum autem non alterius*). The individual is almost no more universal, because it stands at the border to the non-being of universality and it is the furthest away from the first real substance. The individual has no actual existence, because not even the species and genus have one. Moreover, the individual has a very minimal universal specific content, which is given only in thought. The individual does not make a second substance in the proper sense of the category theory. For this fundamental reason dealing with the double deficiency of signification, it follows the meaning created by genus and species. They have their own independent universal meaning. The species forms the final level of meaning (τὸ ὅλον). The disclosure from behind keeps the universal genus *per prius* and the species *per posterius* establishes the last specific unit of meaning for the individual as a part of species (τοῖς μέρεσι).

It is necessary to investigate once more the transformation of the *dativus metaphysicus* according to Aristotle’s *quidditas* (ch. 1.1). The correspondence of things and thinking in the pair “*ousía—parousía*” bypasses the being of the first substance, because the cognition proceeds through categorical predication of the second substance. The real substance bygone in the past is truthfully predicated in the mode of the mentally present second substance. The price to pay was the disappearance of the actual being from metaphysics. It is a tragic event of the abandonment of being (*Seinsverlassenheit*). The previous analysis of the key concept of Aristotelian metaphysics (τό τί ἦν εἶναι) showed the transition of the first substance into the archaic Lethe given by the past nature of the first substance. According to the Aristotelian categorical predication upheld by Porphyry, the species transfers universality to the individual according to the metaphysical dative. Imposition is given in virtue of the first substance and then it is given *per prius* to the species that represents the first substance as the first unity of metaphysical meaning. Neoplatonic modernity accomplished the absurd donation of “indivisible substance” according to the erroneous form of the metaphysical dative. Modernity made the combination of the highest genera defined by Plotinus and the categorical predication of Aristotle. Now, the philosophical tragedy has become a modern tragicomedy. The new pair “*ousía—parousía*” nullifies the basic sense of Aristotelian metaphysics. New transition of modern *quidditas* combines uncriticallythe different meanings of so-called indivisible substance (ἄτομος οὐσία). The modern species as an atomic substance came into philosophy by pure supposition and it retains its signification only within the framework of logical abstraction. This species became the first “Aristotelian” substance of Neoplatonism and the first real substance gradually belongs to the past. In its place came the new “Aristotelian” substance of the third kind (*individum*, τὸ ἄτομον) defined in the *Isagoge*. Aristotelian donation of being “to this existing here” (τό τί) is given in Porphyry’s original version according to Aristotle’s definition of *quidditas* (ch. 1.1). The supposition changes hyparchical meaning into the universal signification that makes another univocal predication from the genus to species. The individual has no suppositional meaning of its own, because it forms part of the species. Modern metaphysics created a new “event” (*Ereignis*) concerning the transition of meaning from a non-being into the kind of peculiar being. The universal meaning of the species acquires the objective appearance as the first substance. It makes the donation of mythopoetic being to the individual as a modern “second substance” (*tertium ens*). Aristotelian species went into the past (ἦν εἶναι) as far as the real relation to the individual and the genus is concerned. The original species of the *Categories* almost ceased to exist. It is separated from the objective individual (*tertium ens*) by the new form of objective difference. That difference appeared because the *individuum* became a new kind of the second substance. Instead of the individual of Porphyry, there is the Aristotelian species that undertook a journey into the realm of non-being. Modernity created a new metaphysical dative, and where it originally could not be. There is no division of meaning from the species to the individual. In virtue of the mythologic and wrong *dativus possessivus* (OBJ III, ch. 4), the modern individual received something that had never belonged to it, namely, an autonomous and even hyparchical meaning. The individual put on the emperor’s new clothes, and thereby a new entity of the third kind came into being. The donation of being in the metaphysics is made by the imposition of universal signification from the real first substance to the species. The founding event of metaphysics exists *per prius* by the species, because the individual cannot possess any autonomous categorial meaning by itself. The individual has the universal categorical signification to a minimal degree because it derives the universal meaning from the species done as supposition in the division of universals. The individual forms a component of the species, since it has no autonomous categorical meaning. The individual makes part of the species, which is the first and most important hyparchical *totum* given with respect to the first real substance. Neoplatonists and Latin Sophists completely reversed the minimal being of the individual, later called *esse diminutum*. Modernity made the individual be the mix of the first and the second substance. Paranoid modernity secured that “fixed being” (*esse ratum*) of a new individuality first in the divine thought and later in the philosophy of Leibniz. The suppositional meaning of the individual in the mode *totum* refers in the quoted section of the *Isagoge* only to the autonomous universal meaning, which is the species in the first place. Therefore, from the point of view of the classical universal predication, the individual forms only a part of universal meaning given at the level of the species as a whole (*partibus enim totum est*). The *individuum* makes the determined unity of meaning (*totum*) because of its indivisibility. The metaphysical meaning of second substance (*totum*) makes part of the species at first. The two meanings of *totum* are fundamentally different because they do not share the same subject of categorial predication. The individual has almost no universal meaning anymore, because it makes no more divisible part of the species within the framework of the supposition. The Tree of Porphyry follows this logic of division on the level of the universals.[[45]](#footnote-45) The last indivisible individual contains universality almost at the zero level, because it puts an end to the secondary division on the level of the species. There is almost no more universal meaning. Individually divided distinguishes from each other by the mere fact of difference done on last level (τοῖς μέρεσι, *aliis*). That is the first known example of “*valeur du signe*” that makes the structural difference in the modern linguistics of Saussure (*les* *écarts différentiels*). The species makes the first unity of universal determination of the second substance, since it has the first universal meaning of its own. The species received a new position with respect to the singular things through the imposition. It is the first universal level of meaning that distinguishes the species from the genus. The first wholeness of meaning (ὅλον, *totum*) is the species, which occupies an ambivalent position with respect to the individual. In relation to the indivisible individual, the species is different by its divisibility in the order of the supposition. Therefore, the species (divisible specific meaning) and the individual (indivisible specific meaning) make a special kind of unity on the level of the same categorial *suppositio*-meaning. In contrast, in the mode of imposition, the species is indivisible and the individual has no meaning of its own, since the primary atomic substance is the species. Boethius and after him the classical knowers of Aristotle knew exactly the original meaning of the individual to be the part of the specific meaning. They took the predication of categorial meaning of individual as *suppositio* with respect to the species that makes the *impositio* with respect to the first substance. Abélard in the controversy with Neoplatonist Anselm and the modern Porretans emphasized the fundamental difference between the *totum universale* and the *totum integrum* (OBJ II, ch. 1.2). This definition species and individual will play a key role in the forms of objectivity after 1250. The practically non-existent *individum* comes as the intellectual Messiah to organize the salvation of modernity. The *individuum* brought about the new parousia of paranoid thinking of modern philosophy. The inexorable triumph of the individual as the mixture of the first and second substance (*tertium ens*) was accomplished by fatal errors on the *via Modernorum*. In the present epoch of metaphysical nihilism, the modern tragicomedy in metaphysics has finally led to the complete forgetting of the sense of being determined by the Aristotelian first substance (*Seinsvergessenheit*). The new form of species passes the universality test in the modern metaphysics as the individual engaged in the parody of metaphysical dative.

Let us shortly investigate this new form of metaphysical dative, which makes the original *dativus obiectivus* for the objective meaning of being (OBJ III, ch. 4). It came to a fatal error concerning the predication by the supposition of the species that now includes even the first real substance. The individual got a new type of the objective beingness (*Seiendheit*) as generic meaning dating back to Neoplatonism. Hermeneutics investigate that peculiar acquisition in the mode of the *dativus possessivus* (OBJ III, ch. 4). The individual received the combined meaning concerning both imposition and supposition. Such nonsense was impossible before, since the individual has hardly any independent being. The atomic substance received the emperor’s new clothes, which suited it perfectly, as in Andersen’s well-known fairy tale. This mythopoetic thinking in the mode of the epochal *Irrtum* has been running up to this day under the influence of academically capable Furies. Objective Western philosophy and science were created in this erroneous way. Furies are the punishing instrument of divine Muses, who led this divine comedy to the present metaphysical nihilism. Deceptive Muses left only the last piece none of the real but of the individual cake to the insane modernity that started to be engaged in the academic tragicomedy. The new statute of the genus and the species gave rise to new beings of the third kind created by the Neoplatonists such as Jamblichus and Simplicius. Neoplatonic determination of *Isag*. 7.27–8.3 proceeded in the mode of epochal *Irrtum*. The successors of Porphyry united the species and the individual in a ridiculous sort of atomic substance. In further development, Simplicius and Philoponus mixed this individual of the third kind with the singular thing on the level of Aristotle’s first substance. The sophistic conflation of singularity and universality established the objective meaning of Aristotle’s *Physics* in Neoplatonism. According to Porphyry’s interpretation of the *Categories*, the revolution of the Neoplatonists founded the two-staged *revolutio* as a return to Plato and Plotinus. First, Neoplatonists displaced the hyparchical predication because they determined the categorization within the framework of the Platonic *dihaíresis*, which defined the division of genus into the species. Second, they made of the indivisible individual an indivisible first substance, which Aristotle respected as a real thing. These two fatal errors caused that from Porphyry’s famous interpretation of the *Categories* remains only the *Arbor Porphyriana* as epochal simulacrum that laid the foundation for the modern and postmodern science. By the transformation of the individual into the highest Platonic genus and a new first substance, a new indivisible substance was born. It represents the typical being of the third kind. The later confusion about universals concerns the unclear status of various kinds of *tertium ens*. The categorical meaning can no longer be predicated on the hyparchical level, because this sense of categorical predication has disappeared in the modernity. The imposition is freely exchanged for the supposition. Objectivity assigns universals as hypostatic beings of the third kind to the first real substance in the mode *ante rem, in re, post re*. The insertion of hypostatic meaning into the first substances or the analogy between the first substance and some hypostatized universals makes complete nonsense according to the Aristotelian interpretation of the *Categories* and its classical inheritance. Aristotle after Plato’s critique considered the dialectical division of universals to be secondary proceeding. Metaphysics presupposes categorial predication as *impositio* in mode *per prius* with respect to hylemorphic first substance. The basic thesis about the non-existence of universals at the level of first substance after the cited *modus tollens* and *destructio primis* was adopted by scholasticism through Averroes’s *Great Commentary on* *De anima*.[[46]](#footnote-46) The genus as a pure universal became a new kind of substance in modernity and made possible the categorical predication of everything that is “specific” and “individual.” The individual must follow the metaphysical dative given in terms of the original generic or specific unity of meaning constituted in the mode *per prius*. The tragic sophistry of modernity and postmodernity, directed by playful Muses, can be summed up in the fact that even after the first substance has been interchanged with the individual, the quoted proposition *Cat*. 2a14–16 about the twofold predication holds logically as well. In the logic, there is no difference between the hyparchical and universal level of predication. The species is situated on the level of predication lower than the genus and it directly determines the ultimate indivisible meaning of the individual. The atomic individual thing became a new *totum* of a modern substance, which had been created completely *ex nihilo*. The tragicomic meaning of the atomic individual arises from the fact that the purely logical predication is incapable of distinguishing the individual from either the first real substance or from the second substance predicated through the imposition. The modern paranoia in the philosophy is fully logical according to modern *veritas*. It is really tragic from the standpoint of the truth as archaic and musical *a/lētheia*.

The classical interpreters of the *Categories* refused categorically to give individuals the metaphysical meaning on the level of the imposition. Since the real philosophers were classically educated, they discerned critically the various kinds of substances. They could in no way accept the tragic confusion of meaning (μανία) caused by the logically capable and therefore modern Furies. The universality follows the reality and not vice versa, because the critical thinking given by the influence of Muses is neither paranoid nor manic. The atomic part of universality has no possibility to obtain a specific meaning. Therefore, the Aristotelian individual does not receive universality from the species in the act of donation by the objective dative as in Neoplatonism and modernity, but only by the last division of universal meaning. The individual cannot appropriate for itself any autonomous universality on the level of *totum* because this privilege belongs only to the species. The Neoplatonic *illuminati*, however, had mythopoetic knowledge of the species and the individual, which was stronger than reality and critical thinking. The newly conceived universals (*individuum, species, genus*) as a second universal substance got a hyparchical meaning. Because of the Platonic *dihaíresis* the species won the place of the modern first substance. The imposition goes to the Aristotelian hylemophysical first substance that was transformed to the modern *individuum*. Taken on the level of logic, the interpretation of the *Categories* did not change at all. Modernists took the text of the *Categories* literally and interpreted it in a new paradigm of blind thinking. A new Pythian mode of science emerged, which constitutes the epochal paranoia of the *Modernorum*. The logical “Socrates” as modern *individuum* made out of supposition in the paranoiac mode of *idem* is the same phenomenon as the hyparchical Socrates made out of imposition in the mode of *ipse*. It does not matter if he is a corpse or a living person.

Porphyry’s contemporaries took seats at the academic table of the first ancient universities, and they started to imitate the glory of destroyed Delphi and disappeared Pythias. New generation of divine academics created mythopoetic science and the oracles of a new kind. These hallowed gatherings (ὄργια, *conferentia*) of the Neoplatonic *illuminati* formed a new form of “orgiastic” Western education under the leadership of academic and fully subjective Furies. They acquired an objective character in the following epochs of metaphysical syncretism. Today, this *apaideusía* (ch. 1.2) is pursued and admired globally. The measure of this mythopoetic madness is objectively indexed in the scientific databases and financially remunerated. the Neoplatonic *Moderni* sealed the fate of Western thought because of Pythian and pseudo-mystical interpretation of the *Categories* and making the same eroneous understanding of Porphyry’s *Category* commentaries. The intellectual hubris of “divine men” as Jamblichus tragically corresponded to the measure of their metaphysical error and personal hubris. The new individual of the third kind began to act as the first or second substance. Then the atomic substance creates the last link of the universal predication, which is given by the specific division of the generic universal meaning into a final and not further divisible meaning. Thus, the species or the individual became first substances and replaced the first real substance, which stood outside of predication in the writing *Categories* and *Metaphysics*. The position of the individual in the new system of division of being is exactly the reverse of that in the *Categories*. See preceding interpretation of the *Isagoge* regarding the position of the species and the individual thing in the mode ἐν ἄλλοις according to Aristotle. The modern individual lost the universal meaning of species as given in the *Isagoge*. The species began to operate as the first substance in Neoplatonism. It possesses its own indivisible meaning in the ontic mode *per se*. Because of this epochal error, the Neoplatonic species of the third kind came into being. It founds both hyparchical predication and metaphysical meaning *per prius* in the mode of *impositio*. In the new Pythian system of Neoplatonic categories, the individual is closest to the curious couple “first substance—species“ being contained in the species as its univocal part (ἐν ἄλλοις). The epochal error of the new metaphysics is obvious, because the interpretation of the *Isagoge* defines the individual exactly the other way around. The specific individual thing was most distant from the first substance; therefore the individual had no hyparchical meaning given by imposition and possessed a very minimal universal meaning given by the share in the supposition made by the species. By mixing the original three different meanings of atomic substance (first and second substance, individual), an original mythopoetic exegesis of the indivisible first substance emerged in the third century. This ambivalence of the atomic substance will play a fundamental role in the history of the West, because it shapes all subsequent forms of gigantomachy. The successors of Porphyry found a new categorial predication *per prius* and *per posterius*, which constitutes a new meaning of substance. The dispute over objectivity concerns the difference between the formal and the metaphysical determination of the adjective ἄτομος, which is assigned to the determination of “undivisible” substance (ἄτομος οὐσία). Porphyry maintains that the real atomic substance in its original unity cannot be divided into parts (oὐκ ἔστιν ἄτομος οὐσία ὁ εἷς τῶν κατὰ μέρος, *Porph. in Cat*. 90.31). Man as a universal whole of meaning is given by it (καθ' ἕκαστον ἄνθρωποι πάντες) and out of hyparchical being of the atomic substance, a universal predication can be carried out (ἐξ ὧν καὶ ὁ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενος ἄνθρωπος, *Porph. In Cat*. 90.32–33). From preceding interpretation it is clear that Porphyry uses only the first real substance for the basis of predication and determines the second substance as an imposition from the first substance. By abolishing imposition, the theory of truth no longer applied according to the Aristotelian correspondence. If science starts from the meanings given suppositionally, e.g. mathematically and logically, then it has no univocity, because it starts on the level of meaning causally created in human mind. For the Aristotelians who defend the truth as the correspondence of intellectual cognition to reality, it is necessarily true that to the indivisible first substance in reality corresponds the indivisible, universally predicated meaning of the second substance in the table of categories. This second substance as the first member in the table of categories must be separated from the individual made out of supposition. The individual is determined only *via negativa*, that is, at the end of the series of differentiation of genera and species done by the division of universals as Porphyry’s tree. This differentiation is based on the metaphysical meaning as *impositio*, which, however, is entirely marginal to modernity.

After the displacement of hyparchical predication, it was not clear to Neoplatonists how to understand Porphyry’s interpretation of atomic substance in his interpretation of the *Categories*. Is the indivisibility related to the first substance or to the second substance or to all of them simultaneously? What is the role of the individual with respect to the first and the second substance? What can be divided and what cannot be divided? Let us now take a look at the fundamental crossroads of Aristotelianism that characterizes the subsequent gigantomachy concerning the modern substance. Quoted sections from Porphyry’s interpretation of the *Categories* (*Porph. in Cat*. 90.31–33) and the *Isagoge* (*Isag*. 7.27–8.3) or Boethius’s Latin translation (*In Porph. Isag*. 2.16) examine this key question. However, the interpretation of *Modernorum* became academic, Pythian and ambiguous. The goddesses of Vengeance are chthonic divine powers of Chaos. Hence, they learned without problems the modern chaotic interpretation of the *Categories*, since it is a perfectly simple and effective tool of vengeance against modern mortals. The modern treatises on the *Categories* became an epochal event of the tragic judgment on the modernity. They completely concealed the archaic meaning of the word κατηγορία. Under the influence of subjective *furor logicus*, modernity became categorically insane. But being objectively sane as the modern mind is, this means that these *illuminati* in question do not know that they are insane. That is the way of modern tragicomedy. Hermeneutics see three fundamental ambiguities in the interpretation of indivisible substance. These ambiguities will later play a key role in the later determinations of being and in the dispute of the universals. The statute of atomic substance can be threefold.

1. The atomic substance is conceived as the first real substance (οὐσία δέ ἐστιν ἡ κυριώτατά καὶ πρώτως, *Cat*. 2a11). The first actual substance is therefore separated from the categorical predication that examines the universally conceived second substance. It is Porphyry’s interpretation of the *Categories* that was followed in the framework of classical Aristotelianism. The hyparchical imposition of meaning comes out from the real first substance, therefore the univocal categorical predication is made *per prius* in this way. The universal supposition in the metaphysic is given only in the mind and it can be taken *per prius* only after the imposition had been established. If there is no imposition, there is no *univoce* made predication, but the homonymy of the level of the logic.
2. The substance becomes undifferentiated in both meanings of the first and second substance in such a manner that the imposition and the supposition merge to make the generic meaning (κυριώτατά καὶ πρώτως καὶ μάλιστα λεγομένη, *Cat*. 2a11–12). A key function is assigned to the divisibility of universal meaning conceived in an analogous way. The indivisibility belongs both to the first substance and to the individual situated at the end of division. Then it is possible to create a new physics and metaphysics by connecting Plato and Aristotle together to make a new unity of being. This unity transcends the signification made by the *Categories*. This is the attitude of the Neoplatonists like Simplicius. They formed the metaphysics as *scientia transcendens*, which finds the mystic meaning of metaphysics situated outside of being and essence.
3. The primacy of atomic substance is based purely formally in the mode of semantics (σημαίνει τὰ σχήματα τῆς κατηγορίας, *Met*. 1017a23). The indivisibility given univocally abolishes the specificity of the categorical predication in the context of metaphysical abstraction and transfers it into logical abstraction. This is Scotus’s interpretation and the modern version of objectivity. It considers the *Categories* to be merely logical writing outside of modern metaphysics. Then it is necessary to build a new metaphysic on the direct insight into the minimal beingness. It makes a further indivisible meaning according to the essence made by Avicenna. This *individuum* is determined as an Aristotelian substance in the order of categories where it takes the place of the second substance. The transcendental metaphysics of Neoplatonists is transformed into a modern, pseudo-Aristotelian *metaphysica generalis*. This is the interpretation of Scotus and the modern version of objectivism. They take the *Categories* as logical writing disconnected from the modern metaphysics.

The preceding interpretation of the *Isagoge* showed that the emergence of these three variants dates back to Porphyry’s unclear definition of the individual. Boethius exactly transferred his definition of the *individuum*. The species presents the *totum* of meaning and the individual makes a part of it as the last unity of differentiated specific meaning (*totum autem non alterius, sed aliis*, *In Porph. Isag*. 2.16). On the contrary, modern individual became an atomic and fully autonomous unity of meaning. This changed the original position of the individual, which in Porphyry and Boethius was taken exclusively in a participatory mode made on the level of the species (*non alterius*). Modernity abolished this participation and replaced it with a categorically conceived alterity, which follows the power of the mythopoetic metaphysical dative. The individual has become a substance on the level of the first and second substance. It has achieved an equal position with other universals (*aliis*). Likewise, the genus also became a second new substance on the hyparchical level of the species. Hermeneutics follow the way of the real Sun in the sky and the real necessity of the metaphysical dative in the thinking. The present interpretation cannot follow the manic path of modernity. Therefore, we must critically distinguish between the different modes of substance. Let us now interpret each version of the categorial dilemma concerning atomic substance in the context of the future projects of metaphysics.

1. In the first group, authentic Aristotelian version of the interpretation, the indivisible substance exists independently of predication and causally establishes the universal *praedicabilia*. According to the writing *De anima*, the universal concept arises in the mind on the basis of the sensory experience. It is effectively brought about in mind by the existing substance. The *praedicabilia* of the type *genus, species, individuum* determine the suppositional divisibility and indivisibility of the universal meaning. Their metaphysical univocity derives from the imposition of the second substance as the first category, which is given *per prius* in the scheme of ten categories. In contrast to the second universal substance in the table of categories, the first substance is indivisible by virtue of the fact that it exists in reality. It acts *per se* in the mode of actual simplicity that is outside any universality and objectivity. This is the view of Boethius, Abélard, Averroes and the school of the first Averroism. There is no dispute about universals, since they are given only in the mind.
2. In the Neoplatonic interpretation of the atomic substance, the indivisibility of the substance belongs to the formal and metaphysical coherence done on the generic level. It is connected through the henology with the universal unity on the level of the transcendentally conceived One. The meaning of the hyparchical first substance within the univocal predication is transferred to the universal and real existing genus, species and individual. They became an another kind of hyparchical first substances. The second substance merged with the first substance. The division within the *Arbor Porphyriana* creates the concept of an indivisible and confused substance (*tertium ens*) as the final link in the classification of genera and species (*individuum*). A key role is attributed to the eternal species, since it forms the intersection of the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic predication towards the superior genus. The individual became the substance as well, since it makes the atomic and subordinate part of the species. The elevation of the genus as the second substance to the level of the first substance means a return to Plotinus’s conception of the highest genera of being. Being is transformed into the universal genus. The hyparchical function of the first substance became superfluous. The Neoplatonic species merged with the first substance or it acts in categorical predication as a wholly autonomous substance, that is, outside the hyparchical bond with the first substance. Done in this way, a new categorical predication *per prius* came into being. The universal genus, the form, or the essence act as subsistent hypostases. They are defined in the mode of mixed imposition and supposition and they determine the subordinate hylemorphic substances in the form of *tertium ens*. An example is the descent of the hypostatized forms into the lower substances in the work *Liber de causis*. This view shared Avicenna, the Porretans, Latin Nominalists, and the school of second Averroism.
3. The third variant shows the way to the objective being of the third kind. Following Avicenna, the Latin interpreters of Aristotle faced a dilemma concerning the atomic substance. It is given as pure beingness (*ens inquantum ens*), outside of any predication. Either they grasped it, in accordance with Aristotle, the indivisible substance in the sense of the hyparchical primacy that concerns the existing single thing given *per prius* (τόδε τι). Or they imported this indivisibility into the categorical statement, which is aligned with the ambivalent status of the individual predicated within the framework of the hypostatized genus and species. But in doing so, they abolish the absolute meaning of the first substance and they predict the *individuum* as a Neoplatonic genus, which Aristotelianism absolutely denies. They found the solution by preserving the primacy of the atomic substance as a universal, see the second point. The individual acts in the framework of a wholly separate insight into objective beingness. It is given outside the real existence of the first substance and outside the categorical meaning of the second substance. This individual is connected analogically with the second substance. It is predicated in the table of categories together with the first real substance. The new predication refers primarily to the first and second substances in the Aristotelian sense. Transcendental logic added the mythological concept of objective existence to the categorical predication. Modernists created a new “exsisting” modern individual as new version of *tertium ens*. The introduction of “objectively existing *individuum*” associated two kinds of predication on the level of imposition. Aristotelian substance (hyparchical imposition) receives the objective and essential existence to complete a modern unity of being (objective imposition). The predication differed from the Neoplatonic *scientia transcendens* in that point that it binds *tertium ens* to the indivisible first and real substance. It is separated from the individual that in Neoplatonism related to the eternal species. It came to the categorial binding of directly apprehended objective individual as new first substance. Passed through this vision, the *scientia transcendens* was transformed into an objective metaphysics. Duns Scotus created this new categorial predication as supposition in the mode *absolute* that concerns the logically defined objective individual. By transforming the Neoplatonic *scientia transcendens* into objective Aristotelianism, this Latin modernist created an objective and completely modern version of the *metaphysica transcendens*. Suárez made out of it the first postmodern system of *metaphysica generalis*.

The dispute about the Aristotelian first substance, which Plotinus called a pseudo-substance (ἐνθάδε οὐσία), assumed a dramatic character from the third century on. Already in Porphyry’s explanation it is not clear how the unity of indivisible meaning is given with respect to the real first given substance: logically, metaphysically, or only semantically? This ambivalence of the atomic substance is later shown by the dispute about the universals. After the transformation of substance into its ambivalent form, indivisibility refers to the concept of the single thing as something determinable (τοιόνδε). This ambivalence regarding atomic substance was briliantly captured by the translation “*un certain tel*” (Taormina 1999, 25). Being an excellent connoisseur of Neoplatonism, she commented in that way the status of substance in Porphyry’s commentary on the *Categories*. The hermeneutic takes over her excellent translation of Porphyry’s saying (ὅπερ οὐκέτι τόδε τι νοοῦμεν ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε, *Porph. in Cat*. 91.3–4). We relate Taormina’s translation to the triple ambivalence of the indivisible substance mentioned above. In the end, Porphyry abolished the dual character of predication *per prius* given in *Categories* 2a14–16. The first modernist found a compromise solution in metaphysics by creating an ambivalent concept of indivisible substance. The presence of being received a new character, since the writing *Isagoge* and the *Commentary on the Categories* shifted the interpretation of Aristotle’s writing towards Neoplatonism. Porphyry introduced, besides the first and the second substance, the new status of being of the third kind.

The new kind of *tertium ens* started from the fact that the writing *Isagoge* created the individual as a new product of dialectical division that concerns the universal meaning. The original meaning of this *tertium ens* was mainly pedagogical. Porphyry tried to explain to the Neoplatonists from Plotinus’s school the meaning of categorical imposition and supposition on the basis of the division of genera and species. Such a division was familiar to them according to the dialogue *Sophistes*. The ambivalence between the first and the second substance came from the fact that in Porphyry, a new type of the atomic substance as an individual came into being. A new individual reconciles both types of indivisibility, the real and the universal. The Neoplatonic successors of Porphyry changed the status of the substance by abolishing the imposition from the first real substance mediated by the senses. The new indivisible substance given suppositionally as something definite or determinable (τοιόνδε, *hoc aliquid*) replaced the original hyparchical relation between the first and second substances given in the *Categories*. Successors of Porphyry abolished both the separate status of the first substance and its primary determinant function for categoric predication and for the scientific proof. The combination of both substances into a new form of atomic substance established new metaphysics outside the real and actual substance given as “this” (τόδε τι). Since the 3rd century, the order of reality and the order of predication form a syncretistic unity of a new quasi-substance. It is given *per prius* und determines a new subject of metaphysics. The substance became for the first time a sort of being of the third kind to unify the first and second substance. Aristotle rejected such a mesalliance in principle. In the ontological scenario of late Neoplatonism, the Aristotelian logic of the Excluded Third determined primarily by the existing thing and secondarily by the universal signification, was no longer valid. The substance became indivisible unity through the conjunction of the Neoplatonic realm of forms and Aristotle’s physics describing the world of immaterial heavenly substances. Neoplatonists wanted to save the emanation of the generic beingness from the transcendent One. Otherwise, they would not have made peace between Plato and Aristotle. The metaphysics placed behind the physics finally found the doubtful unity of being in the mythopoetic universe. Aristotle examined that unity in the real universe.

### 1.3.1 Underworld of Objectivity

Hermeneutics found in Porphyry’s interpretation of the *Categories* the first case of the eclipse of the first substance. That event keeps an epochal character (*Ereignis*) that marked following centuries of thinking. A modern way of thinking began a long time ago, after the decline of mysteries in the 4th century B.C. The divine revenge for the absence of critical reason was quite appropriate. Aeschylus, in the last part of his trilogy, had the Erinyes brought before the court of the wise Athenian people and made of them Reconciled goddesses (Εὐμενίδες). This reconciliation was done in spirit of wisdom on political agora. Unfortunately, Greek modernity cannot accomplish this reconciliation with wisdom in the political agora, because the archaic form of democracy had disappeared. The founding event of objectivity took place in the mode of *epokhē*. Original meaning derives from the astronomical event of the solar eclipse. Objectively, a solar eclipse does not have to occur in real terms because it is not necessary for modern science. The solar intellect shines perpetually and it is evidently right. The further chapters will analyze the new form of the substance of the third kind that derived from the solar eclipse as it is interpreted in the *Second Analytics*. The archaeology of objectivity found in the threefold scenario of Porphyry’s atomic substances the perspective of precomprehension (*Vor-blickbahn*) for modern metaphysics. Metaphysic substance became the *tertium ens* for the first time. The concept of the substance of the third kind became possible because of Porphyry’s interpretation of the *Categories* that brought about a new conjunction of truth and untruth. Neoplatonic schools of Late Antiquity were guided by the syncretistic philosophy and by dying mysteries. In that difficult situation, thinkers searched for some *pons assinorum* to connect the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. The predication *ad unum*, given in terms of the One or the real first substance, seemed to be the most difficult task for modernists. Aristotle rejected the world of Platonic ideas as a mere equivocal signification, since he established the univocity of categorical predication. The next generation of thinkers after Plotinus had to modify the status of a categorical predication in such a way that it took the line of Neoplatonism. In Late Antiquity, the search for the unity of being followed the argumentation in the *Metaphysics Gamma*. The predication *pros hen* leads the first science to the original unity of being (πρὸς ἓν καὶ μίαν τινὰ φύσιν, *Met*. 1003a33). The Neoplatonists took the formal character of categorical predication from the book *Categories*, namely the primacy of the indivisible substance given *simpliciter*. Modernists took up Aristotelian universal unity of being, which had originally been related to the second substance. They transferred it into the scenario of fully subsistent highest genera of being and to the hypostatized forms that emerge from these highest genera.

Plotinus excluded any direct relation between the first and the second hypostasis, because the One would lose the original unity. The original form of the intellect exists in the first hypostasis outside form and outside ideas (ἐκεῖνος ἄμορφος καὶ ἀνείδεος) and the One becomes ideally creative in the second emanation (οὕτω γὰρ εἰδοποιεῖ, *Enn*. 6.7.17.41–42). Instructed by *Physics* VIII and *Metaphysics* *Lambda*, as well as by the hyparchical predication from the *Categories,* Porphyry knew very well that the first Being has to keep in itself a fundamental substantial actuality. Otherwise, on the level of the One, there is no movement and also no creation of being. In that case, there would be no categorical predication at all. Being of Platon, according to the dialogue *Sophistes* and *Parmenides*, belongs to the five greatest genera (*Soph*. 254a–259c; *Parm*. 143a). Therefore, a pure henology of the separated One outlined by Plotinus is impossible according to Plato and Aristotle as well. The best interpreter of Plotinus had to introduce the relation between the One and the Many directly into the First Sphere, since otherwise would have occurred no dialectical movement of thinking and being. Porphyry’s and Iamblichus’s solution to the aporia of the One and the Many utilize the dialectical distinction between the separated One and its Being. The separated One must be absolutely united, what the first and the second hypothesis of the dialogue *Parmenides* postulates. The Neoplatonists, in accordance with the *Metaphysics Lambda*, kept in the separated One the basic activities given by its being.[[47]](#footnote-47) The first principle goes to outside as a kind of operational power. The wholly separated Being of Plotinus was incompatible with the modernized Neoplatonism. Porphyry’s commentary on the dialogue *Parmenides* defines two states of being within the sphere of the One. The being of the separated One (τοῦ εἶναι ὄντος τὸ ἀπόλυτον, *Porph. in Parm*. 12.32) is distinct from the internal idea of being (καὶ ὥσπερ ἰδέα τοῦ ὄντος, *ibid.* 12.32–33). The One exists in itself as the highest idea. The Neoplatonic One is and is not itself; it corresponds to itself from the standpoint of being and at the same time does not correspond to itself on the level of supplementary idea. The modern One contains within itself a creative idea and does not contain it, since the idea makes no independent existence.[[48]](#footnote-48) Through this fundamental ambivalence of the schizophrenic One, a newly founded henology grounds the subsequent determination of lower spheres. The henological identity of being and the One is given on the first level. Porphyry, in agreement with the first and second hypotheses of the dialogue *Parmenides*, emphasizes the separated being of the One (ἐπέκεινα ἑνὸς, *Porph. in Parm*. 12.31). Being is the archetype of the One within itself and at the same time it forms the fundamental capacity of the One capable of founding the cosmos. This twofold nature of being is evident in a fragment from Porphyry’s extant interpretation (διττὸν τὸ εἶναι, τὸ μὲν προϋπάρχει τοῦ ὄντος, *Porph. in Parm*. 12.29–30). The wholeness of Being exists *a priori* within its own act of primordial being (προϋπάρχει). Taken in this original duality, the Being is identical with the One. The hyparchical predication of the categories thus became a “pro-hyparchical” predication of Neoplatonism. Porphyry upheld Plotinus’s critique of the categories. For the equality of two things, the category of quality has an *a priori* given identity with respect to their being (τὸ γὰρ ταὐτὸν ἐν τῷ ποσῷ προϋπάρχει πρὸ τῆς σχέσεως, *Enn*. 6.1.6.20–21). The “pro-hyparchical” quality as the highest genus received a hypostatized existence (ἐν τῷ ποσῷ) outside the real being. The identity has become the ideal being (τὸ ταὐτὸν). Its properties have transcendental character with respect to the subordinate substances. Using this scenario, Porphyry introduced prohyparchic being as a new quality of the One, which produces subsequently hyparchical being, identity, unity, and diversity as original activity emanating from the primordial unity of Being. The verb προϋπάρχει denoting the original existence of unity recalls the hyparchical function of the first substance in Aristotle (*Cat*. 2a14–15) mentioned above, however, with one important difference. The proclitic particle (προ-) that introduces the verb ὑπάρχω refers to the Neoplatonic One and not to the existing first substance.

The reference to the *Enneads* shows that the category of quality with respect to the One stands beyond the hyparchical predication of the first Aristotelian substance. The prohyparchic quality of primordial unity and being establishes a new predication *per prius*, since it reveals being as the basic activity of the One in the direction of multiplicity. In the new scenario of emanation, the existence of the One grounds the wholeness of the actual being (τὸ δὲ ὃ ἐπάγεται ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος, *Porph. in Parm*. 12.31). The doubled being of the One is equipped with prohyparchic quality predicated in the form of transcendental category. This paradoxical unity refers to the One before its emanation into the lower spheres. Porphyry connected with the help of the twofold being Plato’s henology and the concept of the Immobile mover in the *Metaphysics Lambda* as the first substance and the first cause. The paradoxical being of the schizophrenic One was transferred into Aristotelian metaphysics. The modernized One keeps the archontic ability to found the metaphysical unity of being. The quoted section of the commentary (*Porph. in Parm*. 12.25–33) establishes the *Lichtung* that contains historial truth and untruth concerning objective being of the third kind. The being of the third kind was born in the first modern henology after separation of the first principle into the Platonic eminent One and into its Aristotelian being. This schizophrenic doppelganger of Plotinus’s Being was created with the help of the prohyparchic predication *per prius* according to the *Categories*. The new transcendental predication is based on the hypostatized accident of quality that “exsists” (*eksistit*) in mode *prohupárkhei* before the being of the second substance. Through Plotinus and Porphyry, the being of the third kind received the first onto-theological habitat, since it is directly located in the primordial sphere of the One. This duplication is repeated by modernity until Leibniz. He placed the ideas and their mathematical derivatives in the divine intellect, where arises the primordial and archetypal sphere of objectivity (*la région des vérités éternelles*; OBJ III, ch. 5.2.3). At the level of the One, Aristotle’s Law of the Excluded Third does not apply. In relation to the One there is no hyparchical predication, since it is limited to the level of the second substance. The metaphysical dative of Neoplatonists operates in the fully separated mode (*absolute*), which is quite paradoxical. There is no real donation of being at all, since the idea of the Neoplatonic One exists only in the mind of modern *illuminati*. The One is the Many at the same time, because its Being is given in the prohyparchic form of modern twofold identity. It is totally different from the Aristotelian identity given by the *actus essendi* of the real substance. Porphyry transformed Plotinus’s mystical visions into the system of metaphysics presented in the *Enneads*. The visions of mystic Plotinus in the divine presence were transformed into metaphysical *tékhne* for the sake of Neoplatonists. Divine Muses do not like that kind of proceeding at all. Therefore, they sent chaotic Furies to dominate modern thinkers. As a consequence, tragic hubris dominates modernity to be the main characteristic of modern and postmodern intellectuals.

The schizophrenic definition of the One done in the form of *tertium ens* requires the schizophrenic subject in order to be validated as a substance. The non-existent realm must at least be thought consistently and logically. The conjunction of mythopoetic and logic thinking proceeds hand in hand. The necessity given by divine reality of mysteries cannot guide such travesty, therefore the deductive logic produced by the Neoplatonic subject makes the deal. The doubled intellect of the Neoplatonic illuminates develops the new kind of categorial predication. Porphyry’s model of the self-reflexive replication of the intellect in the sphere of the One comes from the *Enneads*, which analyze the performance of doubled seeing (συνορώμενον, *Enn*. 5.5.7.5). The fifth *Ennead* shows the twofold structure of each act of contemplating (διττὸν καὶ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ βλέπειν, *Enn*. 5.5.7.1). The intellect perceives the essence of the thing and besides that it also perceives itself as another entity (ἕτερον ὂν τοῦ εἴδους, *Enn*. 5.5.7.4). Islamic Falsafa knew this *Ennead* through its paraphrase in the work *Theologia Aristotelis*. Ibn Adi was probably inspired by it to construct the trinitarian version of divine subjectivity (ch. 2.2). The insight into the primordial sphere of the One is complete, since it makes a mixture of categorical and transcendental predication. Modernity arose from the fact that thought and being of the third kind began to correspond to each other in the new mythopoetic tale. Porphyry founded the new predication *per prius* in the Neoplatonic One and he finalized the predication of the first Aristotelian substance. The ideal, unrestricted and prohyparchic being of the One in such a primordial quality passes into the restricted hyparchical being in the world. The One possesses itself in the act of primary being, seeing and thinking. The descent to the level of cosmic substance establishes the hyparchical predication in the framework of Aristotle’s *Categories*. The Neoplatonic One contains in itself all the ontological possibilities *per prius* in the act of primary existence, simplicity and actuality. Its essence is given in the order of prototypical possession of Being can be described by the Aristotelian category of quality and habitus. The habitual being of the One and the quality of its unity makes the complicated Other that are given on the level of the One before the first emanation. This differentiation on the level of the One became the first sphere of objectivity. Both cited categorical determinations of Porphyry and Jamblichus have a fundamental significance for the Neoplatonic founder of objectivity, Simplicius of Cilicia. The doubled being of the One has prohyparchic effect upon the hyparchical substances. Porphyry’s unrestricted *actus essendi* of the One, influenced by the *Metaphysics Lambda*, determines the restricted being of the first substance. The emanations from the first level transfer the qualities and habitus of the One into the real world, where Aristotle’s metaphysics and logic apply. Porphyry’s *Commentary on Parmenides* established the basic scenario of the deduction of universals from the original unity of being. This scenario is represented in the scholasticism by the terminus *resolutio* (OBJ II, ch. 2.3.2). The terminus “doubled being” and the scenario of deduction bound to it exported generically designated being from the sphere of the One with the help of categorial predication in the lower spheres. Neoplatonism changed the Platonic dialectic of Plotinus into categorial predication of bizarre Aristotelianism. The doubled being represents in Porphyry’s interpretation the first beginning of the Western objectivity for five reasons.

1. The primordial being of the One is fully real and it is a pure activity (τὸ ἐνεργεῖν καθαρόν, *Porph. in Parm*. 12.26). This primordial activity of mythopoetic One founded the demiurgic subject of the West. It considers itself and also the world as a summary of energies and forms destined for manipulation.
2. This prohyparchic being of the One is separated by its simplicity and absence of limitations from the lower spheres of being. The first limitation begins at the level of the One, since the ideally founded sphere of being is there (ἰδέα τοῦ ὄντος, *Porph. in Parm.* 12.33). The One manifests to the world through this ideality. Ideal compound of the One made possible the emergence of ontotheology in the Falsafa and in Christianity. Corresponding philosophy created the objective god of *Modernorum*. This divine *tertium ens* made the basic justification of objectivity until its death in the 19th century. The legitimation of objectivity runs *ad intra* towards the divine subjectivity and *ad extra* towards creation. Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus fully completed that twofold scenario of objective cosmogony.
3. The idea of being arises from the first objective definition of the henological Being of the One within its prohyparchic ideality (ἑνὸς τοῦ εἶναι ὄντος, *Porph. in Parm*. 12.32). The One creates the other beings by its exemplary ideality and by the highest grade of its peculiar Being. The act of hyparchical being of other existences is derived from the henological primacy of the One—Being. The commensurability of other beings to the One is determined by the following emanations that bring about the real entities. The possibility of predication *ad unum* arises from the hypostatic accidentals of quality and habitus, which preexist in exemplary form in the One. This hypostatic adequacy of the One and the Many is fundamental to the further development of objectivity. That accidental relation is determined *per prius* and it grounds the ontotheological construction of modern metaphysics. Objective predication beyond the second substance is carried out in the mode of false univocity. Classic Aristotelianism of the Falsafa and Middle Ages fundamentally rejected this reasoning.
4. The modern One or the modern God dwells in his twofold being done in prohyparchic way. This simulacrum distributes the hyparchical being downward by the order of emanations. Following this way, the predication can progress hierarchically in the cosmic order from top to bottom (*per prius*) and it can recapitulate this hierarchy in the reverse order (*per posterius*).
5. The transformation of that Neoplatonic scheme of dialectics and emanations of the One into the model of categorical predication inspired Porphyry’s successors. The original division in the framework of Aristotle’s categories referred to the first substance. It keeps its own actuality that determines the universal determinations in the intellect. This determination became obsolete. Neoplatonists found the original unity of being behind the categorial predication. Metaphysics became the first and most important science (*scientia transcendens*). It guaranteed a mystical transition into the parallel world of the modern mind, so-called diacosmos.

Proclus (†485) changed Aristotle’s perspective of categoric predication according to Porphyry’s project. We know his commentary on the dialogue *Parmenides* only partially, because it ends with the interpretation of *Parm.* 142a. But the preserved argumentation proves that Proclus knew Porphyry’ commentary on *Parmenides*, of which we possess only fragments as well. The existence of single real thing originates from the superordinate universal form. The change in the view of being is codified by Proclus in the descending mode. The Latin West adopted that vision through the work *Liber de causis* inspired by Proclus. The determination of being goes from the determining idea to its universal definition and finally to the essence of the single thing. Proclus’s argumentation generalizes the prohyparchic scenario of Porphyry. The new classification of being is based on an inverted perspective, which turns the Aristotelian supposition, made from the first real substance, on its head. Proclus predicates universal meaning in the mode of hyparchic imposition. The higher sphere represents the first real substance that determine by imposition the lower sphere as the second substance.

“In demonstrations and definitions the particular (*ton mekpion*) must be subordinate to the universal (*tou kathalou*) and the *definition (ton horismon*). Definitions of common features in particular do not take in the particulars as a whole. (…) The reason-principle of Man (*ho tou anthropou logos*) in us comprehends the whole of each particular, for the particular comprehends unitarily all those potencies which are seen as being involved in the individuals.” (*Procl*. *in Platonis Parm*. 981.5‒27; trad. Dillon‒Morrow 1992, 335)

The definition relates to universals in the mode *per prius*. It does not include in itself the singular substance in its holomorphic wholeness (κοινῶν ὁρισμοὶ οὐ περιλαμβάνουσιν ὅλα τὰ καθέκαστα, *Procl. in Parm*. 981.8–9). The above-mentioned analysis of Aristotle’s *Categories* asserts the same thing, but on behalf of the first substance, which, thanks to its unique actuality, cannot be included in categorial predication (ch. 1.2). Now the same proposition holds, but in the opposite direction. Since the universal form has all the perfection and fullness of definition, it stands outside the singular thing. It realizes from the original autonomous and universal form only a part of its possibilities (ἀνθρώπου λόγος ὅλον ἕκαστον περιέχει τὸ καθέκαστον, *Procl. in Parm*. 981.12–13). The participation of the first real substance in the universals is limited by the changeability of matter. The opposite perspective modified the unique human person as first Aristotelian substance in a modern individual. That nihilistic *individuum* is made as objective *factum* by the division of universals within *Arbor Porphyriana*. Again, the influence of the prohyparchic scenario of the superior generic being from the doubled One can be observed. The hylemorphic substance is mutable and imperfect; therefore, its being cannot establish a general definition necessary for the categorical determination of being. Proclus’s definition of Socrates as *tertium ens* is quite typical for the new worldview. The universal definition of Socratity now determines the first substance, which is given in and for itself in the *Categories*. The new “first substance” is given in the mode *absolute*, since it came into “eksistence” in a completely new way, separated from the Aristotelian categorical predication. Socrates’s individual existence, according to Proclus, cannot account for its universal extent (*ibid.*, 981.9–11). The work *Liber de causis* elaborates that kind of mythopoetic deduction. This compilation transmitted fundamental elements of Proclus’s deduction of forms from the One to the Scholasticism. The higher being of the universal determines the being of the individual (*imprimunt formas secundas*).[[49]](#footnote-49) The higher form is complete, permanent and subsistent. The lower form, including the first real substance, is only partial, transient and contingent. The Falsafa, Jewish philosophical mysticism, and Western modernism were inspired by Proclus’s axiomatic style of deduction done *modo geometrico*. The superior universal form determines the real hylemorphic substances in the order of causality. The permanent essence, by its influence upon the lower reality, establishes the contingent occurrence of the hylemorphic first substance. This argument is adopted by the Latin modernists as Rufus of Cornwall in the term “*eksistere”* (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.2). The essence is a permanent subsistent form; therefore, it determines the existence of the contingent thing. The singular real being became objective by the fact that its “eksisting” reality depends on the relation to the superior being done in the separated form. Done in this way, it came to the fundamental change of the path of ontological comprehension (*Vor-blickbahn*) that determines the way how the metaphysical entity gets its first and invisible meaning. Being and thinking began to correspond to each other in a new way. Neoplatonists changed the fundamental way “how” (the hermeneutic *Wie*) the thing becomes present for the intellect.

The successors of Porphyry outlined a mythopoetic donation of the being instead of the fundamental metaphysical event (ch. 1.2). Under the academic leadership of Furies, Neoplatonists modernized the above interpreted *dativus metaphysicus* made by Porphyry. In the *Isagoge*, the determination of the individual in the universal signification runs exclusively through the species and only in the mode of participation on specific universal content (ch. 1.3). The *illuminati* transferred the primacy of the first real substance confirmed in the *Isagoge* into the dialectical division of universals given only in the thought. The donation of the abstracted logical being goes with Proclus from the hypostatized species to the individual entity. The original metaphysical dative disappeared completely (τό τί ἦν εἶναι, ch. 1. 1), since it was related to Aristotle’s *quidditas* in the past mode of the first hylemorphic substance. Now the metaphysical dative entered the sphere of the One, which is given as “pro-hyparchical” meaning according to the above explained version of Porphyry’s Platonism. The schizophrenic One grounds the reality of the cosmos through a series of emanations. Neoplatonists and their modern successors, under the influence of Furies, seek the mystical grail of the past and pre-existent One rather than the earthly reality of the first substance. This objectively justified search is what we pay for today out of our taxes and fees. It is indeed musical justice worthy of the divine powers of Truth and Deception. The superior general form determines in Aristotelianism the being of the thing by giving a metaphysical definition to the first real substance. At the end, it defines the being as not further divisible “this here” in its final universal determination of being (ἄτομος, *individuum*). See the preceding definition of this individual in terms of “something determined” (τοιόνδε), which is given in Porphyry’s *Commentary on the Categories* (ch. 1.3). The imposition of the categorical meaning of the second substance was determined in Aristotle by the disclosure from the front, in relation to the existing thing. The Neoplatonic interpretation of substance illuminated the meaning of being from behind, from the indivisible and autonomously existing universal. Enlightened philosophers dwell in the sphere of the thinking of the One. Therefore they prefer to occupy themselves with the higher tasks of reflection rather than with thinking about the unity of hylemorphic substances, as limited Aristotelians do. All the successors of Porphyry had in mind his opening remark in the *Isagoge*, which says that this book will not deal with the subsistence of the genera and the species, because these things are very deep and therefore unsuitable for beginners (*Isag*. 1.10–14). Therefore, the next generation of Neoplatonists understood the *Isagoge* as an analysis of predications, which relate only to sensual meaning of the first substances. In the environment of the Neoplatonic *illuminati*, real substances acquired a relative character related to the universally conceived Being as the highest genus. The hyparchical predication of categorical meaning turned into “prohyparchic” mythopoetic tales. The hyparchical donation of meaning signified through the categories was transformed into a prohyparchic schema of *Enneads*. Neoplatonic interpretation of substance starts beyond the categorial predication, since it runs in the framework of Plotinus’s genera of being (περὶ τῶν γενῶν τοῦ ὄντος, *Enn*. VI.1–3). The enlightened thinkers of antiquity, therefore, sought a full, higher, or deeper interpretation of substance in the prohyparchic scenario related to the One. The Being considered from the point of view of the hidden mysteries of philosophy and the mysteries of the world is revealed in the framework of a new unconcealment of Being, which is explored by the philosophy of Late Antiquity. In this mythopoetic environment, organized by the goddesses of Vengeance, the first conception of Western objectivity emerges. The hubris of the Neoplatonism situated in the environment of mysterious syncretism of Late Antiquity began to produce the first tragic form of metaphysical paranoia. It creates the categorically given original sin (*peccatum originale*), which produces a specific form of metaphysical madness (μανία). A manic generation of modern metaphysicians transmits this madness to the next generation (ἄτη, ch. 1.1). After the expulsion of critical thought from the Aristotelian paradise, the tragic history of modernity took its course (*Irre, Irrtum*). After the expulsion from the Aristotelian paradise of critical thinking, the tragic history of modernity began. The successors of Porphyry produced a first series of being of the third kind that was integrated in the ontotheological structure of metaphysics.

Jamblichus of Chalcis (ca. †330) was Porphyry’s student and also his resolute critic. This did not prevent him from adopting Porphyry's neoplatonism and modifying it profoundly to create a new worldview. Jamblichus’s work stands at the beginning of an ontotheology that led to the propagation of *tertium ens*. This entity was conceptually codified by his successors, Dexippus and Simplicius. Avicenna took a large part of their ontotheology, as a direct founder of Western objectivity. The exegesis of Jamblichus cited above contains key elements of the newly founded ontotheology (Taormina 1999, 15–56). She summarizes Jamblichus’s ontotheology in the terminus “*méta-ontologie‑”* and presents its plan. For the sake of hermeneutics of objectivity, the fundamental question dealing with the possibility of ontotheology is of great importance.[[50]](#footnote-50) Jamblichus established a new figure of the diacosmos that dates back to the dialogue *Timaeus*. The basis of emanations is the separation of the ineffable divine One (θεός εἵς) outside the ontological sphere of the One—Being (τὸ ἕν ὄν). In the epoch of the Gnosticism, this doubling establishes a possibility of plurality in the One just as Porphyry did. Jamblichus explained the emergence of the demiurgic cosmos (διάκοσμος) with the help of mystic mediating between the Monad and the world of lower forms and cosmic souls. Plato’s philosophical tale for modernes educators changed into the first version of modern metaphysics. The interpretation of the diacosmos is intended for the highest class of the philosophical *illuminati*, who are capable to reach divine thinking. Jamblichus understands the work of Plato’s demiurge as theurgic creation within the framework of the deities of the first triad, which participate in the work of the divine intellect. The triadic structure of the first, second, and third intellects is hierarchically differentiated downward.[[51]](#footnote-51) With respect to the onto-theo-logically grounded Being, the predication runs horizontally at the level of cosmic species and vertically along the whole line of emanations (κατά τε πλάτος καὶ βάθος; Taormina 1999, 43). Trinitarian structure of the demiurgic intermediate world establishes the first-known form of objective ontotheology. Baghdad philosopher Ibn Adi recast it to create a new Aristotelian theology (ch. 2.2). The original unity of all meanings based on the division of secondary being is guaranteed by the Platonic principle “Limited—Unlimited” (πέρας καὶ ἄπειρον; *ibid.*, p. 46). The pair ensures the emanation of the Identical and the Different from the first sphere of the Intellect. Therefore, this double principle exists as a mediator between the absolutely separated One (τὸ ἁπλῶς ἕν) and the One—Being (τὸ ἕν ὄν). The principle of separation and division converges into mathematical description of the world made in the first emanation. Jamblichus, in agreement with Plotinus, understands the onto-theological construction of metaphysics according to analogical predication (*ibid.*, 49–50). Through the connection between ontotheology, mathematics and the creative work of the demiurge, analogy acquired a new character related to the unity of neoplatonic Being. The lower being preserves on a limited level the similarity with the higher being by carrying its henological and mystical determinations. This is especially true for the realm of the diacosmos, which connects the higher spheres with the lower world of forms. Porphyry’s doubled being of the One received onto-theological character by the introduction of Jamblichus’s intermediate world. Its new version made by Avicenna led to the objectivity in Latin scholasticism.

This cosmological intermediate stage is codified by Simplicius and his followers as new form of *tertium ens*. The diacosmos created by the successors of Jamblichus integrates the physical definition of the cosmos from Aristotle’s *Physics* into the Neoplatonic system. The physical body became a new species on the level of the hyparchical first substance. This brought together Neoplatonic ontotheology with the Aristotelian cosmological writings *Physics* and *De caelo*. In the diacosmos, all demiurgic activity is determined by the intellect. Done in that way, the Aristotelian physics of the body changed into objective metaphysics of the hypostases. Exposed in the dialogue *Timaeus,* the pedagogical tale of the third world made between material bodies and immaterial cosmic intelligence was reformed into the first model of objectivity. In the diacosmos, the physical meanings of bodies, extensibility, time and motion, etc. are separated from the motion and changes of hyparchic first substances. Formal properties of the substance as the carrier of various determinations (ὑποκείμενον, *subiectum*) done in Aristotle’s physics and cosmology, became universal significations determining the indivisible “substance-species.” The original form of this being of the third kind was born in Jamblichus’s ideal diacosmos. The similarity of demiurgic and mathematically determined entities with the separated One exists within the framework of theurgy; therefore, an analogical predication in new metaphysics is possible. Jamblichus connected the first and the second substance to a mythopoetic unity. The meaning of this *tertium ens* coincides with the universal scope of the analogical similarity of the lower being and the One—Being, which grounded the ontotheological construction of metaphysics. The introduction of analogy into the system of categories produced the first version of reality known through the scholastic term *analogia entis*. The predication of analogy is also meant in the Aristotelian sense, not only in the analogy of Plotinus’s higher and lower genera of being. But the Aristotelian conception of analogy applies only to the less enlightened souls who are unable to recognize the mystical unity of the world in a direct vision. Aristotle’s work *Nicomachean Ethics* takes analogy as coincidental agreement within the framework of *ad hoc* given homonymy (ἀπὸ τύχης ὁμωνύμοις... κατ' ἀναλογίαν, *E.N.* 1096b27–28). The correspondence exists in terms of substance (“healthy person”); the determination of the similarity arises only in the mind of the beholder observing the coincidences (“healthy food”). Predication *per prius* can be introduced into this homonymic analogy. Nevertheless, such a unity is formed only in the thinking of the knower at the level of potentiality. It is not founded by actual causality of substances in reality. This is main reason why the plurivocity of analogy differs from the univocal predication given in categorical statements. Gnostic Jamblichus knows that everything is related to the prohyparchical Being of the One. Therefore, he abolished the Aristotelian limitation of analogy and interpreted categorical predication according to the mythopoetic tradition of Neoplatonism. In Jamblichus’s first diacosmos, the Dyad is simultaneously Monad, the Rest is Motion, and the One is the Many. Henology contains within itself all essential determinations that have not yet been unfolded, but in a way different from Porphyry’s commentary on the dialogue *Parmenides* quoted above. The divine man Jamblichus (ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος), as Simplicius called him, sovereignly places himself at the beginning of creation, where things are and are not at the same time. This divine position creates the basic path to see the world of objective *coincidentia oppositorum*. This ontological perspective of understanding (*Vor-blickbahn*) is repeated by all further *iluminati* of western objectivity. Therefore, let us quote the original mytological position of Western science (*ortus scientiarum*) in full.

“Damascius confirms the fact that the great Jamblichus ‘collects the whole opposition into one intellection’ (πᾶσαν ἀντίθεσιν εἰς μίαν συνάγει νόησιν), since he retains that the expressions ‘in itself’ and ‘in other’ signify the unity of oppositions and do not express two different things, but only one.”[[52]](#footnote-52)

This model of illumination will play a decisive role in Persian philosophy, in Christian Augustinianism and Neoplatonism. What the Aristotelian Porphyry postulates as a deductive conclusion made on the basis of the hypotheses expressed in the dialogue *Parmenides*, this serves the Gnostic Jamblichus as a direct intuitive insight into the original secrets of the cosmos revealed in the dialogue *Timaeus*. Unlike the Tyrian philosopher, Jamblichus is a divine man, since he sees the non-existent diacosmos in direct insight. He does not have to laboriously deduce its “existence” from the One using the system of deduction of hypotheses according to the dialogue *Parmenides*. The same synoptic view made from the mythopoetic position of the divine eye guides Jamblichus’s interpretation of aristotelian categories. Simplicius, in his *Commentary on the Categories* cited further, explicitly links the discovery of the ten categories to the Pythagoreans and to Jamblichus (*Simpl. in Cat*. 116.25–26). Jamblichus supposedly defined substance on the basis of the Pythagorean discovery of the ability of the substratum to accept contrary determinations (black–white), and analogically extended this ability to the definition of substance as such. Simplicius’s commentary on the *Categories* also proves that Jamblichus’s lost commentary on the *Categories* was prepared with knowledge of Porphyry’s now lost commentary on the *Categories* dedicated to Gedalius. It is possible that this lost commentary of Porphyry contains the first fundamental change in the view of the work *Categories* towards Neoplatonism. His successors interpreted the Neoplatonic tendencies of Porphyry in such a way to be able to construct a new version of Neoplatonism, wherein the first objective vision of the world emerged. The status of the individual as another indivisible substance became a key term. The hermeneutic interpretation of changed perspective showed a fundamental difference between the Aristotelian Porphyry at the time of his stay in Sicily and his Neoplatonic successors, namely Simplicius. Jamblichus’s insight into the wholeness of being, according to Simplicius’s commentary on the *Categories*, is conducted from the perspective of modern God, i.e., as pure intellectual contemplation (τὴν νοερὰν θεωρίαν, *Simpl. in Cat.* 2.13). The new predication defined the meaning of being on the level of ontotheology and pseudo-mystics. Such a view corresponds to the disclosure of being from behind, i.e., from the demiurgic diacosmos. Hypostatized forms and emanations establish the superior diacosmos as objective simulacrum to enable the emergence of the hylemorphic world. The substance received a new character in the mode of analogical similarity of the Many and the One. The original hyparchical sense of the hylemorphic substance disappeared completely. The predication *per prius* starts from the general hypostatic form and not from the material single thing.

Dexippos’s interpretation of the *Categories* made in the second half of the 4th century codified new metaphysics initiated by Porphyry and Jamblichus (*Dexip. in Cat*. 40.14–18). Substance has double hyparchical status, either in the realm of intelligible or material forms (διττῆς οὐσίας ὑπαρχούσης, *ibid.* 40.14). The doubling of the first substance follows Porphyry’s interpretation of doubled being of the One. Dexippos’s interpretation of the *Categories* explains the substance in two modes: on the one hand, as Aristotle’s first substance and, on the other, as universalium (τί γὰρ κοινὸν ἐν ἀμφοτέροις τούτοις ἐν τῷ εἶναι ὑπάρχει, *ibid.* 40.15–16). The act of existing, originally given only in the first substance, becomes a privilege of the subsistent being as such, since it includes in itself universals as well. This new hyparchical substance of the third kind stands outside the Aristotelian determination of the body (οὔτε σῶμά ἐστιν οὔτ' ἀσώματον); hence it is given in the order *per prius* with respect to the multiplicity of real substances (πρότερον ἄλλο τούτων, *ibid.* 40.17–18). This gave rise to a new form of prohyparchic predication *pros hen* in Neoplatonism, which integrated the hyparchical predication of the *Categories*. Dexippos also connected the hyparchical and prohyparchic predication at the level of the real substance, which Porphyry would certainly have rejected. The hyparchical status of the first substance changed into the Neoplatonic determination of the transcendental unity predicated by the highest genera. The mythopoetic One, which makes the basis of the new system of metaphysics, replaced the first substance thanks to the Gnostic and philosophical vision of the universally conceived unity based on the analogy. The intelligible cosmic substance known from the *Metaphysics Lambda* (1069a34; 1071b4) is tied in late Neoplatonism to the One by the concept of numerical unity of One—Being. Thanks to the analogy introduced in the mode of mathematical harmony, the meaning of the first and second substance is connected into a metaphysical whole. Aristotle resolutely rejected numerically or analogically founded unity of being as a fundament of the first science. He sought metaphysical unity based on the categorial univocity, whereas the analogy signifies the unity of being only in the mode of homonymy. Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* considers numerical unity to be weak form, because it does not express the real essence of substance (οὐδὲ ὁ ὁρισμὸς τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι οὐκέτι ἔσται, *Met*. 1044a1–2). The mathematically given analogical unity cannot replace the metaphysical unity of being, which is given by imposition of meaning from real substances. The predication *per prius*, given with respect to the first substance, is replaced in Neoplatonism by the scenario of emanations that symbolise hierarchical plurality of hypostasis and forms. Dexippos’s form of analogy shows that a new ontological hybrid given as substance of the third kind was gradually inserted between the first and the second substance.[[53]](#footnote-53) Making use of analogy, Dexippos integrated categorical predication into Plotinus’s system of emanations. The katabasis and anabasis of hypostatic forms make a new relation to the One and it changed the hyparchical predication into a prohyparchical one. The table of categories received the statute of the ten highest genera related to the wholeness of being (δέκα γὰρ ὄντων τῶν ὅλων γενῶν, *Dexip. in Cat*. 42.20). Dexippos transformed the Aristotelian categories into a form of analogical predication founded on the similarity between lower sensible substances and higher intelligible substances. The final category is the One in its actuality of generic and actual Being. It can be predicated downward thanks to the analogical universality of individual beings. This integration of categorical predication into the system of Neoplatonic emanations in the mode *ad unum* will play a key role in the later stages of objectivity.

### 1.3.2 Cosmological substance of the Third Kind

Gigantomachy about substance done in the Late Antiquity showed that Porphyry’s successors had changed the first substance into a particular kind of species. This universal entity received the character of being of the third kind. The introductory interpretation of the *Categories* shows that Aristotle gave to the species no hyparchical status. This universal was the closest to the first real substance (*Cat*. 2b7–8). Porphyry conceived the second substance and the species only in the order of language. These atomic substances have universal character in contrast to the real occurrence of the indivisible first substance. It means that secondary substances need as substratum the human intellect and body in order to be present in the world. New metaphysics was accomplished in Jamblichus’s diacosmos in virtue of analogic unity of being and on the basis of hypostatic properties attached to Neoplatonic species. Neoplatonists deliberately ignored Aristotle’s basic thesis that the unity of the first science should be sought only on the basis of first real substances. The new direction of Neoplatonism showed that true unity of being can be found outside the first substance that exist in reality. The mind of *illuminati* directed to the One or to God no longer needs the reality of the first physical substance to make a mystical escapism. Neoplatonism abolished the original hyparchical orientation of categorical predication. The reason for this change was, among other things, the philosophical and religious syncretism of Late Antiquity, which linked all currents of thought, mysteries and religions into a mystical unity. For the emergence of objectivity, it is a great damage that we do not know the content of Porphyry’s lost writing about the unified philosophy of Plato and Aristotle.[[54]](#footnote-54) Alfarabi took up anew this unity of both philosophers and he constituted the first *Lichtung* of truth and untruth of western objectivity in the Falsafa. The predication of the new form of atomic substance fundamentally changed the table of ten categories. The proof can be found in Dexippos’s commentary on the *Categories* written around the year 350. After Dexippos, Simplicius joined in with the new project of indivisible substance. His *Commentary on the Categories*, written around the year 532, acquires a key significance in the final phase of objectivity. William Moerbeke translates it into Latin about the year 1266. The subsequent generation of *Modernorum* began to use it for the construction of objective metaphysics after the year 1280.

Simplicius summarizes three basic positions of the commentators on Aristotle’s key writing and makes a fundamental interpretative choice that shapes the development of philosophy in the next millennium.[[55]](#footnote-55) The first stream of interpreters claims that the categories refer to real beings. The second group relates the categories only to the nominal meaning, which is given only homonymically, that is, at the level of the word. The third group understands it on the level of the universal concept, which gets very special hypostasized properties. This last position, according to Simplicius’s commentary, was held especially by Alexander Aphrodisias, who conceives the categories as words that signify the ten genera of being by means of the corresponding universal concepts. Simplicius defined a new substance of the third kind as indivisible species according to the cosmological outline of Aristotle’s *Physics* and *Metaphysics*. The new definition of the first substance accomplished a translation of Aristotle’s substance to Neoplatonism within the framework of the species. Done in this way, the objective conception of science came into being. Simplicius predicated the substance of species within the framework of the categorical predication given *per prius*, in which the meaning of the first and second substance intermingled. Porphyry’s ambivalent indivisible substance (ἄτομος οὐσία) received a new status at the level of species by the argument of *modus tollens* (ch. 1.3). Let us now return to the original definition of the primacy of the first substance in the *Categories*. This definition has the primacy of the order of simplicity and shapes categorial predication (*Cat*. 2a11–12). The signification proceeds as the disclosure of being from the front, i.e., from the causality of the first existing substance. The direction of the predication in the mode *per prius* makes imposition of meaning with respect to the primary simplicity of the actual thing. It is represented in the order of universal predication by the second substance. The new plan of metaphysics, on the other hand, begins to seek the meaning of being by exposing it from behind, that is, from the diacosmos of autonomous forms. The concept of the first substance according to Simplicius makes the Neoplatonic *Aufhebung* of the ambivalent status of the *Categories*, which is hidden in Porphyry’s concept of the atomic substance. Simplicius understands the table of the ten categories as generic determinations of being in the Neoplatonic scenario. See the second alternative in the interpretation of the *Categories* in the final explication of Porphyry (ch. 1.3). The revised form of Aristotle’s physics includes the indivisibility of the first substance in the categorical statement. Neoplatonic system of hypostases canceled the hyparchical meaning of the first real substance. Simplicius made of the first substance a special kind of indivisible single entity (*individuum*), which is determined in terms of species and genus in mode *per prius*. The possibilities of interpretation with regard to the indivisible substance were thereby extended by a third above-mentioned alternative. That proceeding founded the objective determination of being in scholasticism. The new *tertium ens* arose from a mix of the first and second substance and, moreover, is predicated within the framework of the table of Aristotelian categories.

Simplicius canceled the classical doctrine of categories given in Alexander and Porphyry and his solution prevailed for its logical simplicity. The cosmic bodies have the character of eternal and indivisible bodies, given as cosmic intellect in pure immaterial and undivided forms. The cosmic species are separated from the sensual perception. Therefore they establish a new kind of causal and material world that consists of specific and formally given uniqueness. These first substances cannot be annulled because they are eternal like the Sun, the Moon and the Cosmos. The cosmic intelligences and forms constitute both the first substance and the eternal and immaterial species given in one specimen. Porphyry’s interpretation of *modus tollens*, which establishes predication *per prius*, therefore does not apply to immaterial cosmic substances (ch. 1.3). Simplicius recognizes affirmative *modus ponens*, which grounds the being of the eternal cosmic “substance—species” in a completely dogmatic way. The affirmation confirms the indivisibility of the cosmic and purely intellectual substances, which are universal forms. At the same time, they keep the physical reality of the first substances. The reality of the substances-species coincides with their immaterial and purely formal determination. By this mythopoetic mixture of existence, essences and categorical predication came into being the first *Lichtung* of the Western objectivity. It is not excluded that the conjunction between ontological and categorial predication with regard to the separate cosmic substances had already existed in some way in the metaphysics of Porphyry. We know his commentary on the dialogue *Timaeus* only fragmentarily; he hints at the division into two types of existence as predicated with respect to the superior world of ideas. Proclus’s commentary on the *Timaeus* quotes from Porphyry’s commentary that the *phūsis* exists in Porphyry in the context of demiurgic predication *per prius* and *per posterius*. The whole of *phūsis* is given *per prius*, because it produces the cosmic life through the mediating character of the Platonic forms (ἡ τοῦ παντὸς φύσις ἡ ζῳοποιοῦσα τὸ πᾶν; *Procl. in Tim.* 257.8–9). Proclus confirms that *phūsis* in Porphyry’s *Timaeus* is determined both by divisibility of bodies in the realm of genesis (ὡς μὲν μεριστὴ περὶ τοῖς σώμασι γενητή ἐστιν) as well as is determined by the indivisibility of the non-corporeal entities in the realm of eternal permanence (ὡς δὲ παντελῶς ἀσώματος ἀγένητος, *Procl. In Tim*. 257.9–11). Porphyry’s dual status of the substances (ἀσώματος, ἀγένητος) is defined through the mediation of prohyparchical forms. Simplicius took that division and predication to be the key element in his system. He created a new analogy to Plotinus’s *modus ponens*. It is applied to the physically given universal species and not to the autonomous genus as in the *Enneads* (ch. 1.3). The abstract individual given as a specific body in the form of the immaterial cosmic intelligence eclipsed the real hylemorphic first substance. The *illuminati* such as Simplicius, no longer perceived the world with the senses because they observed it directly through their enlightened mind. The introduction of hypostatized species suppressed the Platonic supreme genus and it enabled a new type of categorical predication. The synthesis between the first and the second substance created the primary position of the species-substance given in the framework of a formal and ontological indivisibility. The new “first substance” given as hypostatic species is predicated *per prius*. The indivisibility refers to the primary cosmic species, which hold ontological primacy over the first hyparchic substances of Aristotle (καὶ οὕτως κυριώτερόν ἐστι τῶν ἀτόμων κατὰ τὸν τῆς φύσεως λόγον, *Simpl. In Cat*. 85.12–13). The predication contains two important moments related to indivisible substances (τῶν ἀτόμων). In predication, the newly created substance-species plays the role of the first and indivisible being, which categorically determines *per prius* all other and subordinate first substance (κυριώτερόν ἐστι). Their metaphysical primacy is given by the indivisibility of the spiritual and intellectual substances dwelling in the astral spheres. The definition of their nature (κατὰ τὸν τῆς φύσεως λόγον) recalls that the new predication takes place within the framework of Aristotle’s physics describing the motion of hylemorphic bodies and cosmic substances. The new atomic and “physical” substance is predicated *per prius* as the universally given species. It objectively “exsists” like the eternal and immaterial cosmic “intelligence—form—substance.” The newly conceived universality of Simplicius’s “substance” transcended the definition of Alexander and Porphyry. They proclaimed the Aristotelian primacy of the first substance, whether as a material thing or as a separated intelligent cosmic form. Both forms of first substance exist *per se* and *simpliciter*; hence they are separate from the categorical predication. Simplicius’s hybrid substance-species took the place of the first substance, which Aristotle defined to be completely separated from semantic and categorial meanings. In the new categorical predication, species plays the role of the hyparchical first substance represented by the eternal cosmic forms and intelligence. By analogical use of indivisibility for the first and also for the second substance, Neoplatonism raised the second substance to the level of the first substance. Its metaphysical status, on the other hand, was abolished. Simplicius harmonized both divided orders of reality into a new unity. Thereby he completely changed the status of the hyparchical indivisible first substance defined by the *Categories*. The absolute status of the first substance disappeared because it had simultaneously become an indivisible and eternal individual. According to Porphyry’s proposition in the *Isagoge*, the new individual was connected with the species in the holistic mode (*totum autem non alterius*, ὅλον δὲ οὐκ ἄλλου; ch. 1.3). Since the species of the third kind is the universal entity, it necessarily received a categorical determination according to the suppositional predication determined by the higher universality of the genus (Cat. 2a15–16). The bond between the species and the last indivisible part of the meaning (*individuum*) takes the hyparchical level of predication. The individual forms quite modern categorical predication concerning an “atomic substance” of the mythological kind. The previous form of hyparchical predication determined the second substance in the mode of imposition given by the first substance (Cat. 2a14–15). The new *tertium ens* was produced on the basis of the categorization given by Porphyry’s division of the genera into a second and a last indivisible unity of meaning. Porphyry’s indivisible substance (ἄτομος οὐσία) received a new status in Simplicius through the division of universals within the framework of the genus and the species down to the individual that cannot be further divided. This transformation of the substance, which is connected with the disclosure of metaphysic meaning from behind, forms the fundamental step on the way to modern objectivity. The first substance changed into the hyparchic individual, because the cosmic forms and intelligences are substances and have the properties described in physics. This “individual—substance—body” merged with the second universal substance given as a hypostatic cosmic species. The first pseudo-physical body of the third kind came into being by this multiple mixture of the various predications. Moreover, it is intermingled with the hyparchical being of the first substance. Connection of the first and the second substance into an eternal immaterial species of the type the Sun, the Moon or the whole of the Cosmos generated the archetype of objective entities.

Simplicius completed the Neoplatonic eclipse of the first substance, which inaugurated Porphyry’s interpretation of the *Categories*. According to Aristotle’s *Physics*, the indivisibility and simplicity of the first substance is given in the real world of physical bodies and the indivisibility and simplicity of the predicated second substance derives from the first real substance. In a mystic form of Neoplatonic physics, the “first substance” is connected with the help of Jamblichus’s analogy with the Platonic demiurgic diacosmos described in the dialogue *Timaeus*. In late Neoplatonism, a new kind of *tertium ens* emerged that relates to Aristotle’s teaching in the book of *Physics*. An important part of Simplicius’s commentary on the *Categories* states that the universality of the indivisible cosmic bodies is predicated in relation to the singular things. The universal meaning given at the first place is transferred into lower levels (μεταδίδωσι καὶ τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα ἑαυτό, *Simpl. in Cat*. 85.11–12). The verb μεταδίδω denotes the clear revocation of Aristotelian categorial doctrine. Simplicius repositioned the Aristotelian categories as the highest Platonic genera of Being that he considers to be the supreme genus. The *translatio* *studiorum* in the matter of categorial predication confirms a fundamental turn in the category theory and in the metaphysics. The original predication relates to the first real substance, which exists hylemorphically and is first perceived through the senses. It received Neoplatonic meaning that refers to the highest species. Proceeding from universal species of substance, the new type of predication *per prius* pretends to be true version of Aristotelian metaphysics. The new predication *per prius* is possible because the second substance according to Simplikios is given as the highest cosmic substance (τὴν κυριωτάτην οὐσίαν ἔχον, *Simpl. in Cat*. 85.11). Neoplatonism considers the determination *per prius* with regard to the substance, which is given in the realm of autonomous Platonic forms. According to Aristotle, these exist only in thought.

The new universal and also actual “substance—species” fundamentally changed the table of categories. The problem was not in the actual existence of immaterial cosmic forms and heavenly intelligences, since they were for Aristotle the first substances as well. The error consisted in the fact that the predication of these cosmic forms on the level of language reached the same level as their actual and immaterial existence in reality. At the cosmic level, the metaphysical dative no longer applied. In the Aristotelianism, it determined the place of hyparchical predication related to *quidditas*. It was recognized and predicated through *impositio* on the level of categorial meaning. The simplicity of the cosmic intelligences and forms coincides at the highest level with the actual thinking, which is the total hubris of the Neoplatonic *illuminati*. They raised their own subject of mythopoetic knowledge on the level of divine cosmology and made it an eternal a quasi-divine substrate. That is the way how the first form of transcendental relation “subject—object” was born, which determined the tragic fate of Western ontothelogy. Therefore at the level of highest genera, the signification of generic meaning and real entities is mutually convertible and cannot be decomposed to further categorical determinations. The substance-species stands on the summit of a new categorial predication. Specific identity and meaning acquired a categorial position *per prius*, which denotes the metaphysical primacy of genera and species (κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ προηγουμένως, *Simpl. in Cat*. 73.25). In this thesis lies the source of the scholastic *resolutio*, which proposed Philip the Chancellor in his doctrine of the transcendentalia (OBJ II, ch. 2.3.2). The second substance eclipsed the first substance to form the mythopoetic body-species. This being of the third kind became a metaphysical hegemon which established the unity of the categorical predication. The mixture of the species and the first substance gave rise to a new predication *per prius* and *per posterius* (τὸ πρότερον ἔστιν καὶ τὸ ὕστερον; *ibid.*, 73.20). Simplicius linked Neoplatonic predication to the new vision of being presented by Porphyry’s commentary on the dialogue *Parmenides* where the doubled being of the One (ch. 1.3.1) was presented. The mythopoetic language of *illuminati* reached the divine level to be one with the cosmic forms. This “science” of divine academics became the new worldview. The learned word of the *illuminati* became the cosmic body and it dwelt among us from now on, in its objective scientific glory. This completely paranoid metaphorical understanding began to define metaphysics in the first modern divine comedy. The new form of tragicomedy, which emerged under the leadership of the vengeful Erinyes, continues in the nihilistic phase of metaphysics to this day. In the categorically predicated diacosmos of Neoplatonists converge reality and thought, first and second substance, univocity and equivocity. The unity is built on the analogy of *tertium ens* that produces metaphoric predication *per prius*. The cosmic order is seen in the *Vor-blickbahn* given as disclosure of being from behind. The eternal species given in the mind ensure the uniqueness and actuality of the real hylemorphic substances. Neoplatonic species ensure the hyparchical role of the first substance and they enable the new science to have a univocal categorial predication about objective diacosmos. The transfer of predication from the first substances to the newly conceived cosmic species in Aristotle’s sophistical mode abrogated Plotinus’s highest genera of being and Plato’s ideas. A new form of “*Ge-Stell*” appeared when the generic, hypostatic entity was mythologically sent into the real world. The generic objectivity was “de-livered” to the real thing as its second nature, i.e. as a “substance-species”. The guarantor of this quite specific donation of mytological being is the modern, quite paranoid subject. The quoted verb *metadídō* points to the *translatio entis* in the modernity that proceeds in a completely metaphoric and mythopoetic way of thinking. The original source of translation is the eternal and immutable cosmic species. It is separated by its immaterial “exsistence” from the hylemorphic first substance. The transfer of meaning from the second substance to the first and its transformation to *tertium ens* within the framework of the Neoplatonic species establishes the adventure of the Western objectivity in the mode of epochal madness (*Irre*). The thinker of Cilicia, who admired the divine man Jamblichus, follows his hubris and creates a new cosmology as well as a new metaphysics. Simplicius replaced Jamblichus’s mystical insight into the One by the categorical predication in the direction of the One. This transfer of metaphysics was accomplished by Gandavus and Scotus in the school of the modern *illuminati* inspired by the Augustinian Avicennism. The modernists are unsatisfied and insatiable mystics, also *sui generis*.

Simplicius’s “substance—body—species” displaced Plato’s idea in the new form of metaphysics. The new form of *tertium ens* founded a new *Vor-blickbahn* that forms the understanding of being. Neoplatonic predication changed the scheme of the *Categories* and accomplished the epochal *translatio studiorum*. Simplicius’s concept of intellect takes over the definition of intellect outlined in the commentary on *De anima* done by Alexander Aphrodisias. The sense of being proceeds from the active and separate intellect in which the soul participates. Simplicius defends the Neoplatonic and Gnostic scenario of cognition. The meaning of being is given by the disclosure of being from behind, that is, from the subsistent and eternal forms. The soul falls into the material world and its hylic cognition strives to achieve at least a partial unity with the separated One. The intellect enlightened by the higher world of the diacosmos projects intelligible contents towards the material things. The cognition of the first substance became in fact only a projection and a secondary characteristic of the original connection of the intellect with the world of the separated cosmic forms and intelligences. The system of the Neoplatonic disclosure of being from behind shows that the thought and the apprehended object are directly connected. Thus, it is clear that this model of cognition, given by the illumination of being from behind, requires no mediation, sensual or even intellectual. Aphrodisias’s and thus Simplicus’s conception of the hypostatized and separated *intellectus agens*, which acts on our cognition from outside, is rejected in part by al-Farabi and completely by Averroes. The illuminated thinking participates directly in the world of separated subsistent forms thanks to the mystical insight into the substance-species. Such kind of cognitive intention is based on the mythopoetic illumination from the higher forms of the intellect, which exist as fully subsistent being. The following quotation shows the first objective seeing of the world in the mode of modern existential alienation. The illuminated mind full of existential anguish contemplates the univocal and objectively homogeneous world from the viewpoint of the non-existent cosmic intelligible form-species. Thus, a new form of academic myth about the tragic odyssey of the modern spirit is created, which is repeated by Bonaventure and Hegel. It is no wonder that this supreme connection of the body with the spirit can never be realized by the schizophrenic thinking of the *Modernorum*.

“Once, however, the soul has departed from there [sc. the intelligible world], it also separates the formulae (*logoi*) within itself from beings, thereby converting them into images instead of prototypes, and it introduces a distance between intellection and realities. This is all the more true, the further the soul has departed from its similarity to the Intellect, and it is henceforth content to project (*proballesthai*) notions which are consonant with realities.” (*Simpl. in Cat.* 12.18‒25; trad. Chase 2003, 28)

The quote shows a trajectory of ontological comprehension that constitutes the ultimate framework of modern metaphysical meaning (*Bezugssinn*). Science of modernity starts from the autonomous intellectual forms. The soul exists primarily in the mode of alienation with respect to the material world (διέστησεν τὴν νόησιν ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων). This “diastasis” between thinking and reality defines the stage of the contemporary anthropocene. The noemata are not determined by the real things. They are projected in a “proballistic” form from the intellect to the things (τοῖς πράγμασιν προβάλλεσθαι τὰ νοήματα). The verb *proballō* indicates new perspective of comprehension (*Vor-blickbahn*) that make the preleable meaning of each modern metaphysic being. Donation of meaning starts on the level of the modern subject and then it goes to the reality. This kind of dative denotes the new position of the modern subject, which appropriates the world for itself (*Ge-Stell*, ch. 1.2). Modern subject as original source of intellectual cognition produces the noemata that go to real things only in the second step. Simplicius’s form of the metaphysical dative (τοῖς πράγμασιν) confirms that the scheme of cognition is turned from the reality of the first substances to the reality of essences that directly illuminate the intellect. The hyparchical connection does not concern the first real substance. The noetic world exists independently of the hylic world, since it is of immaterial and eternal nature. The metaphysical dative related to the being of the third kind shows a new way in which the objective cognition determines reality. The quotation shows the separation from the Aristotelian categorical predication, which is determined by empiric knowledge of the first substance. The soul of *illuminati* recognizes the noemata in direct insight. In such an intelligible light, they recognize the real world of material and sensual things. Modern *illuminatus* therefore observes the real hylemorphic substances in the mode of fundamental alienation. That erroneous of path of vision (*Irrtum*) makes the fundamental mythopoetic character of the modernity and it founds the specific form of academic madness (*Irre*). Karl Marx very wisely defined that kind of *Entfremdung* als fundament of postmodern kapitalism. The disclosure of the first real substance from the prohyparchical diacosmos founded the mythologic unconcealment (*alētheia*) of the substance in the mode of objective *veritas*. This path of insight illuminates the meaning of being from the objectively given diacosmos or even directly from the prohyparchical Being of the One. The new form of objective disposition of being discovered by Simplicius is later shown by the modern categories in the mode of *dativus obiectivus* (OBJ III, ch. 4). The founding causality of modern cognition is taken from the Neoplatonic species and not from the actual thing existing in reality. The soul plagued by Neoplatonic destiny takes up the intellectual Odyssey to cross the transient world of real first substances. This deviation makes the necessary evil in order to return to the realm of modern diacosmos. The modern *illuminatus* experiences a fundamental alienation from reality in the form of Neoplatonic diastasis, which is given by the distance of the intellect from real things (διέστησεν τὴν νόησιν ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων). This mythopoetic alienation of modern mind from its true home founds the academic odyssey of objectivity. It was repeated in the modernism of the Scholastic and thereafter by Cartesian, Hegelian as well as the Great Reset of nihilistic corporations. The curriculum of the first modern deduction of cognition given *ex nihilo* from the non-existent diacosmos shows the origin of Hegel’s alienation and also the *Lichtung* of media manipulations and the matrix world of today. After overcoming this alienation, the enlightened intellect attains the higher truth by contemplating the world of pure forms. The *translatio studiorum* abandoned the exploration of the first substance in the classic Aristotelian physics and in metaphysics. Modernity prefers the theurgic insight into the mysteries of cosmic intelligences (Jamblichus) and their subsequent predication in the objective diacosmos (Simplicius). The universal noemata are “pro-ballistically” assigned to real things, since they are not abstracted from real things. The noemata enable the participation of the intellect in the world of subsistent forms. Modern intelligentsia examines real things *per posterius*. Aristotle’s scenario of cognition and truth is thereby turned completely upside down. Therefore, the Neoplatonists consider the Stagirite as a mere imitator and classifier of divine men as Pythagoras and Jamblichus. The first form of the *dativus obiectivus* shows that the “proballistic” predication of Simplicius gave things specific reason for their “eksistence” since it transformed the real thing being into an objective being. The noematic contents (προβάλλεσθαι τὰ νοήματα) are sent in mode *per prius* (*pro/ballō*) to the actual things (τοῖς πράγμασιν). The universals give real things a sufficient reason for existence from the point of view of the objective diacosmos. The creation of meaning of the world begins at the level of the modern subject. The “proballistic” activity of the illuminate, under the leadership of Furies, created a new form of metaphysical dative in the form of Heidegger’s *Irre*. The hylemorphic thing exists for itself and the illuminate added to its existence another mythopoetic ratio. That reason makes in the mode of analogy a conjunction with the material being to elevate it in the higher world of the form-species. Simplicius’s mythopoetic *ratio sufficiens* is postulated for the real first substances by Leibniz in the Principle of the Sufficient Reason (OBJ II, ch. 3.5). Neoplatonic interpretation of the *Categories* prepared a new *Lichtung* for truth and untruth of Western scholasticism. The knowledge does not come from the reality of the first substances, but from the performance of the soul, which contemplates the objective diacosmos. The academic myth of the modern intellect—sun, establishes the starting point of knowledge apart from the real things. It came to the first *epokhē* of the first substance in Western thinking. The actuality of the cosmic *intellectus agens* establishes gnostic activity of *illuminati* in the everyday world, in which modernists survive at the price of intellectual alienation. In the second step, Neoplatonists make their journey into the world of material first substances. Simplicius’s noematic insight into being is taken over by the first modernist Rufus of Cornwall in terminus *scibile* (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.2) and after him by Husserl. These two *illuminati* of the Latin West claim that in such kind of cognition they go to so-called things themselves (*zu* *den* *Sachen selbst*). They followed the path of Simplicius claiming that original “thing” of philosophy is given in the act of ideal *Wesensschau*, which the intellect carries in itself and from itself. The hermeneutics follow the interpretation of *translatio studiorum* from Porphyry to Simplicius. Modernity and the postmodernity consider the term “thing” to be the Neoplatonic indivisible substance (*individuum*) presented as being of the third kind. The new *tertium ens* is predicated in the mode *absolute*, i.e., separately from the hylemorphic first substance. Modernity lost the most important point of Aristotle’s explanation in the *Categories* that connected reality and critical thinking.

The category of relation plays a key role in the creation of objectivity and it was already mentioned in Porphyry’s interpretation of the dialogue *Parmenides* (ch. 1.3.1). This accident began to function as an independent hypostasis and substance. Aristotle’s original meaning connected the category of relation (*relatio*) with the state of real substances. Simplicius, by referring to the Pseudo-Archytas, introduces a categorical meaning of *esse ad* in the mode *simpliciter* (πρός τι τὸ ἁπλῶς).[[56]](#footnote-56) Simplicius took the Pythagorean music form of arithmetical relation as the basis of objective signification (περὶ ἀριθμὸν ἢ κατὰ ἀριθμόν τι σημαίνει, *Simpl. in Cat*. 61.9). Aristotle’s accidental category of relation turned into the substance of the third kind. Its meaning is derived from the arithmetical number which establishes the categorical signification according to Neoplatonism in the mode *per prius*. The property, originally considered only in relation to the real substance, began to function as an independent hypostasis in the mode *simpliciter*, since it had a mathematical definition with reference to the Pythagoreans. Thanks to the mathematical analogy, a new hypostatized relation between the substance and the accidentals emerged (τῷ δὲ πρός τι τὸ ἁπλῶς πρὸς ἄλληλα λέγεσθαι, *ibid.* 61.10). By using the mathematical analogy, the superordinate reference given as such (ἁπλῶς) differed from the Aristotelian relation “substance—accident” in the mode πρός τι (“man” in relation to “small,” “large,” “master,” “slave”). Another change in predication and in the whole table of ten categories for the development of objectivity is documented by the important section in Simplicius’s commentary where the categorical determination of the accident called *habitus* is found (*Simpl. in Cat*. 164.13–21). The original Aristotelian determination of this category (τὸ ἔχειν) is derived from two sections in the *Categories* (*Cat*. 2a3; 11b13) and in the *Metaphysics* (*Met*. 1022b4–6). The *Categories* contains a key section (11b13) where six principles are listed that determine accidental predication with respect to the second substance (*actio, passio, ubi, quando, situs, habitus*). Scholasticism knew these principles as key predicaments since the second half of the 11th century through the work *De sex rerum principiis*. The habitus belongs to the accidental determinations of the substance, which generates a specific activity or ability of autonomous movement as the observed and predicated state of the second substance. The original meaning of the accidental habitus in the *Metaphysics* is related to the activity possessed by the substance, which belongs to it like the accident, since it emanates from it (being clothed, armed, dressed). The possession of the activity or state, which is called *héxis*, was translated into Latin as *habitus*. Aristotle asserts that the first substance (“man”) has actual state (“being clothed”), which can be predicated of the second substance as its accidental meaning. Simplicius changed the Aristotelian relation to reality into a Neoplatonic relation between the pure, intelligible concept of possession that received hypostatic meaning. This corresponds to Simplicius’s noematic exegesis of the *Categories* mentioned above. His commentary on the definition of *habitus* in the *Categories* and the *Metaphysics* removes the accidental determination related to the second substance. The new habitus relates only to the substantively conceived quality “of what habitus is in itself” (ἡ ἕξις πρὸς τὸ ἑκτὸν, *Simpl. in Cat*. 164.15). The hypostasis of habitus took place through the already mentioned category of relation (πρός τι), which became the new substance. The habitus as accident changed into a Neoplatonic habitus as hypostatic essence (τὸ ἑκτὸν) and then it was categorically predicated at the level of Aristotle’s second substance (πρὸς τὸ ἑκτὸν καὶ ἐχόμενον λέγεται ἡ ἕξις, *Simpl. In Cat*. 163.31). A key role in the constitution of habitus as a new substance of the third kind is already played by the hypostatized accident of relation mentioned above, which enables to make hypostasis of any other accident. This gave rise to a new identity of *héxis*, which is separated from the first substance (οὐ γὰρ ἔχεται ἡ ἕξις; *ibid.* 164.20). For the further development of objectivity, especially the definition of the habitus with regard to activity of the subject will play a crucial role. This activity is invoked in the *Metaphysics Lambda*.[[57]](#footnote-57) The habitus of activity is defined as the middle position between the active and passive events (τὸ μὲν ποιῇ τὸ δὲ ποιῆται, ἔστι ποίησις μεταξύ, *Met*. 1022b6). The substance possesses this ability with regard to the activities performed actively or passively. The first substance, which is predicated in the second substance, can have something passively, but also be something or perform something actively. Neoplatonism took the habitual determination of substance and hypostatized this property as a universal quality (τὸ ποίησις). Another key element is given in the determination of habitus as possession, which holds the given activity accidentally (ἐνέργειά τις τοῦ ἔχοντος καὶ ἐχομένου, *Met*. 1022b4–5). By the conjunction of hypostasis (τὸ ποίησις) and actuality (ἐνέργειά τις) came to the transformation of the habitus into a new physical substance of the third kind. The new determination of habitus is not primarily determined by the first substance, which is perceived through the senses and predicated in terms of the second substance, but by the intellectual vision of the hypostatic species, which is endowed with its own actuality. Simplicius shifted the determination of habitus from the actuality of the first substance (ἐνέργειά τις) to the middle position between the active subject of possession and the passively possessed object (ἕξις ὡς μεταξὺ τοῦ ἔχοντος καὶ ἐχομένου, *ibid.* 164.19–20). Habitus became a new species, which acts as hypostasis for physical *passio* and *actio* and replaced the second substance in the table of categories. Habitus became the new hypostatized second substance and was no longer the original Aristotelian accident. The *Categories* determined the entire table of categories by the primacy of the second substance as the highest univocally predicated meaning given with respect to the reality of the first substances. Habitus, according to Simplicius’s commentary, represents the hypostatized possession. It is determined by the disclosure of habitus from the world of pure forms. The meaning of habitus in the categorical mode *per prius* no longer determines the hyparchical relation between the first and second substances. The Neoplatonic definition of habitus found in the intellect a fundamental and permanent standard applied to the unrestricted contingency of external things.

The illuminate Simplicius can finally “correctly” interpret the “oracle” of the Pythian Aristotle. He did not know this higher truth when he started to predicate the accidents. The academic madness cannot be seen immediately, since it is given under the influence of the cunning Furies as gnostic *furor interpretandi*. Simplicius’s category of *héxis* separates the hypostatized reference as a noun (τὸ ἑκτὸν) from the infinite regress of the determinate related to the empirical given and cognized thing (ἵνα μὴ ᾖ ἐπ' ἄπειρον; *ibid.*, 164.21). Habitus as an Aristotelian accident became a second substance, which acquired a formal dimension and is inserted into Jamblichus’s dialectic. The intellectual definition of things as such (ἐστὶν ὡρισμένα τὰ ἐφετά; *ibid.*, 164.9) differs from the Aristotelian habitus of empiric substance, which is given in the unrestricted mode because of its mutability and instability. The difference between the unlimited occurrence in reality and the limited, formally given definition grounds the middle categorial position of the habitus given in thought (ἕξις καὶ ἡ διάθεσις ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς λέγηται; *ibid.*, 164.16). The eidetic dimension now determines by its superior theurgic form every physical continuum given as matter, body, motion, time etc. Instead of the relation of first and second substance, a new relation of “*definiens—definitum*” was established. The vision goes from the determining and clearly limited form towards the movable continuum of objective matter originally given as the Dyad of Plato. The categorial determination, which is given by the essential view of the hypostatic form (Husserl’s *Wesensschau*), now determines the indeterminate sense cognition. The categorial determination given by hypostatized form canceled the signification of sensual cognition. The new division of categories is determined by Jamblichus’s principle “Limited—Unlimited” and not by Aristotle’s predication. The change in the conception of the categories shows the way how emerged the new predication as objective speculation. The noematic insight *per prius* regulates the indeterminate matter, which has the potency to be determined by means of the intelligible forms. The predication is no longer determined by the first substance in reality, but by the hypostatized “form—species.” The habitus has a privileged position in Neoplatonism and later scholasticism, since it divides the table of categories into two parts. The second substance, as the first category, is now directly attached to the first substance, and it is further endowed with the hypostatic quality and quantity at the level of the first substance. The habitus begins to play a significant role in the further determinations of objectivity. It is distinguished from the primary determinations of the substance of the third kind given *per prius*, and from the secondary postpredicaments, given in the modes *per posterius*. The second volume follows new determination of habitus, because Simplicius and Avicenna helped to introduce the hypostatized habitus in Latin scholasticism (OBJ II, ch. 2.4.1). Habitus stands in a subordinate position to the first trio of *praedicamenta* (substance, quality, quantity). The formal determinations and the attributes belong directly to this trio. The first three determinations make mixture of the first and the second substance in the new mode of atomic substance. The table of categories changed the sense from “1 + 9” to the new system “3 + 1 (habitus) + 6.” The habitus distinguishes this highest trio from the other determinations. Later scholasticism, which had been inspired by Simplicius’s commentary, named the second series of accidents with the term *postpraedicamenta* (OBJ III, ch. 5.3.1). The middle position of habitus in the new system of predication shows that it took on the meaning of the second substance. Its hypostatized figure stands in mode *per prius* vis-à-vis the remaining accidental determinations. The first three categorial determinations became a universal determination of being and in postmodernism acquired the character of so-called primary qualities hypostatized as substances of the third kind (J. Locke). The first trio of categorical determinations, now related to the Neoplatonic atomic substances, later began to interchange freely with the meaning of species according to Porphyry’s model of ambivalent predication in the *Isagoge*.

Let us look at another important case of the transformation that influenced future development of objectivity. The introductory section of the *Categories* conceives of the whiteness of man and horse merely as a nominal difference between words, which does not allow the common predication because of the difference in substance (παρώνυμα δὲ λέγεται, *Cat*. 1a12). Neoplatonist schools took that paronymy as categorical predication. The whiteness is hypostatized and, as a universal, is directly involved in the existence of both substances. Homonymy on the level of similarity of the word was elevated to the ontological category, which was placed on the level of categorical determination of the substance.[[58]](#footnote-58) The hypostasis of quality as substance made possible the mention of the third genus (τρίτον δὲ γένος, *Cat*. 9a28) directly in the categories. This mention is related to the analysis of the accident of the type “whiteness,” which underwent various kinds of changes on the substantial substrate. The Neoplatonic commentary of Ammonius of Sakka (†242) abolished Aristotle’s hyparchical binding of categorical determinations to the first substance for the first time. Ammonius interpreted quality as a categorial pseudo-substance and gave it an independent statute. The hypostatized quality does not receive the new being at all in reality (ταῦτα οὐ μόνον περὶ τὸ σῶμα θεωρεῖται), but in the actual soul (ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὴν ψυχήν, *Amonii in Cat*. 86.11–12). Ammonius did not heed the warning in the *Categories* that the predicated qualities have nothing in common with the actual being of the first substance (*Cat*. 9b2–3). This Neoplatonist predicates the quality as *tertium ens* according to Plotinus’s predication of the hypostatized genera.[[59]](#footnote-59) Philoponos’s commentary on the *Categories* adopts the interpretation of Ammonius. Philoponos defines the “white body” in terms of the perception of whiteness as a substance of the third kind, which combines the indivisible substance of the “body” and the equally indivisible substance of whiteness (λευκὴ σὰρξ ἀπὸ πάθους τὴν λευκότητα ἔχει, *Philoponi in Cat*. 149.19). Whiteness already appears vis-à-vis the body as a new pseudosubstance (συμβέβηκε γὰρ τὸ λευκὸν αὐτῇ, *ibid.* 149.20). The hypostasis of the quality as being of the third kind is grounded on the Neoplatonic interpretation of the predication of accidents in the mode *per se*, which are taken literally from the *Categories* (λέγεται κατ' αὐτάς, *Cat*. 9a33).[[60]](#footnote-60) The oldest translations into Syro-Aramean already interpret this section in the Neoplatonic sense κατ' ἑαὐτάς (King 2010, 227). The status of whiteness given as hypostasis in the mode *per se* shows the direction to the next interpretation made in the Falsafa. This interpretation is given by the hypostasis of the accidents as new substances of the third kind. A more detailed analysis would show the linkage of this hypostatized form to the early modern interpretation of the *Categories* in the writing *Categoriae decem*, which originated in the eighth century. From there, the school of Porretans takes over the hypostatic worldview (OBJ II, ch. 1.4). Through the hypostasis of the accidents the modern world arose, wherein the accidents exist as new entities of the third kind. The vision of the world done by theurgic *illuminati* became the categorical truth due to reinterpreted meaning of *Corpus Aristotelicum*. Aristotle as a Pythian interpreter of the divine Pythagoras did not know in reality what he said when he predicated the accidents in relation to the substance. But his mistake can be corrected by new interpretations guided by theurgic insight into gnostic mysteries of the cosmos. The Neoplatonists, after the decline of Delphi in year 381, transformed the academic institutions into a new type of objectively given oracle. The ultimate guarantor for indexed truth of nowadays oracles are big corporations. They control the scientific editions in their possession as effectively as the tyrannical city of Athens controlled the sanctuaries at Delphi and Eleusis.

The development of new forms of *tertium ens* began by transfer of Neoplatonic accidents as hypostases into Aristotelian physics. In this way, the categorial predication of the first and the second substance was joined together (Dexippos, Simplicius, Philoponus). The newly constituted *tertium ens* exists in the form of the pseudo-substance and the hypostatized accidents such as quality “eksist” in diacosmos, which was created by theurgic activity of cosmic forms. There is no hylemorphic substance with its limited extension; but at this level is already working the demiurgic ability of Neoplatonic intellect, which creates the eternal cosmic substance-species (Moon, Sun, Earth, Cosmos). The indivisibility of substance got a new meaning. The hyparchical position took the place of general thing in mind, see the Ammonius’s example of the whiteness. The universal being is displayed from behind, that is, from the diacosmos of autonomous intelligible forms. The first and fundamental prohyparchical “ek-sistence” comes from the One as the first principle. It replaced the first substance to create the new hyparchical predication. The new kind of numeric unity towards the One is attached to the hyparchical position of essence or subsistent universals. Done in this way, the nature of the categorical predication was completely changed. The transition of categorial predication was facilitated by Porphyry’s introduction of a special way of determining substance, without which substances cannot exist (*Porph. in Cat*. 95.19–20). This brought some qualities of substance (later called “primary qualities” in Cartesian postmodernism) to the level of categorical determination *per prius*, which had previously been valid only for the second substance as the highest category. The primary qualities were no longer a mere accident of substance, as Aristotle postulated, and began to play a new role in the determination of being. Porphyry’s successors made the substance out of accidents, and gradually extended these formal and categorical determinations to the physical body. The habitual determination in form of pseudo-substance plays an important role in this shift thanks to the activity of the subject. This activity is mentioned in Aristotle’s definition of habitus (ἐνέργειά τις, *Met*. 1022b4). Modernists changed the indefinite pronoun, tied to the activity of the first substance, into an objectively defined substance. This energy contained in the hypostatic reflection creates the intellectual substance that Descartes named *res cogitans*. The intellect or will possess itself through a hypostatized habitus. It can habitually establish an actual reflection of itself as a modern substance, see Cartesian *cogito*. Bonaventure transfers the hypostatized habitus (*habitus innatus*) into the demiurgic subject, which is endowed with a primary creative rule and secondary creative practice (OBJ III, ch. 4.1.2). Together with the category of relation (*relatio*) in Peter Olivi’s and Henry Gent’s thought, the habitus conceived as substance finally receives the full categorical statute and replaces the Aristotelian primacy of the first substance (*esse ad*; OBJ III, ch. 5.1.2). Postmodernism exchanges the categorial determination of habitus for the transcendantal and hypostatic status. The original disclosure of being is given in Aristotle from the front, that is, from the first substance, which activates the senses through sensual phantasms. The universal concept comes to existence only through the abstraction from the individual sensuous species (*species sensibilis*). Such disclosure of being is postulated in Aristotle’s *De anima* (ch. 1.3.) and in the opening section in the work *De Interpretatione* that was taken up in the Latin traduction of Boethius (OBJ II, ch. 1.1). Simplicius changed the definition of habitus and structure of the ten categories, which led to fundamental change in the conception of substance. The disclosure of meaning of being from behind abolished the hyparchical status of the first substance, without which Aristotelian categorical predication makes no sense. The first real substance no longer held a determinant role and its existence only additionally, empirically and accidentally confirms the higher type of necessary and eternal cognition, which is given in the realm of autonomous forms. The trajectory of comprehension (*Vor-blickbahn*) given as meaning of being through frontal disclosure, has definitely changed in the modern metaphysics. The disclosure from behind is directly introduced into the categorical predication, in which the hyparchical function has been exchanged for a prohyparchical one. The intellect creates a parallel reality in itself, having the same capacities as the industrious divine demiurge in the dialogue *Timaeus*. The soul defined by Simplicius actively creates an imitation of the original intelligible realm. Because of its fall into sensuous matter, it could no longer remain in the world of the original prototypical figures of being (τοῦτο εἰκόνας αὐτοὺς ἀντὶ τῶν πρωτοτύπων ποιήσασα; *Simpl. In Cat*. 12.23). We find the objective form of these prototypes of the One in Bonaventure in the form of divine exemplars handed down since the Neoplatonist Augustine. The soul recognizes their worldly imitation in the objectively given *rationes seminales* (OBJ III, ch. 4.1.1). The cognition of real things through the Platonic ideas transformed into hypostatized species. Such a categorial predication was unacceptable to Aristotle. Intellectual cognition is primarily in the passive mode with respect to the first actual substance that is firstly recognized through the senses. They preserve the effects of causality operating in the world. If being became a universal genus, then the categorical predication would be impossible (ch. 1.3). Alexander Aphrodisias and after him Porphyry were still aware of the fundamental difference between the first and the second substance and did not accept the Neoplatonic analogy as a basis of metaphysics. According to these connoisseurs of Aristotle, the unity of being *pros hen* could not be based merely on homonymy. The metaphysics is not logic. Therefore, within the framework of two fundamentally different approaches, the Aristotelian school of commentators separated two modes *per prius*. The metaphysical primacy of the singular and *simpliciter* given the first real substance (mode *ipse*) was distinguished from the categorical signification of the universal and *simpliciter* given the second substance (mode *idem*). From the 6th century on, this distinction became obsolete. The reality of the first substance no longer determined the thinking of being in the hyparchical mode according to the *Categories*. The new position of the intellect, which was connected with the classical doctrine of categories, made it possible for the successors Dexippos and Simplicius to combine the status of the first and the second substance. This mixture, of course, could have no meaning in the mode *univoce*, but only analogical similarity, because the unity was produced by the mental identity of the *tertium ens*. The modernists created a new categorical predication *per prius*. This fundamental contradiction between the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic interpretations of the *Categories* will be treated in all stages of objectivity and it makes next rounds of the Western gigantomachy concerning the substance.

Simplicius’s interpretation tries to reconcile two conceptions of substance, which imply two different ways of cognition. At the first level are the classical Aristotelian categorical meanings of compound substances (λόγοι, ἔννοια). These are distinct from the higher intellectual cognition (νοήσεις) of the immaterial and separated forms of being. The signification on the level of language determines the ultimate limit of the actual sensuous soul and at the same time indicates the lowest limit of the separated forms (ἔστιν ἡ φωνὴ πέρας τῆς ψυχικῆς ἐνεργείας, *Simpl. in Cat*. 13.4–5). This limit must be crossed, and the soul leads its cognition to the higher causes of being (ἐπιστρέφειν εἰς τὰς ἀρχάς, *Simpl. in Cat*. 13.5–6). Simplicius, in his commentary on the *Categories*, knew the Aristotelian interpretation characterizing the eminent position of the first substance determining the signification. However, he belonged to the group of interpreters inspired by the primacy of the prohyparchical determination of being; therefore, he fundamentally changed the meaning of the categories. The universality in the original framework of the ten categories relates to the material and sensually recognized first substance. Such a predication is for Simplicius only homonymic, since the unity of the predicates is given only nominally.[[61]](#footnote-61) The real unity follows Plotinus’s genera to create the univocal predication. Simplicius considered such univocity to be reformed and truly executed “Aristotelian” categorial predication. This mixture between the first and the second substance was excluded by Aristotle with reference to the potential character of signification, which is given only with respect to the first actual substance. Signification is determined by the accidental and receptive character of human cognition. This character is related to the reality of the first substance. It is signified through the universal cognition in the intellectual soul and through the particular language (*De Int*. 16a3–8). Simplicius abandoned the original sense of univocal predication, which Porphyry uphold in his commentaries on the *Categories*. In the Neoplatonism, cognition is no longer causally determined by the first real substance. The later dispute over universals represents a silent witness to this forgetfulness of Being (*Seinsvergessenheit*) within Neoplatonic metaphysics. Simplicius’s “substances—species” started the famous quarrel of universals. The controversy concerning universals displaced in metaphysics the fundamental way in which the metaphysical donation of ontic being proceeds through the first substance. The turn of metaphysics concerns new form of *dativus metaphysicus*, since the donation of being does not come from the first substance, but from the *tertium ens*. Due to the parallelism in the thought of Jamblichus and Simplicius concerning the substance of the third kind, a new concept of being emerges in the first half of the sixth century. Twofold predication *per prius* concerns twofold unity of being. The first predication is substantial and categorical (Aristotle) and the second predication is generic and transcendental (Plato, Plotinus). Porphyry inaugurated that erroneous proceeding by his ambivalent concept of indivisible substance, which is analyzed in the *Isagoge* (ch. 1.3). This concept acquires totally ambiguous character in the next generation of Neoplatonists. The substance is bound to the world of permanently existing immaterial cosmic forms. The *illuminati* can receive a higher mystical determination of metaphysics on the level of predication of the substance as species. Meanwhile, the indivisible substance exists simultaneously as a material body on the sensually given level of cognition. It allowed a “lower” Aristotelian determination of metaphysics on the level of the first substance. In the schools of academic Neoplatonists, the contempt of reality and that of Aristotle go hand in hand. The same development can be later seen in the Latin West. The hyparchical function passed from the first and eventually from the second substance to the universal determination of being in the framework of the species and the *individuum*. These new hypostases are predicated in the school of ancient *Modernorum* as first substance. Finally, the movement of difference from the genus to the species establishes the indivisible meaning of the atomic substance as the universal individual (ἄτομος οὐσία, *individuum*). This mesalliance analogically makes conjunction of the first and the second substance, which is absolutely excluded in Aristotle. Libera’s introduction to the critical edition of the *Isagoge* reminds that it was the Neoplatonist Jan Scotus Eurigena (†877) who accomplished the second predication of substance into ontotheological unity as a super-genus placed above being. This Irish monk placed the first substance (*essentia*) on the top of the pyramid of being as the highest genus. The gradual division of that *tertium ens* finally goes to the level of the last, not further divisible essence (*atomos*).[[62]](#footnote-62) Thanks to the changed table of categories, a new logos of metaphysics arose, which predicates a new kind of henologic indivisibility in the direction downward (*per prius*) and also upward (*per posterius*). The original minimal meaning of the individual in the Aristotelian interpretation is completely displaced and forgotten in the Neoplatonic interpretation of the *Isagoge*. Erinyes completed the first stage of metaphysical revenge in doing quite a poetic and mystical justice. The individual originally had no universal meaning of its own and only a minimal being in thought. It is now inflated to cosmic dimensions and became the cornerstone of the new metaphysics and the most important first substance. The change of seeing the real world into knowing the mythopoetic diacosmos gave rise to a new form of metaphysics within the framework of the Neoplatonic illumination (*Ereignis*). The path of vision turned from the real substance to its simulacrum of the third kind given in the thinking of modern *illuminati*. This event of the modern *translatio studiorum* founded a new interpretation of the reality.

Change of critical thinking into mystic knowledge necessarily transformed Aristotelian conception of the truth as agreement of the intellect and the real thing. Aristotelian concept of truth is founded on the potential and universal identity of the concept as *idem* with the thing that exists in the reality in the mode of *ipse*. The true correspondence in the Aristotelian science cannot be found in what exists only in the mind as a general meaning. The scientific statement is primarily determined by the existing thing, which causally affects our senses. The causality given from the sensually recognized first substance guarantees the univocity and the truthfulness of knowledge. Moreover, the first substance given in reality cannot be integrated into the order of the categorical predication, since it exists in itself in the original atomic ipseity. The first substance cannot make a categorial relation by itself, since the meaning arises in the mind and in the predication. Only the word signifies with respect to the existing thing, and that in different ways (τὸ καθ' αὑτὸ πολλαχῶς ἀνάγκη λέγεσθαι, *Met*. 1022a25). The concept then declares secondarily, i.e., in the order of univocal categorial signification what is true being or non-being (τὸ ὂν εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν μὴ εἶναι ἀληθές, *Met*. 1011b27). In the view of Neoplatonism, the correspondence of reality and Aristotelian *veritas* must be revamped as a speculative concordance of understanding with itself. The formal universal entity in the diacosmos reflects itself (*speculum*) through the noematic concept present in the thinking of *illuminati*. The speculative agreement of two general meaning stands outside the real causality and outside the hyparchical position of the first substance given in the framework of categorical predication. The notion of truth is established as the correspondence of enlightened intellect with objective reality. Such a mirror correspondence represents, from the point of view of Aristotelianism, a pure paranoia of the intellect. The cognition is no more determined by the causally acting reality. It came to the shift of truth from the correspondence of the intellect and the real thing to the formal identity of hypostatized noemata and species. It means fundamental discord between the modern intellect and sensually perceived reality. Simplicius completed the creation of a new substance in Late Antiquity by illuminating the categoric meaning of being from behind, from the world of pure intelligible and actual forms. The earlier Aristotelian truth as the correspondence of the understanding and the hyparchical first substance becomes a partial untruth because it does not reach the Neoplatonic level of mystic reasoning. Noematic and eidetic concepts of paranoiac modernity join the real and contingent things only in order to verify its already previously given ideal truth. The truth is “proballistic” and it is given according to Simplicius’s quotation mentioned above. Illuminati actively throw their mythopoetic noemata towards real things. The original object of cognition consists in the universal noema, not at all in the first real substance. Simplicius’s interpretation of the *Categories* confirmed that the eidetic nature of intellect has an evident character, unlike the real world of uncertain things. The transcendental determination of truth given behind the categories cannot correspond to the Aristotelian conception of truth as the correspondence of the intellect and the first substance. The second category given by hyparchical predication towards the first substance formed the last level of univocal meaning. Beyond it, there is only analogical or equivocal meaning. Aristotelian critical science cannot stand on Plato’s philosophical fairy tale, which was intended for guardians of the ideal polis. Neoplatonists interpreted the Platonic dialogues under the guidance of deceptive Muses. Dialogue *Timaeus* became a fundamental cosmogonic myth for the community of academics. They constituted themselves since Late Antiquity to be ideal guardians of the new *res publica* that united all objectively blind scientists. Neoplatonists made the conception of the active intellect (*intellectus agens*) that reproduce and represents the prototypical Being of the One. Done in that way, a new form of radically subjective truth was established. Neoplatonist Anselm of Canterbury recapitulated it in the concept of *rectitudo* (OBJ II, ch. 1.2). The lower unity is given as the categorial predication of the first real substance. However, the *illuminati* follow the deeper meaning of the *Isagoge*, in order to investigate the higher realm of being. The turn in the metaphysics shows the pioneering role of Jamblichus, who started this development. This divine man was led by academically trained Furies to synthesize Aristotelian first and second substance on account of mystical interpretation of the dialogue *Timaeus*. He created a new parallel world of the spirit. The subsequent interpretations unleashed a new gigantomachy of substance, since it was necessary to make a concordance of Jamblichus’s diacosmos with Aristotelian metaphysics. The key development of objectivity occurs between the 4th and 6th centuries. Jamblichus and Simplicius became the founders of a new epoch of metaphysics. The real being deserts from the first substance into the new kind of “substance—species.” The predication *per prius* done through the *Categories* changed completely. The hyparchical predication was replaced by the prohyparchical unity of transcendental meaning. Ambivalent status of indivisible substance and exegesis tied to the Neoplatonic analogical form of predication *pros hen* went hand in hand. Neoplatonists deliberately performed a displacement of the real substance from metaphysics by rejecting Porphyry’s interpretation of the *Categories*. The academic *illuminati* such as Jamblichus and Simplicius understood Aristotelian interpretation of the *Categories* and the *Isagoge* as teaching for philosophical beginners, to which the educated academics do not need to return. Aristotle is not worthy to enter in the realm of thinking done by the divine man as Jamblichus. He took as the basis of a new metaphysics Porphyry’s late interpretations of the Platonic dialogues as it was the case of the dialogue *Parmenides*. Neoplatonists were inspired by Porphyry’s double Being of the One (διττὸν τὸ εἶναι), which is given in itself and then creates the lower world founded by the emanations of the One. This vision of the One remaining in itself and pouring out of itself was repeated in the next millennium by all modernists, and thereafter by all postmodernists from Descartes to Husserl. On the basis of prohyparchical predication of being, modernity sets up two kinds of metaphysics. The wholeness of being is prototypically seen to be objectively and directly situated in the higher state of the intellect. Afterward it is predicated in an Aristotelian way in the lower empirical world of the senses. By the middle of the sixth century, the realm of Porphyry’s double Being expanded fundamentally from the original henology to the entire realm of demiurgic metaphysics. Thinking passed from henology to the cosmic intelligences and forms that are categorically predicated. In the newly constituted sense of being, prohyparchical predication gave rise to the first objective system of mystical and ontotheological metaphysics. The new atomic substance manifests itself in the form of intellectual vision made by modern gnostics. A new syncretism emerges that of divine Pythagoras, Plato and their industrious, if somewhat limited exegetes, such as Aristotle was. His categorical predication is limited to the material and sensually perceived first substance. But that deficiency of Aristotelian thinking can be corrected quite quickly, since Aristotle did not look deeply enough into the mysteries of divine Pythagoras. In the environment of the gnostic subject endowed with divine thought, there is no need to apply the imposition of meaning from the first hyparchic substance. We find this intellectual contempt of Aristotelianism in the school of scholastic *illuminati* at the University of Oxford around the year 1235, when the first Latin modernists became academics (OBJ II, ch. 3.4.2). The philosophical spirit of the first enlightened modernists will waste neither time nor strength for the investigation of the first material substance.

### 1.3.3 Foundation of Objective Physics

In the middle of the 6th century, a new eclipse of the first substance started the new era of oblivion concerning the first hyparchic substance (*Seinsvergessenheit*). This event is given by conscious disapproval of Aristotelian metaphysics. The source of the oblivion is no longer the fate of the metaphysically determined being by Plato’s Allegory of the cave (*Seinsverlassenheit*). The creator of the new epoch is the modern *illuminatus* as divine Jamblichus, who created a new subject endowed with a theurgic will to knowledge and to power. This habitus of the modern energetic subject (ἐνέργειά τις) objectively determines the epochal destiny of Western thought in the mode of metaphysical *Irrtum*. Its new protagonists in the Latin West become Avicenna in the Falsafa, Rufus of Cornwall and Bonaventura in Latin Scholasticism. The new substance is born in the framework of the mystical theurgy. Modern subject transforms the being of the existing thing into an objective demiurgic form (*Ge-Stell*). It is not surprising that the first concurrence of Platonism and the original Aristotelian schools in the 2nd–3rd century B.C. created a concept of free will (*liberum arbitrium*). The syncretists of Late Antiquity, in a later scenario of the connection between Plato and Aristotle, merged the definition of action and deliberate choice in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and linked it to Stoic responsibility tied to moral action (Bobzien 1998).

This Aristotelian and Stoic subject in the time of tyranny is endowed with the new kind of purely personal and inner freedom. Philosophically and politically quite problematic concept of “free will” (H. Arendt) arises at the moment when a new free *individuum* emerged. The new worldview came into being and the classic Greek democracy went to the Lethe. Christian modernity took up this synthesis of free will in the theology of Anselm, Bonaventure and Olivi. Demiurgy, theurgy, gnosis and mysticism are the godfathers of objectivity. They established the first system of ontotheology, which is given outside the first real substance. The history of Western objectivity outside the first substance and therefore outside the principle of reality shows that the price of finding unity between Plato and Aristotle will not be small.

Jamblichus transformed the act of creation into a mystical henology according to the dialogue *Timaeus*. The substance of the third kind started to be predicated in the framework of the diacosmos. The new kind of being is determined by mathematical creation of the diacosmos, which connects the world of cosmic and material forms in the mode of universal analogy. The exegesis of the dialogue *Timaeus* was one of the reasons why Porphyry and Jamblichus rejected Plotinus’s doctrine of the absolute separation of the One. With a new exegesis of the *Timaeus*, Plotinus’s successors answer, among other things, the question of the unity of the world in the Neoplatonic paradigm. The world was created as a living being and in the one specimen by the work of the demiurge. That highest and therefore the most divine academician realizes in the lower world a mirror image of the autonomous world of eternal forms and ideas (ἕνα, εἴπερ κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα δεδημιουργημένος ἔσται, *Tim*. 31a3–4). The concept of being according to Plato’s philosophical tale establishes the ontotheological construction of metaphysics, which is a condition *sine qua non* for the introduction of being of the third kind. The Neoplatonists had to create a complete scientific description of the diacosmos made by the first academic demiurge. This commendable activity they do until today. The mythopoetic in a new outfit was possible only at the price that the dialogue *Timaeus* integrated in itself the fundamental concepts from Aristotle’s writing *Physics*. Aristotle ties the accidental motion and transformations to the first substance, which is given as a real hylemorphic body (ἀεὶ τὸ μεταβάλλον ἢ κατ' οὐσίαν, *Phys*. 200b33–34). The first substance exists really, *simpliciter*, and *per se*. To this individual body, existing outside of ourselves, all properties must be predicated in a categoric way. Neoplatonists knew that their first substance as species was in contradiction not only with Aristotle’s teaching on the categories, but especially with his physics. The last Neoplatonists of the antiquity had to design a body, space and time of the third kind in such a way that they fulfilled the basic physical requirements concerning the objective body and its properties in the freshly outlined diacosmos. The worst enemy of modern academics was physical reality described by Aristotle. The time is bound to the kinetic or metabolic movement of the bodies, which is sensually recognized. Time is given only in the soul (δύο εἴπῃ ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ νῦν, τὸ μὲν πρότερον τὸ δ' ὕστερον, *Phys*. 219a27–28). The determination of change and time is only potential and accidental characteristic given in the mind that relates by predication to the real existence of the body. The sequence of detached moments of the body’s motion as “before” and “after” (*Phys*. 219a33–34) establishes the concept of time (τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος, *Phys*. 219b1). Simplicius, in the above model of thought after Porphyry, abolished the *modus tollens* that was valid for the quantitative determination of the real body (ch. 1.3.2) and let physical determinations of the body exist independently of the real thing. This was possible because accidental categories as relation and habitus became independent hypostatic entities. The cosmic species exist eternally; therefore, at the level of cosmology, there must be universal and formal determinations of the Neoplatonic body.

The body is defined beyond the first substance in two steps. Thanks to the formal determination of Jamblichus’s category “Limited—Unlimited” was created the subsistent form of the physical determination (time, extension, matter), which received an ideal, purely formal definition. Simplicius bound together these determinations of the third kind with the definition of unrestricted primary matter in his *Commentary on Physics* (τὸ σῶμα ἂν εἴη ἡ πρώτη ὕλη, *Simpl. in Phys*. 227.30). The new interpretation of the matter of the third kind created a non-existent substrate for the abstract determinations separated from the first substance. The matter and the body of the third kind carry the hypostatized accidental determinations and thereby create a complete physical being of the third kind. An inspiration for this type of determination became the dialogue *Timaeus* that provides the first act of creation on the level of pure form. Simplicius applies the scenario of Jamblichus “Limited—Unlimited” to develop formal descriptions of the *Physics*. The original formlessness and indeterminacy of primary matter as the carrier of abstract determinations can be found in the dialogue *Timaeus* in concepts *hypodokhē* a *tithéne* and *khôra*. The paradigmatic ideas of mathematics and geometry act on these recipients through the triple genus (χρὴ γένη διανοηθῆναι τριττά, *Tim*. 50c7). The first genus is given by real physical substances which are subject to change. The second genus consists of eternal hypostatic forms, which are given in the demiurgic intellect. The third genus represents the paradigmatic world of mathematical and geometrical forms. These objectively given substances come into being by the cosmic intellect. It imprints the actuality of the forms given in the cosmic intellect into hypostatized recipients like the hypodoche. The dialogue *Timaeus* constitutes the fundamental *Lichtung* for the concept of objective matter and the objective body through the cited fusion of the second genus (Aristotelian abstraction) and third genus (Neoplatonic hypostasis). This new substrate of the third kind emerged on the level of unrestricted and formless determination, and it enabled the demiurgic imitation of original forms in the objective diacosmos. The ideal production of determined forms (τὸ μὲν γιγνόμενον) is determined by the actuality of the higher forms. Thanks to the imprinting of these forms into the objective matter of the original indeterminacy of primary matter, it comes to the determinacy that is required for limited lower forms in the diacosmos (τὸ δ' ἐν ᾧ γίγνεται, *Tim*. 50d1). Another inspiration for objective physics was Jamblichus’s doctrine on the structure of the diacosmos. Platonic determining form (πέρας) delimits the continuum of the indeterminate recipient (ἄπειρον). Aristotle’s hypothetical first matter, which consisted in pure potency, received a substantial determination through the mixture of the second and the third genus according to the dialogue *Timaeus*. The prime matter formed in such a way became a new being of the third kind. Neoplatonists predicated the physical properties not only with respect to the real hylemorphic substance, but also and especially with respect to the body and matter of the third kind. Simplicius’s *Commentary on Physics* changed the conception of matter from a real determination to an objective one. The scholastic modernists at Oxford repeated his proceeding through universal hylemorphism (OBJ II, ch. 3.2). At the level of the ideal diacosmos arises new relation “specifically determining” versus “specifically determined,” which is formed by means of the objective forms of the third kind. They are produced by demiurgic activity of the cosmic intellect. The determinate and evidently formed *definiens* (eidetic form) determines the determinate and amorphous *definitum* (potential substratum). The new body given by conjunction of the second and the third kind exists either in the diacosmos (Jamblichus) or it possesses the status of cosmic substances as species (Simplicius). Time, space and matter create the first form of the objectively given *tertium ens*. The process of academic creation of the world takes place in the mythopoetic diacosmos, since it higher activity than to create an ordinary world. The passive, eternal and unrestricted recipients enumerated in the dialogue *Timaeus* represent for Neoplatonists the being of the third kind. The new mythopoetic took *tertium ens* as the basic substrate, which the demiurge can form according to previously given ideas. These ideas create the body of the third kind, because they put the forms into the unlimited substrate. Plato and after him Neoplatonists needed some original substrate which can carry primary cosmological, purely noetic specifications. Otherwise, no modern Big Bang would be possible. Only then can they justify the process of active determination of the demiurgic diacosmos from the actual higher form to the passive substance of the third kind. They had to secure the emanation of intellectual forms into the lower hylic spheres. The sealer requires wax to make an impression of the original seal. Therefore, in the Neoplatonic diacosmos must exist some universal substance of the third kind to initiate the process of ante-physical changes. Neoplatonists understood that the substrate of physical changes must exist independently of eternal forms. They have no physical motion, since they are purely intellectual. The subject of the ante-physical changes in the diacosmos must have to some extent the character from the immobile cosmic intelligible forms. The first emanations of the One are not bodies, but they become ones in the process of pseudo-physical objectification mythically described in the dialogue *Timaeus*. Time and space, bound to the new body of the third kind, acquire an ideal and formal character, which corresponds to the changed status of the first substance described in Jamblichus and Simplicius. The dialogue *Timaeus* inspired the emergence of the Neoplatonic diacosmos through mathematical division and formation, which is founded on the notion of magnitude separated from real bodies (κατὰ μῆκος σχίσας, *Tim*. 36b7). The schizoid conception of body, space, and time represents a fundamental contribution of divine Furies to the newly created diacosmic sphere that gives rise to various entities of the third kind. The era of the modern objective physics began after the introduction of the quasi-physical properties of the body, which are separated from the first real substance in the mode *absolute*.

Let us briefly review the emergence of the basic objective categories that determine the new status of the body of the third kind. The cited study emphasizes the change in Jamblichus’s temporal scheme, which Simplicius attests in his *Commentary on the Categories* (Taormina 1999, 60). Neoplatonists created an objective time of the third kind, which is given as a pure cosmological movement of the diacosmos, where so far there is no sensual soul, but only the movement of pure forms and intellects. The definition of time in physics received an ideal hypostasis in Jamblichus’s gnostic diacosmos, which Simplicius categorized in his turn. Time is annulled as recognized motion of the body. It received a new character in the context of the ontotheology proposed by Jamblichus. Simplicius’s *Commentary on the Categories* confirms that cosmogonic time is tied to the motion of the Monad allegedly described by the Pythagorean Archytas (*Simpl. in Cat*. 351.13). According to Jamblichus, cosmological time acts upon the changes in the body of the third kind. Simplicius related that objective time to the motion of the eidetic substance in order to form the primary formal determinations (ἀρχοειδὴς ἔσται ὁ χρόνος, *Simpl. in Cat*. 350.22). Jamblichus’s diacosmos received a pseudo-physical time through Simplicius. Positioned in a mythopoetic time, the *illuminati* deal with mythopoetic change given as the descent of demiurgic forms into the first mythopoetic matter. Done in this way, the first parallel universe of paranoiac modernity was born. The emanation of eternal forms in the diacosmos establishes Jamblichus’s archontic and eidetic time. Its formal and ideal “before” and “after” is not bound to the cognizing human soul, nor to the kinetic or metabolic movement of the physical bodies. The eidetic and archontic form of time is not given in the physical body recognized by human soul, since neither a hylemorphic body nor a sensually cognizing soul exists in the original diacosmos. The primary proto-time of the original Monad is given in the spheres of immaterial and eternal substances and exists before the emergence of the physical time of the substance (τὸν προϊόντα ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχικῆς κινήσεως ὡς μονάδος; *ibid.*, 351.14). The definition of time received an objective determination bound to eternal substances as species. Time is no longer a property of the cognizing subject, but became an integral and internal determination of the hypostatized form and is not determined externally (μέτρον αὐτῆς ποιεῖται τῆς κινήσεως αὐτοφυὲς καὶ οὐκ ἔξωθεν; *ibid.*, 351.3). Thus time became a new objective hypostasis, which today is fundamentally necessary for the construction of a postmodern cosmology. According to Simplicius, the time defined in Aristotelian physics belongs to the sphere of lower faculties of cognition, which are sensual and given only with respect to material substances. The conception of Aristotelian time, the cause of which is the human soul, supposedly arose thanks to Aristotle’s ability to interpret the mysterious teachings of the ancient Pythagoreans (*ibid.*, 351.8–9). Time acquires the same ambiguous character in the gnostic philosophy of Neoplatonists as their invented substance. In addition to the substantial determinations already described, another being of the third kind emerged, which is indispensable for the construction of objective science. The body and the time of the third kind lead a proto-existence in the original diacosmos and they determine the lower forms of emanation into the physical world. To accomplish that next step, Neoplatonists needed a corresponding concept of extension and matter as further categorical determinations of the body. Simplicius, in addition to the objective circumstantiality, established the matter of the third kind. His concept of objective matter had a great future in the Latin Avicennism and modern objectivity. The concept of matter had to be adapted to the newly emerged being of the third kind. According to Aristotle’s *Physics*, matter is an indeterminate potency of circumstantiality (ἡ ὕλη καὶ τὸ ἀόριστον, *Phys*. 209b9), which is given with respect to the determinant form (ὑπὸ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ ὡρισμένον, *Phys*. 209b8). If we think away all quantitative determinations of the body, at least a theoretically postulated basic substrate of these determinations must remain. According to Aristotle, primary matter exists in its generally determined essence merely as a purely potential concept in thought, where it is postulated from the standpoint of logical necessity (τὴν ὕλην ἀνάγκη φαίνεσθαι μόνην οὐσίαν, *Met*. 1029a18–19). Aristotle’s primary *hūle* defined in this way does not exist in reality. It has no possibility of being actualized, since it is a pure theoretical concept. Everything that exists must somehow be actual, as a kind of formed matter. The existing hylemorphic composition of the body occupies space like the materially given extension of the actualized magnitude (ὁ τόπος εἶναι τὸ διάστημα τοῦ μεγέθους, *Phys*. 209b6–7). Aristotle sees a fundamental difference between the two factors, which Neoplatonism confused completely. The defining form gives spatiality and size (μέγεθος, *magnitudo*) of the body by actualizing the substance as potency. Thanks to the actualization of this potency, a spatial body is created as a materialization and actualization of quantitatively given extension (διάστημα, *extensio*). The formal concept of extension is not important for Aristotle, because only the first substance has extension thanks to the formed matter. The real and hylemorphic substance has different kinds of accidental determinations investigated in physics, to which also the measurable quantity belongs. For Aristotelian physics dealing with the real bodies, quantitative determinations put outside of the physical body are a complete nonsense. An extension in the sense of substance cannot exist outside the hylemorphic single thing, because in reality there is no general abstract body (σῶμα γὰρ κοινὸν οὐδέν, *De gen. et corr*. 320b23). Any universal determination of the body exists only in the soul as a potential concept of cognition; therefore, the concept cannot replace physical determinations of the first substance. Physics is truthful insofar as it adequately recognizes the properties of bodies as actual first substances, i.e., material and immaterial. The statements about the magnitude as the essence, hypostasis, etc. make but potential determinations in the mind. Physics as knowledge about the movable substances and their transformations has its basis in the real world of the first substances. The magnitude as universal determination is predicated in a hyparchical way, thus adequately and physically, only with regard to the body as real hylemorphic single body. Without the real substrate, no accidental determinations of physical properties can exist in the science. The accidental determinations of the second substance are valid within the framework of categorial univocity only if they predicate the first substance in the mode of imposition. They must predicate the causality of real first substances that is entailed in the middle member (*medium*) of scientific deductive judgment.

The Neoplatonic *illuminati* intellectually despised Aristotle. They created a new objective and pseudo-scientific picture of the world from Plato’s philosophical fairy tales. Simplicius’s philosophy conceptualizes the mythical creation of the demiurge in the diacosmos made by Jamblichus and Plato. Objective matter, like the eternal forms, must exist in the proto-eidetic time of mythic time, *in illo tempore*, that is, before the creation taken by the demiurge in dialogue *Timaeus*. Jamblichus’s archontico-eidetic time thus received an objectively given magnitude. The quantitative magnitude and extension of the body are related to the *ápeiron*, which is given as a basic property of the indeterminate and hypostatic matter taken in itself. The determination of the body does not consist in the concrete form existing in the framework of the individual substance as in Aristotle, but in the pure determination (μέγεθος, *magnitudo*) as such. The magnitude became a hypostatized pseudoform and represents a determinate and purely formal factor, which determines the indeterminate quantitative extension of matter. Simplicius no longer defines space in terms of the circumference of the first substance, but he conceives it in terms of the ideal eidetic form. That form “exsists” outside the physical determinations of the place and matter that Aristotle originally defined (οὐκέτι τὸ εἶδος ἔσται ὁ τόπος ἀλλ' ἡ ὕλη, *Simpl. In Phys*. 537.10–11). Simplicius’s *Commentary on Physics* fundamentally changed Aristotle’s concept of matter. Time, space, and matter are defined outside the actual hylemorphic body and became a determination of the universal body of substance (τὸ εἶδος). The eidetic determination of the physical body as species would never have been admitted by Aristotle for the categorical predication. The imposition of meaning comes from the real physical body. The actuality which grounds the cognition of physics can be found only in the hyparchic first substance. Since the real body exists in the reality, we can predicate its generally determined properties in the mind. It does not work the other way round, because in the predication determining the scientific knowledge of the physical body the *modus tollens* is strictly valid in the form of *destructio primis* (ch. 1.3). If the first substance disappears, then there are no physical changes and accidental determinations. The Aristotelian physics as science abstracts the general significations from the physical body, which is given as real first substance. The writing *Second Analytics* confirmed that proceeding by investigating the solar or lunar eclipse. The same applies to the matter, which on the level of the concept cannot replace the reality. Only the real thing has its own causality. Aristotelian physics is unthinkable without effect of the metaphysical dative, because the really existing body is the basis of the theoretical and general determinations. These determinations are therefore always secondarily with regard to the reality. The actual hylemorphic body is always given as actual composition of four cosmic elements or of the ether as fifth celestial element. Simplicius’s commentary remained in Alice’s realm of mythopoetically defined wonders of the dialogue *Timaeus*. The real hylemorphic cat disappeared and its objective and eidetic grin remains as the basis of modern science. The hypostatized determinations of physics “eksist” without the existence of the body. They make a mythopoetic “first substance” in the diacosmos of modernists. Simplicius, inspired by the Neoplatonic model of hypostases and emanations, created a first definition of the body, which keeps merely eidetic and logical character (τὸ σῶμα τὸ μὲν ὡς κατὰ εἶδος καὶ λόγον, *Simpl. in Phys.* 230.23). The objective body “exsists” outside Plato’s idea and Aristotle’s determination of the body in the *Physics*. It has the character of universal determination of metaphysics, because it summarizes all being between being and non-being (πανταχόθεν ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντος ἀπορρέον εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν; *ibid.*, 230.25–26). Matter and magnitude are detached from the imposition made by the real body. They are determined by mathematical and geometrical proportion.

The new definition of extension applies outside the quantitative extension given by the hylemorphic body. In Simplicius’s model of lower theurgy, the extension of primary matter acts as a determining factor. The *Commentary on Physics* shows its activity before the extension of actual matter (ἐν τόπῳ εἶναι μέγεθος τὸ εἰδοπεποιημένον ἤδη, *Simpl. in Phys*. 537.12–13). These ideal determinations determine the activity of the demiurge in the diacosmos, where the intellect forms the bodies outside of material hyle of Aristotle. The form plays the role of the species and represents the first quasi-substance as the original carrier of physical determinations. The commentary cancels Aristotle’s conception of the extension given in relation to the first substance (“The height of the house is 10 meters”). The completely modern and objective Simplicius allows as *modus ponens* the definition of the substance, which predicates the purely formal quantity (“The objective circumference of the house is determined by the mathematical number 10″). The sense reference for both statements (*Bezugssinn*) is completely different, thanks to the exposure of the sense from the front or from behind. But, modern illuminates do not care for such details. The extension is predicated objectively, outside of the real substance and received the subsistent character of the being of the third kind. Space is formally and identically defined according to Aristotle’s quoted definition (*Phys*. 209b6–7) as extension of magnitude (ὁ τόπος εἶναι τὸ διάστημα τὸ τοῦ μεγέθους, *Simpl. in Phys*. 537.10). The sophistical substitution of the Aristotelian extension as the accident of the second substance for the objective, mathematically determined hypostasis brought about a fundamental change in the interpretation of physics and metaphysics. Simplicius’s *Commentary on* *Physics* follows the reasoning of Plotinus, who was the first to separate the quantitative quantity given by the material body from the purely formal definition of the body (σῶμα φανερῶς ἂν εἴη καὶ οὐχ ὕλη μόνον, *Enn.* 2.4.12.36–37). Neoplatonic substance of the third kind became new *tertium ens* by formalizing time and space, which covers all meaning of being in the mode of universal analogy. The body received formal, ontological and at the same time substantially given determinations on the level of diacosmos. The determination of the body was bound in physics only to the actual and causal action of the material and immaterial first substances and the cosmic bodies. Jamblichus and Simplicius created an eidetic body of the third kind, which is characterized by its own time, space and size. They are predicated in the mode *per prius*. By making the objective body of the third kind and its objective physical properties, Simplicius repeats to a large extent the Neoplatonic scenario of the genesis of archontico-eidetic time (χρόνος ἀρχοειδὴς), which was introduced into the ontotheological form of metaphysics by the above-quoted Jamblichus. The genesis of the new transcendental quantity confirmed the emergence of a new pseudo-substance, which became a new body *per se*, without having any real matter or form. Simplicius as the last innovator of antiquity conceptualized the formal and ontological definition of quantity in the Neoplatonic diacosmos. His precursor Jamblichus performed a demiurgic division according to geometrical and mathematical proportion. The objective matter is defined in terms of the hypostatic formal extension placed outside of the real substance. The primary extension of matter (ὑλικὴ διάστασις, *Simpl. in Phys*. 623.18) can be conceived as a simple and eternal substance—species at the level of the formal diacosmos. Objective magnitude, therefore, does not form a constituent of the hylemorphic body. It would have no eidetic character done *simpliciter* (οὐ γὰρ διάστασις ἁπλῶς ἐστιν; *ibid.*, 623.20). The physically given quantity on the real body belongs to the lower theurgy of quantitatively determined bodies (ἀλλὰ διαστῶσα χώρα; *ibid.*, 623.20). On the level of diacosmos, a theoretical look in the manner of the divine Jamblichus makes a sufficient reason to determine the body. Neoplatonic physicist and mathematician objectively determine the real circumstances of the material body by “seeing” the objective body with the eyes of his enlightened soul. The eidetic seeing is determined by the diacosmos of pure forms in the mode *per prius*. This conceptual view defines through the ideal and formal dimensions the original limitlessness of the lower sphere (κατὰ τὸν διασπασμὸν καὶ τὸ ἀόριστον θεωρουμένη; *ibid.*, 623.18–19). The real body is unlimited by its contingent occurrence, but is limited by the universal definition that includes the hypostatized specific determinations of the body in the demiurgic diacosmos. Because these ideal and objective determinations are determined in mode *per prius*, they are more real than the mutable reality of the physical body. Seen the other way around, the hylemorphic reality gets an additional and therefore eternally valid reason for its existence, which Leibniz later described in the principle of *ratio sufficiens*. Simplicius’s *Commentary on Physics*, which defines the magnitude and extension, emphasizes that the definitions do not concern accidental determinations of hylemorphic substance. The formal determination of spatiality constitutes the essence of the first substance as the body (οὐδὲ συμβεβηκὸς ὁ τόπος, ἀλλ' οὐσία καὶ οὗτος; *ibid.*, 623.19–20). The objective determination of physics, which is considered in the original realm where physical bodies do not exist, has two levels. The hypostatized accidents and properties (quantity, extension, size, time) represent the objective species, which are determined by a categorical definition. Thanks to this definition, these forms in and of themselves already exist in the diacosmos, since they are delimited by demiurgic thought. In the direction of the lower emanations these objective determinations receive a causal effectiveness by the descent in the unlimited matter. They create a quantitatively limited matter and therefore create the hylemorphic body according to Aristotle’s *Physics*. The predication enabled by Jamblichus allowed Simplicius to introduce a new concept of objective quantity by the set of hypostatic determinations. They are predicated within the framework of signification *per prius*, which is related to the substance of the third kind. For a new determination of the objective physical reality, only mathematics as well as the divine insight of the enlightened demiurge are sufficient. Thus two sciences about the body and two forms of physics arise: the theurgic physics and the Aristotelian physics. The objective form of science, which is based on the theurgic interpretation of the philosophical tale in *Timaeus*, involves eidetic determinations of the body that create independent hypostases eternally existing in the demiurgic diacosmos. Hypostatic determinations are eternally right (*semper*) and once accomplished by the demiurge in the prototypical creative mode (*semel*), they apply absolutely. Therefore, they are detached from Aristotle’s materially given physics. In this parallel universe, according to the Neoplatonic version of Alice’s Wonderland, the veracity of the new form of being of the third kind is given in the mode *semel—semper*, which is adopted by the Porretans and the school of *Nominales* (OBJ II, ch. 1.5). The second and lower science given as Grosseteste’s *scientia cogitabilis* (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.1). Such a science exists on a lower level of hylemorphic physics, which is determined by the causality of the real physical bodies.

Simplicius’s contemporary John Philoponus (c. †570) brought the formation of a new conception of matter and body to a climax. This thinker started from a Neoplatonic exegesis of Aristotle’s *Physics*, which opened the process of objectification of matter. Philoponus, in the same way as Simplicius, defined the difference between two abstract quantities that define the body in the Neoplatonic Aristotelianism. For establishing a new physics outside of reality, a movement of two principles is sufficient. Again, the rule quoted above applies. The limited and evident *definiens* (eidetic form) determines an amorphous *definitum* (potential substrate). The previous section has shown that this form of Neoplatonic determination of space and matter was introduced into philosophy by Simplicius, who had been inspired by Jamblichus. The mode of “determinating form” versus “determinated matter” applies in the same way to quantitative determination according to the scenario propsed by Simplicius and Jamblichus. The new definition of volume (ὄγκος) is given in Philoponus as the activity of purely determining form, and to it corresponds likewise the abstract comprehensiveness (διάστημα) given in abstract matter.[[63]](#footnote-63) This determining boundary line (πέρας) given by the superior form forms the defining boundary of the originally unbounded substratum (ἄπειρον). Inspiration for this definition of the body is cited Jamblichus’s model “Limited*—*Unlimited.” Philoponus is perturbed by possibility that things need not exist at all, which could not be possible in case of the basic cosmic elements. Since the cosmic elements are permanent and material, they cannot exist without a hypostatic foundation, which is eternal and not subject to change. The work *De aeternitate mundi* contains a conceptual determination of the body and the quantity, which are extracted from the Aristotelian scenario (*De aeter*. 424.9–11). Philoponus gave matter a formal and essential determination, making of it a new substance and a new supreme genus. The body, determined in Aristotle purely physically and within the framework of the first substance, became a new kind of substance of the third kind (τὸ αὐθυπόστατον καὶ ἡ ἁπλῶς τοῦ σώματος οὐσία, *De aeter*. 424.9). The objectively bounded body has magnitude in three proto-dimensions, which are given outside the quantitative limitation of matter (ὅπερ ἐστὶν τριχῇ διαστατὸς ἀόριστος, *De aeter*. 424.10). The quantitative simplicity of the material or non-material substance-body is defined by “circumferential” or “enveloping activity” of some determinant form (ὄγκος τις, *De aeter*. 424.10). Philoponus’s definition concerns the substance-species, to which he adds further formal determinations that determine the body from the point of view of the proto-quantity given in all three dimensions. This threefold proto-quantity (τριχῇ διαστατὸς) refers hereafter to the numerically countable quantity of bodies. This mesurable quantity is given on the level of sensorial experience as “large” or “small” (μεγέθει τε καὶ σμικρότητι, *De aeter*. 424.10–11). Simplicius’s and Philoponus’s transformation of matter into a *tertium ens* may have been inspired by Aristotle’s work *De generatione et corruptione*, which discusses the common material basis of opposing entities.[[64]](#footnote-64) The quotation defines matter as a hypothetical substrate given by logical exclusion of the third (τὸ αὐτό...οὐ τὸ αὐτό). The section ends with a speculative remark about a possible common basis of both substances (ὂν ὑπόκειται τὸ αὐτό), which, however, is not given in any actual existence. The use of a logical form of judgment for *materia prima* is a purely universal concept given only in thought. The formal logical operation of identity, which is different only from nothingness, creates in Philoponus’s and Simplicius’s system a new substratum (ὑποκείμενον, *subiectum*). The new subject of science is in pure identity with itself and thus different from everything else. The last stage of the emergence of objectivity establishes in the same way in the school of Latin Sophists (*sophistae Latini*, OBJ II, ch. 2.3.1). An identity of the objectively existing “first substance” as a theoretical substrate is defined only in relation to non-being. This determination of being acquired a key significance in modern objectivity because it created the body only by negating the nothingness (*non repugnat esse,* OBJ III, ch. 5.1.2). The first indivisible substance, given as a real entity in Aristotle, is created in the epoch of nihilistic metaphysics merely by the logical rule of the Excluded Third. This nihilistic determination of the body was elaborated at the same time by both Simplicius and Philoponus. Philoponus’s commentary on the quoted section from *De generatione et corruptione* absolutized the formal determination common to fire and earth. Out of this hypothetical matter, he made a substance of the third kind. The commentary transformed the physical accidents of the body (in his case it is a metabolic movement) into a new substance of the third kind, which was linked to the objectively given substrate of metabolic transformations (ὑποκείμενον ὅπερ σημαίνει τὴν οὐσίαν, *Phil. in De gen. et corr*. 63.11). According to Philoponus and Simplicius, the new *materia prima* became a Neoplatonic genus and received the determination of substance. The contemporary commentary on the quoted section (*Phil. in De gen. et corr*. 63.11) clearly sees the uniqueness of this concept of matter.[[65]](#footnote-65) We find the idea of spiritualized and substantial matter in a new form in the Latin West through the universal hylemorphism in Avicebron’s work *Fons vitae* (OBJ II, ch. 3.2). The Neoplatonic matter forms a basic component of objective determination of being in the framework of the second averroism. The objective physics could not define the determination of the body in the original form bound to the hylemorphic substance. The diacosmos exists eternally and therefore independently of the changeable reality of the hylemorphic bodies, which are subject to change and corruption. In Aristotelianism, the matter determining the actual circumstantiality of the body is bound to the hylemorphic first substance in the model “potency—actuality.” The new substance of the third kind became a mixture of both, which was not possible in Aristotelian physics. The physical body exists as actual thing, or otherwise it cannot be predicated in the way of an imposition. It is the only way to reach the scientific demonstration. Universal determinations are potential and they are only in the mind. The Aristotelian determinations given in physics were gradually taken over by the new atomic and objective “first substance.” Neoplatonic exegesis worked out the objective, mathematically defined invariants of the body, the matter, the time and the size. The new position of mathematics, introduced by Simplicius’s *Commentary on Physics*, made possible an analogical predication of pure quantitative magnitude in the world of immaterial bodies. Mathematics, within the framework of Pythagorean and Platonic formalization, defines the immaterial being given by demiurgic formation in the diacosmos (τὸ μαθηματικόν, τὸ δὲ ἔνυλον μετὰ ποιοτήτων καὶ ἀντιτυπιῶν φυσικῶν, *Simpl. in Phys*. 623.16). This mathematically determined being of the third kind exists in the lower cosmos as a material body (οἷον τὸ σῶμά ἐστι; *ibid.*, v. 17). The new pseudo-matter and the concept of *materia prima* extend the demiurgic determinations of substance as described in the previous chapter. Form, body and magnitude, separated from the real body as the first substance, were placed in the Neoplatonic diacosmos, where they receive an effective causality according to mathematical and eidetic forms. The physical tales of the Neoplatonic *illuminati*, who metaphysically and mystically retold the dialogue *Timaeus*, were no longer merely potential concepts given in thought. The new determinations of the body originated in Jamblichus’s diacosmos. Through the objective theurgy of divine *illuminati*, the possibility of objective causality was established. According to the *Second Analytics*, in the middle section (*medium*) of deductive scientific syllogism, science postulates only the efficient causality of real substances. The mythopoetic substance received the form of effective causality. Aristotle would certainly have wondered about the interpretation of the *Physics* which was presented in Plato’s allegorical way. The philosophical fable about the industrious cosmic craftsman Timaeus became an objective concept of theoretical physics proclaimed through the enlightened insight of the Neoplatonic *illuminati*. The transformation of the perspective related to metaphysic understanding was carried out by the gnostic and demiurgic subject. New perspective of pre-comprehension (*Vor-blickbahn*) founded a new form of ontotheology. It incorporated the Neoplatonic exegesis of Aristotelian writings devoted to the determination of substance and body. According to Aristotle, the physical determination of the body exists only in the mode of the indivisible single thing (τόδε τι) that exists primarily outside of signification. The hyparchical function of the first substance restricts the categorical predications to ten modes and they cannot be analogical. They make signification of substance in the mode of univocity, which is primarily given by the second substance and secondarily by its accidents. In the syncretism of Jamblichus and Simplicius it was true that the diligent Aristotle interpreted the writings of the divine Pythagoras and the divine Archytas on the lower level of the material substances. But the *illuminati* must direct their thinking higher and further than to the recognition of the world of the first material substances. The work of the hidden Muses is obvious. In the mode of untruth, there was a fundamental shift of the original mysticism of the “divine man,” as Pythagoras was called, into the philosophy of *illuminati*. The first modern academics, in the manner of the seers and the shamans, appropriated for themselves the truth of the divine world and they began to administer it through their own enlightened minds. Academically educated Furies certainly had a bright joy in such a progress of falsehood in the newly founded divine comedy, called “objectivity.”

In the epoch after Parmenides and after the emergence of metaphysics in Plato, the archaic hermeneutics show the hidden way how metaphysics began to tell the untruth under the influence of the Muses (ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν, ch. 1) to inaugurate the ontological mode of epochal wandering. Through the Neoplatonic interpretation of the *Isagoge*, the epochal error and paranoia (*Irre*) of Western thought were enacted. The divine Muses, through the hidden initiative in the mode of archaic commencement (*Anfang*), led the Western thought through the mythopoetic fairy tale, conceived for the academics, to the beginning of objectivity (*Beginn*). The archaic Muses spoke tragicomically and authoritatively through dialogue *Timaeus* in the mode of divine errors committed by divine men of Neoplatonism. Truth as archaic *alētheia* of Being passed into the tragic figure of the hidden Lethe. First, it came to the abandonment of Being (*Seinsverlassenheit*), which is given by Plato’s Allegory of the cave (ch. 1). From the second half of the 6th century on, the epoch of the forgetting of being on the level of the first substance (*Seinsvergessenheit*) enters into full historical effectiveness. Objectivity left the original *Lichtung* given by Porphyry’s interpretation of the *Categories* in the mode of metaphysical *a/lētheia*. In the *Isagoge* the meaning of the modern substance still coexisted in the archaic musical form of truth and untruth (ch. 1.3). The will to power which accompanies this specific forgetting of the first substance is shown by the figure of the mythical demiurge Timaeus and by the interpretation of Neoplatonic *illuminati*. The demiurge is gifted with the instrumental rationality determined by the eidetic vision of the world as well as by the mathematical analogy of everything with everything. The Neoplatonic One that grounds this analogy is primary and initially schizophrenic because it is divided into two spheres within the framework of Porphyry’s doubling of Being (ch. 1.3.1). This modern and therefore quite paranoid determination of the Being—One endows the nihilistic demiurge with an ideal and absolutely unhindered activity limited only by nothing (τὸ ἐνεργεῖν καθαρόν, *Porph. in Parm*. 12.25–26). The second determination of the One, which is given ad extra as illumination of the Idea (ἰδέα τοῦ ὄντος, ch. 1.3. 1), gives the demiurge an ideal instruction on how to bring one’s objective order into a formless world in the mode of analogy. The first modern nihilists created in their enlightened thinking an objective diacosmos, which determines the real world according to their eidetic visions. By this epochal turn of thinking, the real world was hidden twice in the newly invented objective being. The metaphysical meaning of being changed fundamentally, since the unity of the world disappeared, and even the primacy of the real substance. The real substance no longer determines cognition, because the first science is academically determined by the active cognition of paranoiac subjects engaged in the modern divine comedy. The theurgic demiurge creates in his enlightened intellect a copy of the real world through the demiurgic activity given only in his thought (*liberum arbitrium*). Furies disguised themselves in a metaphysical garment to instigate a chaotic knowledge in Neoplatonism, which is given by the disclosure of being from behind. The new worldview of modernity is based on a schizophrenic conception of physics and metaphysics, which is determined by mythopoetic interpretation of the dialogue *Timaeus*. This event was shown for the first time by Heidegger’s conception of the epoch as a turn of Being (ἐποχή *des Seins*, ch. 1.2). In the second phase of objectivity brought into being from the sixth century on, the meaning of the first hylemorphic substance is already quite modern. It is given in the intellect of the mathematizing demiurge. Its creative volition is determined by an objective interpretation of the world. The wisdom of Aristotelian metaphysics disappeared and was replaced by the instrumental rationality of the modern demiurge. This rationality is illuminated by the subjectively determined necessity, thus determined only by the instinct of self-preservation. The tragically unwise mortal was downgraded to the *animal sociale et rationale*. Aristotelian substance and critical logos retained noetic primacy in the *Categories* through a precise distinction of predication both in terms of the separated real substance and in terms of its categorically given meaning.

Aristotle’s successors lacked this critical spirit. On the contrary, they were endowed with a considerable dose of an intellectual hubris, which, according to their perception of Pythagoras, was mystically and musically determined. The original Aristotelian line was defended by Porphyrius during his academic exile in Sicily. After Plotinus’s death in 270, he returned to Rome, where he brought Neoplatonism to a peak around the year 298 by editing the *Enneads*. The second line of metaphysics directly follows Plotinus (partly Porphyry and fully Jamblichus, Simplicius, Proclus, Philoponus). In the center of the new gigantomachy stands the admired as well as criticized Plotinus as *Plato redivivus*, who interprets secrets of the cosmos seen for the first time in the teaching of the divine Pythagoras. This mystagogy is taken over in the Falsafa and in the Scholasticism by Avicenna and the so-called second averroism that follows his teaching. These thinkers founded modernity and the objective vision of the world. The next Aristotelian interpretation of the categories came for the Falsafa from al-Farabi, who was given the honorary title of “Second Master” as *Aristotle redivivus*. For Latin scholasticism, the last connoisseur of philosophical antiquity Boethius performed an Aristotelian rectification of the *Categories*, which is shown by his exact translation of the *Isagoge* into Latin (*Porphyrii Isagoge translatio*). By translating the problems and ambiguities given in the *Isagoge*, a new gigantomachy around substance began in the Falsafa and then in the Latin West. Aristotle’s realist position is defended by Boethius, Averroes and the Latin school of the first Averroism inspired by them. These philosophers protect the primacy of the first actual substance given in Aristotle’s *Physics* and the *Metaphysics* that are interconnected. The defenders of “meta-physics”, i.e., of the unity of the first substance behind physics, defend, like Averroes, the doctrine of the *Categories* about the different predication *per prius* given in the framework of the secondary and therefore universal substance. They insist on a fundamental separation the second substance from the real substance, whether material or immaterial, to preserve the truthful cognition and predication. Both determinations of substance are mutually non-transferable, but complementary. They enable the thinking of investigating the world as correspondences of intellect and thing. This school keeps Aristotelian project of science as predication of the real causality of the first substances. Hermeneutics of objectivity examine the features of original Aristotelian metaphysics in the concept of disclosure of being from the front, i.e., from the direction of the first real substance. In this system of critically examined determinations of the first and the second substance, it is not possible to build a unitary ontotheology of the Neoplatonists and the modernists prolonged by the contemporary model of Unified Science.

Let us recall that at the time of the decline of the mysteries and the darkness given by the first modern form of forgetfulness of Being (*Seinsvergessenheit*), the last philosophically important message of the mysteries and the Muses emerges. Plutarchus, as one of the last already modern priests at Delphi, delivers to modernity the message of the passing mysteries. They command the protection and salvation of the phenomena (τὰ φαινόμενα σῴζειν, *De facie in orbe lunae* 6, 923A3–4). Modernity, unfortunately, protects *prima facie* its own products of mind; therefore, it went to the tragic way of epochal madness (ch. 2.4.4). The connection of body, matter and magnitude of the third kind has a key significance for the determination of being in the later modernity. It will be attested by birth of the Oxfordian Fallacy in works of Grosseteste and Rufus of Cornwall. The difference between the first and the second substance disappeared in the new concept of the body. Its real existence is of absolute importance for Aristotle’s *Physics*, *Metaphysics* and the *Categories*. The objective determination of body, matter and extension enable the new substance, given in the form of a quasi-physical body, to receive any formal determination. Analogical similarity has no restrictions imposed by the reality. The event of the un/concealed being in the mode of the Pythian *a/lētheia* created a new form of insight into the substance by Porphyry’s modern eclipse of the first substance. The philosophical *illuminati* of high scholasticism (Rufus, Kilwardby, Bonaventure) took up this theoretical form of thought predicated within the syncretic frenzy of Late Antiquity. In Paris around 1240–50, the school that publishes the *Summa Halensis* transposes the demiurgic myth of Neoplatonists into the objective diacosmos given within the framework of Christian ontotheology. Simplicius’s *Commentary on the Categories* will play a key role in the second wave of objectivity given from 1280. The objective determination of being was expanded in Cartesian postmodernism. It includes primary qualities such as finitude, infinity, resistance, impenetrability, materiality, and so on. The epochal turn to a physics placed outside the reality of the first substance finished another round of gigantomachy concerning substance (ch. 1.3). Afterward, it began an ambiguous wandering of Western metaphysics (*Irre*) that became a special kind of academic mythopoetic science. The ontological trajectory of metaphysics has been determined by a completely different meaning of being that Aristotle searched for. Book of *Metaphysics* follows the original search for the unity of all being behind the book of *Physics*. Metaphysics is fundamentally determined by physical definition of the first substance *qua* substance. Since the real body exists as the first substance in its own causality, we have the physics of bodies. Since we have the scientific knowledge about the real causality of the bodies, the last part of the *Physics* can pass into the *Metaphysics*. The concluding eighth book of *Physics* deals with the problem of eternal motion, which is connected with the metaphysical question of the *Primum Mobile*. Only this procedure, based on the disclosure of the metaphysics from the physical properties of the first substance examined in the *Physics*, is scientific according to Aristotle and therefore it justifies the unity of the first science. The Neoplatonic exodus from the first real substance constituted a new first science about the being, which created in itself an objective physics according to philosophical tales.

The interpretation of the Aristotelian corpus after Jamblichus and Simplicius gave the modern substance the first form of historically effective knowledge that was based on the first form of objectivity. Neoplatonic *illuminati* created a new being of the third kind out of Porphyry’s substance, to which they added a suitable physics and metaphysics after the mythopoetic fabulation of the dialogue *Timaeus*. In late Neoplatonism was no longer valid the Aristotelian principle of reality founded on the twofold determination of predication *per prius*, which is related to the first substance, on the one hand, and to the second substance on the other. Instead of the hyparchical position of the first substance, the model of universal mathematical analogy prevailed. It relates to the mystical beginnings of philosophy in the circles of Pythagoreans. The universal *intellectus agens* is the ruler in the objectively given diacosmos. Such a kind of cosmos is not real, since its determining form deals with everything possible and potentially determinable. In the objective realm of the Neoplatonic *illuminati* there is a universal sympathy and analogy of everything with everything. The enlightened and industrious Gnostic is an absolute ruler of such a mythopoetic realm. He is endowed with extraordinary demiurgic qualities and with an almost divine character. The intellect of that divine man is not the supreme One, but he speculates on the level of the One. The univocal intellectual reflection of the One and the Many produce the doubled being in the mode of the sophistical simulacrum, which already contains unity and multiplicity in the primary henological state of the One. The ontotheological structure of predication is made possible by giving the paradoxical connection of the Many and the One directly into divine and then into human thought. From the world of original forms, the henological unity can be examined thanks to the analogically communicated act of the first objective science, which is founded in theurgy, in mythopoetic tales and in the mathematics. The ontotheological determination of being arises in the Neoplatonic project of objective metaphysics by the fact that being is of archetypal nature and it is formally determined. The new physics and metaphysics is created mythopoetically *ex nihilo*, beyond any real physical movement related to the emergence and decline of the first substance and the causally given status of physical bodies. Neoplatonic diacosmos represents the divine limbo of reality and objectivity, wherein the being is and is not at the same time. The human intellect, identified with this realm of spirit, explores in the mode of analogy the properties of the first substance from the mystical position of the divine eye. The *illuminatus*, under the influence of objectively potent Furies, travels in the world of ideal analogy where he can climb up and down the mystical Jacobus ladder of forms as a divine messenger. For modernity, Bonaventura’s work *Itinerarium mentis* (OBJ III, ch. 4.1.4) finds this travel map through the Christian diacosmos. Postmodernists led by contemporary form of Apate travel according to Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*, which was critically revised by Marx’s *Capital* in the spirit of the first averroism. The Neoplatonic *illuminati* settled themselves in the sphere of the primary unity of being, which is placed outside of time and change. The demiurgic creative power of the subject was no longer restricted from outside, since the modern paranoia of the intellect and the schizophrenia of the One—Being had created a parallel noetic cosmos. It is limited only by logic, geometry and mathematics. As it is well known, the paranoiac is a strictly logical creature. The modern diacosmos has its own substance, its own body, its own matter, its own time and its own space. What could not be done on the Earth because of the Aristotelian primacy of the first substance that can be put before the creation of the world into the ideal diacosmos. The modern successors of Neoplatonism imitated Plato, whom they confused with Neoplatonic Pythagoras. Plato was alleged initiate into the mysteries of the goddess Isis. His teaching returned in a mythological way made by ideas to the space of Homer’s *Iliad*, when the seer Calchas sees with synoptic visionary vision what is, what will be and what was (*Iliad* 1.70). The philosophical worldview of the *illuminati* of Late Antiquity became paranoid in a distorted way, by imitating the ancient world of mysteries. Modern visionaries postulate a correspondence of the mind and the thing in the parallel world of the intellect, which understandably was not the case of the archaic seers and rhapsodists. The seers knew the workings of deceptive goddess Apate in the space of the visionary realm of collective memory administered by Mnemosyne. The rhapsodists like Hesiod critically distinguished the unconcealment of the Pythian *a/lētheia* proclaimed by the Muses. The modern intellect of the Neoplatonic *illuminati* was directed from the ideal knowledge of the non-existent demiurgic intermediate world to the objective path of the mind. This knowledge was finally reflected in paranoiac mode of modern metaphysics by the intellect of the divine man Jamblichus. The *illuminati* live in the higher world of the absolutely objective mind. They descend into the hylic world, from time to time, to serve tyrants that grant them necessary well being. The immaterial and eidetic diacosmos is separated in the mode *absolute* from the actual hylemorphic first substance. Such a lower kind of science determines only the lower level of knowledge. By elevating the hypostatic substance into the divine thinking, a new ontotheology was born that follows the trajectory of modern preliminary understanding (*Vor-blickbahn*). The creative idea in divine mind fundamentally determines the manner “how” the formal definition constitutes the realm of new entities. This objective diacosmos enabled new round of the demiurgic activity of creating and knowing. It was opened by Avicenna in the Falsafa and it was finalized by Descartes and Husserl in the Latin West. The impact of these postmodern “divine men” cannot yet be evaluated in full, since the complete picture of intellectual cognition in the West is missing so far. Neoplatonism was necessary for the constitution of objectivity in Western thought. Objectivity arose due to the blending of Neoplatonism and Aristotelianism in Late Antiquity. The thinkers of Islamic Falsafa finally created a new form of *Lichtung* in which the truth and falsehood of objectivity were revealed in a new, completely objective way.

# 2. Falsafa and Fate of Metaphysics

Heidegger’s analysis of Platon’s allegory of the cave showed that the emergence of metaphysics is linked to the turning point of Being itself. This epochal event (*Ereignis*) gives rise to the new Western subject and a new meaning of the existing linked to the act of ideal cognition (ch. 1.1). The hidden Being of the first philosophy changed into the idea of the Good, which illuminates all possibilities of being. The hiddenness of Being (*a/lētheia*) takes place in the space of the changed *Lichtung*, where the display of truth and untruth is given by metaphysic being (*eídos*). The radiance of the idea displaced the original occurrence of Being, which became a forgotten event displaced by the metaphysics (*Seinsverlassenheit*). The perception of the present Being passed over into Plato’s idea, which is given as eternal substance. The metaphysical dative of Aristotle gave priority to the first real substance. He let its *quidditas* be predicated in the science dealing with the second substance. The causality of the first substance causes a new presence of the universal meaning, since the thinking relates to categorically predicated second substance.

The disappearance of the original question of Being by the ideal or apophantic presence of substance established a different interplay of concealing and revealing the truth than in the preceding period of the first philosophy. Gigantomachy related to substance joined the history of modernity in the philosophy of Porphyry. His interpretation of the *Categories* changed the hermeneutic triad of historiality, historicity and history. Archaic Being retreated into historial concealment (Lethe) with the discovery of the Platonic idea (*Seinsverlassenheit*). At the time of late Neoplatonism, unfortunately, the originally given Aristotelian first substance was hidden in the mode of intentionally provided oblivion of being (*Seinsvergessenheit*). The new historicity (*Geschichte*) of philosophy started at the same time, since primordial Being has been displaced by the cognitive subject of the theurgic *illuminatus*. He became the first source of knowledge instead of the reality of the first substance. The original question of the first philosophy concerning the hidden Being was obliterated even in a double way. Modern objectivity originates in the historical turn of being, which was given by transition from theurgic Neoplatonism to formally conceived Aristotelianism. Jamblichus, Simplicius and the other Neoplatonists initiated a new course of the history. The modern subject took up mythopoetic aberration of thinking (*Irre*) in a quite radical way. The dialectic followed transformation of seeing into knowledge, which was given in the Allegory of the cave. Metaphysics reached a new stage of the objective deception (*Irrtum*) formed by the simulacrum of Pythagorean mathematical harmony. The importance of the first substance for the hyparchic predication disappeared from the new metaphysics. The imposition of truth from the reality was replaced by the supposition made out by the modern subject as privileged source of meaning. This new trajectory of pre-comprehension (*Vor-blickbahn*) produced the new vision of the world (*aspectus*) through the will of the demiurge. That modern will to power started the history of typically Western thinking. Metaphysic received the legitimation of being through the subject (*ratio sufficiens*) and this transformation established a new history of the West. Aristotelian meaning of the first and the second substance given in the *Categories* passed in the realm of oblivion (Lethe).

The first gigantomachy concerning objectivity originated between Averroes and Avicenna in the Persian Falsafa. The dispute between the two thinkers was taken up in the new historical constellation by the school of the first and the second averroism after the year 1220. Latin thinkers of the first group received Averroes’s metaphysics in the mode of authentic Aristotelianism given in the line of Boethius and Abélard. The school of the second Averroism was influenced by Avicenna. They explained Averroes’s teaching through the Neoplatonic Augustinianism, through the corpus of Arabic translations provided by the Neoplatonic tradition of Toledo, and later through Simplicius’s *Commentary on the Categories*. Those modernists opened the path of *via Modernorum*, since they found a new *mathesis universalis* as revised version of the original Neoplatonism. The fundamental dispute concerning substance began in the Latin West at the moment when science started to investigate the objective simulacrum instead of the first substance. First, around the year 1230, there was a change in the conception of science given by the Neoplatonic interpretation of the *Categories* and the *Second Analytics*. The first substance changed in the school of the Latin *Modernorum* into a direct vision of *tertium ens*, which was conceived as objectively given being. The transformation of science into a Neoplatonic speculation introduced the concept of modern person based on the plurality of substances. Done in that way, an objectively schizoid subject of the Latin West emerged, whose influence we globally experience in the epoch ironically called “Anthropocene.” The transformation of Aristotelianism led to a direct attack on the philosophy of Averroes, which after the year 1250 resulted in an open competition between the two schools. The truth of the first averroism, which was based on the commentaries of Averroes, became the untruth of the so-called “Averroism“ in the next round of the confrontation. After the authoritarian suppression of authentic Aristotelianism by condemnatory decrees of March 1277, a new conception of objectivity emerged. The second averroism, based on the objective vision of Avicenna, became the global knowledge of the West. It transformed the cognition of the first substance into an objectively conceived science. This hitherto hidden history of philosophy must be correctly interpreted, because it establishes the destiny of the Arab and Latin West. This truthful and tragic event of thinking and Being stands outside the objective tragicomedy. At the end of the 13th century, it emerged a complete metaphysical definition of objectively determined being. The second averroism finally changed into an objective metaphysics, which received the first complete shape in the philosophy of Duns Scotus. His reformed Avicennism became the leading knowledge in the following centuries, whereas Averroes became an Averroist. The above-mentioned transformation is described in the subsequent volumes. The Latin reception of Falsafa-teaching founded a new epoch of history, which the ethnocentric philosophers and the historians of ideas call the “second beginning of metaphysics.” The struggle of the two schools of the Islamic Falsafa opened the modern dispute of the West about the concepts of metaphysics. Their interpretation of Aristotelian Corpus shaped the subsequent epochs of thought.

## 2.1 Ambivalent Concept of Substance and Metaphysics (al-Fārābī)

The first Neoplatonic commentators on the *Organon* attempted to reconcile Plato’s doctrine of ideas with Aristotle’s primacy of existent substance. Porphyry, Simplicius, and the other Neoplatonic thinkers combined Aristotle’s first and second substances into a new concept of species. Their eidetic vision founded the substance of the third kind. Jamblichus and his successors founded the demiurgic diacosmos, in which the being of the third kind became a physical body with an objective determination of space and time. From the 6th century on, a kind of syncretistic Neoplatonism made an important message addressed to every thinker, who saw himself able to participate in the new round of the gigantomachy concerning the objective substance. Its first form coined in the Late Antiquity reconciled Platonism and Aristotelianism by introducing new forms of *tertium ens*. Hermeneutics recall a hitherto unexplored influence in this gigantomachia made through Byzantine centres of knowledge where philosophy was taught from the 5th century onwards. The Syriac translations of the Aristotelian corpus were essential to the emergence of new thinking in the Islamic philosophy. The Falsafa took over the struggle of the aristocrats of the spirit and prolonged it after the fall of antiquity. The Arabic thinkers developed new type of predication, which linked Plato and Aristotle.

The first of them was the Neoplatonist al-Kindī (†ca. 873). He was influenced by Aristotle’s teaching on the primacy of the first cause; hence, he considers causality as one of the sources of predication *per prius*. Al-Kindī sees the being of created things only in a derivative or inauthentic sense (*bi’l-mağāz*) to be the participation (*ifāda*) of inauthentic beings in the being of the One (Menn 2012, 91). Al-Kindī’s school conceives of the causality of the first substance in the Neoplatonic scenario of final cause, as it evidenced by the quote from the work *Falsafa al-ūlā*.[[66]](#footnote-66) The first truth (*al-ḥaqq al-awwal*) is being in and of itself and predication *per prius* is placed outside the primacy of real substance and outside the categorical determination given in Aristotle’s framework of the second substance. The subsequent generation of Falsafa thinkers had to work on this extreme form of Neoplatonism. The Muslim and Christian critics of al-Kindīs school in Baghdad were inspired by the authentic Aristotelianism because they started from the recognition of the first existing substance. The epochal importance of al-Fārābī (†ca. 950) in European thought is at best confirmed by the dispute between his two brilliant disciples. They determined the thought of the Latin West through two different projects of metaphysics in a fundamental way. The original synthesis of Aristotelianism and Neoplatonism, in the opinion of the Second Master, as Alfarabi was honorably called in the Falsafa after Aristotle, established the first project of Neoplatonic objectivity by Avicenna. Later, Aristotelian metaphysics of Averroes established fundamental criticism of Alfarabius and Avicenna. The critical edition of Avicenna’s major work *Scientia divina* begins with a quotation from his autobiography.[[67]](#footnote-67) The Persian thinker read Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* probably about forty times without understanding its meaning. He opened his eyes after reading Alfarabi’s commentaries on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*. The project of Avicenna’s metaphysics was taken up by al-Ghazālī and, after him, by Averroes, who, from a philosophical position, responded to al-Ghazālī’s theological criticism of modernists, such as Avicenna was. Averroes criticized Avicenna’s errors, which allegedly Alfarabi had already rejected.

Thinking of the Second Master critically ties in with the Neoplatonic orientation of metaphysics given by previous Syriac-Arabic tradition of al-Kindīs school. The key quotation that opens the debate on objectivity includes the commentary on Aristotle’s philosophy, wherein the basic philosophical terms and some key problems are stated in the form of questions and answers. Hermeneutics examine the next round of determination of objectivity opened by brilliant summary of categorical predication according to the section from *Categories* 2a11–16 commented on above (ch. 1.3). Through the interpretation of this section, the disclosure of being from the front and from the back is determined. Alfarabi clears the disclosure of substance in the twofold mode of predication *per prius* according to the authentic teaching of Aristotle and Porphyry. The separation from al-Kindīs’ Neoplatonism is given by the fact that the Second Master distinguishes in the mode *per prius* between the hyparchical position of the first substance and the merely general predication of the second substance.

“The first substances, i.e., the individuals, need nothing but themselves for their existence. But the second substances, like the species and the genera, need the individuals for their being. Consequently, the term ‘substance’ comes earlier to the individuals and they are more worthy of this name ‘substance’ than the universals. But another way of consideration is this: The general concepts of the substances still exist and remain, while the individuals (single phenomena), on the other hand, are passing and disappearing; therefore, they are more worthy of the name ‘substance’ than the individuals. In both cases it is clear that the substance is predicated *per prius* and *per posterius* in relation to what it is predicted about; therefore, the term ‘substance’ is a word with double meaning.”[[68]](#footnote-68)

Alfarabi emphasizes primarily the classical concept *per se* for the first existing substance, which stands of itself in no relation to the predication. The primacy of cognition holds the real existing substances, since the second substances, like the species and the genera, need the real substances to make a meaning. Alfarabi clearly affirms the hyparchical position of the first substance, which establishes a categorical predication. The existence of the second substance depends on the first substance. The first imposition of meaning is determined by the hyparchical first substance (πρώτως οὐσίαι λεγόμεναι ὑπάρχουσιν, *Cat*. 2a14–15). The framework of the *Categories* points out that genus and species possess univocal signification because the universal determinations are predicated by the imposition of meaning from the actual singular thing. The imposition of the meaning entails the disclosure from the front, from the first real substance. Then it is necessary to defend the further part of the interpretation of the *Categories*, which directs the predication *per prius* and *per posterius* from the supposition of universal meaning. The genera and the species signify the substances in a categorical way (τὰ μὲν γὰρ γένη κατὰ τῶν εἰδῶν κατηγορεῖται, *Cat*. 2b20). The commentary therefore proceeds with the analysis of the universal predication given by disclosure of being from behind, from the direction of universal meaning. From the point of view of the suppositional predication given at the level of universality, the reverse classification of meaning *per prius* and *per posterius* is valid as with respect to the existing primary substance (*eine andere Weise der Betrachtung*). The second part of the quotation considers the general terms as higher degree of being because of their generality and permanence. Taken in that aspect, the general terms of substances are more worthy of the name “substance” than the individuals. The complete structure of categorical predication covers both directions: both from the hyparchical imposition and from the universal supposition. The ontological primacy of the first substance as a naturally existing thing is confirmed by Alfarabi in many other places, e.g., in the analysis of Aristotle’s *Categories* (*Qātiguriās*). As far as “meta-physics” of Averroes is involved, especially the conclusion of Alfarabi’s writing *The Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle* makes a key importance.[[69]](#footnote-69) The quotation summarizes the whole orientation of Aristotelian philosophy by the disclosure from the front summed up as investigation of the real substance. The realism attached to the first substance is evident from the first chapter of the writing *Kitāb al-Ḥurūf*, which analyzes the concept of “existence” (*wuğūd*). The definition of existence is primarily given by the determination of meaning related to the existing substance. The metaphysical abstraction establishing the unity of being is taken over by the second substance within the framework of the categorial predication *per prius* valid for the first science. The accidental determinations *per posterius* relate to this hyparchical predication. The meaning is related to the second substance. The essentiality of the thing is predicated by means of the second intention (*ma’qūl ṭhānī*, *second intelligibile*) and is given only in thought (Menn 2012, 60). The quoted commentator suggests that the emphasis on the priority of existing substance is related to Alfarabi’s criticism of the Arab thinkers around al-Kindī, who were influenced by the Neoplatonic interpretation of Aristotle. Alfarabi repeats in a new guise the dispute between Porphyry and the Neoplatonists, which led the Tyrian philosopher to an unbiased reading of the *Categories* (ch. 1.3). Alfarabi made a similar reading of Aristotle’s writing for the Neoplatonic Falsafa of his time. Alfarabi’s writings, which systematically analyze Aristotle’s philosophy, clearly indicate the general approach of research from physics to meteorology and finally to the divine science called metaphysics. The Second Master rejected the emanation thesis of the book *Liber de causis*, according to which things exist only as far as they permanently receive their actual existence from the First Being. He divided the first philosophy according to Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* into three basic parts: the existing substances perceived by the senses; the first principles of thinking and the procedure of scientific proof; the analysis of immaterial entities within the framework of the first philosophy related to the First Being (Fakhry 2002, 46–47). The first substance stands in the order of the actual being higher than the universals. They grasp but the essential determination of the things given in the thought. The first philosophy is carried by the knowledge of the separated, immaterial, first substances that are behind sublunary physics of the material substances. This fundamental form of substantial and cosmological predication *per prius*, bound to the first substance, was adopted by Latin scholasticism from Alfarabi’s writing *De ortu scientiarum*. The superiority of substance is bound to the essence (*massa*) of the supralunar cosmic spheres, which exist in the closest proximity of the Creator.[[70]](#footnote-70) These stellar substances have imperishable character thanks to the intellectually established being and causality taken from the separated First Cause. Therefore, they are necessarily existing in the mode *per se*. The canonical thesis identifies the primacy of the substance with the study of the first philosophy as the cognition of the stellar sphere, which is determined by the “fifth element” (*caelum est materia quinta*; *De ortu scientiarum* IV, p. 23.33) that is the intelligent substance of cosmic spheres. The key to the recognition of the First Mover is represented by the physical and metaphysical study of the really existing substance (material or cosmic) as the primary source of recognition, causality and predication bound to it. Averroes defends precisely this project of metaphysics later. Alfarabi emphasizes the fundamental separation of all other spheres, including the active intellect (*intellectus agens*), from the First Mover. The later analysis of the school of the first Averroism shows that in this line of the first philosophy both objectivity and speculative ontotheology are impossible. The new form of Aristotelianism rejected the demiurgic diacosmos, wherein the hypostatized properties of the first substances exist before the emergence of real bodies. The being of the third kind would destroy the whole science investigating the “meta-physical” reality of the material and immaterial first substances. The metaphysics of authentic Aristotelianism cannot create a *tertium ens*. It contains either the real substances or their general predications in the form of the second substances given categorically in the intellect. Aristotelianism asserts that truth is categorically determined and given only in thought (ch. 1.3). The cognitive judgment establishes the universal similarity of thought with the real and first individual substance. No universal meaning can occur in the world of first substances in the manner of the Neoplatonic diacosmos. Since the actuality of the individual thing belongs to the real and *per se* given first substance, its being must be different from the representation ot hte firts substance in the thinking. The second substance exists *simpliciter* as well, because it incorporates universal meaning. The categories predicate the unity of being in the modus *per prius* with respect to the second universal substance as well. Nevertheless, the univocity of categorical statements and the first science presupposes the relation to the first substance. The second substance reflects the first substance at the level of categorical predication.

However, Alfarabi was connected with the Neoplatonism through the section of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* VI.2, where both determinations of being are found together: the categorical and the transcendental one. The *Book Epsilon* enumerates in the second chapter various ways of predication, with an explicit reference to relation of being as truth and non-being as untruth (τὸ ὡς ἀληθές, καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν ὡς τὸ ψεῦδος) as well as to the relation of truth in the framework of categories (τὰ σχήματα τῆς κατηγορίας, *Met*. 1026a33–b2). The second way of predication includes different approach than substance and accident, actuality and potency. Truth, according to this interpretation of *Metaphysics*, belongs to the primary determinations of being directly and without mediation by some kind of conceptual cognition. Truth has the character of a hypostatized beingness beyond the classic scheme of predication accomplished by logical and scientific judgment. The previous chapters have shown that the Neoplatonism of Late Antiquity proclaimed this immanent determination of truth to be analogical resemblance of the Being—One. Alfarabi took up this approach, in order to reconcile the entire lineage of Aristotle’s and Plato’s philosophies. The work *Kitāb al-Ḥurūf* follows the Neoplatonic line of Aristotelianism in the question of truth and it affirms the twofold determination of being (*mawjūd*) as the actual and the truthful. According to the quoted section of *Metaphysics* VI.2, the truthfulness is somehow directly united with the first substance. Neoplatonists conceived the truth as a universal form within the analogical unity of diacosmos. They predicated this universal being to the lower demiurgic forms, which are equally universal and analogically given. The analysis of Aristotle’s philosophy in the work *Kitāb al-Ḥurūf* integrates into the determination of categorial predication of truth the second definition of truth according to the cited *Met*. VI.2 based on the Neoplatonic concept of transcendental predication *pros hen*. Alfarabi, in accordance with the tradition of his time, considered both pseudo-Aristotelian writings compiling the *Enneads* as authentic works of Stagirita (Fakhry 2002, 77). Both conceptions of truth are incompatible. They differ due to the disclosure of being from the front, from the cognition of the first substance; or from the back, that is, from the being of the autonomous forms communicated in the form of direct eidetic vision. Truth, in the Neoplatonic scheme, is not a correspondence of thought and reality, but the result of direct illumination of human intellect from the world of higher forms. The primary position of the first substance and the hyparchical categorical predication of the second substance cannot be reconciled with pseudo-Aristotelian interpretations according to the corpus *Plotiniana Arabica*.[[71]](#footnote-71) The work *Kitāb al-Ḥurūf* therefore plays a similar role in the history of the West as Simplikios’ *Commentary on the Categories* (ch. 1.3.1). Alfarabi claimed that Aristotelian predication done by the imposition out of the first substance is compatible with Neoplatonic participation toward the One. However, that kind of truth must be excluded from the level of Neoplatonic highest genera of being.

Aristotelian universal meaning is given in the predicative form *per prius*, that is, as product of human thought. The imposition of meaning in universals is secondary with respect to the being of the first substance. Aristotelian work *First Analytics* offers this thesis through the exclusionary statement. Either the universals are in mode *per posterius* or do not exist at all (τὸ καθόλου ἤτοι οὐθέν ἐστιν ἢ ὕστερον, *Anal. prior*. 402b7–8). Alfarabi therefore rejected Neoplatonism’s claim to the new form of categorical predication. The reason for Alfarabi’s turning away from the Neoplatonic school of al-Kindīs reveals the above-mentioned quotation, which precisely distinguishes the meanings of this or that direction of predication according to *Categories* (*Cat*. 2a11–16). Alfarabi, like Porphyry, distinguishes precisely between the different predication *per prius* and *per posterius* in the mode of the imposition of categorical meaning either from the first or from the second substance. Either we perform an imposition from the first hyparchical substance or a supposition of the universal meaning from the second substance. In the second case, the status of predication *per prius* and *per posterius* changes completely. As a general concept, the substance stands higher than transient things, because of the permanence of the immaterial forms. The predication as supposition makes the case that the truth is given in the universal mode *per prius*. In the supposition of generic meanings and specific meanings, it is possible to perform a division of universal meanings according to the *Isagoge*, and thus to compare universals among themselves in the mode of accordance. But from the view of the imposition of meaning, the universal form of categorial predication satisfies the basic requirements of Neoplatonic predication *pros hen* only in the mode of Aristotelian predication of universals given *per posterius*. If it is the case, than the second substance is given universally and *per prius* and the universal signification *ad unum* within the framework of Neoplatonism is possible and truthful. The substance is considered from the point of view of the universal determination of being as the second substance created by supposition, i.e., through *Vor-blickbahn* determined from behind. The suppositional predication made in terms of the unity of the forms relates to the One and the Good beyond the ontological priority of the existing real substances. There are two different sens of reference (*Bezugssinn*) made by two formes of categorial predication by imposition and supposition. The primary position takes the real substance as the Immobile Mover according to the *Metaphysics Lambda*. Its mode *per prius* is out of the order of universal predication, because of the unique and actual reality of the Mover. Alfarabi imported with emphasis on the separated being of the One under Aristotle the theological question *creatio ex nihilo* into Islamic Aristotelianism, which developed Byzantine thinker John Philoponos. Alfarabi adjusted the categorial predication in view of the primacy of the first substance. The orientation toward the current substance, which is underpinned by the commentary on the main sections from the *Corpus Aristotelicum*, forms the basis to al-Fārābī’s philosophy. His antiplatonic orientation is supported by the analysis of the sections *Met*. IV.7 a *Anal. Post*. II presented in the writing *Kitāb al-Ḥurūf* (Menn 2008, 91). The Second Master made use of predication *per prius* and *per posterius* in the mode of hyparchical imposition and universal supposition to unite Aristotelian and Neoplatonic determination of substance. It represents a brilliant solution, which can be compared with the thinking of Porphyry and Boethius. The metaphysical concept of truth is guided by the predication *per prius*, which relates to the first substance as the Immobile Mover. Meanwhile, when we look at the world with the eye of the mystical illuminate, we predicate in a Neoplatonic way a descending or ascending order of the forms given in the categorical mode of Aristotle’s predication. This predication has validity for the universal meanings (*Cat*. 2a15–16). Then it is true that the highest Neoplatonic genera of being subsumed in themselves also the eidetic formes of universal meaning and truthfulness. But in the Neoplatonic supposition, which determine the place of the categorical predication from the realm of universal meanings, the first actual substance is not directly involved, only its potential meaning given in thinking. The order of reality and the order of predication are clearly distinguished in Alfarabi’s philosophy. The Neoplatonist Avicenna abolished that fact and the Aristotelian Averroes renewed it. Both philosophers considered themselves authentic disciples of the Second Master. Gigantomachy of Avicenna and Averroes concerning the inheritance of Alfarabi’s metaphysics continued in the Latin scholasticism.

The disclosure from the first substance has a fundamental character. It points to the future interpretation of metaphysics that started to run in two fundamentally irreconcilable directions. Alfarabi introduced in the Falsafa new path of pre-comprehension (*Vor-blickbahn*). Twofold perspective (*Bezugssinn*) clarifies the fundamental hermeneutic question “how” the insight into the whole of being arises (ch. 1). The being of substance receives categorial determination *per prius* in two ways: Aristotelian and substantial, or Neoplatonic and formal. Both forms of predication are equivalent for Alfarabi with respect to the twofold determination of truth given in *Metaphysics* VI.2. But they are neither identical nor interchangeable, not even in the mode of any analogy.[[72]](#footnote-72) Both kinds of truth are legitimate according to *Metaphysics* and *Categories*, but in a different order of thinking. The predication is determined either by the causality of the real thing or by the general signification of the second substance. The twofold mode of the imposition and the supposition creates this or that form of predication *per prius* and *per posterius*. The successors of the Second Master proceeded in an equally contradictory manner as the successors of Porphyry. They no more understood the precise distinctions in his interpretation of the *Categories*. In the environment of the Persian Falsafa formed by the school of Alfarabi, a new ambivalence of substance emerged. It was completed by Avicenna’s model of metaphysics toward Neoplatonism and by Averroes’s project toward Aristotelianism. Avicenna took the universal conception of predication in the mode *per prius* and, following the pattern of Neoplatonism, abolished the separated character of the first substance. Avicenna, Latin Avicennism, and later objectivism created a new model of Jamblichus’s analogy, which merged the first and second substances into a new being of the third kind. In the Latin West, this syncretism of truth and the hyparchical position of the first substance created a new direction for which we choose the term “second Averroism.” The second direction of scholasticism inspired by Averroes defines truthfulness as the relation of the similarity of universal thought with respect to the first individual substance. The first substance is true only in the mode of human cognition, since the knowledge exists merely *simpliciter* and not *per se* as it is the case of the first substance. This direction of Alfarabi’s philosophy defended Averroes against Avicenna. In the Latin West the so-called first averroism took up this position. The ambivalence of truth is tied to the twofold imposition of the meaning *per prius* and *per posterius* for the first and the second substance. It created a new *Lichtung* for the further orientation of Western metaphysics. Averroes as Aristotelian cannot accept Avicenna’s metaphysics in univocal and sophistical mode *ens inquantum ens* because it lacks the hyparchical predication based on the first substance. An abstract insight given only in thought cannot establish any kind of the first science. It must be related to the unity of real being. The Aristotelian Siger of Brabant saw the fundamental error of the Avicennist metaphysics based on the objective abstraction, because he was and still is the best commentator of Averroes in the Latin West. Both examples of the gigantomachy concerning the substance are important. They show that the determination of the substance arrived at a decisive historical crossroad right at the beginning of the independent Western philosophy that the Second Master had laid out in the Falsafa.

### 2.1.1 Emergence of the New Worldview

The fundamental distinction of twofold trajectory of metaphysical understanding, later called *resolutio*, produced a new *Lichtung* of truth and untruth in the history of Western metaphysics. The birth of new metaphysics is based on subjective *factum*. The first existing substance was erased to make place for the metaphysical thought produced by the modern subject. Twofold hidden Being refers to the subjective being as “real” (i.e. objective) substance to sent it into metaphysic thinking (*Ge-Stell*, ch. 1.2). The new founding event of being (*Ereignis*) is connected to the modern subject of the West due to authentic Aristotelian stream of the Falsafa. The thinking of the Falsafa is determined by a new figure of truth and untruth that relates to the cognition of the world made by the Neoplatonists (*Irrtum*). Simplicius started the new way of thinking in Late Antiquity by (ch. 1.3.2) by producing the first modern version of forgetting Being (*Seinsvergessenheit*). Falsafa took over this ambiguity concerning the status of the being, which led the West on the path of objective error and irrationality (*Irre*). Hermeneutics must find in the work of the Second Master an event where the *Lichtung* of objectivity received a new form. The transformation of cognition concerns the definition of intellect in Aristotle’s work *De anima*. Alfarabi’s writing is influenced by the treatise on the intellect (*De intellectu*) written by Aristotelian Alexander Aphrodisias. This treatise follows his writing *De anima liber cum Mantissa*, in which Aphrodisias separated sensual knowledge from intellectual knowledge. The interpretation of the intellect is inserted into the hierarchy of cosmic separated intelligences. The primary causality of cognition is not provided by the material thing apprehended by the senses, but by the holistic architecture of cosmic intelligences. Alexander gave the primacy to the active component of the intellect that is engaged in human thought from the outside.[[73]](#footnote-73) The cosmic, active and fully creative intellect occupies the first place. The material intellect (νοῦς ὑλικός) is separated from the empiric cognition of senses. This individual intellect is actualized by the separate active intellect of the cosmic spheres (νοῦς ποιητικός), which acts in us through the individual cognition of the acquired intellect (νοῦς ἐπίκτητος). The structure of understanding has Neoplatonic character. Alexander separated the sensual and intellectual components of cognition in the soul by the central position of the material intellect. Its receptive character, in the mode of intellectual illumination, is primarily turned toward the actual *intellectus agens* of the cosmic spheres. Let us now quote Aphrodisias’s definition of the separate material intellect, which forms the core of further debates.

“But [material] intellect does not apprehend things that exist by means of body since it is neither a faculty of body (νοῦς οὔτε διὰ σώματος ἀντιλαμβανόμενος τῶν ὄντων, οὔτε σώματος δύναμις ὤν), nor is it affected, nor is it one of the things that exist totally in actuality, nor is it that which is potential as a particular thing (οὐδέ ἐστι τόδε τι τὸ δυνάμνον), but it is simply a capacity (ἔστιν δύναμίς τις ἁπλῶς) for a certain sort of entelechy and soul and a capacity of receiving forms and thoughts.” (*De anima liber cum Mantissa* [*De intellectu*] 107.15‒20; trad. Schroeder 1950, 47)

Alexander’s definition of the material intellect as a separated intellectual potency in the form of hypostasis or substance has been adopted by all versions of Averroism until today. Averroes, however, rejected it for fundamental reasons that emerge from his interpretation of the Second Master (ch. 2.4.2). Alfarabi cannot accept Alexander’s definition of the material intellect as an intellectual potency detached from sensual cognition. Alexander’s model of cognition is fundamentally dualistic. The material intellect produces immaterial universal cognition by being detached from the senses. However, Alexander is not a Neoplatonist; therefore, he does not separate the intellect in man as an independent substance. This Aristotelian recognizes according to *De anima* that every concept exists only in potency. Therefore, the intellect is a pure immaterial potency (δύναμίς τις ἁπλῶς), which cannot be any form of substance (οὐδέ ἐστι τόδε τι τὸ δυνάμενον; *De intellectu* 107.17). Alexander defined the purely potential intellect. Unfortunately, he made out of it a separated substance to accomplish the process of immaterial cognition. Alexander’s partial return to Aristotle created for the West a new figure of *intellectus materialis*, which influenced in a fundamental way the further dispute about the nature of cognition.

Let us now look at the new *Lichtung* of Western metaphysics that shapes the dispute about future objectivity. Alfarabi, in his commentary on *De anima*, follows the Aristotelian scenario of cognition according to *De anima* III.4–8, which is given by the disclosure of being from the front, i.e., from the empirically recognized first substance. His commentary therefore rejects Alexander’s dualistic interpretation given in the Neoplatonic scheme. The critical Aristotelian thinker asked the right hermeneutic question concerning the fundamental proceeding “how” (*Wie*) immaterial cognized forms enter in the receptive component of intellect. Alfarabi adresses this basic challenge to himself and to his successors.

“In this way, it must be made clear how the forms of what exists come into this being, which Aristotle, in his book *On the Soul*, calls the potential intellect.”[[74]](#footnote-74)

The new form of passive intellect differs from Alexander’s material intellect, separated from the senses. In the translation of Alfarabi, the disclosure of cognition comes from the front, from real things in the world. Unlike Alexander, Alfarabi integrated the basic scope of Aristotle’s metaphysics into the cognitive process. Teaching of the Second Master transformed Alexander’s material intellect according to the explanation of the *Categories*. Without the knowledge of the real world, there was no imposition of categorical meaning. The definition of cognition passed from the description of the Neoplatonic architecture of intelligences to the Aristotelian position. Alfarabi explores the emergence of immaterial forms in the human intellect according to the disclosure of intellect from the front. Thanks to the disclosure of the receptive intellect from the sensory experience, a new definition of cognition emerges. It is separated from the senses and actualized with the help of abstraction. The exegesis of Aristotle’s writing *De anima* shows that the immaterial forms of the intellect arise on the basis of the sensual forms. The sensually applied cognition goes the path of Aristotle’s abstraction, which has been produced within the framework of the second intention (*ma’qūl ṭhānī*, *intellectum secundum*). This form of reception, by its potentiality, establishes the process of abstraction. The recognized forms in human intellect differ in principle, thanks to the abstraction, from the higher type of recognition which the substantial *intellectus agens* performs at the level of immaterial cosmic intelligences and forms. The receptive cognition does not go primarily to the actual cosmic forms in the mode of direct illumination. According to Aristotle, cognition is determined by the senses and it takes place on an intellectual level through the abstraction given in the receptive intellect.

The Latin translation of the section quoted above dates back to Dominicus Gundisallinus (about †1190) that made part of translators in the school of Toledo. He names this receptive component of the intellect with the term *intellectus in potencia*.[[75]](#footnote-75) Second Master asks about the nature of Aristotle’s passive intellect (*intellectus in potencia*), but he does not determine this nature as a Neoplatonic generic essence. Alfarabi follows the interpretation of the three parts of the work *On the Soul*. Aristotle proceeds from the sensual apprehension to the intelligible cognition (*De anima II and III*). The examination follows the the real working of intellect when it makes the act of cognition. Alfarabi’s version of *De intellectu* establishes a new field where it comes to the revelation of being. The manifestation of meaning adheres to the definition of *intellectus in potencia*, which is defined in contradiction with Alexander. The receptive intellect became potential in the material human body, which the cited Alexander explicitly rejected (νοῦς οὔτε διὰ σώματος). Abunaser’s definition of receptive intellect takes it, in accordance with *De anima*, to be the faculty of abstraction of essences and forms from material things (*abstrahere quiditates omnium que sunt, et formas eorum a suis materiis*, ed. Gilson, p. 117.86–87). The abstracted forms are at first receptively acquired by the possible intellect (*ponere omnes illas formam sibi ipsi*) and then they are formed into intelligible forms of cognition in the active part of the intellect (*vel formas sibi ipsi*; ed. Gilson, p. 117.87–88). The sensible forms passed into the intellect through the corresponding reception of the immaterial forms. The definition of the receptive faculty of the soul shapes the new hermeneutic perspective (*Vor-blickbahn*) directed to the being as truly recognized. The cognition starts by the disclosure from the front, from the sensual apprehension. The human intellect differs from the active intellect of the stellar spheres (*intellectus agens*), since it is bound to the process of abstraction and to the reception of sensual forms by the *intellectus in potencia*. The definition of receptive intellect refused to follow the deduction of forms according to the *Liber de causis*, but it investigates the real process of cognition according to Aristotle’s *De anima*. Abunaser’s treatise *On the intellect* follows *De anima* by emphasizing the principal role of the passive intellect in the process of abstraction. The sensual cognition actualises the immaterial human intellect and this synthesis makes the cognition possible. Human intellect by the activation from the front, from the existing material substance. The new form of potential intellect is needed to recognize the first Aristotelian substance, since it takes the middle position (*medium*) in the process of cognition. Only the passive, potential and therefore fully receptive ability of the intellectual soul in the existing person as the first actual substance ensures that the soul is fully disposed to accept any kind of cognition. Latin scholasticism knows this thesis in the term “soul is somehow everything” (*anima est quodammodo omnia*) after the original question of Aristotle (ψυχὴ τὰ ὄντα πώς ἐστι πάντα, *De anima* 431b21). The Second Master proceeds with equal prudence and care in the case of the interpretation of *De anima* as in the case of the interpretation of the *Categories*. First, he establishes the original Aristotelian interpretation of cognition and then he tries to reconcile this position with the Neoplatonism. Aristotelian definition follows the disclosure of the cognitive process from the front. The first step of cognition must be accomplished in the form of categorial imposition; otherwise, there is no correspondence between the intellect and the real thing. After that, the supplement in the form of supposition outlines the Neoplatonic scenario of gnostic disclosure from behind. In this case, the cognitive process is realised by the effective action of the higher immaterial form, which is given as a fully active cosmic intellect (*intellectus agens*). Alfarabi and the Neoplatonists assert that the general forms potentially exist in the material things; but as an Aristotelian he declares that these forms would not have been actualized without the work of the abstracting, sense-based intellect.

The doctrine of the intellect follows the logic of the above-mentioned twofold imposition and twofold cognition, which reconciles Aristotle’s and Plato’s metaphysics. But the connection of both kinds of metaphysics is possible only when the middle link (*medium*) of the cognitive judgment is found, which connects the material sensual and the immaterial intellectual cognition. Alexander’s interpretation failed on this point. Alfarabi saw it clearly and corrected Alexander in the newly introduced concept of *intellectus in potencia*. In this key point for the development of objectivity, Alfarabi differs from the Alexander. The best student Alfarabis grasped this rightly and he brilliantly executed the position of his master. Averroes recognized the epochal significance of the second part of the quoted Aphrodisias definition of the material intellect, namely, its pure, immaterially given potentialities (ἔστιν δύναμίς τις ἁπλῶς). Alexander introduced the new determination of the receptive, immaterially given intellect, but separated it from the body. Alfarabi saw his discovery as the key component of human cognition and in agreement with Aristotle linked this immaterial intellect to bodily cognition. The second intention (*ma’qūl ṭhānī*, *intellectum secundum*) actualizes the receptive component of intellect. That new concept of receptive intellect separates Alfarabi and Averroes from the Neoplatonic scheme of cognition that characterizes Avicenna’s modernity and Western postmodernity. Alfarabi’s exegesis of *De anima* follows real and actual act of seeing instead of Neoplatonic mythopoetic. The key section of the treatise *On the Intellect* describes the connection of passive intellect with the senses and with the active intellect through the analogy with the process of perceiving illuminated color (Geoffroy & Steel 2001, 39). The similar analogy can be found in other writings of Alfarabi. Aphrodisias separated the material intellect as a pure potency of the intellect from sensual cognition.[[76]](#footnote-76) Therefore, he does not require mediation between the sunbeam and the irradiated things. The sunbeam gives itself directly to the cognition and therefore brings about directly apprehended colors as well. This idea finds expression in the above quotation from Alexander’s *De intellectu* by a connection expressing the full independence and superiority of light (αὐτὸ ὁρᾶται καὶ τὰ σὺν αὐτῷ; *De anima liber cum Mantissa*, p. 111.32). We observe things merely through the sunbeam and cognize them directly in the soul through the hypostatized intellect. Modern cognition is given by the intellect that brings about the knowledge by the causality situated outside of the body (αἴτιος γίνεται τοῦ νοεῖν ἡμῖν; *ibid.*, 111.34). Such a separated intellect (ὁ θύραθεν νοῦς, *ibid.*) works in the body in a Cartesian way. The illumination of being comes from behind, that is, from the acquired intellect (*intellectus adeptus*). Therefore, no things recognized by the senses are needed for the actualization of the receptive intellect. Alexander establishes the epochal blindness of the new form of metaphysics, which causes an eclipse of being, unfolded by the Avicennist school of Latin *Modernorum*. Alfarabi defends the Aristotelian conception of abstraction, which establishes intellectual cognition through the mediation of sensual apprehension. Therefore, he cannot adopt the mythologic model of intellect as Neoplatonic sun, which directly illuminates material things and the immaterial intellect. Alfarabi sees Alexander’s error hidden in the deceptive form of Neoplatonic dazzling by the solar intellect. His disciple Averroes criticizes Avicenna’s metaphysics because of this fundamental obscurity. Therefore, Averroes considers Avicenna’s project of first philosophy flawed in principle (ch. 2.4.1). Alfarabi is the first thinker of the West who understood that Alexander’s conception of cognition is fundamentally blind to the occurrence of the first real substance. Modernity has no possibility to recognize the hylemorphic substance as an entity existing in itself, in its hyparchic being. The mind of the *illuminati* is blinded by the brilliance of the idea and they are led by Furies into intellectual darkness. See the movements of the prisoner in Plato’s mythopoetic cave (ch. 1). The adapted intellect of Neoplatonists in Falsafa (*intellectus adeptus*) is connected with mythopoetic diacosmos in analogic mode of immateriality. The cognition runs directly, through the efficiency of subsistent forms. The commentary of the Second Master defends the Aristotelian interpretation of *De anima* against Alexander. New exegesis follows the mediation by means of the middle member of the judgment, just as the *Second Analytics* have it for the scientific proof by the deductive judgment. Alfarabi introduced the necessary middle member (*medium*) into the scheme of cognition in order to establish the medaition between the sensorial and intellectual cognition. This imposition of meaning ensures the fact that the mediation between senses and intellect enables the cognition to pass from the material to the immaterial mode. This connection follows the real causality, which actualizes the soul to obtain corresponding knowledge of the real world.

The first Western definition of *intellectus possibilis* arises thanks to the Aristotelian transformation from the empiric cognition into intellectual one. Since both proceedings and ways are fundamentally different from each other (individual and material, universal and immaterial), there must be some mediator between them. The passive intellect performs this mediation with the help of the causally given effect. The writing *Second Analytics* postulates for truthful cognition a specific mediation with the help of the middle member of judgment. Causality exists between things in the real and at the same time it finds univocal expression through the middle member of demonstrative judgment (τὸ μέσον, *medium*).[[77]](#footnote-77) The possible intellect stands in the middle position, mediating the cognition of material things produced by the senses. The same mediating role performs diaphanum in the cosmos, since it mediates the sunbeam through the space into the act of seeing. The eye passively perceives colors actualized on the surface of the bodies. The recognition of the color of the body is given because the surface is irradiated by the sun, whose ray travels through a transparent environment (*diaphanum*). The color has potential character because the sun ray actualizes the potency of the color on the surface of the body through the diaphanum. The body exists in and of itself and we recognize it as colored. The writing *De anima* applies this scheme founding sensual apprehension on the immaterial cognition. This cognition is carried out by the passive ability of the intellect and the active faculty in the soul.[[78]](#footnote-78) The quoted section from *De anima* on the two components of the intellect (νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι, ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν, *De anima* 430a14–15) will play a fundamental role in Averroes’ *Great commentary on De anima* (CMDA). The cognition of the soul passively perceives the external thing and actively produces an immaterial concept. The introduction of the diaphanum into the scheme of cognition has a fundamental character because it connects the senses and the intellect. Under this condition, Aristotle’s preceding definition of the soul can be properly understood. Let us quote the brilliant interpretation of the work *De anima*, which is unfolded by Averroes’ writing CMDA and in the Latin West by Blund’s school. Alfarabi reads the writing *De anima* according to Aristotle’s intention, that is, from the second to the third book. The modernists read it quite uncritically, that is, from the end to the beginning. The Second Master did not skip the analysis of sensory cognition in *De anima* as Neoplatonists and postmodernity. Hence, he precisely sees the role of the diaphanum in the process of cognition of the senses and the intellect.

“Thus the principle by which the regard became actually seeing something, after it had been only potentially seeing before, and that in virtue of which regarded object, which was only potentially comprehensible, became the really seen; that ability to see (transparency) comes to the act of vision from the sun. Done in this way, something comes to that being, also to the potential intellect. The incoming sensual apprehension relates to the receptive intellect in the same way as the actual act of vision relates to the ability of seeing.”[[79]](#footnote-79)

The cognition is compared to the process of seeing, through which the individual capacity of seeing is actualized (*wodurch der Blick actuell sehend ward*). Abunaser states in an Aristotelian way that the causality of seeing is given by the external influence of light on the eye, by which the gaze became actually seeing something. In a similar way, it comes to the actualization of recognized things in the intellect. The intellect is primarily an immaterial and passive faculty of the soul; therefore, the cognition must be mediated to the intellect from the senses. Alfarabi relates the process of abstraction in the receptive intellect to the act of seeing, where two processes take place. The act of vision is mediatized by a special form of transparency (*Durchsichtigkeit, diaphanum*). On the one hand, the surface of the body is illuminated from the causally acting sun, and on the other hand, the process of seeing the colored surface takes place in the human eye and its general recognition takes place in the intellect. The diaphanum transfers the actuality of the beam to the surface of the body. This turns a potentially colored surface into an actual colored object. The diaphanum convey the actuality of the ray on the surface and in the second step it enables our sensual recognition of this surface as illuminated and colored. The actualization of vision in the eye is merely accidental with respect to the original causality of irradiation. The colored thing exists outside of us, on the illuminated body. The signification of the color through the mental concept endows this sensual accidentiality with the universality. This makes the course of cognition complete, because cognition passes from the thing to the senses and then to the intellect in the mode of actuality and potency. The quotation shows the disclosure of being in the intellect from the front, also from the real thing. Averroes understood that original position of Alfarabi and he brilliantly defended it against Avicenna. The Latin term “*diaphanum*” denotes a transparent environment that conveys the actuality of the ray on the surface of the actual body. The transition is necessary because the light is actual substance and the color is a potential accident, which is given on the body as first actual substance. The diaphanum transfers the actuality of light to our receptive sense organ. The eye is not light, but it perceives the light. In the same way, the surface of the body is the body that becomes colored when it is illuminated by the light. Abunaser discovered the fundamental role of the diaphanum for human cognition. He was not blinded as Neoplatonism that professed the Platonic intellect-sun. Alfarabi carried out a fundamentally new interpretation of the section *De anima* 430a16–17 with regard to Alexander. The quoted text described the way, how the light causes (τὸ φῶς ποιεῖ) that things colored in potence become actually colored (τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα χρώματα ἐνεργείᾳ χρώματα). Light acts on the potentially given environment wherein the qualities of real things are still given in pure potentiality (τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα). The fully potential diaphanum cannot produce a hypostatized form of *hypodokhē* like that of the being of the third kind. That was the position of the dialogue *Timaeus* and afterwards that of Neoplatonism (ch. 1.3.3). The true and the false meaning of the diaphanum established original *Lichtung* of the Western objectivity in the archaic mode of the un/concealment (*a/lētheia*). The hermeneutics must go with the Pythia into the dark cave to see the real effect of the sunbeam correctly. This epochal event (*Ereignis*) was displaced, since the modernity forgot (*Seinsvergessenheit*) about the mediation. It replaced the missing mediation by a mythopoetic simulacrum of the intellect-sun. The original *epokhē* cancels the epochal error of modernity. Exegesis must go back to original interpretation of *De anima* according to Aristotle to find out the metaphysical *alētheia*. The interpretation of diaphanum determines the course of cognition according to *De anim*a that Alfarabi partly and Averroes fully exposed. Necessarily, it reveals the whole history of the untruth given by the displacement of this mediation in Avicenna’s Neoplatonism and in the future forms of objectivity. The definition of the possible intellect correlates with the role of diaphanum. That connection defines the cognition from the point of view of the phenomenological perspective “how” (see Heidegger’s *Wie*, ch. 1) arises the first ontological disclosure of the substance. After the *epokhē* of mythic solar intellect, we can see the beginning of the metaphysical error (*Irrtum*) that characterizes modernity and postmodernity in the Latin West.

The new interpretation of the revelation of being in the intellect that was set in motion by Alfarabi, was adopted by the Latin West in various translations of *De anima*.[[80]](#footnote-80) Alfarabi’s commentary on *De anima*, connected with the treatise *On the intellect*, was probably translated into Latin by Dominic Gundissalinus in the second half of the 12th century under the title *De intellectu et intellecto*. The school of Toledo, in the translation of the quoted section, unlike the present original (ed. Dieterici), does not mention with a single word the environment through which the actualized sunray penetrates.[[81]](#footnote-81) The active intellect ensures a complete course of cognition by its own actuality. Therefore, it represents for the Neoplatonic Toletans the only principle of cognition (*ipsa est principium quod ea que sunt intellecta in potencia, facit esse intellecta in effectu*). The Latin translation claims that Alfarabi gives the primacy to the active intellect, which actualizes the potentiality of the cognizing forms. This sentence is correct in a certain sense, but it is incomplete. Any form of mediation disappeared from the scheme of cognition. Even the external thing fell out of this sentence. In the original, the solar myth of the Modernists cannot be found, because the cognition arises through the mediation of diaphanum. Alfarabi follows the mediation given by the order of following doublets that transmit the material and the immaterial cognition.

* The sun operates in the cosmos in the same way as divine *causa prima* operates on the level of cognition in the intelligible part of cosmos.
* The sun ray in the material world operates in the same way as operates the cosmic hypostatized and fully actual *intellectus agens* in the human soul.
* The physical *diaphanum1* operates in the world as *perspicuum*, which transmits the actual ray through the space to the bodies. The causal effect transmitted by *perspicuum* is the color of the illuminated body.
* The secondary process runs on the level of cognitive *diaphanum2* that apprehend the colored body by the senses and transfers it to the intellect. The sensually recognized color of the body changes into the general concept of intellectually recognized color.
* The second mediation runs in the series: receptive eyes (sensorial organ) — sensual imagination (*imaginatio*) — receptive *intellectus in potencia —* human *intellectus agens*.

The translation *De intellectu et intellecto* into Latin was made by the school of Toledo that was influenced by the Avicennism. It states in general that the potentiality of seeing receives the actuality of the sun (*quod tribuit illi ab illo principio*). This is not a phenomenological description of cognition, but a banal statement of the fact that we cognize things because they are illuminated by the sun. The hermeneutic core of the question, “how” we recognize, was replaced in the translation of the Toledo-school by the sun myth of the Neoplatonic modernity. The attribution of the sunlight as the being of the third kind represents an error of principle, which eliminates any scientific proof of the *Second Analytics*. The light is not a universal concept and it cannot act directly on the intellect. There is no real and actually given causality that could start the process of cognition. The solar intellect does not exist, this is a mythical nonsense of the *Modernorum*. The light is a materially given physical substance and the cognition is a universal immaterially given form in the intellect. Therefore, it needs the above-mentioned chain of mediation. The critical thinking of the Second Master sees the real causality of the action of the light on the cognition. The natural activity makes the role of first substance and the human cognition makes the role of the second substance. The causality given by the sunbeam and mediatized by the various diaphanum is taken by Alfarabi into the predication of the middle section of scientific judgment.

The school of Toledo displaced the diaphanum from the process of cognition and transformed the light into the being of the third kind. The light, which causes immaterial cognition, and the solar intellect represent in the Toledo-school two entities of the third kind. To these non-existent entities, modernity gave an efficient causality in the mythopoetic process of cognition. Done in that way, the first generation of modernists created a twofold principal fallacy in the mode of metaphysical mistake (*Irrtum*). The mediation completely disappeared in the modern interpretation of cognition. On the contrary, it makes a principal point in the original scheme of cognition of Aristotle and the Second Master. In the Latin translation, the radiation of the sun’s rays (*comparatio irradiationis*) replaced the mediation of the diaphanum. The theory of cognition as a comparison given in the school of Toledo does not include the mediation by the diaphanum that keeps the major position in the original version of the Second Master. The Neoplatonic scheme of cognition prefers direct disclosure of intellect by the sun; therefore, it does not need a mediator. Solar corpuscles exists in the form of the substance of the third kind. They are fully efficient thanks to their clarity and actuality. The ray is the first actual substance that causes a potential, universally given cognition in the human mind. This is a nonsense according to Aristotelianism. The immaterial intellect has no possibility to receive the physical ray of the sun. The scheme of direct disclosure of the intellect belongs to the Neoplatonic Avicenna in the faulty translation of the Toletans, but not to the Aristotelian Alfarabi. In this way, another figure of the latinized Second Master appeared in Toledo. Hermeneutics follow the tragic history of the objectively blind modernity. It is obvious that the mythical cognitive scheme of the Toledo school was covertly guided by goddesses of Vengeance through the solar mythopoetic of the Platonic cave, which was transmitted to the Latin West through Avicenna. Let us recall the origin of the Greek word for “knowledge” as the consummate and perfect act of seeing, which establishes the original event of Western metaphysics in Allegory of the cave (ch. 1). The modern *illuminati* do not care about the way, how they see something. The troglodytes from the Platonic cave are blinded by the solar intellect, which directly manifests the *intelligibilia*. The objectivist illuminated by the solar intellect “sees” all immaterial knowledge as well as real things. Intellectual knowledge comes from platonically blinded Socrates when he descended into the cave. He make use of academic institutions to proclaime this objective truth to the instrumentally thinking and technically proficient cave dwellers. They instrumentalize all the nonsense available at their disposal (*Ge-Stell*), because they are technically absolutely competent to do so. According to above-mentioned Heidegger, science does not think because it does not have to see anything of the real happening of Being itself (ch. 1.2). The objective insanity of Western civilization (*Irre*) originated in the mode of metaphysical formation in connection with the Greek expression παιδεία, which is handed down in Heidegger’s interpretation of the Platonic cave myth (ch. 1). Descartes and Arnauld confirm this mythopoetic scheme of Toledo-school for postmodernity (ch. 2.4.4). From the second half of the 12th century, the doctrine of Falsafa led to the eclipse of the first real substance and it was immediately transferred into scholasticism. Alfarabi’s Latin translation of *De intellectu* took over Alexander’s eclipse of the real process of cognition, since the school of Toledo displaced diaphanum. The school of authentic commentators on *De anima* founded by John Blund returned the diaphanum to the gigantomachy of substance around the year 1200, making it the basic element of cognition. This school, after a thorough reading of *De anima*, renewed mediation through Alfarabi’s notion of *intellectus possibilis*, to which they added the concept of *intellectus formalis*. Blund’s school distinguished precisely in Abunaser’s original interpretation of abstraction two distinct processes. The Second Master associated them to the receptive intellect in an undifferentiated way, into the process of reception and abstraction (OBJ II, ch. 2.1.1). The following tome shows that the dispute over the twofold interpretation of Alfarabi’s *De intellectu* continued with the fundamental conflict over the interpretation of Averroes’s corpus between the Avicenna’s line reserved to the school of Toledo and the Sicilian school of Aristotelians. The doubt concerning the missing mediation of the cognition of the senses and the intellect was cleared up after the arrival of authentic Averroes works in the Latin West. Neoplatonic interpretation of the school of Toledo was based on the Avicennist translations of Averroes that can be dated around the year 1220. Michael Scotus changed it in favor of the authentic Aristotelianism of the Sicilian school after his arrival to Paris in 1230 (OBJ II, ch. 2.1.3). The presence or absence of the diaphanum contains the core of all later quarrels about the nature of cognition.

Thanks to the introduction of the *intellectus in potencia* into the Neoplatonic scheme of cognition, a new event of the unconcealment (*alētheia*) occurs in Western metaphysics. The soul possesses its own ability of cognition, which, however, keeps only a secondary, accidental value compared to the existing real thing. The cognition is determined by the reality. We perceive the thing through senses that are actualized directly from the first substance. Through the secondary relation to the real thing, the soul becomes everything (νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι, *De anima* 430a14). Recognition is actualized through the Aristotelian metaphysical dative and it is predicated as categorial imposition. Knowledge is given in the past mode of being of the real being vis-à-vis the cognized concept (τῷ τί ἦν, *quo est*; ch. 1.1). Cognition arises from the individual imagination and from the individual *intellectus possibilis*. Both types of diaphanum constitute a twofold form of sensual and intellectual mediation in the soul. This twofold mediation brings about the immaterial meaning of original material things in reality. The intellect keeps its present concept related to past character of the actual existence of the cognized thing. The blind modernity, thinking under the influence of vengeful Furies, sees the parousia of eidetic meaning through the objective sun myth. This paranoiac vision creates mythopoetic reality, which replaced the Aristotelian deductive proof and critical knowledge of the first real substance. That new kind of knowledge is projected on the wall of the Platonic cave. The role of the “educated” guardians of Western civilization, who found their living in the academic institutions, is quite indispensable in this divine comedy. The play of man-made simulacra replaced the diaphanum and poetically establishes the globally efficient Platonism for the troglodytes in the epoch of objectivism. Averroes was fully aware of the epochal significance of Abunaser’s principled shift in understanding the intellect and he completed this tradition in CMDA. Avicenna and Averroes explained the disclosure of being in the intellect in an opposite way. Their twofold manifestation of being established two epochal forms of metaphysics. The Latin West adopts both versions of metaphysics through the controversy of the first or the second averroism. The ambivalence regarding the manifestation of substance and truth shows Abunaser’s twofold concept of abstraction. Aristotelian form is abstracted from matter thanks to the activity of *intellectus possibilis*. It differs from the cosmic intelligence thanks to the receptivity. Due to hyparchical primacy of the first substance, the universal forms of cognition are only potentially contained in matter. Therefore, the truth exists only in the intellect, thanks to the process of abstraction of the recognized forms from the hylemorphic substance. Blund’s school understood that this activity of the intellect has a different character related to passive intentional reception. The hermeneutics found *Lichtung* of modernity and it must raise the fundamental question, in line of Heidegger. We must investigate twofold sense of reference (*Bezugssinn*) that indicates the fundamental way “how” this or that school understood the disclosure of being in the possible intellect. In the receptive intellect, the potential contents of cognition are transformed into intelligible forms. The receptive component of the soul enables a primarily passive recognition of immaterial forms, which is afterwards completed by the active intellect. The second substance is tied to the hyparchical position of the hylemorphic first substance, which is recognized by the senses and by Alfarabi’s *intellectus in potencia*. The second intention (*ma’qūl ṭhānī, intellectum secundum*), thanks to this specific form of universality and potentiality, differs both from the actual form in the hylemorphic first substance and from the immaterial and actual cosmic form as the first immaterial substance. With regard to the hylemorphic structure of reality and to the effect of the metaphysical dative, the human *intellectus agens* is active through the *intellectus possibilis*.

However, Alfarabi follows the Neoplatonic line in the interpretation of cognition as well (ch. 2.1). The conception of truth as given in the quoted section *Met*. VI.2 is directly determined in terms of being and it occupies the same level as categorial predication. Truthful cognition, therefore, must also make a correspondence with regard to the cosmic immaterial forms and intelligences. According to dialogue *Theaetetus*, this recognition elevates man to the divine world (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, *Theait*. 176b1–2). According to the *Nicomachean Ethics*, it perfects the immortal divine potential given in man as the strongest element that dwells within him (ἀθανατίζειν. ..πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὑτῷ, *E.N*. 1177b33–34). In this model of cognition, the intellectual forms are given in the scheme of univocal or analogical similarity of the lower forms, which participate in the world of the higher forms. The efficient and actual form is given in Neoplatonism by emanation. The higher form is degraded to a lower level of being in contingent matter in the process of catabasis. Then the correspondence of intellect and matter must be given directly and without categorical predication based on the abstraction from the senses. The process of cognition of subsistent and separated intelligible forms in the human soul is guaranteed by Alexander’s term “acquired intellect” (*intellectus adeptus*). The history of this type of intellect is linked in Arabic to the translation of Alexander’s commentary on *De anima*. The paragraph quoted above describes the active intellect, which acts from outside on human cognition (ὁ θύραθεν νοῦς, *De anima liber cum Mantissa* 110.4). This term was translated into Arabic as “assumed intellect” or “acquired intellect” and shifted the interpretation of intellectual cognition toward Neoplatonism (Geoffroy 2002). Alfarabi considers the acquired intellect (*intellectus adeptus*) as the final and highest sphere of human intellectual activity, which borders on the action of separated cosmic intelligences. By connection of the receptive intellect with the acquired intellect, a figure of the fully activated intellect (*intellectus in effectu*) is formed. Thereby the cognition of the separated intelligible cosmic forms in a human intellect can be given in the direct Neoplatonic vision that exists parallel with Aristotelian cognition made through abstraction from senses. The human *intellectus adeptus* differs from the *intellectus agens* of the stellar spheres. It is receptive and cognizes only in potency. The cosmic intelligences have no receptive intellect because they are immaterial and fully actual. Thanks to the actuality, the cosmic active intellect acts directly as it pushes its forms into human acquired intellect. The craftsman actively forms the passive matter by his own idea in the same way. This scheme of cognition follows the active imprint of intelligible forms into the soul through the predication called “*in artificialibus.*” That illumination scheme is fundamentally different from the process of Aristotelian abstraction, which is given by activation of the potential intellect from actual sensual cognition. In the second floor of cognition, which is given by illumination from the separated cosmic *intellectus agens*, the acquired intellect plays the role of the receptive intellect. Avicenna’s interpretation of *De anima* applies this scheme and follows Alfarabi’s Neoplatonic line, which is given by the illumination of being from behind. The hypostatized cognitive form is directly observed thanks to the power of the *intellectus adeptus*. This intellect has the same essence as the separated cosmic *intellectus agens*. The cognition bound to the *intellectus adeptus* is based on the schema of Neoplatonism. The acquired intellect can known the cognitive forms because the separated active intellect enables it. In virtue of disclosure from autonomous cosmic forms, the acquired intellect is activated to a higher level (*intellectus in effectu*). In the case of direct insight into the Neoplatonic forms (*intellectum primum*), the intellect does not follow the process of abstraction from the real thing, since it receives directly the formes from the separated cosmic *intellectus agens*. Alfarabi emphasizes that even the cosmic active intellect does not perform uninterruptedly. He does not exist in the full actuality, which is solely a divine quality.[[82]](#footnote-82) In connection with cosmic active intellect actualizes the acquired intellect the mental contents in the same contingent way. Averroes followed in that crucial point Themistius’s voluntaristic conception of the sensually cognizing *intellectus materialis*. He takes this property as evidence of the volitional properties of the individual human soul and abolishes the acquired Neoplatonic intellect altogether (ch. 2.4.2). It is not the position of Abunaser. In his illumination theory, the higher cognition is not triggered by the process of abstraction, but by the actual and entirely separated *intellectus agens*. The cosmic intellect acts through the form of individual abstraction, i.e., as acquired intellect (*intellectus adeptus*). Thus, the knowledge given from above is carried out thanks to the fourfold form of intellect, which is first given by the Aristotelian abstraction from the senses (*intellectus possibilis — in effectu/adeptus — agens*). Aristotelian definition of cognition means that the intellect is actualized through the senses and abstraction (*in effectu,* νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι). To this naturally actualized cognition comes the additionally added acquired intellect (*adeptus*). It is actualized from the world of the cosmic intelligences. The passive intellect (*intellectus in potencia*), thanks to its connection with the active intellect, produces an ambivalent character of cognition. The Second Master integrated the Neoplatonic scheme of the solar intellect into the Aristotelian scheme by reversing the order of the actualization in this way (*possibilis — adeptus/in effectu — agens*). The scheme of actualization follows the disclosure from behind, because the acquired intellect is activated by the cosmic intellect and therefore activates the possible intellect. This scheme is adopted by the Neoplatonic Avicenna. The middle position of the actualization of the intellect by the disclosure from the front or from the back plays a key role. Either the cognition runs through the Aristotelian second substance within the framework of the categorical predication originated by abstraction (*abstractio*). Or the cognitive form makes a substance of the third kind in the framework of the demiurgic diacosmos. The cognition made in this way is a direct contemplation of cosmic forms (*illuminatio*). The acquired form of the intellect plays a fundamental role in the process of cognition as *illuminatio* because it actualizes the acquired intellect directly by the power of cosmic intelligences. The Second Master, even in the second variant, always maintains the thesis of *De anima* that the human intellect performs a passive and active abstraction of immaterial forms from material things. Then the illumination given by disclosure of the acquired intellect from the cosmic intellect completes the process of Aristotelian abstraction from the sensually recognized first substance made by the possible intellect. Avicenna abolished this thesis and he created a new process of abstraction by separation of intellect and the senses. The intellect perceives the universal forms directly and in the things as well (*denudatio*). In this case, the cognition represents an intuitive insight into the substance of the third kind, which was conceived by the line of Neoplatonists after Porphyry (ch. 1.3.1). Abunaser is an Aristotelian and claims against al-Kindīs school that the first substances do not come into being in the process of Neoplatonic emanation, but they are actualized thanks to the existence of the other material as well as immaterial substances. The process of abstraction therefore explicitly relates to actual hylemorphic substances. Illumination represents the second stage of cognition, when the soul like a *tabula rasa* is already actualized thanks to the Aristotelian scheme of cognition. The formal essence in mind is produced by the abstraction from the first real substance. It means that illumination starts by the actualization of the cognition from the senses. The hylemorphic substance changes through the human cognition in the universal categorial cognition and truth according to Aristotle’s version in *Metaphysics* VI.2. In the second degree of cognition through illumination, the intellect is actualized directly from the world of separated and subsistent Neoplatonic forms.

This particular form of abstraction (*al-muğarrad*), which Avicenna’s Latin translations and later traditions refer to by the term *denudatio* or *spoliatio*, plays a key role in the emergence of objectivity. Truth is not at all defined as the correspondence of the intellect and the real thing, but is placed outside of the categorical predication as the transcendental genus of being according to *Metaphysics* VI.2. Avicenna takes the second variant of direct cognition as illumination to be the basis of human cognition. He creates a concept of objectivity through a new form of abstraction. Thus, a twofold reconciliation between Plato and Aristotle is possible. Abunaser’s conception of cognition is characterized by a fundamental ambivalence, as was the aforementioned status of indivisible substance in Neoplatonism.

“But if the intelligible become the actually intelligible, many of these other categories are lifted away from it, so that its being becomes another entity, which was not that being.” [[83]](#footnote-83)

The Latin version of the quotation says that in the process of abstraction another being (*aliud esse*) comes into being. This new entity made by abstraction forms a conceptual unity at the level of intellectual cognition. The question is the same as in the case of Porphyry’s interpretation of the *Categories* (ch. 1.3). What is the nature of this *aliud esse* in the process of signification and categorical predication? Does Alfarabi ground the first abstraction in the classical Aristotelian category predication, which is given in a hyparchical way from the first substance? Or is this abstraction taken in the transcendental mode of Platonic truth as hypostatic being, that is, according to the section from *Metaphysics* VI.2 quoted above? Or is there something in between, in the style of demiurgic diacosmos suggested by Jamblichus and Simplicius according to the dialogue *Timaeus*, where categorial meaning and substances are predicated as being of the third kind? The following lines immediately deepen this ambiguity concerning the new substance according to the above-mentioned quotation, see attached translation of the Toledo school.[[84]](#footnote-84) The universals keep their own hypostatic existence in the world, which the Avicennist translation of the Toledo school emphasizes (*habent esse in mundo*). This section establishes the original *Lichtung* of objectivity in the mode of epochal *Irrtum*. Objectivity is by no means bound exclusively to Avicenna, but already to Alfarabi. His philosophy was read and handed down by the Toledo school in the paradigm of Avicenna’s metaphysics. That Latin school of translators introduced the Avicennist denudation in the context where Alfarabi keeps a scheme of illumination made by the Aristotelian abstraction. Taken into the schema of illumination, denudation creates a being of the third kind in the acquired intellect. Alfarabi takes illumination in the framework of the Aristotelian philosophy. It corresponds to the abstraction according to *De anima* that excludes the being of the third kind. Neoplatonic interpretations of *De anima* have led to further confusion in the interpretation of knowledge according to the Second Master. In the soul, according to Aristotle, only the mental concept is recognized in the mode of potency. In mind, there is no place for the actual cosmic form as objective pseudo-actuality of the Neoplatonists. The Latin scholars William of Auvergne (Alvernus) and Albert the Great adopted position of Alfarabius regarding the illumination. Both excellent Aristotelians and representatives of the first averroism defended the concept of supernatural illumination, but they rejected Avicenna’s objective nature of the third kind. The objective illumination is made in the soul as an intellectual imprint of the being of the third kind. Alfarabi’s *aliud esse* became a kind of *tertium ens* is actual intellectual form that passes from the cosmic *intellectus agens* into the acquired intellect. The new being given in illumination is fundamentally different from the real first substances as well as from the second intentions. These are given exclusively in thinking as conceptual potency. The acquired intellect of modernists is actualized directly from the separated cosmic *intellectus agens*, because it forms a full unity of the recognized content and the cognizing subject. Modernity receives directly acquired immaterial and actual substances as Neoplatonic and objective species. This specific unity of cognition arises at the level of the human acquired intellect and cosmic active intellect. The acquired intellect is actualized from behind from the separated active intellect and it becomes actual in this way (*intellectus in effectu*). In the act of the first pre-Cartesian reflection, the acquired intellect recognizes the actualized noema in its essential essence (*sunt intellecta in effectu et ipsa essencia*). Thanks to the universal essence grasped in direct way, the intellect is subsequently recognized in its actuality (*sit intellectus in effectu et inteligat eciam*).[[85]](#footnote-85) The translation of Toledo school sees only the actual recognition of immaterial forms, which creates a unity of the acquired and actualized human intellect. This intellect is irradiated by the actual and separated active cosmic intellect. This new kind of species (*ipsa essencia*) is typical for Avicenna. His version of *intellectus adeptus* directly and immediately contemplates these objective essences. The cosmic forms produced by *intellectus agens* are directly given as *intellectum primum* for the solar intellect of uncritical modernists. The modern *illuminati*, furthermore, recognize these forms in the actuality of their own hypostatic intellect. Avicenna establishes this sphere as the basic model of a new metaphysics and after him the Latin modernism and postmodernism took it over. Alfarabi, however, is not a modernist à la Avicenna, which Averroes correctly recognized. The Second Master determines cognition according to the classical scheme from Aristotle’s *De anima*. Afterwards, the intellect can be fully actualized by illumination. The wise man, of course, is not immediately divine, but only after an accomplished cognition. This small detail, defended firmly in the theory of the Second Master, escaped the modernity which, under the methodological guidance of Furies, considers objective wisdom of the heavenly realm immediately and directly. The original *De anima* has a different type of cognition than the direct insight into the forms and intelligences in the Neoplatonic diacosmos. The possible intellect perceives the cognizing forms merely in their potency because they exist as first real substance.[[86]](#footnote-86) The actualization takes place through the process of abstraction, which is given by the reception of abstracted forms into the potential intellect. This potential intellect produces a second type of immaterial cognition (*intellectum secundum*) after the material sensual cognition. This actualization of cognitive form in the intellect differs from the direct apprehension of intellectual forms as being of the third kind. Alfarabi modified Alexander’s Neoplatonic interpretation of cognition according to *Met*. VI. 2. The higher truth is given on the level of the first actual immaterial substances. It must actualize the *intellectus in potencia* by mediation over the acquired intellect, which is directly actualized by the cosmic forms. The receptive intellect is immaterial and potential, truth as direct determination of being according to *Met*. VI.2 is immaterial and actual. Made in that way, it is possible to create a scheme of cognition as a transition from potency to actuality. That is the reason why Alfarabi introduced his own form of Neoplatonic knowledge of intellectual form in addition to Aristotelian abstraction (*illuminatio*). He could not place this insight in the cognitive form according to Aristotle. The receptive *intellectus in potencia* is activated by abstraction from the senses. The second kind of illumination acts on the possible intellect through the mediation of the acquired intellect, because the latter actualizes the cognition from behind (*intellectum primum*). The actualization of the acquired intellect is twofold, from the cosmic form transmitted by *intellectus adeptus* and from the sensual conception transmitted by *intellectus in potencia*. Both the first and the second intention is capable of actualizing the intellect according to the above-mentioned quotation, since it creates an accomplished cognitive form (*fiet intellectus in effectu propter intellectum primum et intellectum secundum*). The difference between the two kinds of cognition in the mode *intellectum primum* and *secundum* is fundamental and corresponds to the aforementioned interpretation of *Categories* 2a11–16 (ch. 2.1). Let us start with the disclosure of cognition from behind in the mode of illumination from the universal cosmic forms. The first intention is given by direct consideration of the actual form in the acquired intellect, which is actualized as human *intellectus adeptus* from the separated cosmic *intellectus agens*. Taken in this order based on the mystical and supernatural enlightenment through the intelligible form, the cognition made by the abstraction from the senses was moved to the second place. Then the illumination is given in the first mode of *intellectum secundum* because it finalizes the human nature into divine form according to the above texts of Plato and Aristotle. But the natural course of cognition is of primary importance. It must correspond to the metaphysical dative that entails the imposition of meaning from first existing substance. Then the order of both intentions is reversed. The first intention establishes empiric cognition according to the scenario *De anima*, that is, through the disclosure from the front, from the real hylemorphic substance. The cognition undergoes the classical process of abstraction through the passive and receptive function of the intellect. The possible intellect takes the intelligible form from the senses. The possible intellect activates through that form the cognition in such a way that the intellect becomes actual (*intellectus in effectu*). The interpreted sections show that Abunaser strived to harmonize Neoplatonic and Aristotelian variants of cognition into a whole. Aristotle’s polemic against the opponents of the Principle of Non-contradiction and the principle of the Excluded Third speaks of a direct apodictic insight into first principles by means of the pure performance of the intellect (*Anal. Post*. 100b11–12). Moreover, this intuitive performance of the intellect proves that the first principles are the ultimate grounds of cognition (ἀνυπόθετον, *Met*. 1005b14–16). For this fundamental reason, the first principles of cognition are logically unprovable. They can be defended only in a dialectical manner. Alfarabi and after him Avicenna based on this direct insight into the first principles a special form of abstraction and intuition, which starts from the twofold predication *per prius*. It relates both to Aristotle’s substance and to Plato’s idea. This abstraction is characterized by a total ambivalence, as it is the aforementioned status of indivisible substance in Neoplatonism. Averroes rejected in principle this effort. He considers it as destruction of the Aristotelian metaphysics based on the cognitive proceeding in *De anima*. The Second Master, however, does not come to illumination from Neoplatonism like its disciple Avicenna, but through the Aristotelian interpretation of the *Second Analytics* and *Metaphysics*.

The emergence of new comprehension of being (*Vor-blickbahn*) through the *intellectum primum* and *secundum* establishes the *Lichtung* of truth and untruth, which characterizes a new epochal unconcealment of metaphysics. Avicenna takes the model of cognition through illumination. This model follows the disclosure of being from behind, from the first substance as cosmic form. Avicenna found the first science on the manifestation of the *primum intelligibile*. It is given by the illumination in descending mode of cognition: *intellectus agens—intellectus adeptus*. The translators in Toledo adopted this view from Avicenna and it was regarded as universal scheme of cognition. The school of second Averroism used this perspective for erroneous interpretation of Averroes’s writing CMDA. This disciple of the Second Master rejected in principle the Neoplatonic solution, since he considered Avicenna’s metaphysics fundamentally wrong. As to the foundation of metaphysics, Averroes takes from Alfarabi’s scheme of cognition only the naturally given first floor, that is, the process of classical Aristotelian abstraction coming from the senses. Averroes follows the process of ascending generality that builds up cognitive forms (*secundum intelligibile*). The intellectual notions come about in the process of empiric cognition. The meaning arises through hyparchical predication, which is based on cognition through the senses and through the intellect given in potency. This actualization of the intellect arises through the disclosure of being from the front according to the ascending mode of cognition: *intellectus in potencia — intellectus in effectu*. That proceeding excludes any cognitive form as hypostatic *tertium ens*. However, Neoplatonism of the Second Master caused that actualization of forms in the passive and active intellect created a new sphere of being (*aliud esse*). This new “being” is not an Aristotelian abstraction made after the model of cognition proposed in *De anima*. In the scheme of cognition created by the imposition, the cognitive form of the real thing passes from the senses to the imagination and then to the passive intellect. The ambivalent cognition of Alfarabi is based on the twofold conception of abstraction and intentionality. It assumes actuality both from the first substance sensually recognized and received in the potential intellect, and from the world of autonomous forms perceived in the acquired intellect. Alfarabi had to solve the basic question of Porphyry, Simplicius and others, which is given by the ambivalent statute of the third substance (ch. 1.3). The hermeneutics confirm that Alfarabi explicitly introduces the second insight into the predication of generic substance given by disclosure from behind. The cognitive form corresponds to the primary actuality of the separated active cosmic intellect (*intellectus agens*), which called the intellectual forms through the direct insight into the acquired intellect. The active intellect plays the role of the active craftsman, which presses the forms both into the matter and into the acquired intellect. This conception of illumination, given in the Neoplatonic form of abstraction (*denudatio*), we will encounter again in the mode of objective predication called “*in artificialibus*.” The following quotation establishes the original *Lichtung* for the new form of metaphysics of *Modernorum*, which is completed by Duns Scotus.

“The acquired intellect (*intellectus adeptus*) is at the same time the substrate for cognitive formes and thus it becomes the form for the intellect given in actuality (*intellectus adeptus est quasi forma intellectui in effectu*), and this is the substrate and matter for the acquired intellect. The actualized intellect is the form for the possible intellect (*intellectus uero in effectu est quasi materia et subiectum intellectui adepto*) and the latter is given as matter for the actualized intellect. At this level, the forms begin to descend into corporeal material forms (*incipiunt forme descendere usque at formam corporalem ylealem*), although before they have gradually risen to the point of separating themselves from matter and so heading up to immaterial forms.”[[87]](#footnote-87)

The quotation begins with an insight into the world of immaterial forms that come over to the cognitive form in human soul. This form is called “the acquired intellect” (*der erworbene Intellect, intellectus adeptus*). The predication of actual intellectual forms from above needs this substrate of thought to create a world of different being (*aliud esse*) behind the hylemorphic first substance. The quotation continues downward to the world of real material substances. The predication in the categorical scheme of Aristotelianism is possible only with respect to the first empiric substance, that is why it is not applied there. The first part of the quotation shows the deduction of the higher cognizing forms from the world of cosmic intelligences and it runs in the downward direction. Therefore, the acquired intellect, thanks to its already given actuality as form, also serves for the actualization of the potential intellect. This one is “material” thanks to its pure potentiality, see Alexander’s definition of the detached hylic intellect (*est quasi materia et subjectum intellectui adepto*). Thus, a new figure of *intellectus in potencia* arises, which is not given in the process of abstraction, i.e., by the actualisation of cognitive form by the first hylemorphic substance. The new figure of the “material” or “receptive” intellect arises in the process of actualization, which is given by illumination from the separated actual form. Such illuminated “receptive intellect” (*intellectus in potencia*) acts as a hypostatic substrate (*subiectum, hoc aliquid*) capable of receiving actualized forms coming from the cosmic *intellectus agens*. Taken in the formal way, it is the scenario according to Aristotelian proceeding in *De anima*, but it is used for the cognition in a Neoplatonic sense. The higher component of cognition in the form of the quasi-form determines the receptive component, which is given in the form of the quasi-matter. The little word “*quasi*” has a central meaning in the whole scheme of determining the intellect, which Averroes understood correctly both against Themistius and against Alexander (ch. 2.4.3). The new position of *intellectus in effectu* was actualized by illumination. It confirms that the actualization of *intellectus possibilis* derives from the illumination coming from the world of autonomous forms. The *intellectus adeptus* mediates this actual cosmic form to actualize directly *intellectus possibilis*. Then it is true that the individual knowledge of the soul is illuminated by the light of the separated cosmic *intellectus agens*, which works through the human *intellectus adeptus*. The latter realizes itself as a hypostatic form directly from the cosmic active intellect. The cosmic form is first accepted on the higher floors of the human intellect (*intellectus adeptus*). It is directly connected to the autonomous *intellectus agens*. The *intellectus adeptus* actualized in this way acts as an active hypostatic form with respect to the receptive *intellectus possibilis*. The latter is actualized in a new way. Before, it recognized immaterial forms by abstraction, that is, from the senses and from the material world. The receptive *intellectus possibilis* recognizes in the act of enlightenment the higher intellectual forms. They come from outside and therefore the cognition is primarily exposed from behind, that is, from the world of autonomous cosmic forms as first immaterial substances. Alfarabi defends the model of cognition as illumination together with Aristotelian abstraction. Both directions of cognition, which are given by Aristotelian abstraction and Neoplatonic illumination, complete the actualization of intellect. The actualization in the mode of *intellectus in effectu* can proceed in two ways. Firstly, through the Neoplatonic illumination given by the acquired intellect. It is actualized by the cosmic intellect and therefore it directly contemplates the intelligible forms. Secondly, the *intellectus in effectu* is actualized by the Aristotelian abstraction, which originates in the disclosure from the front, i.e., from the sensually cognized first actual substance. This hylemorphic first substance is received by the passive and empty *intellectus in potencia*. Aristotelian Alfarabi holds the primary disclosure of the sense of being from the front, from the sensually apprehended first substance. But this cognition exists only on a lower level and possesses only auxiliary character. Its completion enables the work of the acquired intellect (*intellectus adeptus*), which is connected to the separated *intellectus agens*. In the second stage of cognition, the intellect is actualized directly from the world of separated and subsistent Neoplatonic forms. This act of cognition requires a special form of insight, which the Latin translations of Avicenna and later tradition designate by the above-quoted terminus *denudatio* or *spoliatio*. The Neoplatonic unity of the intellectual form refers to the substrate of the thinking of the purely intellectual forms, which the Latin translation of the cited section Alfarabis calls *quasi-subiectum*. This substrate or carrier of the new type of cognition represents new *Lichtung* of truth and untruth for the objective determination of the person in the Latin West. If we take this subject in a modern way as substance, the *intellectus in effectu* serves as the basis for the act of knowing given by disclosure from behind. This substrate makes a new mythological “substance—species” in the human person to multiply the substances in the modern, and thus totally schizophrenic subject. Thanks to the introduction of the term “*quasi”* for the definition of intellect as matter and forms, the Second Master did not allow plurality of substances in man. The plurality of objective substances as hypostases in the first substance is philosophically ridiculous; therefore it is inhuman and stupid.

The modernity founded by Avicenna works with the assertion that the acquired intellect becomes an active form and cause of intellectual cognition (*intellectus adeptus est quasi forma intellectui in effectu*). The metaphysical dative hidden in that formaluation indicates the new donation of being that determines the new kind of actualisation of intellect (*intellectui in effectu*). That quite modern “intellect” became a new kind of *tertium ens* as quasi-substance in human being. That direction of donation created the new form of Aristotelian *quidditas* and it lead directly to the first form of *dativus obiectivus* (OBJ III, ch. 4). The actualization made by the separated cosmic intellect is possible under the condition that *intellectus adeptus* is a quasi-substance for the forms produced by the cosmic intellect (*intellectus adeptus est quasi subiectum illis*). At the same time, the *intellectus adeptus* is an effective quasi-form for the lower intellect, which has been actualized in the process of Aristotelian abstraction determined from the material substance (*est quasi forma intellectui in effectu*). This lower material intellect actualizes the potential forms in things through Aristotelian abstraction (*abstractio*), but it can also become actual through disclosure from the acquired intellect (*denudatio*). Then the receptive intellect presents a quasi-matter for the superior actual form of the acquired intellect. The abstracted form came from the hylemorphic substance (*intellectum secundum*); now, it becomes the object of direct vision made by the hypostatic intellect of *illuminati* modernes. The sense of being given in this quite objective way (*intellectum primum*) comes from the conjunction of the acquired human and separate active intellect (*Es gibt, Ereignis*). This donation of meaning replaced the classical metaphysical dative, because the *quidditas* is not the same as in the case of Aristotle. The second floor of Aristotelian cognition provides, within the framework of *abstractio*, a form abstracted from the real, sensually apprehended things. The result of abstraction enters in the process of illumination. The intelligible form makes a subject of direct insight that comes from the acquired intellect. It is illuminated, that is, actualized, by the cosmic *intellectus agens* outside the living person. We find the same form of the intellect in Alfarabi’s writing that comments on Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics*.[[88]](#footnote-88) The abstraction given by disclosure of intellect from behind brings about a very different concept of cognition in comparison to Aristotle’s *De anima*. Avicenna’s abstraction as *denudatio* proceeds in the same way. Either the activity of the intellect runs according to Aristote as the determinacy of the passive intellect by the real thing (*abstrahere*). Then it is a classical theory of truth as *adaequatio* in the order of Aristotelian signification given by the hyparchical relation of the first and the second substance. Or the intellect contemplates a particular form of essences which exist as *tertium ens*. The cognitive vision formed by *intellectus adeptus* starts from behind, since it is actualized and directed by the *intellectus agens*. Modernists directly contemplate intellectual forms as *tertium ens* that do not exist in reality. Thus, they created a paranoiac predication *per prius*, which starts from the imposition of the non-existent world. Such modern cognition is formed by actual universality, which exists in the world of cosmic separated and fully subsistent forms. This process of illumination is based on the work of *intellectus adeptus*. The acquired intellect is empowered by the active cosmic intellect through the new form of abstraction that does not need the actuality of the first substance perceived by the senses. The soul is not a *tabula rasa*, because the intellect of the *Modernorum* carries a kind of actuality in itself. The intellect acquired from a higher sphere actualizes the human intellect as a new subject of cognition in the mode of being of the third kind (*aliud esse*). That kind of non-existing human intellect does not relate primarily to existing hylemorphic substance, but to the world of the separated immaterial cosmic forms. The cited term “*aliud esse*” gets another meaning than in case of Aristotle’s formal abstraction, since the Aristotelian predication makes a universal meaning exclusively in the intellect. In the process of Neoplatonic cognition, it comes to the manifestation of new substance (*aliud esse*), which is directly recognized as pure and hypostatic form. The contemplated actual form actualizes the cognition (*intellectus in effectu*) through the intuition of that form (*intellectum primum*) in the realm of *intellectus adeptus*. The actualization of the cognition does not start from the reality of the first substance, but from the separated cosmic *intellectus agens*. This quasi-substance, which is accepted by the *intellectus adeptus* on the level of the second abstraction, differs from Aristotle’s abstraction from real things. The objectively manifested and directly apprehended *primum intellectum* differs from the Aristotelian abstraction. The new type of intellect recognizes an objective form equipped with a new type of quasi-actuality (*aliud esse*).

Alfarabi stands at the beginning of a twofold conception of cognition because he crossed the Rubicon of Aristotelian metaphysics. Aristotelian abstraction cannot reach the level of the thinking of the cosmic active intellect. Human cognition exists on a lower level of the hylemorphic forms and it starts in the form of the intellectual cognition as pure receptive potency (*intellectus possibilis*). In the Aristotelian scenario of abstraction, it is not possible to know truth as a direct determination of being according to the cited metaphysics built from upside down. Neoplatonic *illuminatio* presupposes the emanation of hypostatized cosmic forms. In such a scenario of cognition matter and hylemorphic substance play only second fiddle in the primary process of autodetermination of some kind of separated substance. The emanation of forms comes directly from modern God, moreover, done in the way that they directly determine the creation. Such theory was absolutely unacceptable to the Second Master as an authentic Muslim. Alfarabi overturned Neoplatonism by introducing a twofold categorical predication into the course of cognition. His conception of illumination is not Neoplatonic, but Aristotelian, because the predication of causality passes through the universal supposition (*Cat*. 2a15–16). Through emanations and its direct eidetic cognition, the truth as Aristotelian *adaequatio* would be invalidated. The intellect is fully actualized as a *tabula rasa* from the senses and from the first hylemorphic substances. Abunaser finally gives the gnoseologic primacy to divine illumination and in the lower floor of cognition he quarters the Aristotelian form of empirical cognition. This synthesis of Plato and Aristotle was adopted by Avicenna, Grosseteste and Scotus. They prefer the objective insight in the autonomous forms that are in the world of higher substances. The actualized intellect (*intellectus in effectu*) is adapted for receiving the world of immaterial substances as hypostatic forms, because the act of cognition starts from above (*intellectus adeptus*). The acquired intellect became a hypostatic entity that forms a new subject of cognition. The cognition determined by hypostatic form exists in a different ontological mode than the form abstracted by the senses. The modern intellect represents the substance in the manner of Alexander’s detached intellect and it does not require uncertain sensory reality for truthful cognition. Avicenna grasps revolutionary value of this thesis and he establishes a new metaphysics adopted by Latin modernity. Averroes rejected these modern “Alexandrians” that later founded the Latin school of the second Averroism. The objectively recognized forms through direct insight and by the predication *per prius* create after the year 1230 a new version of the scholastic diacosmos. It consists of *intellectum primum* that established the school of the second Averroism. Philip Chancellor adopted the Neoplatonic view of denudation from Avicenna. He created the first modern insight of the Latins into transcendental determinations of the being in the concept of *resolutio* (OBJ II, ch. 2.3.2). Philosophy of Duns Scotus closed the legacy of the Second Master in the Latin West. He adopted these innovations of Avicenna through the school of the second Averroism, which was already in decline and in urgent need of another modernization.

The introduction of the new form of being of the third kind as *aliud esse* had a key significance for the development of objectivity. The intellect described by Alfarabi abstracts from the categorical determination of the existing substance (Aristotle, Porphyry) and investigates the essentiality of pure forms as transcendental properties of the One (Plato, Plotinus). The Second Master, however, rejected the Neoplatonic emanation, and abolished the univocal Neoplatonism of the twofold One and Many. That key element of Neoplatonism, Porphyry and other thinkers supported through the modified Aristotelian categorical predication. For the first time in the Western philosophy, there is a complete outline of the intellect done in the unified mode of cognition according to the Aristotelianism and the Neoplatonism. The predication *per prius* relates to unity of being according to the vision of Neoplatonism. The acquired intellect performs a new form of cognition through the new mode of abstraction, which Étienne Gilson and Jean Rohmer described as *denudatio* (OBJ II, ch. 2.3.1). This ambivalent form of cognition establishes a new predication *per prius* that brought about new transcendental determinations of the substance. The intellect acquired from above becomes a substrate for purely immaterial forms (*intellectus adeptus est quasi subiectum illis*). Avicenna fully established that kind of intellect that observes directly entities of the third kind (*equinitas tantum,* ch. 2.3.2). The Second Master managed the first objective meaning of being in the mode *aliud esse*, because he created a new being of the third kind. The categorial predication received a new form thanks to the introduction of new meaning in the metaphysics. The synthesis of denudation and abstraction shows that intelligible contents are no longer abstracted from the real things perceived with the senses. Modern cognition is actualized thanks to the new type of intellect as an actual and substantially conceived substrate (*quasi materia et subiectum*). This new subject of cognition despises the actual real substance, since the new cognition is partially defined outside the Aristotelian intellectual soul. In Aristotelianism, the soul makes an actual form of the material body and it cannot actually exist otherwise. The imposition of meaning from the cosmic, *per se* existing substances as intellectual forms takes place one level higher than the common reality of the first, sensually perceived substance. The acquired intellect becomes an autonomous substrate of abstracted contents of thought (*intellectus adeptus est quasi subiectum illis*). This epochal “*quasi subiectum*” of the West operates as a quasi-substance outside the Aristotelian *anima intellectiva* and parallel to it, because the acquired intellect and its cognition makes a kind of substance that acquires the actuality given from above. The subsequent development of scholasticism influenced by Avicenna directs the development of the intellect as a *quasi subiectum* to modern dualism, wherein the person breaks down into two and more substances. A new figure of this intellectual subject of the third kind is created by postmodern Descartes, who opens the epoch of metaphysical nihilism. His renewed Neoplatonism establishes a new subject of Western cognition and science (*res cogitans*). Thanks to the process of reflexive denudation, *res cogitans* is endowed with its own type of actuality that is separated from physical *res extensa*. This concept gave rise to the contemporary dualism between two separate substances, the physical and the intellectual. The acquired intellect as a substance of the third kind began to act as an actual substrate of abstracted contents of thinking (*intellectus adeptus est quasi subiectum illis*). Standing at those crossroads, Alfarabi established the fundamental *Lichtung* of Western thinking. Its untruth is revealed through the historical figure of *via Modernorum*. It was actualized after the pattern of the Avicennist Falsafa by the scholastic modernity in Oxford around the year 1240 (OBJ II, ch. 3.2). The division of man into several substances completes in the epoch of metaphysical nihilism the original *Irrtum* of Western metaphysics. The modern, postmodern and nihilistic determination disintegrated the human person into a collection of disparate substances. This leads to the modern dehumanization of human being.

However, Aristotelian philosophy of Alfarabi found the truthful human nature, which is given to all men by the *intellectus in potencia*.[[89]](#footnote-89) This term has key character for the new determination of the person, because it describes the specific character of universal human cognition. The receptive intellect is separated from the sensual cognition of the animals and from the purely intellectual cognition of immaterial cosmic intelligences. Humanity became a *species humana* because all humans use this specific form of intellect. Dante finds anew the term *universitas humana* for the Latin West. Alfarabi and Dante founded this unity of humanity by through the universal form of *intellectus possibilis* (OBJ III, ch. 4.4.3). This common faculty of the human species enables the reception of intelligible forms and constitutes the first stage of the naturally given actualization of intelligible forms. Thus, the natural human ability (*fiṭra mushtarika*) common to all human beings is confessed in the Falsafa. All human beings are capable of a normal use of the mind. By protecting the term *fiṭra*, that is, the natural knowledge based on the receptive character of intellect, Alfarabi criticizes the Islamic theologians of his time.[[90]](#footnote-90) These lived in the age of the one truth, which was not yet given by the Bible, as the Paris condemnation postulated in 1277, but it was postulated by the Quran. The fundamentalist theologians denied any meaning of the term “nature” or “determination of being” (*ṭab’*) in the sense of the Aristotelian transition from potency to actuality, because this metaphysical determination of being would limit the Almighty in his omnipotence (Griffel 2012, 8). The preceding analysis of the ambivalence of the acquired intellect has shown second stage of development as well. Alfarabi combined the human nature (*fiṭra*) with the acquired form of the intellect, whose cognition is partially actualized from the world of immaterial forms. Avicenna took up the term *fiṭra* to include the faculty of direct intellectual insight into the middle link of the syllogism, so that the intellect draws conclusions almost intuitively and instantaneously from presuppositions (Hasse 1999, 34–35). Human nature is presented in the spirit of Aristotle’s philosophy as the capacity for direct insight into the first principles of cognition. Avicenna holds this direct insight into the first principles of cognition in the habitual intellect, which immanently contains primarily intelligible (ch. 2.3.1). The acquired intellect (*intellectus adeptus, al-'aql al-mustafād*) determined the transition to the new insight of being because it covers all people via the concept of human nature. The term *fiṭra* later acquired another meaning in al-Ghazālī. Human beings look intellectually into the essence of things thanks to the natural connection with the cognizing intellect.[[91]](#footnote-91) Al-Ghazālī confirmed the natural ability of the human intellect to recognize the world. Al-Ghazālī partly used this modern definition of human nature by Avicenna. However, this brilliant theologian criticized the prevailing Avicennism of the time as mistaken worldview (ch. 2.3.3). Neoplatonist predication *per prius* establishes a new unity of being and a new unity of the human species based on the acquired intellect.

The work of Alfarabi establishes the *Lichtung* of modern destiny of man in his tragic historicity, which is given by hidden interplay of truth and untruth. This *a/lētheia* determines the beginning of Western humanism in its *alētheia* (Albert, Siger, Dante, Ockham). On the contrary, the untruth of that original Aristotelian humanism reveals ist distorted form (Thomas Aquinas). The complete Lethe of that classic humanism can be found in the nihilistic and schizoid form of modernity (*via Modernorum*). The truth of the person as unified first substance is given in the classical Aristotelianism of the West by the determination of the human species (*species humana*). The natural unity of humanity is determined by the Aristotelian form of *intellectus possibilis* that Averroes introduced in the line of the Second Master. The falsity of the modern subject is given by the specific unity of humanity, which is given by the *intellectus adeptus* introduced by Avicenna that followed Alfarabi in the determination of the hypostatic essence of man. Modernists transformed the person into a Western subject as being of the third kind. The intellect actualized from above acts as a schizophrenic *subiectum* (ὑποκείμενον) and human being is split into several actual substances and hypostases. Modernity then bravely carries these non-existent beings of the third kind on its shoulders (ὑπόκειται) in the mode of modern historical necessity. This subjective form of the Greek divine power Ananke came into being through the epochal wandering of critical thought (*Irre*) in the modernist Falsafa. Siger, Dante and other Aristotelian magisters in Paris defended the true figure of humanism based on the unity of the person. They lost the battle of common sense. The victorious modernists imposed in the Latin West the line of nihilistic anti-humanism based on the subject as sophistic simulacrum. The Second Master, in the mode of authentic humanism, shows the way how the human *intellectus adeptus* approaches the detached cosmic *intellectus agens* and how it comes to the actualization of highest cognition in man.

“But after he [i.e. *intellectus agens*] lent the forms to the matter, he strives, according to the situation prevailing in the world, to bring the isolated things together and close to each other, so that they come to the acquired intellect, in which human nature is contained, i.e., that man is as close as possible to the active intellect in everything that his nature produces. Herein, then, rests man’s highest happiness and heavenly life, and though this is attained the highest perfection (*hic est finis ultimus*) and the most sublime thing that constitutes his nature (*acquiritur perfeccio eius ultima*).”[[92]](#footnote-92)

The meaning of this statement must be connected with the previous statement about the common receptive nature given to humans through *intellectus in potencia*. All thinkers of Late Antiquity and the Falsafa agree that the connection of human intellect with separated cosmic forms is the culmination of human happiness. Alfarabi described the conjunction of both intellects in such a manner that he established the first historical figure of the Western intellectual three centuries before the Latin disputes in Paris in 1270–77. In the Baghdad house of studies, which was called the “House of Wisdom” (*Bajt al-Hikma*), regular meetings of intellectuals of all kinds and creeds were held. This is attested to by the testimony of an outraged Muslim from Spain sometime toward the end of the 10th century. The confessor of the Quran met members of different religions in Baghdad at the common intellectual work, which turned out as follows:

“When the hall was nearly full, one of the infidels took the word and said: ‘We have gathered to discourse, he said, you all know the preliminaries; you Muslims must not fight us on grounds of proof drawn from your Scriptures or based on the speeches of your Prophet. For we believe neither in this book nor in your prophet. Let each of us use only the arguments taken from human reason.’” [[93]](#footnote-93)

The meaning of this conjunction must be related to the preceding assertion about the common receptive nature given to all men by *intellectus in potencia*. Then all have the same possibility to realize this supreme goal of humanity, but each in his own receptive way and according to the individual form of intellectual enlightenment. The new conception of the possible and the acquired intellect received an epochal importance. It was linked to the human nature conceived strictly philosophically, that is, defined within the framework of the receptive component of the intellect. The new form of the intellect determines the fundamental space of the revelation of being and it produced henceforth a new subject of the metaphysics that contemplates it. Alfarabi created a new kind of metaphysics since he described the new subject of natural and universal cognition. The first science, in the version of the Second Master, establishes the second beginning of metaphysics, which is now given in Avicenna’s philosophy.[[94]](#footnote-94) Hermeneutics demonstrate that this beginning is given directly in the Second Master’s thought. His thinking shaped the further development of Falsafa and the Latin West. The original *Lichtung* of the objective form of metaphysics arose long ago before Scotus and before the Latin version of *via Modernorum* founded by Avicenna’s philosophy. Alfarabi’s *intellectus adeptus* has subsistent ability to actualize already recognized contents given at the level of the first abstraction. In addition to this, the intellect is able to extract the original hyparchical form by the disclosure of hypostatic human intellect from behind, i.e., from the detached cosmic *intellectus agens*. The achievement of the second kind of abstraction runs on the level of the immaterial forms. They emanate from the active cosmic intellect and directly determine the individual acquired intellect in the human soul. Jewish and Christian mysticism received this connection between the human and cosmic intellect through Avicenna’s *coniunctio* (*ittiṣāl, ittiḥād*). Alfarabi opened the philosophical possibility of this mystical conjunction in the Western modernity. His scheme of cognition can be interpreted in both Aristotelian and Neoplatonic perspective. The first direction was completed by Averroes and the second by Avicenna. The first form of science is established by reference to Aristotelian *intellectus possibilis*. Based on that connection to the real world, the first figure of the Western intellectual emerges whose vocation is critical thinking. The link to the Second Master goes through the Aristotelian thought of Siger of Brabant and through Dante’s political philosophy. The second form of mystical connection is given by direct contemplation of the noemata by the enlightened *intellectus adeptus*. That worldview established the objective figure of modern illuminated intellectual as Rufus of Cornwall, Kilwardby, and a Bonaventure, and after them a postmodern Descartes, Leibniz, and Husserl. The distinction between the two types of abstraction founded the controversy concerning the first and the second averroism. Grosseteste made commentary on the *Second Analytics* around 1230 and this Oxford scholar took the role of the Latin Abunaserus *redivivus* (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.1). Situated in the *Lichtung* discovered by Alfarabi, Aristotelian substance appears in a new form of metaphysic *a/lētheia*, since it is understood through two different paths of *Vor-blickbahn*. Either the meaning of the existing entity is given by the fact that being is exposed from behind, i.e., from the acquired intellect determined by the world of pure immaterial, *per se* existing forms; or the existing thing is exposed from the front, i.e., from the world of material substances. Its actual existence in the sensually perceived reality enables the possible intellect (*intellectus possibilis*) to carry out the abstraction of conceptual form that is determined by sensually perceived real things. If we conceive the actualization of abstraction merely from the existing real thing perceived by the senses, then we obtain a universal concept as recognized form of the real thing by the hylic intellect (partly Alexander Aphrodisias, fully Averroes). Or we refer the predication *per prius* according to the above-mentioned quotation that describes the separated eidetic substrate in the form of the acquired intellect. Such a hypostatic form (*quasi subiectum*) is actualized from the world of autonomous cosmic forms as first immaterial substances. Such a new subject of metaphysic creates a new type of Neoplatonic predication *per prius*. Modern predication is related to the realm of detached cosmic forms. The acquired and previously actualized intellect as quasi-substance plays the role of the new cognitive substrate (*subiectum*), which ensures cognition through direct illumination. The human intellect refers to these separated eidetic quasi-substances through the acquired intellect, which is defined as an independent hypostasis or substance (Themistius, Avicenna, Latin modernism, Semiaverroism, Postmodernism). The receptive intellect, actualized in the twofold way of abstraction and denudation, becomes the crossroad of metaphysics where the twofold revelation of the meaning of being occurs. The hermeneutic interpretation in Alfarabi’s treatise *On the intellect* shows that when we ascend upward from the world of hylemorphic substances, we change the direction of predication *per prius* from the material form to the purely intelligible insight of diacosmos. This cognition is determined by separated immaterial substances. The modernists consider the truth made by themselves (*rectitudo, certitudo*) to be directly on the level of objective being as such (*ens inquantum ens*). This insight grounds metaphysics on the level of the Neoplatonic analogy of being univocally related to Being as One. This analogy was first defined by Porphyry and after him by Jamblichus (ch. 1.3.1). In this case, there is the form of “*aliud esse*” as a substance—species, because it represents *tertium ens*. The determinacy of cognition from the Aristotelian abstraction is taken as anotehr kind of *aliud esse*, which is given as *ens rationis*, i.e., as universals that exist only in the intellect. Alfarabi’s conception holds both forms of actualization of intellect, which are given by disclosure of being from the front and from the behind. His philosophy confirms the border position of man as a being at the border line between the material world and the world of separated immaterial intelligences.

The Second Master corrected Alexander’s conception of the intellect toward Aristotelianism and created a synthesis between the two metaphysics. His new interpretation of *De anima* abolished the Neoplatonic illumination and emanation metaphysics. Alfarabi’s ambivalent position of cognitive form between *primum* a *secundum intellectum* refers both to the mental content of abstraction in the possible intellect and to the direct transcendental insight into being in the acquired intellect. Alfarabi finally chose the path of the Neoplatonic descent of forms in the process of mystic cognition, but not the Neoplatonic determination of substance. This way is known from the work *Liber de causis*. Descending from the world of immaterial spheres, Neoplatonism takes categorial predication *per prius*, which is analogical to hylemorphic substance. Or it may ascend along the path already interpreted through the process of the first and second abstractions to the world of separated cosmic forms, souls, and intelligences. Avicenna and after him the modernity adopted a intermediate Neoplatonist position that does not follow the descent of the forms into the contingent substances (ch. 1.3). The key sections from Avicenna’s commentary on *De anima* (II.2, V.5) describe that new woldview. Then, the *intellectus adeptus* plays a central role in determining cognition, metaphysics, and the nature of man. That hypostase mythique entails the process of objective illumination. This objective solar myth has been adopted almost by the entire Western thinking. The contemporary form of global Platonic cave is full of bank derivatives and virtual bills. Something interesting or horrifying must constantly be projected onto the cave wall, lest the industrious troglodytes fall prey to the life-threatening *taedium vitae*. The technicians proceeding with simulacra cannot think in the mode of *vita contemplativa*. Science does not think in this way. Postmodern and nihilistic human sciences have only an objective knowledge concerning the collection of non-existent substances of the third kind. Avicenna introduces this type of cognition for the first time in the West, using the metaphysical model of the disclosure of being from behind. He ties this disclosure to categorical predication according to Alfarabi’s philosophy. Avicenna’s predication defines the acquired intellect not at all according to Alfarabi’s pattern as a *quasi subiectum*, but as an actual subject of objective intellectual forms. These forms establish the diacosmos of another being (*aliud esse*), which is placed beyond the second substance and therefore beyond the original unity of Aristotelian categorical predication. Following the pattern of Jamblichus and Simplicius, the intellect is determined as matter and substance of the third kind. It takes up the higher forms of cognition, which are given by disclosure from the separated cosmic *intellectus agens*. This line was completed about the year 1240 in the Latin West by the school of the Oxford and Paris *illuminati* (OBJ II, ch. 3.2). They introduced even the universal hylemorphism into the process of cognition. It was fully unacceptable for Alfarabi. Through the illumination from behind, from the separated cosmic substance of the *intellectus agens*, the intellect receives a new function with regard to the sensually abstracted contents. The eclipse of the first substance was accomplished by the *intellectus adeptus* illuminated from above. That *epokhē* of the first substance creates the new history of metaphysics called “the path of contemporaries” (*via Modernorum*). The *intellectus adeptus* of modern and postmodern illuminates manifests the whole of being in its objective meaning. In this special form of cognition, there is the connection of two insights into being as *intellectum*, whose cognition is determined from two directions concerning the hidden disclosure of being. Averroes as strict Aristotelian rejected the principles of Avicenna’s metaphysics as a false revolution, because he remained faithful to the truth of his teacher as *revolutio* to Aristotle. Alfarabi interpreted the writing *De anima* against the Neoplatonic Alexandrians in such a way that he sent knowledge to the beginning (*revolutio*) of cognition, that is, to the original metaphysical intention of Aristotle. Averroes gives the central role to *intellectus possibilis*, which obtains a completely different status than in Avicenna. Averroes refuse all explanations of *aliud esse* made in the process of Neoplatonic abstraction (*denudatio*), or to be a substance of the third kind. He found out a new Aristotelian determination of the intellect (ch. 2.4.3). Both insights into being (*abstractio, denudatio*) refer to Alfarabi’s *Lichtung* of truth and untruth. This fundamental event establishes the tragic historicity of modernity. The subsequent history of metaphysic thought is determined by the twofold figure of the receptive intellect. The modern and anti-modern worldview relates to twofold disclosure concerning the ontological meaning of being. The first form of disclosure of being comes from the first hyparchic substance. The intellect follows the real causality to acknowledge the real world through Aristotelian abstraction. The cognitive forme exists as *aliud esse* only in human mind (*intellectus in potencia—intellectus in effectu*). The second form of the disclosure from behind is based on the realm of cosmic forms. They influence directly the process of cognition and it creates the intellect as Neoplatonic *aliud esse*, that is, as a new being of the third kind. This meaning of the hypostatized form creates the actualized acquired intellect from behind (*intellectus adeptus—intellectus agens*). This event of truth and untruth, created by the metaphysics of the Second Master, has a key meaning for the further development of objectivity. The foundation of double perspective of comprehension (*Bezugssinn*) brought about the objective history Western metaphysics made by that epochal *Irrtum* of modern philosophy. This gave rise to the history of effects that constituted the second beginning of metaphysics in the mode of Heidegger’s *Beginn*. In the conception of truth as unconcealment of metaphysical being (*alētheia*) comes to unconcealment (*Lichtung*) of truth and untruth given by the twofold disclosure of the sense of Being itself (*a/lētheia*). The hermeneutic interpretation showed the original configuration of objectivity in its archaic truth and untruth. Taken in the historial force of this archaic event (*Ereignis*), the history of Western knowledge manifests itself objectively as the epoch of *Irre* and *Irrtum*.

The founder of modern objectivity created a twofold proceeding “how” (hermeneutic *Wie* of Heidegger) all possible cognitive forms can be manifested in the intellect. The whole of being recognized in such a holistic way is literally grasped in its totality, because it includes moreover the mythological scenario of objectively determined knowledge. Modern noemata, forms, intelligibilia, mathematical concepts, etc. are given and revealed by the thinking determined by the disclosure of sens coming from behind. In the categorical predication determined by the imposition of meaning from the primacy of the *per se* first hyparchic substance, the *intellectus adeptus* has no meaning at all. Knowledge arises only within the framework of the purely human *intellectus agens*, which is a subsequent form of recognition for the receptive *intellectus in potencia* being actualized from the sensual cognition. By the connection of both purely human intellects (*possibilis, agens*) the resulting cognition is created, which is given in a fully actualized intellect (*intellectus in effectu*). All subsistent forms and being of the third kind are completely superfluous for autonomous human cognition. According to the argumentation of the type *destructio primis* (ch. 1.3), the being of the third kind has no possibility of existence. This argumentation known as “Ockham’s razor” (OBJ III, ch. 5.4.2), Averroes took it up for the first time against Avicenna’s project of the objective diacosmos. The being of the third kind belongs to the ontotheology or to the objective mythology given by the mythopoetic interpretation of the diacosmos according to the dialogue *Timaeus*. Aristotle and his critical successors in the Falsafa and in the first Latin Averroism did not believe in philosophical fairy tales, even if they recognized their pedagogical value. Their uncritical and dogmatic contemporaries (*Moderni*), on the other hand, turned philosophical solar myths into a new form of objective metaphysics. The difference is given by this or that interpretation of the receptivity of the intellect according to *De anima*. Hermeneutics characterize the twofold manifestation of cognition as disclosure of being comming from the front or from behind. Classical Aristotelianism asserts that the process of determination of cognition proceeds from the actuality of hylemorphic substance. The first substance is given *per se* and is absolutely simple, the second substance is given with respect to the first *per posterius*, and its meaning is given from genus, species and their difference (ch. 1.3). Aristotelian intelligibilia exist only in thought. Therefore, they have neither the statute of autonomous Platonic forms nor of Neoplatonic objective beings of the third kind. The human soul performs an actualization of the possible (i.e., material, receptive, potential, etc., intellect) through the reception of sensory cognition in that kind of receptive intellect. In this way, an intelligible intention is brought to the abstracting active intellect. The resulting concept signifies the first and therefore real and separated substance in the mode of universal completion, that is, in accordance with the necessity of the metaphysical dative. The cognition arises in the act of intellectual donation of being from the first substance, since it is the only actual hyparchical entity. The resulting concept comes to the accomplished intellect (*quasi forma intellectui in effectu*). The whole procedure signifies in the order of cognition the ontological primacy of the first substance. That is why the key word *quasi*, which is attached to the intellect as the actualized form, plays an absolutely important role. Aristotelian Alfarabi considers the *intellectus in potencia* neither as substance nor as actual hypostasis. This problematic status is given to the *intellectus adeptus* and the *intellectus agens*. The receptive intellect represents the cognitive potency of the real person, because only the person is the first substance existing *per se*. The conception of intellect as a kind of substance is impossible in Aristotelianism. The reality of the first substance is ontologically something quite different from the universal, therefore only potentially given meaning. The dispute about the essence of intellect depending on this or that way of the revelation of existing substance and it shaped the essence of Western objectivity. Hermeneutics interpret objectivity in the archaic mode of *a/lētheia*. Then it is true that Abunaser founded the beginning of a new metaphysic thinking. Duns Scotus accomplished full development of objective metaphysics in the Latin West by taking the path, that Avicenna opened for the first time. The Second Master made the first step on this path by creating the first structure of redoubled cognition.

### 2.1.2 Ontotheological Structure of Metaphysics

Elias’s 6th-century commentary on the *Isagoge* established a new direction of categorical predication by connecting Neoplatonic teaching to Aristotelian metaphysics. The key section took the Neoplatonic univocal predication to the One as the the highest genus of Being (ταῦτα δὲ τὰ ἀφ' ἑνὸς καὶ πρὸς ἓν, *Eliae in* *Isag*. 71.2‒3) and combined it with the predication of Aristotle’s categories. The categorial predication lost its original meaning related to the first hyparchic substance. Such “categorial” predication brought about the lost of univocity as inevitable result. After modernisation of *Isagoge*, univocal categories of Aristotle became mere homonyms (μέσα ἐστὶν ὁμωνύμων καὶ γενῶν, ibid.). The generic value of categories is already universal, but it comes by the imposition from sensible things. This harmful fact separates the Aristotelian predication from the superior world made by Neoplatonic genera of Being. The founders of the Falsafa grasped the principal meaning of that “being-in-between*”* (μέσα ἐστὶν) mentioned in Elias’s categorical predication. Hermeneutics consider this term to be the starting point for the predication of the *tertium ens.* The Falsafa used Elias’s notion of “intermediate being” as a starting point for the predication that connected Plato’s metaphysics with Aristotle’s teaching. This concept founded principal possibility of predication concerning all kinds of *tertium ens*. They became “substances—species” and passed into categorical statements in the form of Neoplatonic hypostases. Elias’s intermediary predication entered the philosophy of Alfarabi and Avicenna by means of the new type of homonymy (*asmāʿ mušakika*, *amphibola*). The meaning predicated through amphibola relates to a special kind of unity, which stands both outside the categorically predicated univocal genus and outside the equivocal predication given merely nominally. Alfarabi’s work *Kitāb al-Ḥurūf* (§ 19) uses amphibola in the middle term of judgment (*ismʿ mušakik*) to introduce a new kind of predication to unite Aristotelianism and Neoplatonism. The cited paragraph from the work *Kitāb al-Ḥurūf* introduces a special intermediate stage of predicates called “modulated terms” in addition to the predication made *univoce* and *aequivoce* (Treiger 2012, 346–47). Alfarabi places in this special group of predication terms such as the being, the one, and the thing.[[95]](#footnote-95) The transcendentalia created in such a way are directly related to the being in its pure beingness. They established a new kind of predication, which allows a direct insight into being beyond the actuality of the first real substance. Transcendental meaning of being (*passio entis*) can be predicated categorically through the amphibola. Such predication makes use of analogy that concernes the level of being taken in itself, in order to relate such categorial generic being to Neoplatonic highest genera of Being. The enlightened *intellectus adeptus* directly contemplates that middle section of being (μέσα ἐστὶν, *ismʿ mušakik*) in which a new kind of unity of being arises. It is predicated outside the second substance. Latin scholasticism adopts the predicate *mušakik* through the terminus *analogicus* or *ambiguus* (Wolfson 1938, 171). The whole model of predication ties in with the ambiguous statute of universals (ch. 1.3). Falsafa, like Late Antiquity, sought an ass bridge between Aristotle and Plato. See the double determination of being as actual and true cited above (*Met*. 1026a33–b2). The introduction of amphibolic predication in the schema of Aristotelian Platonism gives three possible answers how to predicate the *aliud esse* introduced by Alfarabi above with respect to substance (ch. 2.1.1).

1. The predication of being other than in the first substance runs but formally, according to the Aristotelian categorial predication. The hylemorphic substance is perceived first through sense-given intentionality and apprehension (*intellectum primum*). The form recognized as *aliud esse* is nothing else than the universal meaning, which exists only in our thinking (*intellectum secundum*). Then the universal as second substance has only the potential existence in relation to the first actual substance. To this conception of intelligible form given by disclosure from the front corresponds the scheme of cognition in *De anima* and the hyparchic structure of propositions in the *Categories*.
2. The predication takes *aliud esse* as fully independent being, equivalent to Aristotle’s first hyparchic substance. This being exists as a separated Platonic form *per se*, *simpliciter* and *universaliter*. This form is known directly because it is a hypostatized intelligible substance (*intellectum primum*). The other secondary beings participate in the being of the primary emanated forms in the mode of analogical *méthexis* given as geometrical and mathematical proportion (*intellectum secundum*). The cognition of these forms is determined by separated *intellectus agens*, which illuminates the individual *intellectus adeptus* from behind. The hypostasis taken according to Simplicius and Jamblichus is predicated *per prius* in Neoplatonic determination “Limited—Unlimited” (ch. 1.3.1). The predication *pros hen* exists as an emanation of the Platonic idea of the Good or descends from Porphyry’s doubled Being of the One (ch. 1.3.1). The work *Liber de causis* presents this model of deduction and recognition of hypostatized forms as independent substances that determine the lower material world. The intelligible form appears as the first hyparchic Aristotelian substance. Neoplatonic *illuminati* recognize this diacosmos in their mind that is directly enlightened by the separated cosmic *intellectus agens*. The detached active intellect actualizes human *intellectus adeptus* as the only component of our cognition capable of seeing the subsistent intelligible forms in direct insight.
3. The amphibolic predication in the analogical mode of *aliud esse* determines modern *tertium ens*. It is inserted in the ontotheological structure of metaphysics according to the Second Master. This interpretation cancels the original version of the Neoplatonic diacosmos. Alfarabi refused to hypostatize the universals as first substances as it presupposes the scenario of Neoplatonic emanations. On the other hand, the categorical amphibolic predication creates the world of truth in itself and transcendental meaning beyond the first substance (*primum intellectum*). Metaphysic being received a new ontological determination within the framework of a transcendental unity. The acquired intellect considers the amphibolic formes as a kind of substance—species according to Simplicius (ch. 1.3.2). The subject and the object arise through the abstraction of the second order, which is given as the direct contemplation of the pure form. The acquired intellect makes the substance of the third kind for the hypostatic forms (*intellectus adeptus est quasi subiectum illis*, ch. 2.1.1). This form, however, is not a Neoplatonic hyparchic substance. It is actualized in the modus *per prius* by Aristotle’s abstraction based on the categorial predication (*secundum intellectum*).

The amphibolic predication of the Second Master is related to transcendental nature of truth. He founded the ontotheological structure of modern metaphysics by enabling the first coexistence of all three meanings of being. This coexistence is given by these three aspects of unity: 1) the unity made by Aristotelian categorial predication; 2) the unity made by Neoplatonic ideas in the form of Plotinus’s highest genera; 3) the unity made by amphibolic nature of being (later called “objective vision of being”) that makes a new group of *tertium ens*. The cognitive scheme of the new amphibolic substance is the same as in the second case of Neoplatonic illumination. Objective cognition is produced by the illumination coming from the cosmic intellect. The active intellect exists as a separated substance of the cosmic intelligences. It communicates itself to the human intellect in the act of mystical connection (*ittiṣāl, ittiḥād*). The Second Master created a new conception of abstraction and predication by an original combination of Platonic and Aristotelian metaphysics. The potential intellect is necessary only at the first stage of abstraction because it must actualize the *intellectus in potencia* into the *intellectus in effectu*. At the next stage of cognition, the *intellectus adeptus* receives separated, actual and hypostatized form as *tertium ens* that comes from the separated *intellectus agens*. Predication proceeds in the amphibolic mode according to truth directly given at the level of the first substances. Such kind of intellectual illumination created new generic determinations of being. In the third mode of cognition, the modified Neoplatonic scenario comes into play. Aristotelian accidents are transformed into new hypostases given in the ontotheological structure of metaphysics. The difference to the second form of *aliud esse* is in the fact that the third form makes the mixture of potentiality and actuality. This mixture is given by the twofold conception of cognition through abstraction and denudation. The cognition begins in the mode of univocity as Aristotelian predication, which is determined by the empirically known real substance. The cognition does not follow mystical analogy within the framework of Plotinus’s highest genera of being.

Alfarabi became the father of Western objectivity by introducing a new form of diacosmos in the form of ontotheological structure of metaphysics. Amphibolic predication created a new level of signification by direct observation of forms within the framework of *intellectus adeptus*. The predication of transcendental brought about a new being of the third kind, which scholasticism adopted under different names in new forms of categorical predication (*passio entis*, *transpraedicamenta*, *passiones per se*, *modi entis*). We find the first Latin model of amphibolic predication for the first three transcendental (*ens, unum, verum*) in the determination of being that proposed Philip the Chancellor (OBJ II, ch. 2.3.2). The categorial predication done by amphibolia takes the sensual cognition derived from the first substance only as an accident, since the autonomous activity of intellect is supposed to be independent. The direct insight into the acquired intellect exists separately from Aristotle’s categorical signification, which determines the relation between the first and the second substance. If the potency of cognition is actualized by amphibolic predication in the mode *per prius*, then the Aristotelian *intellectus possibilis* becomes entirely superfluous. The receptive intellect, determined by sensory cognition and abstraction, is no longer necessary for the primary orientation of transcendental thinking. The *illuminati* discovered the new form of categorically predicated diacosmos. Amphibolic predication is defended in the work *De intellectu* in the section that signifies the unity of being with respect to the world of separated intelligible forms. Dieterici’s translation distinguishes the separate forms of abstracting or contemplating intellect and it precisely determines their order in predication *per prius* and *per posterius*. The school of Toledo translates this place according to Avicenna, and in this case quite correctly.

“If the actualized intellect (*intellectus in effectu*) reflects upon intellectual contents that already exist as pure forms (*res quae non sunt in materiis*) and understands them as actual forms, then this actualized intellect becomes the acquired intellect (*intellectus adeptus*).”[[96]](#footnote-96)

The process of abstraction begins with the real substance and the intellect becomes actual by disclosure from the front, from the real thing. Aristotelian abstraction produces a recognized form as *species intelligibilis* in the intellect. But the quotation continues to the next level. The abstracted forms actualize the intellect (*intellectus in effectu*) for the next stage of cognition beyond the Aristotelian abstraction. The cognitive forms are no longer called by the same term, because they have their own actuality similar to intelligible cosmic substances. The translation of Toletans rightly designates these forms with another term in order to emphasize their being as immaterial substances (*res quae non sunt in materiis*). The contemplation of amphibola in the direct insight runs outside the Aristotelian abstraction. The *illuminati* carry out predication of such entities outside of the classical categories made as the second substance. The univocal meaning of being now exists with regard to the second immaterial “substance—species” as a new form of amphibolic hypostasis. Therefore, the scholastic Aristotelians of Blund’s school and subsequently the first Averroism rejected the *intellectus adeptus* as a component of natural human cognition. Aristotelians rightly understood the quoted text *De intellectu*. Actual forms at the level of the acquired intellect cannot arise in the process of Aristotelian abstraction from the possible intellect, but only by direct contemplation of the cosmic intelligible forms in the process of illumination. This, however, is not natural cognition, but mystical one. Therefore, Blund’s school created a definition of formal intellect from Alfarabi’s definition of possible intellect and not from Avicenna’s acquired intellect (OBJ II, ch. 2.1.1). The double trajectory of ontological understanding (*Vor-blickbahn*) is given *per prius* either from the front, from the hylemorphic first substance, or from the back, from the immaterial cosmic form. The second direction has created a new ontological sense of being. Although the mystical vision formally maintains the predication *per prius* and *per posterius* according to the cited section of the *Categories* (ch. 1.3), it fundamentally changed its meaning. The predication *per prius* and *per posterius* builds on the cited double explanation of the categories. Alfarabi precisely distinguishes two directions of predication according to Aristotle (ch. 2.1). The introduction of the second level of cognition enabled a double cognition of the forms according to a differently taken imposition. It keeps the fundamental value, because only the imposition establishes the univocal categorical meaning. Either we take the imposition in the categorical Aristotelian sense from the real world of hyparchical first substances, which is Alfarabi’s original position. Or, in the mystical and later objective view, we take the imposition of meaning in the amphibolic predication determined by the new trajectory of understanding that concerns the world of hypostatic intelligible forms. The hermeneutics takes seriously the theory of Shiite origin of Alfarabi (Henri Corbin, Najjar Fauzi), including the political and mystical theories tied to spiritual meaning of the successors of Muhammad. Alfarabi created a prophetic philosophy, which he understood as a second stage of mystical enlightenment that provides a direct insight into the spiritual meaning of the world. He translated this spiritual sense of the “world according to Mahdi,” well-known and common in Shiite Sufism, into the amphibolic and hypostatic predication. Then it is clear that the sense of reference (*Bezugssinn*) has a different ontic meaning depending on which direction of predication we choose. Either we accomplish the imposition of the categorical sense on the basis of abstraction from the senses or by the illumination of cosmic forms. Consequently, terms *primum* and *secundum intelligibile* do not have the same meaning, since they are determined by a different insight into the sense of being (*Vor-blickbahn*). The predications per prius and per posterius are fundamentally different in both cases, because the status of the recognized form (*intellectum*) is not the same. The unity of cognition *pros hen* is given either with respect to the second substance or with respect to the amphibolic predication of the unity behind the real substance. This or that perspective determines which intellect (*possibilis, adeptus*) plays the key role as the subject of cognition. Twofold relation to the predication determines which kind of form is primary and which is secondary. Both modes of cognition cover the world of material and immaterial substances, but each time in a different form of metaphysical insight. Either we proceed by means of disclosure of the second substance from the front or from the back, which is determined by the priority of the one or the other predication. In the case of the disclosure from the front, it is true that the intellect receives the potentiality of the forms of recognition from the real things, see the quotation of Alfarabi above (*ea que sunt intellecta in potentia, facit esse intellecta in effectu*, ch. 2.1.1). In this case, the metaphysician recognizes the world from the position of Aristotle’s *De anima*. Metaphysics abstracts the recognized form from the sensuous substance in the form of the immaterial *species intelligibilis*. The disclosure from behind proceeds from the permanently actual and external *intellectus agens*, whose actual immaterial, and purely intelligible forms we directly take in, through the acquired intellect. The twofold insight gives rise to a new architecture of the unity of being, which is given either by categorial or by amphibolic predication.

The link between divine omniscience and human freedom provides a classic example of confusion that mixed ontological perspective taken from the front or from the back. Alfarabius confirms the interpretation of the future sea battle in *De interpretatione* 9 as indeterminable in principle, which is authentic Aristotelian meaning. However, modern mix of divine providence and human freedom provides the first example of an objective view of the world from both modern God (i.e., illumination from behind) and Aristotelian knowledge (illumination from the front). Mythopoetic God of the modernists recognizes the future events from his side as necessary in themselves, that is, he sees them as ascertained facts. In this case the future states are determined exclusively by modern God in one distinct logical meaning. But it is not excluded that the future states are changed by causal action in reality.[[97]](#footnote-97) They can be given differently by the real causes, because they are in themselves only a pure possibility. But, this godlike possibility receives the logical and objective value in itself, which was unthinkable in the Aristotelian logic. The modern philosopher looks at the world from the side of the divine omniscience. It is a typical point of view of Avicenna and the later Avicennists in Oxford (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.2). The project of metaphysics, within the framework of such paranoiac ontotheology, is characterized by a threefold fundamental ambivalence. The first one is related to real or to amphibolic kind of being. The second one concerns the ontological perspective of cognition given as disclosure from the front or from the back. The third one gives metaphysical determination of substance in form of categorial predication (Aristotelianism) or transcendental analogy (modernity). The amphibolic substance manifested in the *Lichtung* of classical metaphysics simultaneously exists and does not exist. It is neither Aristotle’s hyparchic, first real substance nor the categorically predicated second substance given in thought. The substance exists real in the world and simultaneously quasi-real in the acquired intellect as being of the third kind. These objective forms have a hypostasis of “exsistence” (*exsistere*) in the mind of the *illuminati*, where they come out by mythopoetic imprinting made out by same higher form of intellect. The transfer of the *tertium ens* takes place by impressing of the intelligible forms from the sphere of the cosmic *intellectus agens* into the human intellect.

New form of intentionality corresponds to new ambivalent substance in the objective mode *aliud esse*. Alfarabi’s conception of intentionality completed the construction of a new ontotheology by outlining the constitution of intentional objects in the scheme of the disclosure of being from the front and from behind. His commentary on *De interpretatione* translates the Greek term νόημα in terms of a mental concept (*ma’qūl*), which expresses the logical and semantic meaning given only in thought (Gyekye 1971). Cognition by intention starts from the sensuously cognized first substance. It begins with the reception of *species sensibilis* by the *intellectus in potencia*. It is transformed into the *intellectus in effectu* by receiving the noema given by abstraction from the senses. Through Aristotelian abstraction from the material determinations of substance, an actual unity of *species intelligibilis* as the known form arises in the actualized intellect. The actual knowledge resides at the level of the soul in the body. In the concept of intentionality conceived in this way, the terminus *aliud esse* shows the disclosure of being from the first real substance and defines in the mode *per prius* the second intention (*ma’qūl ṭhānī*) cited above that exists only in thought. The soul makes the immaterial form of the body and its own activity necessarily holds a purely formal causality. Averroes and critical scholasticism adopted this concept of intentionality and universals through Aristotelian abstraction. The second direction of intentionality takes place in the framework of Elias’s analogical predication (μέσα ἐστὶν, *ismʿ mušakik*) that Alfarabi adopted in a kind of amphibolic predication. Intentionality goes directly to the hypostatized substance—form, which is given in a direct contemplation made out as absolutely given mysticism. It is the way how the Sufism of Shia school of thinking founded the modern objectivity in the West. This insight into cosmic substances and subsistent forms in the diacosmos corresponds to Simplicius’s position of hypostatized species as atomic substance of the third kind (ch. 1.3.2). Newly predicated class of amphibola assumes the role of Simplicius’s species—substances in the modern system of categorical predication. The vision of the illuminate creates amphibolic predication based on connection with the world of cosmic forms with the help of the acquired intellect. Such a view does not need sensual cognition and neither Aristotelian abstraction provided by the receptive component of the intellect. The predication of amphibola takes place in a different way. The difference between the second substance and its accidents disappeared in transcendental predication of the *ens inquantum ens*. The last indivisible meaning is given at the level of Porphyry’s atomic substance (ἄτομος οὐσία, *individuum*) that makes part of the last division of universal meaning. The classification of universals takes place in the mode of Platonic division (διαίρεσις) from the highest genus downward, according to the Tree of Porphyry (ch. 1.3). Avicenna holds this view of intentionality on the basis of abstraction given as *denudatio*. Avicenna considered directly such intentional object in the form of the essence of the horse taken in itself (*equinitas tantum*). In the transcendental predication of ontotheology, this *individuum* of Porphyry, remade by Simplicius, received the meaning of an objectively known form (*aliud esse*) and it became a substance of the third kind (*quasi subiectum*). The cognition actualized from behind by the *intellectus adeptus* is given in the human soul by the fact that the separated cosmic *intellectus agen*s gives human soul the ability of direct intellectual insight into existing actual and fully immaterial form. This cognition given by the disclosure of being from behind asserts that every intelligible form exists objectively as *tertium ens* in the intellect. This form is accessible in the direct insight. The contemplation of hypostatized species—form establishes a different kind of predication. It begins *per prius* with the hypostatized form and goes *per posterius* to the real thing. If cognition in the mode *per prius* is given by disclosure from behind, then the term *aliud esse* discussed in the last chapter means atomic substance of modern kind. According to Porphyry, Simplicius and other Neoplatonists that substances as species are defined as being of the third kind. Reception of such a subsistent form is possible thanks to separated active intellect, which actualizes the individual acquired intellect in the soul. Avicenna, after him the school of the second Averroism and the whole modernity build up the Western science in such a peculiar way. Through the disclosure of cognition from the hypostatized intellect, the intentionality of modernity and postmodernity represented by Descartes and Husserl came into being. It does not need any mediation from the senses and thus needs no diaphanum. Aristotelians as Johannes Blund reject this conception of intentionality, wherein the species is regarded as intertwined with the first substance. Blund’s school and the first Averroism form a distinction between the sensual *intentio prima* and the purely intellectual *intentio secunda* (OBJ II, ch. 2.1.2). Thereby they profess the Aristotelian definition of truth and the process of cognition according to *De anima* and *Second Analytics*. Such Aristotelian abstraction is defended by Averroes’s exegesis of the writing *De anima* and subsequently by the first Averroism. The passive intellect (*intellectus in potencia*) represents an intellectual form of diaphanum. In that kind of cognition, mediation is necessary, since the actual *species sensibilis* actualize the immaterial intellect. Mediation of the immaterial intellect by the actualized sensual form is indispensable to know the real world. The sensual species actualize the immaterial intellect through the intentional orientation of the receptive intellect to this already actualized sensual form. The possible intellect receives the intellectual form which is potentially given in the sensuous cognition and before that in the existing material substance. These two scenarios of disclosure of being and the predication *per prius* and *per posterius* associated with them created the basic *Lichtung* of truth and non-truth to create all further versions of Western metaphysics.

The thinking of the Second Master found a new kind of the first philosophy. This critical philosophical mystic created a new history of the objective metaphysics and science (*Wirkungsgeschichte*), in which the being of the objective being is revealed (*das Offene*, ch. 1.2). Along the borderline of human and cosmic intellect, a new sphere of the *tertium ens* arose, in which the first concept of objective reality comes into being. Aristotelian Alfarabi related the determination of being primarily to the real substance and secondarily to the categorical and accidental predication. At the same time, however, in a revised Neoplatonic mode, he postulates the special kind of amphibolic predication that transcends the categorical determination of substance. By combining these different levels of occurrence of substance (first and second substance, amphibolic species, objective individual), a new correspondence of thought and thing emerged, which changed the meaning of being. Taken from the view of the immaterial and fully actual forms of the cosmic intelligences, the cognitive forms contained in the material intellect actualized by the senses act as a new categorical basis (ὑποκείμενον, *subiectum*). The predication made according to the amphibolia and according to the first substance creates a completely different unity of being. The manifestation of *tertium ens* is integrated into a new project of metaphysics. That new concept of existence results from connection between the categorical imposition and the supposition. The Second Master grounds the conception of objective existence in Heidegger’s mode of *Irrtum*. Alfarabi created the *Ereignis* of new ontotheological metaphysics. Averroes criticized Alfarabi for historically first form of the Oxfordian Fallacy (OB II, ch. 3.1.1). He made this mistake by misinterpreting the middle member of scientific judgment according to the *Second Analytics*.[[98]](#footnote-98) Hermeneutics followed the origin of the objectively conceived existence back to the third model of *aliud esse*. The new entity “comes into being” (*exsistit*) in the process of eidetic vision. Alfarabi's doctrine generates these specific forms on the basis of mystical experience. Avicenna conceptually generalizes this elitist mystical experience in order to instruct the common *vulgus philosophicus* by establishing mythological objectivity that brandmarks the modernity. The academic *illuminati* are not mystics, they only pretend to be. Following Avicenna's prescription, they directly contemplate his non-existent being, they dwell in an objectively designed Platonic cave and interpret the world under the influence of the academically trained Furies. The objective and metaphysic *furor interpretandi* of modernity stands and falls with the new form of intentionality. They methodically bracket the normal world in order to see the brave new world in the Platonic cave. Once again, the deceptive work of Furies can be seen, who secretly direct return of academicians to the cave, but not to the cave of mysteries, but to the one made of Platonic myth. For the determination of the epochal *Irrtum*, which is connected with the objective form of “exsistence,” it is necessary to connect a new form of metaphysics with the original event of Being related to the dwelling of the mortal (*Ek-sistenz*).[[99]](#footnote-99) The hermeneutic term of “exsistence” (*exsistere*) is used in the following volumes for the description of the objective forms of being. Therefore it basically differs from the original Heideggerian questioning of Being. The thinking given by the *Ek-sistence* of mortals responds to the epochal challenge of Being. By persisting in this fundamental question of thought, Heidegger’s “*ek-sistenzielles Denken*” remains awake and receptive vis-à-vis the original event of Being in the cited mode of friendly thinking (*Andenken*, ch. 1.2). The introduction of ontotheological predication into metaphysics changed the existing thing into a simulacrum of objective “*exsistence*.” The existence of man and the meaning of being come out (*exsistere*) to meet the epochal challenge of new metaphysic simulacra. That idolatry is given as a new form of being of the third kind. The hermeneutics of objectivity therefore transfer the term “*ek-sistence*” into the metaphysics. Simulacra of existence create the basis of a new metaphysic, which is given in the mode of *Seinsvergessenheit* and *Irrtum*. The new form of “exsistence” concerns the changes of Latin Scholasticism. It proposed new form of objectivity and made transition into the present age of metaphysical nihilism. Transposed in the new ontotheology, the being of the third kind received a new form of “exsistence” which Rufus of Cornwall tracts in the term *exsistere* (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.2). Alfarabi changed status of being, since he established the first form of transcendental philosophy. Without his transcendental thinking Kant could not have made a postmodern definition of objectivity presented in his First and Second Critique (ch. 1). The new diacosmos, unlike the preceding one in the Neoplatonism, is purely monotheistic in its structure and has no model of emanation given by the descent of hypostases from the One. The Second Master, as a faithful follower of Islam, respects in his philosophy the absolute difference between the Creator and the Creation. The Falsafa made connection between the thinking of both great philosophers in the framework of Islamic monotheism. The new way did not follow the syncretism of the Late Antiquity. Therefore, it had to reach for Aristotle’s categorical predication of the first material substance. It has no henological, theurgic and mystical character linked to the mythopoetic doubled Being of the One. This was the reason why Alfarabi abolished Jamblichus’s diacosmos of lower theurgic deities. The objective form of Western monotheistic ontotheology can be found in Alfarabi’s writing harmonizing the doctrine of Plato and Aristotle. The writing *On Harmony Between Plato and Aristotle* places all creative forms in modern God, which Avicenna later presents in the concept of the active cosmic intellect as the donor of created forms (*Dator formarum*). The following passage describes a simple and separated divine being, which contains in the virtual multiplicity of forms. This form of mythopoetic ontotheology established the original *Lichtung* of Western objectivity (*ortus scientiarum*).

“Since God, the Praised One is alive and called this world into existence with all that is in it, it was necessary that in him exist all forms of what he wanted to create in his glorious and incomparable Being.”[[100]](#footnote-100)

Alfarabi mentions the pre-existence of the forms in the divine thought, but does not analyze their metaphysical status. It can be understood both in the emanation theory of Neoplatonism and in Aristotelian thought of Immobile Mover, which contemplates its own actuality and perfection. This ambiguity is solved by Abunaser’s contemporary Ibn Adi and afterwards also by Avicenna. Both thinkers completed the ontotheological structure of metaphysics outlined in the cited pre-existence of forms in divine thought. The pattern of the new synthesis is found in Jamblichus, see his trinitarian structure of diacosmic intelligences (ch. 1.3.1). This paradoxical connection of the Many with the One is possible only at the level of the eternal divine thought. It can be contemplated by human intellect and by analogy at the level of the formal and transcendental predication of the being of the third kind. The divine knowledge as reflexive self-awareness can be found the commentary on Aristotle’s philosophy quoted above. Alfarabi goes through the basic philosophical terms and key problems of metaphysics in the form of questions and answers. Thanks to the new ontotheology, a new determination of substance and essence was created on the basis of a new meaning of being. The ideas and forms are hidden in the modern God in the form of *tertium ens*. They are ontologically indifferent in the original sense of the Latin word “*neutrum*,” that is, with regard to being and non-being of the hyparchic first substance. They pre-exist in the divine thought as a special kind of the archetypal potency. The invention of objectivity is inextricably linked to this modern metaphysical neutrality. Abunaser’s philosophy actualized Plato’s paradoxical moment in the dialogue *Parmenides* (τὸ ἐξαίφνης, 156d3), when musical un-concealment (*a/lētheia*) of the objective being is revealed for the first time (ch. 1.3.1). This being of the third kind is given in the divine thought as a separate and primary substratum for all possible determinations of being that God can conceive in Himself. We have analyzed the original pattern of this ontologically neutral sphere through the doubled Being—One in Porphyry, when prohyparchic being precedes Aristotle’s hyparchic predication (ch. 1.3.1). The possible entities that modern God reflects in himself founded the ontotheological nature of metaphysics. Those divine possibilities of being established the fundamentals of the modern worldview. Created entities take up these primordial divine determinations. They are necessarily, neutrally and completely given in modern God and they are separated from the creation. The modern objectivity was founded by the introduction of potential, absolute and neutral version of the possible being hidden in modern God. In the 19th century, the philosophy of German Idealism attacted this neutral absolute. The postmodern philosophers definitively (*de fine*) eliminated an objectively neutralized God of *Modernorum* to instaure the last age (*novissimum*) of the nihilistic metaphysics. The Second Master established new form of Western ontotheology through amphibole predication and direct insight into divinely given essences. Alfarabi’s writing on the aim and direction of Aristotle’s metaphysics explores the beings not only in relation to the substance, but also within the framework of the Neoplatonic determinations of the type “earlier—later,” “potentiality—actuality,” “perfect—imperfect” (Dieterici II.35; p. 56.1–14). The new form of amphibolic predication is determined according to Porphyry’s Tree. Done in this way, the first harmony between Plato and Aristotle was made in the West.[[101]](#footnote-101) The introduction of the categorical predication based on the amphibolia abolished the Neoplatonic scheme of emanations and created original *Lichtung* for the later *metaphysica generalis*. The new connection between Plato and Aristotle run through a double face of “meta-physics” related to determinations of the first substance. By introducing the metaphysical predication of substance, Averroes and the first Averroism refused the misinterpretation of Aristotelianism made by Avicenna. The error concerns the essential metaphysics, which is based on generic being in the mode *ens inquantum ens*. The second Averroism and the whole modernity adopted that essential nature of metaphysics based on generic and amphibolic meaning of *tertium ens*. The Second Master establishes the first ontotheological outline of objective diacosmos. The concept of objective being (Henry of Ghent, Scotus, Leibniz) was successively added to it since the second half of the 13th century. The neutral sphere of divine multiplicity and simplicity forms the primary ontotheological realm in Avicenna’s metaphysics. Duns Scotus took over the modernist thesis concerning the unity of being in the mode of absolute simplicity. He modernized Avicenna’s objective determination of the *ens inquantum ens*. The final modern definition of the first science integrates Aristotle’s metaphysics into the transcendental scheme of truth, made out in the modern subject. This subject created basic condition for the emergence of objectivity in the Falsafa, because it is separated from the reality of the first substances.

The preceding section has shown that Alfarabi undertakes his own and epochal new Aristotelian synthesis of the commentators on metaphysics known to him. Abunaser rejected pure Neoplatonism and adopted Aristotle’s categorical signification determined by the first substances. This can be seen especially in the position of mathematical analogy, which Neoplatonism elevated to the level of metaphysical abstraction. Alfarabi fundamentally opposes the elevation of mathematics to the level of metaphysics. The first science must abstract from the quantity given in mathematics and geometry; therefore mathematics is excluded from the claim to be the first science. Its object is merely ideal and not essential, because the essence exists only in real things (Dieterici II.35, p. 57.3–9). The unity of being is not analogical, but categorical, because it is given with respect to the real substance. Mathematics is a science based on abstraction; therefore, it does not have an ontological statute as in the case of the Neoplatonists mentioned above (Jamblichus, Simplicius). The predication in the first science concerns the real world. Therefore it runs on the level of the metaphysical, univocally founded abstraction and not on the level of the merely equivocally given analogy. The object of the first science is identified by the unity which is given with respect to the final determination of categorically predicated unity on the level of the second substance. In the first science, investigating the divided first substances, explicitly belongs the theology. God as Creator is the beginning of every created being (Dieterici II.35, p. 56.23–25). The categorical and transcendental determination of being has only the one object of ultimate cognition; otherwise a twofold knowledge of the first philosophy would arise. Plato’s most famous dialogue puts this unity behind the essence (ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας, *Rep*. 509b9). Therefore, the search for the ultimate unity behind the being of the first substance ultimately denies the metaphysical unity based on existence of real things.[[102]](#footnote-102) Alfarabi gives this ultimate unity of being with respect to modern God in the transcendental conception of metaphysics. He is the first protagonist of the theory of one truth, which the group of second Averroism and modernists vehemently defended by the Paris and Oxford condemnations in March 1277. He nevertheless defended the specific position of theology over philosophy conceived as Aristotelianism for the people.[[103]](#footnote-103) The ambiguity of substance grounds the ambivalence of the first science. It is defined both by the investigation of the real substance and by ontological determination of the transcendental Being as absolutely simple and separated One and Truth. This justification legitimizes the passage from the *Metaphysics* quoted above by connecting the being of the being and also the equally given truth in the modus *simpliciter* (Met. 1026a33–35). Unified truth given behind the being of substance signifies the being (τὸ ὂν) according to the cited quotation from the *Metaphysics* in the mode of original simplicity (ἁπλῶς λεγόμενον). Therefore, the Second Master seeks this first and last truth corresponding to transcendentally unified predication, because the Creator is this truth. The new predication of truth transcends Aristotelian categorial determinations. The Neoplatonic One outside substance or the Aristotelian One as the superior substance is fully separated from the subordinate celestial spheres and they determine them simultaneously. The fundamental predication *per prius* concerns both amphibolic determination of being and Aristotelian determination of substance.

After the departure of the Second Master, the metaphysics necessarily took two fundamentally different directions. Aristotelian determination of substance proceeds in the framework of the categorial predication. The first substance forms the source of the movement and the causality according to the metaphysical dative. These substances are primarily related to the being of the First Mover, which is given physically as *Primum mobile* and metaphysically as *Prima causa*. Platonism, on the other hand, insists on the absolutely separated One whose being is located behind the Essence and the Being. The primary connection of the One with the world of cosmic forms is accomplished by ontotheological determination of being of the third kind. It dwells in the mythopoetic sphere of neutral multiplicity, which is preserved in the Neoplatonic One. The separated One is also the Many in Porphyry’s double Being—One, in order to contain all potential determinations of being in the primordial form of *tertium ens*. The connection of the One with the Many is causal, formal, final. It is made by mystical and objective participation. The mystic vision of modernists therefore descends from the One downward to the multiplicity of forms and substances. Likewise, by means of Aristotelian abstraction, we can ascend from hylemorphic first substance to the One. By combining both forms of seeing, the unitary structure of modern ontotheological metaphysics comes into being. The view from the perspective of catabasis from the One into the creation asks how it comes in the human intellect to the recognition of hypostatic forms. Their first signification relates to the realm of the One—Being. The modern form of abstraction (*denudatio*) represents the direct and evident insight of modern *illuminati* into the hypostatic form. It is given as ontotheological *neutrum* in the divine Intellect or as *tertium ens* in the cosmos of hypostatic forms. The acquired intellect (*intellectus adeptus*) rejoins the hypostatic thinking of the One. Under influence of academic Furies, the *illuminati* can “see” this objective form. The objective madness of modernity (*Irre*) consists in the fact that both subjects (the *illuminatus* and the form recognized by him) create the mythopoetic unity with the cosmic *intellectus agens*. The subjects of illumination are the autonomous forms and the amphibola, which are communicated by the acquired intellect illuminated by the detached active intellect. The anabasis to modern God as a Giver of those forms is established at first on the level of Aristotelian abstraction. It runs first by sensual perceptions to form recognized forms in the actualized material intellect (*intellectus in potencia*). Aristotelian intellect then follows the path of causally given natural cognition and discovers naturally recognized God as *causa prima*. The acquired intellect (*intellectus adeptus*) becomes a point of intersection of both views, since the ontological trajectory of understanding is determined as the anabasis of knowledge and the catabasis of intellectual forms. The gnostic and mystical insight of the acquired intellect follows the path of modern generic being. It ascends (anabasis) to the unity with the help of cosmic forms. This unity is originally given as a kind of ontotheology, by the transition from the One to the Many (catabasis). The enlightened intellect considers and interprets the path from unity to plurality in the opposite direction, because it ascends through the objectively, neutrally and mystically considered meaning of modern diacosmos to the One—Being. The second floor of cognition represents a typically Neoplatonic product. The *illuminati* of Late Antiquity like Simplicius transcended in this way the categorical unity given in *Isagoge* (ch. 1.3.1). The unity of predication on the level of second substance and based on the sensual apprehension is supposed to reach the Neoplatonic unity on the level of pure hypostatic forms and intelligences. This level of being can be reached directly only by the *intellectus adeptus*, which is linked to the celestial, immaterial and detached *intellectus agens*. This type of theoretical and mystical vision completes the cognition of the human intellect. Its sensual actualization performs at the level of the first intention (*intellectus in potencia*) and the intellectual reception follows that performance in the form of second intention by active abstraction of the hylemorphic forms (*intellectus in effectu*). Aristotelian intellect is actualized from the senses in order to reach the second stage of cognition. This cognition is then completed by the Neoplatonic illumination given by active abstraction of the autonomous forms. Neoplatonic illumination starts its activity on the level of the second intention. The *intellectus adeptus* ties to the activity of already actualized Aristotelian intellect that is immersed in the hylemorphic reality. The new vision of being directly contemplates the actual hypostatic forms that are produced by the activity of the separated cosmic *intellectus agens*. Abunaser created a synergy of two actualizations of intellect, which was accepted by Avicenna and rejected by Averroes. The metaphysics based on illumination experienced an unexpected dynamism in the following generations of Christian-Arab thinkers and it formes the hidden fundament of objectivity until today. Aristotelian abstraction and interpretation of cognition according to *De anima* were adapted in the new ontotheology by the fact that the Second Master introduced another level of cognition. The new determination of hypostatic forms proceeds on the level of the acquired intellect, which is based on the already secured cognition through the *intellectus in effectu*. It is first actualized thanks to the disclosure from the front, i.e., from the Aristotelian abstraction given by the *intellectus in potencia*. The acquired intellect is actualized through the natural cognition and then this hypostatized intellect as substance of the third kind communicates directly through the illumination with the separated active intellect of the cosmic intelligences. The first insight into the new metaphysics goes to the real substance and its properties. The second insight follows the amphibolic properties of pure generic being, which transcend the causality of the first substance.

Thanks to this triple ambiguity, which is given by the new position of the substance, the essence and the intellect, the being is given in the space of the new ontotheology as A and at the same time as Non-A. Hermeneutic archaeology found the original event of the emergence of being of the third kind (*Ereignis*). This being emerged in the Western objectivity in original *Lichtung*, which is related to archaic Being. The philosophy of the Second Master created the next original ambiguity of Western metaphysics following the pattern of the First Master. In the historial space of new metaphysics, all future forms of the Western thinking coexist in the mode of their epochal unconcealment (*alētheia*). The metaphysic began to proceed in the Persian Falsafa in two directions after the death of the Second Master, since Plato and Aristotle have determined the twofold determination of the first science. The metaphysics explores in the line of Aristotle’s “τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά,” i.e., the first substance as the *causa* *prima* of origin and decline of the bodies and of their motion (*Primum mobile*). This direction of “meta-physics” took Averroes, who had become a hitherto unconquered Aristotelian of the West and known by the unique title of “Commentator.” Or in the line of Plotinus, the metaphysics explores transcendental determinations of being beyond the physics which relate to the henological unity of being outside the first substance (*passiones entis*). Avicenna took this direction of metaphysics as direct insight into the transcendental unity of being in its pure beingness. This direction positioned metaphysics as investigation of the ultimate determinations of being as such (*ens inquantum ens*). These determinations goes beyond Aristotle’s categorical determination that is given as the imposition of meaning from the empirically recognized first substance. For the further generations of the Second Master’s interpreters such as Avicenna and Averroes, another gigantomachy arose between the Platonic primacy of the wholly separated One—Being and the Aristotelian recognition of the causes of motion, which are tied to the first substance and the first cause. Alfarabi’s project of metaphysics integrates Plato and Aristotle. It begins with the illumination of being from the front and goes on by the process of illumination from above. The resulting insight into the forms arises in the human soul thanks to the action of the superior intellect (*intellectus agens*), which exists separately in the world of fully actualized Neoplatonic forms. This form of insight establishes the knowledge of the world *more geometrico*. Such a deduction runs according to Proclus’ work *Stocheiōsis theologiké*, which was adapted into scholastic form in the book *De causis*. Western tradition of translating the *Elementa theologica* began in the Georgian academy Gelati (12th–13th c.), which was the analogue of the imperial university in Constantinople (Πανδιδακτήριον τῆς Μαγναύρας), which taught medicine, philosophy, and law from the 5th century onward. The Gelatian theologian and philosopher Ioane Petritsi (c. †1125) introduced the study of Proclus’ *Elementa* into the Western tradition via translation into Georgian. This seeing of forms adopted from the *Liber de causis* the scholastic school of the Porretans and the *Nominales* and later the school of the second Averroism. The project of Aristotelian metaphysics, on the other hand, is based on the disclosure of the sense of being from the front. The cognition begins and ends with the real hylemorphic substance as the source of the movement and further categorical determinations. The metaphysical view follows the real hylemorphic substance as first and last cause of cognition. It does not concern a mythological movement of ideas in divine thinking, which are potentially and formally given, but the movement of the real substance. The metaphysics entails the material state of bodies and finally the immaterial stellar spheres, the cosmic intelligences and the wholly separated First Mover as a pure act of the self-reflecting intellect. This project cannot create a parallel and ontologically neutral substance, body, matter, time and space, as we have already seen in the Neoplatonist metaphysics. The predication *per prius* and *per posterius* gets categorical character in the framework of the univocal general statement about the real and effectively acting first substance. The understanding of the world is given from the front, from the existing real substance, which actualizes the passive intellect through the senses (*intellectus possibilis*). The intellect activated by disclosure from the front builds up the structure of abstraction (*ens secundum rationem*) to reach the actual First Substance, which exists fully *per se*. Aristotelianism acts in accordance with the priority of the causes of ontologically given motion as a transition from potency to actuality. This first level of causality is the basis for the following determinations of bodies, their origin, their disappearance or their movement. The first philosophy assumes a world of separate, immaterial substances that exist beyond sublunary physics and relate to the exclusive existence of the First Cause. The realist attitude exposes the project of the first science as “meta-physics” and starts from the cognition of the real world, which is given by the senses and by Alfarabi’s *intellectus in potencia*. The receptive component of cognition is actualized from the actual substance. Therefore, it cannot primarily look at the world of transcendental unity of forms, which are given as subsistent being or substrate of intellect. It is the *intellectus adeptus* coined by the Neoplatonists and then recreated by the Falsafa that operates this type of supernatural receptivity. Alfarabi stands on the border between Aristotelian and Neoplatonic metaphysics. Therefore, Avicenna and Averroes rightly considers the Second Master as a congenial interpreter of the First Master.

## 2.2 Ontotheological Determination of Being (Ibn Ādi)

Christian philosopher Yahya ibn Ādi Abu Zakariyya (†974) testifies the conflict of two versions of the first philosophy that simmered between the Aristotelians and the Neoplatonists. Ibn Ādi led the Baghdad school of Wisdom (*Bajt al-Hikma*) after the departure of Alfarabi. The philosopher and theologian changed the teaching of his master in such a way to better fulfill apologetic function in the framework of Christian theology. This Jacobite had to philosophically uphold the unity of substance and the diversity of Persons in the divine Trinity against the strictly monotheistic school of Islamic philosophers in the circle of Neoplatonist al-Kindī. Ibn Ādi does not perform harmonization of Aristotle and Plato in the same manner as the Second Master did. This is approved by the fact that he does not use in his works the concept of acquired intellect (*intellectus adeptus*) from his teacher Alfarabi (Périer 1920a, 220). Ibn Ādi works with the first level of abstraction in the case of the cognition of created things and to keep universals on the level of the seconsd substance. Aristotelian approach regarding the relation between the first and the second substance is shown by the quotation from his work *On the Necessity of Incarnation*.[[104]](#footnote-104) The reason for the Aristotelian orientation from his philosophy was the emphasis on the concept of God as the effective creative cause that is separated from the rest of creation. He rejected the existence of universals outside the existing things. Existence is inseparable from Aristotelian first substance. A key argument against the existence of independent forms refers to *modus tollens*.[[105]](#footnote-105) Aristotelian teaching rejects all hypostatized beings of the third kind. These beings would be placed on the level of the first substance, which is pure nonsense. He adheres to the categorical attitude of his teacher formed by two interpretations of *Cat*. 2a11–16 (ch. 2.1). Ibn Ādi defended Aristotle’s categorical predication against the Neoplatonists as Porphyry did (ch. 1.3). Let us quote the defense of Aristotle’s abstraction from his key text, which analyzes the different forms of being. Ibn Ādi defends the separated existence of the first substance to create the universal categorical predication. The definition of man cannot be derived from the individual that comes into being by the division of general concepts in the framework of Porphyry’s tree.

“This is so evident and manifest that one does not seek proof of it nor is one obliged to make it plain. It is strictly necessary that this occurrent thing must [1] either agree in every respect with the existing human who is composed of a matter and a form (and this entails an absurdity, for the composite, [complete] with its matter and its body, will be in ourselves, and this would amount to the occurrent thing’s existing in ourselves; and this is manifestly objectionable…” (*On the Four Scientific Questions concerning the Three Kinds of Existence: Divine, Natural and Logical*, cap. 12; ed. Menn & Wisnovsky, p. 92)

Ibn Ādi rejects the idea that concept of existence could be taken on the same ontological level as the first substance. The individual given by universal division is not the first substance because they do not have the same form of existence. What was obvious and evident for the critical Aristotelianism, that became absolutely confused in the course of time. The quotation comments upon the first arrival of the western *Modernorum* in the House of Wisdom. Avicenna represented that group in the next generation of scholars. The objective being duplicates the first actual substance. It was introduced to the Latin West by the Porretans in Avicenna’s lineage, and the Oxford branch of this school combined it with universal hylemorphism. Ibn Ādi, in agreement with Aristotle, claims that the existence of universals requires a supplementary proof by the way of abstraction and deduction. Universal meaning is not given in direct experience of existing substance. Therefore, the Aristotelian thesis holds that the universals cannot occur in existent hylemorphic substances, because theirs forms are actual and they are materially given.[[106]](#footnote-106) The principle of *destructio primis* confirms that point. Without the first substance, there is no meaning on the level of categorial predication made by second substances.

But on the other hand, the Baghdad academician consider the universal concept much higher than merely a representation of the essence in the cognitive thought, thanks to the participation in the truth on the level of One—Being. Al-Farabi founded a new doctrine of hypostatized essence by setting up a system of double abstraction and creating a new form of *aliud esse* as being of the third kind (ch. 2.1.2). Ibn Ādi does not need a Neoplatonic or amphibolic hierarchy of hypostatized forms like his teacher Alfarabi to create predication *per prius*. He introduced the categorical determinations directly in divine intellect and intentionality. Done in this way, new type of ontotheological predication came into being that creates a categorial imposition outside the existence of a real first substance and out of human intellect (*neutrum*). Ontological neutrality in the modern God takes place in the sphere of his intentionality and thought as pure possibility. This divine and objective neutrality is transmitted to creation as divine creative will and power. New interpretation of relations in the divine Trinity runs in the peculiar mode *per prius*. This way of predication influenced in a fundamental way Avicenna’s concept of objectivity, which is primarily found in modern God. The divine and objective *neutrum* goes in the form of creative forms into the creation. The philosophical concept of the divine Trinity forms the second reason why this Christian apologist and important representative of Falsafa is on the list of authors establishing objectivity. Aristotelian and Christian Ādi emphasizes that the persons in the Trinity make the one substance separated from the creation. He provides an original defense of the unity and multiplicity in the divine Trinity. The second floor of predication *per prius* is composed in such a way that it philosophically defends the multiplicity and unity in one God. New solution upheld the communion of three divine Persons (Father, Son and Holy Spirit) against monotheistic Islam. Their essence remains in itself and it is one; therefore, God in his essence is the One. But the divine essence is given in three different hypostatized relations (i.e., “persons”), which differ with respect to the act of reflection.[[107]](#footnote-107) Let us now quote the key part of the *Treatise on the Unity of the Divine Trinity*. The intellect reflects itself in its own activity and thereby simultaneously perceives itself as the object of self-reflection.[[108]](#footnote-108) God as intellect is in itself and by itself (*'aql, intelligere*). During the act of self-reflection he brings about the person of the Son as a new determination within the divine essence (*'āgil*, *intelligens*). The act of self-reflection proceeds both from the intellect and from its reflected action. The relation of the Father and the Son bring about the Holy Spirit. It comes back to the Father and the Son because it is their internal object and at the same time he makes the accomplishement of their thinking (*mā'gūl, intelligibile*). The immanent relations of divine Persons within the one essence are necessary, eternal and even hierarchically done (*processio*) within the framework of predication *per prius*.[[109]](#footnote-109) The quoted excerpt from the *Treatise on the Trinity* emphasizes that the difference between the persons is given in the mode *per prius*. Relation is described by a triple mode of thought and not by the plurality of three substances (*Traité* *I*, p. 22). The new form of primordial predication enabled unity and multiplicity directly at the level of the divine Trinity, that is, in the sphere of the diferentiated One. The model of self-reflexive doubling of the intellect comes from Plotinus’s *Enneads*. The fifth *Ennead* investigates the process of twofold seeing. Ibn Ādi may have known the fifth *Ennead* through the paraphrase in the work *Theologia Aristotelis* and also through its application in Porphyry’s commentary on the dialogue *Parmenides*. This dialogue introduced the form of the doubled Being of the One (ch. 1.3.1). The following passage from the *Theologia Aristotelis* shows the Neoplatonic doubling of henological Intellect, which is presented as an act of reflexive understanding.[[110]](#footnote-110) These sections reached the philosophical schools in Baghdad through the writings of the *Corpus Plotiniana Arabica*. Ibn Ādi, following the pattern of Plotinus’s internal difference (ἕτερον ὂν), emphasizes that Son and Spirit are second in the order of this predication, but are nonetheless involved in the subjective genitive of the one essence (τοῦ εἴδους) as in the *Enneads* cited above (*Enn*. 5.5.7.4). We find a similar triad of relationships within the divine intellect already in Alfarabi’s writing *Al-Madīna*, from where it was probably adopted by Ibn Ādi.[[111]](#footnote-111) The Jacobite teacher of wisdom influenced theologians and philosophers of Aristotelian orientation (al-Ghazālī, Averroes) especially on the question of the creation of the world *ex nihilo*, the existence of divine attributes, the resurrection of the body, and the divine cognition of individual things (Périer 1920a, 222). The new predication of the divine Persons in the Holy Trinity serves as a key argument against al-Kindī. He questions the concept of Trinitary God that seems to be polytheistic. The treatise *Défense de la Trinité* *contre Al-Kindi* refutes the possibility of compositions in monotheistic God at the level of substance, accident, genus, or species (ed. Périer, pp. 118–28). Ibn Ādi created a new form of Porphyrys’s doubled Being, which was not connected to prohyparchical Being of the One, but to hyparchical being of Aristotle’s first substance (ch. 1.3). The divine substance is predicated in the mode *per prius* as a threefold modality (*hypōstasis, persona*) of the one divine essence. Threefold act of divine self-reflection in the one substance assumes that the Persons incorporate a different relation to the substantial unity. Done in his way, Ibn Ādi can confirm the secondary difference at the level of properties as Good (Father), Wisdom (Son) and Power (Holy Spirit). New determination of divine Persons made in virtue of triple act of thinking establishes in the divine essence the first modern reduplication of being on the level of ontotheology. The definition of the Holy Spirit as an *intelligibile* forms a new kind of representational being. It is tied to the twofold act of thinking of Father and Son in the mode of hypostatized relation (*esse ad*). This form of hypostatized relation keeps a central role in the modern version of objectivity since 1280. But Latin version of *esse ad* took up Simplicius’s *Commentary on the Categories* (ch. 1.3.2). Ibn Adi expanded the concept of *aliud esse* coined by Alfarabi and inserted it in the framework of ontotheology made on the level of divine self-reflection. Modern God intends the world before he creates it. The objective *individuum* received an absolute determination in the mode *semel–semper*, which exists directly in modern God. What he once thinks in his intellect that has eternal validity. Moreover, divine thinking contains in itself the objective possibility of the future incarnation of the Son of God into the material world. That divine intention of the Incarnation is given by the Trinitarian self-reflection and it carried out in the one divine Essence. The possibility of future creation is given in the similar mode of creative reflection, which contains in itself the intention of the created things. In contrast to the Incarnation, those intentions are given merely as accidents of the divine thought. They are ontologically neutral, since they do not make yet the object of his creative will. This determination of creation proceeds from God in the mode of *intellectum* *secundum*.[[112]](#footnote-112) That determination has a key significance for the later definition of objectivity given by Avicenna.

The proceeding makes the double predication *per prius* concerning the relations that are to be found in modern God: 1) three Persons in the one divine substance; 2) objective existence of creation in the divine mind. The creative act relates *per prius* both to the predication of personal relations in the divine substance and to the objective essence of creation in divine mind. That prohyparchical meaning finds expression through the causal predication *per posterius* to create the creation and the incarnation of the Son in the world (*Traité VII*, pp. 89–91). The creation and the Incarnation proceed on the level of the sublunary substance in the body that keeps various accidents. Unlike the ambivalent status of substance in Alfarabi, Ibn Ādi upholds but two orders of substances (uncreated being and created substance). He follows in this key point fully the Aristotelian metaphysics. After the primary ontotheological deduction of Son and Spirit from the Father (*processio*), this Arab and Christian philosopher performs a new apology of God’s incarnation, another cornerstone of Christian dogma. Ibn Ādi’s Jacobite Monophysitism emphasized the co-essential position of the incarnated Word, which possesses divine nature. In Christ, there is no distinction between deity and humanity. A key passage for the emergence of objective content in divine thought is ensured by the tractate cited above on the defense of the Incarnation (*Traité VI*, pp. 81–83). Avicenna uses this section in constructing the first objective version of ontotheological metaphysics (ch. 2.3.3). The original place of objectivity in divine thought was found by the Second Master, see preceding chapter. Its edited version is found in Ibn Ādi’s treatise on the various modes of being. This treatise describes the existence of created forms in divine thought as follows:

“Now for their divine existence, which is their real existence (I mean [their existing] in their [essential] realities), and in which they are not clothed with anything else, they need nothing at all apart from themselves. (…) Rather, all of these three existences must always attach to it, as long as their Creator and Existentiator — hallowed be His names — wishes it.” (*On the Four Scientific Questions concerning the Three Kinds of Existence: Divine, Natural and Logical*, cap. 16; ed. Menn & Wisnovsky, p. 96)

A key function comes to the definition of the new type of beingness. It has an essential nature and contains no other determination of being (“they are not clothed with anything else”). The predication defines a new class of objects within the divine substance that established another ontotheological sphere of objectivity. Aristotelian univocal predication relates to divine self-reflection of Neoplatonic origin. Modern God reflects in himself in a trinitarian way the non-existent creation, which is given in a prohyparchical way. Divine intention and reflection created a new sphere of ontotheology. The act of intentionality takes place directly in divine intellect. This bold modernist operation enabled the vision of the whole of being taken directly from the position of the divine eye. This creative intentionality is later reflected by the term “*esse ad*.” It founded the objective metaphysics of Olivi, Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus through Simplicius’ commentary on the *Categories*. The mythological path makes the unity of *illuminati* with modern God. That totally illusionist *Ge-Stell* created the path of ontological understanding (*Vor-blickbahn*) which founded the objective worldview. The divine self-reflection given in the one essence thinks something, objectively intends something and then actually wants to create something. The new *factum* of ontoteology is divinely conceived, objectively intended and chosen to be created. That ingenious proceeding founded the new category for the predication of *tertium ens*. The created things like the real beings and the universals in thought are separated from the substantial aspect of the divine Trinity. Intentional objects in modern God received a new kind of “exsistence.” It is primarily oriented *ad extra* and it “exsists” (*exsistit*) only in divine intentional and potential form. This neutral “exsistence” is related to divine Being (*esse ad*). The concepts remain in divine mind, taking the form of intentional objects. They represent things and events that have not yet been created. Done in this way, the first objective definition of every being arises in the mode of the archetypal demiurgic intentionality. The first objective entities pre-exist in absolutely separated, archetypically founded intentionality. The definition of such a neutral “not-yet-being” is separated only from the pure nothingness. Thereby, a new figure of Porphyry’s individual emerged, which has the features of the minimal being (*esse diminutum*). This atomic substance as *individuum* dwells in the sphere of eternity and it is endowed with ontotheological determination of being. The objective individual has an absolutely unchangeable nature, which exists directly in the modern God. The new type of *illuminatus* is a divine observer on the level of the Holy Spirit that can directly “see” the processes of divine intentionality. Ibn Ādi introduced a new form of existence and he established a new form of diacosmos and a new form of *tertium ens*. The transformation of the Neoplatonic *individuum* into divine thought in the form of Alfarabi’s intentional object (*ma’qūl ṭhānī, intellectum secundum*) founded a new type of amphibolic predication in the ontotheological mode *semel—semper*. The Porretan school in the Latin West made use of that predication to create the metaphysic of *tertium ens*, which is present through various forms of *mathesis universalis*. The transition gous from the Neoplatonic trinity of transcendental properties (γνῶσις, δύναμις, ἀγαθότης), which had been adopted from Proclus’s work *Stocheiōsis theologiké*, to Aristotelian triad “the intellect—its performance—its object”. The transformation can be dated in Ibn Ādi’s work around the year 965 (Lizzini 2003a, 500). That year makes the historic date for the emergence of objectivity in the West.

Avicenna transfered this pure beingness from divine thought to the world. It is manifested in the direct view of objectivity as such (*hoc esse tantum*, ch. 2.3.1). Settled in the Baghdad House of Wisdom in the second half of the 10th century, the first prototype of modern God acquired a very specific set of Aristotelian features. The new diacosmos is placed outside Neoplatonism and outside the polytheistic forms of ontotheology given by Neoplatonic emanations. The intentional thinking of noncreated objects was added into the actual essence of the divine Trinity. Ibn Adi created a new *Lichtung* of truth and untruth, where potentially “existing” entities manifest themselves in their primary ontotheologic neutrality. The divine accidental thinking of the Other, made in actual essence of the divine Trinity, created a new realm of potentially “noncreated” things. Thus, a new form of unconcealement of being of the third kind (*alētheia*) emerged in Western philosophy. That kind of *tertium ens* founded the metaphysics of objectivity. Avicenna begins to predicate hypostatized properties already at the level of the first substances in the mode of comitation (ch. 2.3.2). The gradual emanation of forms from the One, which is given in Proclus’s Neoplatonism *modo geometrico*, is abolished in the new ontotheology in two ways. Firstly, the primordial unity of the divine substance and in the multiplicity of the three persons is completely separated from Neoplatonic, consubstantial emanations. Secondly, the act of creation separated the essence of the divine Trinity from the objective being conceived by modern God and given in the mode of merely potential accidents made on the level of divine intentionality (*esse ad*). The original act of hypostatic creative thinking given *per prius* creates *per posterius* the realm of objectively intended entities. They fully depend on the first act of divine thinking und they are separated only with regard to their individual being. This fulfills the basic definition of the individual in the *Isagoge*, where the distinction is made at the level of the superior species (here, the divine mind) and individuals are only distinguished from each other (*aliis*, ἐν ἄλλοις, ch. 1.3). This led to a new definition of the ontotheologically neutral indivisible substance (ἄτομος οὐσία, *individuum*) given by the final subdivision of the universal meaning that modern God intends for ever. Avicenna made use of divine self-reflection outlined by Ibn Ādi and defined modern God as donor of forms (*Dator formarum*) that are separated from his existence. At the end of the 10th century, predication of possible events as intentional objects in divine intellect created mythopoetic sphere of human and divine thought in the mode *esse ad*. Both kinds of thinking are analogical and they differ only in actuality and potentiality, in the infinite and finite realm. This insight into the divine essence plays a key role in the emergence of the Western form of objectivity in the philosophy of Duns Scotus. After 1280, the thinkers of the second Averroism use transcendental predication of being, which is given at the level of divine reflection (*ens diminutum*). Latin modernists did not know that Ibn Adi discovered that kind of predication. Their inspiration comes from Avicenna’s commentaries on *Metaphysics* and from his commentary on *De anima*. Ibn Ādi insists on the fundamental difference between the divine and the human intellect. But he keeps analogy of the two intellects based on formally identical operations. His doctrine of cognition remains in Alfarabi’s ambivalent scheme of ascending and descending cosmic intelligences and forms that we receive through the *intellectus adeptus*. On this point, this Christian philosopher takes up the mystical tradition of Neoplatonism, which professes the connection of the active intellect with the divine world of intellectual forms (*ittiṣāl, ittiḥād*). This tradition was confirmed by his teacher Alfarabi in the cited treatise *De intellectu et intellecto* (ch. 2.1.2). The actualized and enlightened human intellect can reach the divine essence, since it has the same structure of thinking as the divine Trinity.[[113]](#footnote-113) Thanks to the identical structure of cognition, this insight philosophically completes the infused mystic contemplation that the Creator gives directly to the prophets. Ibn Ādi understands the similarity of the created and the uncreated intellect in the fact that both intellects formally possess the same structure of reflection. The preceding analysis of the relations in the divine Trinity has shown new way of transcendental predication *per prius*. It is based on the doubled self-reflection that creates a neutral ontological sphere of being. The new diacosmos in divine mind enables a timeless differentiation of the divine Persons on the basis of various cognitive and reflexive acts of the intellect.

The formal similarity of the human and the divine intellect founded the ontotheological construction of metaphysics outlined by the Second Master (ch. 2.1.2). The human intellect, thanks to the act of enlightenment, has the ability to see the transcendental properties of being, which are in a certain way common to modern God and modern man. This line of insight is given according to the mystical vision from the fifth book of the *Enneads* quoted above (συνορώμενον, *Enn*. 5.5.7.5). New ways of seeing make the link to the henology given as the divine act of reflection. Such vision opened the way to analogical unity of being, because it established common predication of being to unite God and the creation in the mode *esse ad*. The Christian Persian thinker, who presided over the first Western university in Baghdad, shifted Neoplatonism to a new form of objective metaphysics in a decisive way. Ibn Ādi found a new form of categorical predication of divine attributes that he placed directly in the sphere of the One. The monotheistic God remains in his original substantial unity. However, in this unity a new form of neutral being and twofold reflection emerged, made by trinitarian structure of the divine Persons and their relations. Both phenomena are given by the trinitarian structure of the divine Persons and their relations, which arise first from the intentional and then from the creative action of God towards creation. This structure, in turn, is analogically found in creation as well. The predication of divine Being separated from the world corresponds to the claim of strict monotheism. Moreover, it establishes the concept of *creatio* *ex nihilo*, which is placed outside the emanation model of Neoplatonism. The emanation is substantially given by the exodus of hypostatized forms from the One, which is unacceptable for monotheism. The new predication of the objectively defined creation discerns between the substance of the Creator and the intentional contents made out in his eternal thinking. These contents have only accidental character in relation to the divine substance. Ibn Ādi fully used Aristotelian differences between the actual being of the *per se* given the first substance and the potential and accidental predication of the universal meanings given at the level of intellect. That special kind atomic substance stands in the last place in the order of universality conceived by modern God and it borders on pure non-being. The new trinitarian structure given by the divine intellect establishes the first objective determination of being as *individuum*. It makes a mixture of the Neoplatonic and the Aristotelian predication. This form of objectivity is discovered by the modern scholasticism for the Latin West around the year 1280. Nihilistic postmodern metaphysics adopted the Avicennist metaphysics through the *via Modernorum*. The Baghdad House of Wisdom (*Bajt al-Hikma*), was founded at the time of Caliph Harun al Raschid from Persian dynasty of Abbasiders. It became the place where Western objectivity emerged through the ecumenical thinking of Alfarabi and Ibn Ādi. This way of reflection is completed by Neoplatonist Avicenna and rejected by Aristotelian Averroes. Avicenna’s philosophy plays the major role in the ontotheological construction that concerns being of the third kind. Ibn Ādi placed *tertium ens* in the neutral sphere of divine Being. Avicenna expanded the ontotheological neutrality of modern God to encompass all objective metaphysics.

## 2.3 Metaphysics of Objective Being (Avicenna)

The first round of the gigantomachy on substance extends from late antiquity to the beginning of the first battle in the nascent West. The House of Wisdom in Baghdad became the place that decided the fate of the Western metaphysics and thus the Western civilization. In order to clarify the *Lichtung* of the truth and non-truth in falsafa, it is necessary to make a quick review of the initial hermeneutical position. The gigantomachy follows the transformations of modern intellect that reveals objective meaning of being. The initial trajectory of comprehension (*Vor-blickbahn*) must be investigated on the ontological level. The archaeology of objectivity explores the fundamental question of “how” the ontic being is manifested from the hidden event of archaic Being. It dwells hidden in the musical *a/lētheia* and it manifests itself in an ontic way through the act of substantial donation (τό τί ἦν εἶναι, *quidditas,* ch. 1.1). The starting point of the investigation is therefore the real first substance, because it forms the fundamental starting point of Aristotelian metaphysics. Hermeneutics of objectivity cannot investigate the relation “subject—object” that refers to the recognized thing or to the purely mental content of cognition (*ens rationis*). The investigation follows the metaphysic order of being and the human intellect makes part of it. The hermeneutics called this donation of substantial meaning as metaphysical dative (*dativus metaphysicus*). This manifestation of metaphysical meaning in the framework of archaic *Lichtung* must be distinguished from the positively given being of something. This entity arises in virtue of metaphysical determination of the substance as “this here” (τόδε τι). Heidegger separated the original task of thinking from the metaphysics. The original manifestation of Being through the metaphysical substance indicates the Greek word παρουσία, from which emerge Heidegger’s terms known as “ontological present” (*das Anwesen*) and “ontological presence” (*die Anwesenheit*). Both terms express original revelation of the world in the mode of *a/lētheia*. The hidden Being puts the visible being in the historial manifestation of metaphysical truth and untruth and then it withdraws itself into the original Lethe. The interpretation of the different modes and ways of the presence of being (*Anwesende in seiner Anwesenheit*) belongs to the fundamental characteristics of the new type of hermeneutic thinking (*Vernehmen, Andenken*) concerning the original event of Being. The realm made out of hidden art of presentation (*Präsentation des Präsenten*) makes the fundamental condition for every being to be present as such and such entity (*das Präsente, Seiendes*).[[114]](#footnote-114) Hermeneutic presentation of metaphysics taken from the perspective of Being is therefore different from what is found in the realm of that primordial sphere as an individual entity. The process of presentation is an event of a different order than the resulting product of this hidden revelation. Truth of being as *veritas* is defined in the framework of the positively determined metaphysics. The previous chapters presented ontological disclosure of the first Aristotelian substance as the disclosure of being from the front or from behind. This way of the unconcealment of metaphysics (*alētheia*) shows the changed *Vor-blickbahn* that determines basic comprehension of substance in various projects of metaphysics. That proceeding answers the fundamental question, “how” this or that vision of being is manifested in the field of *Lichtung*. This event of un-hiddenness (*a/lētheia*) of Being brings about the twofold truth of the musical or tragic historiality of thinking (*Geschichtlichkeit*). The effect of the hidden commencement (*Anfang*) of the first philosophy of Being (*Seinsverlassenheit*) makes itself visible through the double donation of the sense of the substance de Plato and Aristotle. Its essence or whatness (*quidditas*) is no longer given in the mode of the principal dative of the first philosophy (*dativus principalis*) but through the metaphysical donation (*dativus metaphysicus*). The archaic mode of twofold donation determines modern gigantomachy of metaphysics related to the manifestation of Aristotelian substance (*Seinsvergessenheit*). Therefore, there is a double donation in view of the objectivity, which runs as unconcealed (*alētheia*) and misleading parousia (*Irrtum*) of the first substance. This unconcealment (*alétheia*) makes ontic being to reveal itself in the historicity (*Geschichte*) of Western metaphysics which is either true (Aristotelian *veritas*) or misleading (modern objectivity as *Irrtum* of Heidegger). That kind of hidden historicity is positively revealed in the history of Western metaphysics.

Hermeneutics must explore the exposition of objectivity that is hidden in the metaphysics of Avicenna. In his definition of the substance, the objective being is enacted as metaphysical *Irrtum* (ch. 1.2). Alfarabi created a new insight into the substance without elucidating metaphysical status of this operation. His definition of substance makes a quasi-substrate of various determinations of being, which represented a very problematic and contentious compromise (ch. 2.1.2). The Second Master mixed transcendental and categorial predication *per prius*. Neither he explained the ambivalent determination of the *tertium ens*, which was incorporated into the new structure of metaphysics. The untenability of such attitude is proved by Avicenna and Averroes that took up a fundamental meaning of Alfarabi’s metaphysical neutrality analyzed above. Both famous disciples of the Second Master understood the ambivalence of substance and its intellectual insight as a dispute between two determinations of metaphysics. Each of them defended one or other metaphysical perspective (*Vor-blickbahn*). Averroes solved the ambivalence of substance by abolishing all being of the third kind. He returned to original Aristotelian difference between the first and the second substance. Avicenna, on the other hand, took Alfarabi’s *aliud esse* quite seriously and made out of it the substance of the third kind. New form of *tertium ens* was integrated into ontotheological project of metaphysics and to the corresponding gnoseology. Ibn Sina, in his own words, gave a great alms to beggars on the day when he finally grasped, through repeated lectures of Alfarabi’s writings, the intended object (*ġaraḍ*) of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* as the first science. A contemporary analysis of Avicenna’s path to understanding metaphysics investigates two mentions in his *curriculum vitae* (Bertolacci 2001). The first reading concerned mainly Books II.1–2 (*Alfa elatton*) and XII.6–10 (*Lambda*), where metaphysics is presented as *theologia naturalis* based on the action of the First mover understood as *Causa Prima*. The first reading was under the influence of al-Kindi’s treatise on the first philosophy (*Kitāb fī al-Falsafa al-ūlā*). Metaphysics as natural theology (*Met.* II and XII) is transformed into a transcendentally conceived first science, which is related to the First Cause and to the First Being by the predication of the *ens inquantum ens*. The second reading followed the intermediate period of interpretative uncertainty until Avicenna fully grasped Alfarabi’s metaphysical intention, which is given in the form of ontotheology. This is tied to the new form of *aliud esse* (ch. 2.1.2). Avicenna based the generic form of being on a new form of ontological neutrality outside the first substance. This new synthesis of Plato and Aristotle establishes the modern version of *metaphysica generalis* since Suárez and postmodern objectivity since Kant.

First, it is necessary to investigate the predication *per prius* that triggers Avicenna’s project of the first science as a new unity of being and knowledge. The new unity of objective substance and its objective knowledge is proposed to make a correct reading of Al-Farabi’s legacy that can reach the ultimate goal of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*. This threefold objectivity of the world, subject, and their correspondence founded the Western path to the epochal error (*Irrtum*) of metaphysics denounced by Averroes. Avicenna’s project of first philosophy agrees with Alfarabi’s Aristotelianism on three fundamental points. These points have already been discussed in the previous chapter. The manifestation of being in metaphysics must be contemplated through a higher form of intellect connected to the hypostatic form of substance. The *tertium ens* understood in that way must be integrated into the new scheme of first science that the Second Master established as ontotheological form of metaphysics. Ibn Sina responded in a new way to the challenge of neutral being that Alfarabi and Ibn Ādi elaborated for the first time in the Falsafa. The confrontation between Avicenna and Averroes shows unveiled truth and falsity of the metaphysics of the Second Master. Averroes rejected in principle modern theory of truth as speculation and assimilation of formal contents and he defended Aristotelian conception of truth as *adaequatio*. Avicenna’s conception of truth and intellect is updated from the year 1240 by the group of *Modernorum* in Oxford and in Paris that established the first scheme of objectivity in Latin West. Avicennist Rufus at Oxford names this assimilation theory with the apt term *coaequatio* (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.2). Twofold form of metaphysic truth given by gigantomachy of Avicenna and Averroes determine in a fundamental way the whole history of Western civilization.

### 2.3.1 Objective Vision of Being

The controversy between Aristotelianism and Neoplatonism has shown that primary understanding of being in human intellect comes either from the real thing or from the autonomous intelligible forms. The new figure of abstraction and intellect took over the mythology of intellect-sun that passed from Plato’s Allegory of the cave into Avicenna’s philosophy. Aristotle refused to establish a scientific cognition through Plato’s subsistent ideas contemplated by illumination or anamnesis. Without an actual hylemorphic substance given outside human intellect, no act of sensory cognition (διὰ τί ἄνευ τῶν ἔξω οὐ ποιοῦσιν αἴσθησιν) is possible, because the faculty of the senses is mere potency and not at all actuality (τὸ αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐνεργείᾳ, ἀλλὰ δυνάμει μόνον, *De anima* 417a3–7). The sensorial organs must be initiated by the actual external source, just as a combustible substance can be ignited only by an already burning fire. The senses and intellect are only in potency with respect to the cognition of the first substance and they keep merely receptive character. The activation of apprehension starts from the front, from the existing thing. Only the *simpliciter* and *per se* existing first substances establish a categorial predication as truthful cognition of the world (ch. 1.3). Without disclosure of being from the front made by the presence of the first substance, there is no correspondence of the thing and the intellect, only an analogical similarity of one intellectual form with another. The universal receptivity of the senses and intellect, which is given outside of real substance, poses the fundamental question of “how” (Heidegger’s *Wie*, Aristotle’s πώς) the human soul can receive all cognition (ψυχὴ τὰ ὄντα πώς ἐστι πάντα, *De anima* 431b21). The previous chapters confirmed that Neoplatonic schools in Late Antiquity and the first Falsafa preferred the active intellect to the receptive one, which Alfarabi rejected with the introduction of *intellectus in potencia* (ch. 2.1.1). Intellect and senses are, for the Aristotelians, merely potency of the soul; they do not exist by themselves. They form a part of the body as its sense organs or a component of the soul as immaterial entelechic forms of a living organism. The intellect activated by senses has the primacy of cognition in the soul. This part of soul is actualized by *species sensibilis* at the first place. The intelligible part of the soul is immaterially receptive with respect to actually or potentially recognized things in order to be capable of the universal knowledge. This fundamental difference between the receptive (γίνεσθαι) and active components of the intellect (ποιεῖν) occurs in the most important part of *De anima*. Aristotle describes the twofold component of cognition in the soul (νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι, ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν, *De anima* 430a14–15). Alexander’s Aphrodisias commentary on *De anima* gives canonical designations to these components of the soul. The receptive component of the soul is expressed by the material intellect and the active component by the active intellect (ἐπεί ἐστιν ὑλικός τις νοῦς, εἶναί τινα δεῖ καὶ ποιητικὸν νοῦν; *Alex. in De anima* 88.23‒24). The Second Master refused to hypostatize the intellect like Alexander and created an intersection of the first and second abstraction through the diaphanum and through a new concept of passive intellect (*intellectus possibilis*). The new form of the acquired intellect (*intellectus adeptus*) follows Neoplatonist scenario of cognition.

Avicenna knew Alfarabi’s treatise *De intellectu et intellecto* with the above-mentioned facts. He had to solve the fundamental question: How do we recognize the world? Unlike his teacher, he returns to the Neoplatonic solution, which emphasizes the concept of the soul as an autonomous and actual substance that directs the body as a superior mover. The starting point of new cognition became the *intellectus adeptus* of the Second Master that makes direct insight into cognitive forms of the third kind (ch. 2.1.2). Avicenna rejected the disclosure of intellect in the Aristotelian scenario of cognition through the real thing. In the actual substance, there are only potential forms of cognition, which are not enough to produce a true knowledge. Truth is not fully given in the scenario of Aristotelian correspondence, since it originates in the second phase of abstraction according to Alfarabi’s scenario. Only this kind of cognition entails full self-reflexivity of intellect that ascertains the fact that we clearly recognize something. The disclosure of being in Avicenna’s metaphysic does not come primarily from the actual thing. It comes from the heavenly immaterial form or from the actuality, which is given in the soul as its own source and act of recognition. The work *Kitāb al-Najāt* comments on the above passage from *De anima* 417a3–7, which defines the performance of the intellect from sensual cognition. Avicenna rejected Aristotle’s disclosure of being from the front. The treatise *De anima* presented the answer on the crucial question how the intellectual soul can be able to know everything in a human way (πώς ἐστι πάντα, *De anima* 431b21). Avicenna correctly summarizes the teaching of *De anima*, but rejects it as an insufficient solution. Cognition cannot be based on the reception from the senses, but on acceptance of intelligible forms. They already exist in their actuality and can move human intellect in their way. The tenth chapter of *Kitāb al-Najāt* advances a threefold series of arguments against the conjunction of the intelligible soul and the sensual body into a hylemorphic unity of the first substance. Avicenna makes modern dualistic conclusion.

“So we hold that the soul has two activities: an activity in relation to the body which is its government and control, and an activity in relation to itself and its principles, which is intellection. These two activities are so opposed to each other and mutually obstructive that when the soul is occupied with the one it turns away from the other, not being able easily to combine the two.” (*Kitāb al-Najāt*, cap. 10; ed. Rahman 1952, 53.26‒32)

Avicenna introduced the fundamental dualism between sensory and rational cognition. This thesis was continuously repeated by modernists in the second Averroism and by postmodernists as Descartes. It forms the basis of the present dualism between the intellect and the body. Rahman’s commentary on the quoted passages from *Kitāb al-Najāt*, ch. 10 explores the difference between Avicenna and Aristotle on the question of cognition based on sensorial organs (*Kitāb al-Najāt*, p. 103). In the full mode of cognition, the intellect performs *denudatio* of already existing universal form. The vehicle of this cognition is the acquired intellect. The devaluation of sensual and intellectual potency in the soul canceled the conception of receptive intellect, which is determined from the real thing that is recognized by the senses. Avicenna does not require the full receptive function of the intellect (νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι, *De anima* 430a14), as it was in the case of his teacher Alfarabi. Such reception is based on sensual synthesis to create *species sensibilis*, which are given in the imagination; all this represents for Avicenna only the animal level of cognition. In the modernist scenario, the *species sensibilis* does not cause the emergence of the *species intelligibilis* in the intellect. In a person divided into two substances, sensual cognition has no possibility of reaching the immaterial level of cognition. There is no place for the connection of sensual and intellectual reception, because the intellect is exposed to universal forms in the higher world. In the cognitive theory of modernists, there is no fully receptive component of the intellect, which assumed the actuality of the external world mediated by the senses. The soul is therefore not *quodammodo omnia* (*De anima* 431b21) because it is an actual substance or an actual form (*hoc aliquid*). Avicenna created a new model of truth as a theoretical reflection (*speculatio*) of intelligible forms in the substantial human intellect. It receives and reflects the cosmic forms as immaterial and substantial mirror (*speculum*). The cognition runs as assimilation of different kinds of hypostatized forms, which are actualized more or less, in the mode of universal similarity. The modern disclosure of being depends on the metaphor of the intellect-sun, which manifests the fundamental sense of being according to Alfarabi’s scheme (ch. 2.1.1). Avicenna does not need a diaphanum because the enlightened acquired intellect is separated from the senses and it directly recognizes the immaterial forms. The material intellect is related to the real object through the mental content made in the imagination or memory. The sensorial apprehension abstracts the sensual forms, because the material intellect is based on the senses and it makes part of animal soul. This ability of making instinctive conclusions (*wahm*) is material. The sensual abstraction builds the act of abstraction upon individual form of the thing which the senses perceive. It intentionally forms the animal ability of synthesis (*vis aestimativa*). The animal *intentio* produces the ability of instinctive conclusion, which is given on the basis of the individual sensual cognition. The sheep sees the wolf through the act of animal imagination, because it has created its own sensual form through sensual abstraction. Then it focuses its attention on this sensual impression and therefore makes the instinctive conclusion that it is necessary to flee. It is not the case of human cognition that starts on the second level of abstraction. Avicenna’s commentary on *De anima* abolished both in the human understanding: the receptive faculty of intellect and Alfarabi’s version of intentionality. Avicenna adopts the Neoplatonic illumination through the acquired intellect, which is activated by the cosmic *intellectus agens*. The whole metaphor of solar intellect is interpretation is moved one step forward if it is compared to Alfarabi’s interpretation (ch. 2.1.2). The actualization of human intellect is not given through Aristotelian *intellectus in effectu*, therefore no mediation is necessary in the new scheme. Illumination is given by the above-mentioned self-reflexive activity of the intellect, which is carried out quite autonomously with respect to itself and due to its own principles.

“The comparison of the intellect with regard to human soul is like the role of the sun with regard to sight. It is evident that sun exists actually by itself and can be seen by the real sunbeam, even if the sun is not perceived directly in its actuality. Intellectual cognition takes the same position with regard to human soul.” [[115]](#footnote-115)

Avicenna is exclusively interested in the relationship between the sun and the ability to see (*comparatio solis ad visus nostros*). Therefore, the theory of cognition as a comparison does not include mediation by the diaphanum. It was confirmed in the Alfarabi’s translation of the work *De intellectu* when the translators in Toledo took over the Avicenna’s scheme. The mediating role of diaphanum in Latin translation disappeared and was replaced by radiation of the sun’s rays or intellect (*comparatio irradiacionis*, ch. 2.1.1). To this level of relationship corresponds the disposition of soul related to the superior active intellect (*intellectus agens*). The cited view emphasizes from the original version of *De anima* the Neoplatonic line of cognition given by Themistius: sun (*causa prima*) — ray (*intellectus agens*) — eye (*intellectus adeptus*) — color (*intellectum*). The recognized color or intellectual knowledge connects both the receptive and the active process of cognition. The eye receives the rays of the active sun directly through the exposed surface, which modernity adopted through Descartes and Arnauld (ch. 2.4.4). Similarly, the *intellectus adeptus* acts in the autonomous soul. We recognize the real substance given outside of ourselves directly, through autonomous hypostatic forms. There is no real mediation between the sunray and the eye, only mythopoetic analogy of sun and intellect. In the first place, there is the actual light from a transcendent source, which is quite actual and exists subsistently (*sol per se in effectu*). Human cognition is determined by an analogous mode of enlightenment, and the intellect is actualized in a similar way.

Hermeneutics must, first of all, analyze the actuality of intellect in the mode *per se* that constitutes the process of modern cognition. In such a scenario, the intellect relates to a mythopoetic, separate and hypostatized form, which is a substance of the third kind (*intellectum primum*). This makes a fundamental difference from the Aristotelian notion of cognition through the *intellectus in effectu* that runs mediation based on the actual hylemorphic first substance (*intellectum secundum*). The knowledge is received first by the senses and then by the receptive intellect. The correspondence of the modern intellect to the sun in Avicenna is given directly. The intellect enters in immediate relation with the sun through the solar ray. This is a full nonsense, and all the more according to Avicenna’s teaching based on the separation of sensual and intellectual cognition. Definition of knowledge made in a Aristotelian way through the *species sensibilis* and *intelligibilis* can never take up the reality of an external thing in its original actuality directly into our mind. The tree in the nature does not have the same mode of existence as in human knowledge of that tree and the same applies to the sun’s ray. Avicenna’s scenario abolished mediation through the diaphanum, since knowledge through the senses cannot affect the immaterial intellect. The metaphor of the *per se* given solar intellect claims that the soul needs the sensual cognition only indirectly. The final actualization of intellect proceeds from the world of separated forms. From the point of view of hermeneutics, it is the scenario of disclosure of being from behind. Alfarabi introduced it in the mode *aliud esse* through the activation of the possible intellect in virtue of the acquired intellect (ch. 2.1.2). The actualization of cognition is determined *per prius* from the Neoplatonic forms or from Alfarabi’s amphibolia as being of the third kind. Avicenna’s commentary on *De anima* V.5 gives the first *Lichtung* of truth and untruth concerning objective being. A new concept of metaphysics emerges in that chapter. We use the translation from the Arabic original in the quotation. The commentary makes use of key terms of Latin translation of this text (*Liber de anima* V.5, 127.39–47). Following quotation contains the basic scheme of modern cognition which we find in the later representatives of Latin Avicennism including Descartes.

“When the intellectual faculty considers the particulars which are stored in the imagination and the light of the above-mentioned active intellect shines upon them in us, then the particulars are transformed *(istaḥāla)* into something abstracted from matter and from the material attachments and they get imprinted in the rational soul; but not in the sense that the particulars themselves are transferred from imagination to our intellect, nor in the sense that the concept buried in material attachments — which in itself and with regard to its essence is abstract — produces a copy of itself, but in the sense that looking at the particulars disposes the soul for an abstraction *(al-muğarrad)* from the active intellect to flow upon it.” (*De anima* V.5, ed. Rahman, pp. 235‒236 ; cit. after Hasse 2000, 184)

The receptive intellect introduced by Alfarabi makes no use for Avicenna because sensory cognition is separated from the intellect. Radically adapted memory takes the place of the role exercised by *intellectus in potencia*, which differs fundamentally from Aristotle’s conception of memory related to the senses. Modern memory stores the entities as hypostatized species, which in Avicenna’s scenario are substances of the third kind (*singula quae sunt in imaginatione*). The scholastic term *locus specierum* designates in the second Averroism this hypostatized memory as the place from where the cognition of modern intellect starts (OBJ III, ch. 4.3.1). Neither the real thing nor the process of sensory cognition by the *species sensibilis* have a determinant influence on the cognitive process. The hylemorphic substance recognized by the senses merely dispose the soul to know everything by abstraction. It is defined as an emanation of forms coming from the separated active intellect (*aptatur anima ut emanet in eam ab intelligentia agente abstractio*). The cosmic intelligible forms imitate the solar ray, because they possess the actuality in the same way. Avicenna separates sensual cognition from abstraction that he transforms into a kind of Neoplatonic scheme. The quotation states that basic universal determinations already exists in the reality in indistinct form and they are bound to the real hylemorphic first substance. But they are in no case Platonic ideas, which Platonism and Neoplatonism conceive as actual substances or forms. The soul is not directly determined from the senses but by the separated *intellectus agens*. It enlightens the soul, which then activates the species of the individual things, which are already present in the real things. The species-essences are abstracted in a special way (*istaḥāla*) and stored in our intelligible memory. It is clear that such a memory is not the sensual memory. Aristotle’s *reminiscentia* makes part of animal and human cognition. Avicenna’s *memoria* is illuminated by an active intellect, hence it has a mythopoetic nature. Sensual cognition according to Avicenna makes merely a psychological disposition of the soul. Human soul is perfected through the lower act on the level of the sensual forms given to animals (*cogitatio*) as well. It recognizes its higher possibilities, which are given in the process of illumination. The key sentence shows that the soul does not need to contemplate the singular objects of cognition given in imagination. They only dispose (*aptatur*) the soul to start a real cognitive process. The *species sensibilis* and empiric intentions have no causal relation to the cognition of intellect. The intelligible form exists in advance, since it is an effective cause of cognition. The soul is enlightened from behind by the light of the cosmic intellect, which acts as a donor of actual forms. The quotation excluded the connection with the really formed first hyparchic substance. It cannot reach the higher cognition, because such forms lack the necessary immaterial actuality to do this. Neither the hypostatic soul has the possibility to recognize the immaterial forms in the material things, because the recognition of human soul is immaterial in principle. The sensual species makes no cause of cognition, because the causality conceived in a Neoplatonic way must proceed from the superior form to the lower one. The result of illumination represents a new type of abstraction, which considers directly immaterial forms (*al-muğarrad, denudatio, spoliatio*). Avicenna’s metaphysics recognizes the essences or species in things directly through illumination and does not need sensual recognition for this purpose. The intellect of *illuminati* extracts already in itself existing universal forms from matter. It does not create them in thought through Aristotelian abstraction like the *species sensibilis* and *intelligibilis*. There is a fundamental suppression of metaphysical dative in the modern cognition of reality. The actual hyparchical first substance does not determine cognition by the actuality of its own. In the Aristotelian cognitive schema, this actuality went into the past and the universal character of recognized concept took its place. The western *illuminatus* such as Avicenna recognizes the world in the form of the parousia given in his mind, which is actualized by cosmic intelligible forms.

Avicenna accomplished the first modern eclipse of the first substance in opposition to the doctrine of the Second Master and introduced a new oblivion of being (*Seinsvergessenheit*) into the Western philosophy. The thinking activated with the help of acquired intellect stands on a similar level as cosmic active intellect, which deals directly with the separated intellectual forms. The abstraction taken as mythopoetic illumination means that modern knowledge of the existing thing does not involve the abstraction from materially given and sensually recognized individual entities. The act of abstraction proposed by Avicenna acquires a twofold sense, which Gilson precisely characterizes in his well-known study of Latin Avicennism. Let us now quote the key sentence which aptly formulates the modern form of abstraction separated from empiric experience: “To abstract does not mean to transfer into the intellect that form which lay in the imagination.”[[116]](#footnote-116) Enlightened mind can directly see the eternal and objective essence in the same way as the cosmic *intellectus agens* contemplates them. The analysis of perception and cognition can be explained as a gradual *denudatio* of matter to pure universal form.[[117]](#footnote-117) The actual process of cognition has the causal effect on human intellect at the level of interaction between the two higher forms of intellect. The key passages in the quotation show that in the soul there are two almost completely independent proceedings: the sensual apprehension and the intellectual cognition. The sensual impression plays only an accidental role, because it helps the soul to see something new. What should the soul see beyond the common form of abstraction, which is given on the level of the material intellect? The second part of cognitive process describes the conceptual abstraction taken in the mode *per se*. The new mode of knowing intends only a formal or essential simplicity, which is given outside the sensuous multiplicity of single things. The active intellect illuminates the sensual contents of the soul from behind from the higher form of the intellect (*illuminatur luce intelligentiae agentis in nos*). This activity of the intellect is designated in the Latin translation as *abstractio* with an explicit reference to the direction of illumination. The active intellect is the original source of cognition (*ab intelligentia agente abstractio*). Avicenna, in the *Metaphysics al-Shifa*, comments on the process of abstraction in a similar way. The active capacity of self-reflection of the intellectual part of the soul (*ipse intellegit seipsum*) joins the actualization of the soul through acquired intellect.[[118]](#footnote-118) Cartesian scheme of cognition outside the senses is now complete. The superior enlightened intellect collects the pure naked forms in the act of its own self-reflection. See the final sentence of the above quotation, which speaks of the special kind of “collecting” (*iltaqaṭa*) those universal formes. This conception of reflexive reference to reality is adopted by Avicennist schools in the Latin West in the terminus *collectio*, and after them, from about 1280, by the entire movement of Latin modernists. Today we collect the digitized simulacra that the nihilistic *illuminati* give us as worthy of mystical reverence and admiration. The supernaturally enlightened intellect collects secondarily or verifies in the hylemorphic substances those universals which it has already come to know in a direct way. The cognition is not given by direct Neoplatonic emanations of hypostatic forms from the separated cosmic *intellectus agens* into the acquired intellect. Avicenna is still influenced by Alfarabi in that question. He prefers eidetic vision of immaterial forms in the act of the acquired intellect that receives amphibolic meaning of *tertium ens*. This corresponds to the third kind of cognition in Alfarabi, made in the framework of the new metaphysic *Ge-Stell* (ch. 2.1.2). The new donation of being produces the modern form of *aliud esse*, which is set in the framework of the first Western ontotheology.

Avicenna let run two parallel processes in the soul and both of them depend on the reflexive function of active intellect. The cognition given by Aristotelian abstraction and it is perceived by the movement of the soul (*cogitationes et considerationes motus*). It disposes the soul to accept the higher forms of cognition (*ad recipiendum emanationem*). The cognition proceeds in the mode of scientific judgment, wherein the middle member dispositions the soul (*termini medii praeparant*) to immediately contemplate the necessary universal conclusion (*ad recipiendum conclusionem necessario*; *Liber de anima* V.5, 127.48–50). Avicenna sees the forms and essences in things with the eidetic and intuitive insight made by the cognitive judgment. That sort of insight adopted later Descartes and Husserl as well. According to the *Second Analytics*, deductive judgment postulates, in exceptional cases, a direct insight into the premises of judgment and, therefore, the formation of an intuitive conclusion (*Anal. Post*. 88b37). Enlightened thought possesses the instantaneous ability to perceive the conclusion without syllogism as it is immediately given in the premises (*ibid.*, 89b10–11). Avicenna used this model of Aristotelian syllogism and abolished the Neoplatonic scenario of conjunction with the One made by emanations and hypostases. In the syllogism based on the direct intuition falls away the actualization of the middle member from the causally given *species sensibilis*. That proceeding is later repeated in the so-called Oxfordian Fallacy developed in the school of Avicennists (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.1). Necessity is not given causally from the hylemorphic reality of the first substances, but thanks to the logical necessity which operates in the world of hypostatized forms. The dualistic Avicenna, long before Descartes, emphasizes that the immaterial component of the soul is fundamentally different from the material body, thanks to the ability of self-reflection. The new interpretation of *De anima* excluded causal influence determined by sensory knowledge upon *species intelligibilis*. As to Avicenna, immaterial cognition begins at a separate level. A new type of insight into pure forms emerges due to the intellect’s own actuality and its capacity for self-reflection. Avicenna separated the intellect from the senses and made of it an angelic potency and substance thanks to an intuitive form of *demonstratio*. The cognition through the intellect is not a formalization of the sensual experience in the soul. This kind of knowledge is defined as Aristotle’s concept of *tabula rasa*.[[119]](#footnote-119) The soul with the Avicennist intellect holds something which belongs to the intellect in an actual and substantial way. This subsistent intellect exists before the experience gained by the senses. The cognition takes a course to the actual given cosmic forms, which are described by the third form of Alfarabi’s ontotheological system. The intellect is actualized by the recognition of the hylemorphic substance (*abstractio*) and at the same time forms a special quasi-substrate which enables a higher form of abstraction (*denudatio*). The cognition through denudation and through the acquired intellect participates in the cosmic unity of hierarchically structured forms thanks to the direct illumination through the active intellect (*intellectus agens*). Illumination is as anabasis of thought to the original source of forms (*ittiṣāl, ittiḥād*). The essence is recognized from the first substance, but it exists simultaneously as an absolute and timeless form in the thought of *illuminati*. Avicenna’s writing *Kitāb al-Nağāt* makes a precise distinction between the Aristotelian conception of abstraction and the direct insight into the world of forms.[[120]](#footnote-120) The universal forms are either abstracted from the material things recognized by the senses, since they are taken by direct insight. The higher component of the soul and intellect is turned toward the world of pure forms and perceives them through the act of intellectual intuition. Avicenna defines both forms of abstraction, but places them in the Neoplatonic hierarchy of forms, where the higher form determines the lower. Unlike Alfarabi’s synthesis, the vision of *illuminati* does not need to be determined from the Aristotelian *abstractio* to arrive at modern *denudatio*. Étienne Gilson saw exactly the difference between Avicenna’s *denudatio* and classical *abstractio*, which is given with respect to the sensual experience and to the passive and active intellect in the soul. If a higher form of abstraction is given, then the cognition of individual things is unnecessary for the intellect. Therefore, the sensuous cognition has only a propaedeutic character. Abstraction from the senses is incapable of self-reflection, which is reserved only for the active and the acquired intellect. Descartes as an Avicennist defines the ability of abstraction as evident deduction and transfers the way of *denudatio* into postmodern metaphysics. For both thinkers, the execution of the forms proceeds from the internal field of self-reflexive insight actualized by the acquired intellect (*intellectus adeptus, res cogitans*). It is clear, then, that *cogito* of Descartes is Avicenna’s *intellectus in effectu* actualized by illumination from autonomous intelligible forms. The recognized attributes “exsists” (*exsistere*) in the mind as hypostatized *tertium ens* and the acquired intellect considers them in this amphibolic form.[[121]](#footnote-121) The ability of the acquired intellect to recognize the being of the third kind establishes the Cartesian dualism known since Avicenna’s thought experiment of the so-called Flying Man. The full version of this argument is given in *Liber de anima* I.1 and scholastic authors knew it from that book.[[122]](#footnote-122) The human intellectual soul, separated from the body, participates in the separated active intellect. The modern intellect floats freely in space and thanks to the soul as a substance he has a self-consciousness even without the knowledge mediated by its own body and through the senses. That philosophic fairy tale was adopted by postmodernism and nihilism through the thought experiment known as “Brain in a Vat*”*. This modern schizophrenia was criticized in a fundamental way by Averroes with reference to Alfarabi’s *intellectus in potencia* (ch. 2.4.2) and the diaphanum thanks to the Aristotelian definition of intentionality.

Avicenna separated the sensual knowledge from rational cognition, which his teacher Alfarabi still held in an ambivalent unity. Both cognition processes define two different mental activities. According to Avicennia interpretation of *De anima* I.5, cognition is given as an intensified process in which an increasingly adequate relation (*niṣab*) to the abstracted forms arises. Avicenna’s interpretation of Aristotle’s writing *De anima* shows the descending and ascending hierarchy of four forms of intellect (*materialis, in habitu, in effectu, adeptus*) that are involved in the process of cognition (Hasse 1999, 29–31). The process of cognition is exposed twice, in *De anima* I.5 and *De anima* V.1–6. Different forms of abstraction determine each level of understanding (Hasse 2000, 177–79). The human intellect (*intellectus materialis*) refers first to autonomous forms as potential content of cognition. Thinking represents the pure ability of reception, which is given since we are born as human beings. Then a relation to the form arises in the possible potency (*possible potentiality*) as ability of the human being to form analytical judgments such as “Everything is greater than its part” (*intellectus in habitu*). This is followed by accepting the cognitive forms in full potentiality (*perfect potentionality*), which is tied to the process of sensually grounded cognition actualized by the higher component of the intellect (*intellectus in effectu*). Finally, the intellect is capable of perceiving the fullness of the actualized form in the acquired intellect (*intellectus adeptus*). The acquired intellect produces the cognition of immaterial form, since it is lightened by the detached active intellect (*intellectus agens*). That kind of illumination takes Avicenna to be actual and individual act of cognition. There is a patent difference to Alfarabi’s scheme, which presupposes the mediation by diaphanum and possible intellect. Avicenna’s scheme rejects any causal dependence of the senses and the intellect on the higher form of cognition. Actualized from the senses, *intellectus in effectu* has no possibility of influencing cognition at the level of correspondence between the *intellectus adeptus* and the *intellectus agens*. Avicenna’s propaedeutic function of empirical knowledge is not able to establish a causal chain to illuminate knowledge by the actualization of knowledge from the front. Actual empiric knowledge cannot actualize the *intellectus adeptus*. The followers of Blund’s school rejected Avicenna’s model of knowledge and described the course of knowledge phenomenologically according to the way how the intellect makes the act of cognition from the first substance (πώς ἐστι πάντα, *De anima* 431b21). The thinkers of the first Averroism built knowledge on Averroes’s interpretation of *De anima*. Averroes takes the actualization of potency of *anima intellectiva* from the senses. The soul cannot be universally receptive through Avicenna’s self-reflection, that is, both in material and immaterial sense. Albert the Great understood Avicenna’s conception of the intellect according to Averroes’s writing CMDA, which he received in the manner of the Sicilian school. According to Albert, Avicenna’s forms of intellect show only the degree of Neoplatonic self-reflection of intellect (*quattuor sunt gradus*). The actual process of cognition, according to the Aristotelian view, was given by the performance of individual acts made by three faculties of intellect (*tres sunt species*; OBJ II, ch. 2.4.2). The separation of Avicenna’s intellect from sensual cognition establishes the ascent of the *intellectus adeptus* into the world of pure forms. The acquired intellect resembles the Giver of forms in the act of unification made by the *intellectus sanctus*. Modern Avicennists sophistically attributed this “Averroistic” scheme of knowledge to Averroes. The separate *intellectus possibilis* and *agens* operate on the individual’s exercise of immaterial knowledge in the soul. Fortunately, Averroes fundamentally rejected the Neoplatonism of the Alexandrians and Avicenna concerning that crucial point.

New act of donation elevates the soul into the world of immaterial spheres. In the process of cognition, it comes to the fundamental change of the way how the intellect is actualized. This way of illumination of being established a new field of the revelation of substance in its unconcealment (*alētheia*). The universal receptivity of the intellect is given outside the first substance because it is illuminated from the eidetic forms of the third kind. Ibn Sina gives a new answer to the basic question: How (*Wie*, πώς; *De anima* 431b21) can the soul operate universal knowledge of the world? The answer has an objective and therefore fully mythopoetic character. The higher intellect (*intellectus agens*) transforms the individual material intellect in such a way that it receives abstracted forms from the world of separated intelligences. The abstraction receives those forms as gift, which makes Avicennist definition of receptive soul. Since Avicenna, the process of abstraction became an active mental event connected to the self-reflection of the soul. On the contrary, Alfarabi followed Aristotelian meaning of *De anima*. Therefore he insisted on the passive reception of the sensual species into the material intellect. The intentionality turned to the senses with the passive and thus fully receptive part of intellect (*intellectus in potencia*) according to the above-mentioned utterance “*anima est* *quodammodo omnia*” (De anima 431b21). The new form of abstraction canceled the primacy of Aristotelian abstraction. Avicenna brought about new conception of cognition based on interaction between the *intellectus adeptus* and the *intellectus agens*. Thanks to the disclosure of cognition from behind, i.e., from the external cosmic intelligences, the acquired intellect has a similar actuality and the ability of self-reflection as the separated cosmic *intellectus agens*.

Twofold form of imagination plays a key role in the transformation of the intellect into the subsistent hypostasis given in the soul (Descartes’s *res cogitans*). The higher form of imagination is connected to the world of cosmic souls and forms the basis of prophetic vision.[[123]](#footnote-123) This direct contemplation of cosmic formes has the mystical character. The subject is the *intellectus sanctus*, which cognizes through the *virtus sancta*. This cognition takes place within the framework of the highest form of illumination, which is given as *modus prophetiae*.[[124]](#footnote-124) Avicenna, however, conceives the movement of human cognition according to the potency and actuality of the soul as exposed in Aristotle’s work *De anima*. He needs the lower form of abstraction to provide the individual way of knowing. The act of knowing in the first person could never arise in the world of pure insight into universal forms. This insight is given by the actualization of cognition from the separated cosmic intellect. The detached *intellectus agens* is a cosmic actual and universal form; therefore, it has no possibility of individualization, which is given only by the act of human thinking in the body. The soul driven by the active intellect would be the only actual form of everything thought in the way of the separated cosmic *intellectus agens*. But then it could not be a passive principle of cognition, which also absorbs the sensual forms through the material intellect. Therefore, according to his teacher Alfarabi, Avicenna keeps Aristotelian *abstractio* in his scheme of cognition. He ensured the individualization of the intellect in terms of the hypostatized substratum that carries the autonomous cognition of the intellectual soul. Therefore, the *intellectus materialis* has an individual character in the way of primary matter.[[125]](#footnote-125) The child gradually learns cognition and establishes its unique intellectual habitus by its own activity. Further it is true that we have a similar structure of sensual cognition on the instinctive level as the animals have. Their cognition is sensually individualized. But the first level of abstraction, which is passively given from the senses, cannot establish a real cognition of autonomous forms, since the sensual individuation is materially given. Avicennism emerged from Neoplatonism and it presents a different scenario of the sense of being than Aristotelian abstraction. The difference is given by the fact that Avicenna postulates the grasping of the middle link (*medium*) of the recognition syllogism (*demonstratio*) in a purely intuitive manner. This insight is given at the level of the first innate principles of cognition, which directly receive the primary intelligibilia. The previous chapter described the term *fiṭra*, which already in Alfarabi describes the intuitive and natural ability of the mind to know correct conclusions (ch. 2.1.1). The lower form of cognition actualized from the sensible forms, due to imperfect abstraction from the senses, only a similarity (*similitudo*) of the sensual judgment (*wahm, cogitatio*) and the apprehended thing. The external active intellect (*intellectus agens*) as Giver of forms ensures that the purely sensual cognition of reality (*similitudo*) becomes a real connection with the world of universal forms. Only at this level of reasoning (*intellectio*) emerges the truth of actually recognized forms. The concept of truth is not given in the mode of Aristotelian adequation of the thing and the intellect, but out of Neoplatonic unification of *anima intellectiva* with the world of current intelligible forms. Avicenna comments on Aristotle’s conception of abstraction in a Neoplatonic way and speaks of two faces of the soul (D’Ancona 2008, 55–56). The first occurrence of this term can be found in the Neoplatonist Proclus. His interpretation of *Timaeus* 35a (ἀμφιφαὴς καὶ ἀμφιπρόσωπος οὖσα, *Procl. in Tim*. 130.24) addresses the doctrine of the two faces of the soul for the first time (Buffon 2007, 91–92). The dualistic Avicenna claims that one part of the soul regards the body and the second part is turned toward the world of immutable and immaterial forms. This part of the soul does not require sensory experience for abstraction because it recognizes the forms in the act of direct vision. The external thing makes only the first floor of intellectual abstraction, which is marked by sensual errors and delusions. However, the second and higher level of intellect or the second face of the soul is directed to the pure world of forms. The explanation of Avicennian abstraction has shown that the theoretical part of the soul receives the universal forms directly in the act of its own self-reflection. It is connected with them on the same level of immaterial actuality as separated *intellectus agens* is giving them to the human intellect. This union of cognitive form in the acquired intellect with the cosmic source of forms established the modern concept of truth as Avicennian assimilation of forms. The acquisition of hypostatic and fully autonomous species does not need any actual and first real substance to establish a truthful correspondence of thought and the real world. The primary actuality of the cognizing intellect stands outside the passive capacity of Aristotelian soul as *anima intellectiva*. The higher intellect of Avicenna is active by itself, being in contact with the autonomous world of immaterial forms.

The process of abstraction according to Avicenna made epochal change in the framework of modern *epokhē* concerning the first hyparchic substance (*Seinsvergessenheit*). The empiric cognition is transformed into a fully formalized and thereby actual form of understanding. The quotation from *De anima* V.5 has shown that the intellectual part of the soul is capable of receiving immaterial actualized forms. They are imprinted (*imprimuntur in anima*) in the soul from the active intellect living in the world of pure intelligences (*ab intelligentia agente*). The original source of human cognition is not the material intellect, which is actualized from real things, but a mythopoetic active intellect. See the quotation above, where the active intellect has fashioned by its own light a new scene of the revelation of what exists (*illuminatur luce intelligentiae agentis in nos*; *Liber de anima* V.5; p. 127.41). The active intellect serves as an instrument of illumination (*luce intelligentiae agentis*) and the soul becomes the tool of that higher intellect. Thanks to the connection with the active intellect in the individual mode of the acquired intellect (*intellectus adeptus*), the intellectual part of the soul is raised to the level of the cosmic intelligences. The acquired intellect works as an independent substance thanks to the ability of self-reflection. The self-awareness of hypostatic intellect comes from the reception of the recognized forms emanated from the cosmic *intellectus agens*. This self-reflection makes of the intellect an actual species and hypostases. The lower intellectual faculty of cognition, which is given by the Aristotelian actualization from the senses, lacks this actual intellectual self-reflection.[[126]](#footnote-126) In that way a new form or substance in human beings came into the light of modern mythopoetic reason. The acquired intellect is an individualized substrate that takes up immaterial forms, which are given by the emanation of the active intellect into the Avicennian and later the Cartesian *cogito*. The soul moderne, thanks to its own propaedeutic work on the level of sensual cognition, has already actualized the first principles of cognition, which were put into it since birth as germs of the higher intellect. The first level of self-reflection made as partially actualized cognition is produced by individualized material intellect. It carries out a sensual abstraction and makes inferences on the level of imagination, which is put into the memory. Then it is possible to enter the world of direct contemplation of the cosmic forms. The following quotation shows the emergence of a new worldview from the demiurgic subject. At the first place, the soul of illuminatus performs a reflection of its own contents of cognition. It comes to indispensable actualization of the intellect in the act of self-reflection. In the second step, it contemplates the cosmic intelligible forms through the act of an accomplished self-reflection.

“When the soul passes through its own thinking, it cognizes what makes a component of the higher reflexive intellect (*intellecto inquisito*); the soul then turns to what is intellectually contemplated. This insight is nothing else than the conversion of the soul to the principle that gives the understanding (*ad principium dans intellectum*). In this way, the soul can connect itself with the separated cosmic intelligences (*coniungi intelligentiae*). Then from the soul radiates the cognitive faculty of these intelligences (*emanat ab ea virtus intellectus simplicis*), after which follows the emanation of actively ordering cognition of things in the world (*quem sequitur emanatio ordinandi*).”[[127]](#footnote-127)

Avicennian and Cartesian intellect first investigates itself in the mode of special *inquisitio*, which is separated from the unreliable senses. The modern inquisition is based on the self-reflection (*conversio animae*) that makes recognition of the first principles. They provide direct understanding of themselves (*ad principium dans intellectum*). These principles are originally given in the world of cosmic forms. In the act of a mystic conjunction, the inquiring intellect links up with the detached *intellectus agens* of the higher spheres (*solet anima coniungi intelligentiae*). Through the conjunction with the external actual intellect in the act of enlightened self-reflection, it comes to the conjunction of receptive intellect not with the material thing, but with the world of pure forms (*emanat ab ea virtus intellectus simplicis*). These pure forms exist in the order of the cosmic emanations proceeding from the Giver of forms (*Dator formarum*). The human intellect recognizes them in the individualized acquired intellect and changes the world accordingly (*quem sequitur emanatio ordinandi*). The definition of cognition found a new form of demiurgic activity, which establishes modernity in the mode of actively ordering cognition carried out by modern subjects. Modernity does not look for knowledge of the world as it was the case of the millenia before. It carries out the inquisition of the wold in the light of pre-established principles. That inquisitionary task became the sacred duty of the Western imperialism. Done in this way, a radically new form of *Ge-Stell* (ch. 1.2) came into being. The world must perpetually justified itself before the modern subject because of its naked existence. Protestant capitalist ethics took this trajectory on ontological comprehension (*Vor-blickbahn*) as the basis of the secularized doctrine of justification. The next two volumes show the way how this demiurgic activity was actualized in the Latin Avicennism by Bonaventure and after him by Olivi. Thus, the pseudo-mystical and capitalist conquest of the world was born at the same time following the course of such fallacious presuppositions. The quote shows the nature of modern knowledge based on inquisition, as the intellect holds its autonomous capacity of reflexion outside of sensible reality. In the process of self-reflection, the soul keeps the certainty of self-reflection without the mediation of the sensual body. In this way, the actuality of the first principles of cognition procures the necessary certainty and evidence (*certitudo*). Modern cognition is speculative in true meaning (*veritas*). The order of knowledge based on the first principles is therefore a mirror (*speculum*) of the cosmic order with its organizing principles. These principles ground understanding in the hierarchical structure of science that reflects the hierarchy of cosmic intelligences (*rectitudo*). The intuition of the first principles and the subsistent forms within the framework of the intellect exposed from behind represents the basic scheme of the cognition of modernity. The demiurgic potential of modernity as organizing cognition arises through objective connection to the separated *intellectus agens*. The acquired intellect (*intellectus adeptus*) carries out the process of *illuminatio* as a human subject of knowledge (*intellectus in effectu*). The illumination of the intellect runs from behind, made by the separated active intellect as actual principle of knowledge. The causal nexus producing modern science is completely mythological. Through the self-reflection of the acquired actual intellect on the first principles of cognition, the first and highest form of cognition arises as the direct insight into the first principles and the cognizing forms (*ipsa inspectio*). This direct insight into hypostatic principles creates the new *Lichtung* where the truth and untruth of Western modernity are revealed. Avicenna separated the science from the Aristotelian categorical determination given by the metaphysical dative. Latin Avicennism adopted this twofold insight through Grosseteste’s interpretation of *scientia simplex*. This insight of the first absolutely simple science is followed by the process of deduction of empirical conclusions in the framework of Aristotelian *scientia cogitabilis* (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.1). Within the framework of the extended process of cognition, the chain of deduction organizes the individual empirical findings into the previously given structure of cognition. This structure provides the basis for a world-view in the mode of modern objectivity as an emanation of objective forms into the human intellect (*emanatio ordinandi*). Done in that twofold way, the new worldview is founded in the mode of modern objectivity. The difference from the above-mentioned view of *De anima*, where the soul appears as an Aristotelian *tabula rasa*, has a fundamental character. Primary hypostatized subject of cognition is Avicenna’s active intellect or Cartesian *cogito*. The act of cognition constitutes the reception of the contents generated in the soul of modern subject that is activated by the active intellect. The epoch of Anthropocene makes a necessary and quite tragic result of this metaphysical error.

The devaluation of the cognition of the real world made of the first substances is confirmed by Avicenna’s already cited writing *Kitāb al-Najāt*. The concluding and therefore the most important chapter of the writing (ch. XVI) deals with the connection of active and passive intellect in the soul. Avicenna maintains the indirect approach of the intellect to the sensually given cognition. Rahman’s commentary underlines that fact.[[128]](#footnote-128) The key sentence says that the sensible images have no causal connection with the intelligible contents. Descartes’s *Mediationes de prima philosophia* (1641) follows a similar approach. Thought actualized and enlightened by God in the act of *cogito ergo sum* goes subsequently and additionally to the reality of the first substance given in the world. The truthfulness of cognition is not given from the direction of the first substance perceived through the senses. The direct insight into the essence is given by the ontotheological deduction, which is based on the innate idea of God existing in human thought. The empirically perceived thing is unreliable for Descartes’s evident and certain cognition; therefore, it must be suppressed entirely in the first step of new method. This postmodern *epokhē* echoes Avicenna’s epochal eclipse of first substance. The hylemorphic reality does not form a real substrate of cognition. Empiric reality is problematic since it provides a mere resemblance to the original form of thinking. The truth is acquired of emanation from the direction of cosmic intelligences (Avicenna), or through the innate idea of God (Descartes). This objectively-actual idea of Descartes replaced Avicenna’s objectively-actual Giver of cosmic forms (*Dator formarum*). The enlightenment in the self-reflective *cogito* is connected with the rejection of lower cognition. The act of Cartesian reflection fulfills all the fundamental aspects of Avicenna’s *denudatio*, which is tied to the self-reflection of the intellect. Cartesian meditation begins with the separation of cognition from sense illusions (1st meditation). The intellect is placed outside the senses as an independent substance (*res cogitans*); therefore, in the first self-reflexive insight, *cogito* intends its pure form (2nd meditation). This evident insight into the primary *intellectio* relates to the actuality of modern existence outside of the body (*cogito ergo sum*). That self-reflection of Avicenna’s “Flying Man” establishes the basic standard of the clear and distinct truth (3rd meditation). The new framework for the revelation of being exists directly in the soul of the modernist. He makes the disclosure of the world from behind, from the direction of the previously given actual intellect that acts as Avicenna’s *intellectus adeptus*. Archimedes’s point for acquiring knowledge is established through the act of *cogito*. The self-reflection of hypostatized and mythopoetic mind without the body secures the island of the objective existence revealed in the act of pure immaterial thinking. Avicenna created the firts *Lichtung* that manifests the modern being of the third kind in its truth and non-truth. The primary intelligibles are habitually given as the first principles of thought (*intellectus in habitu*). Their vision describes Avicenna’s terminus *ilhām* translated into Latin as *illuminatio*. The vision of postmodern *illuminati* is provided by Descartes’s term, “*clare et distincte percipio,*” which the work *Principia philosophiae* (1644) gives as the basis of truthful judgment.[[129]](#footnote-129) The innate idea of God replaces in us Avicenna’s detached *intellectus agens* and ensures the connection of the human intellect with external sensual reality (*intellectus adeptus*). Since the innate idea of God exists within us and since we exist, the habitual first principles of cognition are actualized in the intellect through self-reflection (*intellectus in effectu*). The act of primary cognition actualizes in postmodern philosophy the first analytic principle of *cogito*, which is actual and immanent in comparison to the secondary sensory cognition. Aristotelian scheme of knowledge is secondary, because it builds on sensory knowledge given empirically and synthetically according to the original model of the Second Master (*intellectus in potencia/in effectu*). The first actualization of the cognition of the world on the level of hylemorphic substance begins on the level of the sensually cognized own body (*res extensa*). The Avicennian, Cartesian or Husserlian intellect keeps already its actuality either from itself or from the direction of the separated *intellectus agens*. Hermeneutics recall that in this dualistic scheme of Avicenna and Descartes comes to the disappearance of universal receptivity given by Aristotelian *intellectus possibilis*. The key significance of this receptivity was defended by Alfarabi in the concept of possible intellect and in the concept of diaphanum against Alexander’s interpretation of *De anima*, although already in a certain ambivalence of *quasi-subiectum* (ch. 2.1.1). The role of *intellectus possibilis* in the new scheme of cognition is not causal as in Aristotle. Receptivity keeps merely propaedeutic function and it is given *ex-post*, after the primary act of self-reflection. Avicenna displaced empirical and intellectual mediation from the understanding the world, in order to create the modern scenario of the eclipse of the hylemorphic first substance. The changed form of metaphysics makes necessary consequence of the new worldview.

### 2.3.2 Birth of Objective Metaphysics

Avicenna changed the fundamental way of phenomenological *Vor-blickbahn* concerning the disclosure of being to the intellect. It was necessary to design the new figure of *anima intellectiva*, because the modern soul was involved in the process of cognition in a radically new way. That proceeding was adopted by Latin modernity through the translation of Avicenna’s *De anima* into Latin. The scholastic knew the modern definition of hypostatic soul from Avicenna’s commentary on *De anima* (*Liber de anima seu Sextus de naturalibus*) through the translation created by Avendauth and Dominicus Gundissalinus between the years 1152 and 1166 in Toledo. Avicennism spread to the Latin West through Gundissalinus’ paraphrase of this writing in the work *De immortalitate animae*. The soul becomes the perfection of the body (*perfectio prima corporis naturalis*) and at the same time the immaterial substance (*hoc aliquid*). The actualization of intellectual soul by the disclosure of being from behind makes the modern intellect to be a kind of subsistent form (*hoc aliquid, res cogitans*). This concept of soul defined as the hypostatic substance of the third kind is absolutely fundamental for the hermeneutics of objectivity. It creates a new subject of cognition in the manner of Alfarabi’s acquired intellect (*intellectus adeptus est quasi subiectum*, ch. 2.1.1). Avicenna closed this path of the Second Master and changed the acquired intellect into a hypostatized form. Modern man has received a new kind of *anima intellectiva* as a substance of the third kind. Western scholasticism adopted the first component of Avicenna’s determination of the soul in the form of the hypostatized habitus.[[130]](#footnote-130) The second determination therefore necessarily concerned the soul as an independent substance (*hoc aliquid*), which Dominicus Gundissalinus supplemented in the translation of Avicenna’s *De anima* in the spirit of Neoplatonism.[[131]](#footnote-131) The new interpretation of cognition gave the incipient school of *Modernorum*, through the school of Toledo, a new type of intellect, which possesses the demiurgic activity primarily from itself. The first master of modernity thereby created a new parallel world of the mind in the manner of Jamblichus’s diacosmos (ch. 1.3.1). Latin modernists changed it into an objective determination of being. Avicenna’s hypostatized intellect will continue to play a key role in the later stages of objectivity until the present day. The known object is a pure form that “exsists” (*exsistere*) in itself by the fact that there has been a mythopoetic union of the donated intellect with the world of actual cosmic forms. They emanate from modern God or from the active cosmic intellect as ultimate Donor of these forms (*Dator formarum*). The modern intellect became an independent substance in the manner of the Neoplatonic intellectual emanations and forms. In the Falsafa, it came to the further eclipse of the real substance, which follows Porphyry’s interpretation of the *Categories* (ch. 1.3). The new path of understanding (*Vor-blickbahn*) creates a unity of being outside of hyparchical position retained by the first substance. This proceeding determines the cognition by the *intellectus possibilis* in Aristotelian scheme. In modernity, the real hylemorphic first substance is invalidated both on the side of the subject and on the side of the recognized object. The intellect became blind to reality by becoming a universal subsistent being. The universal receptive potency of the soul, which is given as the form of the body, became obsolete. The transformation of the intellect into an independent substance and the eclipse of the first substance is completed by the school of Latin *Modernorum* at the end of the 13th century. The objective Avicennism transformed itself into the postmodernism of Descartes that paved the path to the contemporary Western nihilism.

Avicenna gave a new answer to the question “how” (πώς, *De anima* 431b21) the soul can universally receive any cognition. The ambivalence contained in Abunaser’s definition of recognized noema (*aliud esse*) disappeared. In the intellect, there is a new being of the third kind that can be directly contemplated. Neoplatonic Falsafa abolished the hyparchical primacy of the first substance, because it was engaged in a similar struggle concerning the substance as was the case of the Late Antiquity. The transformation of substance into *tertium ens* follows Alexander’s commentary on Aristotle. His Aristotelianism separated the real existence of the material body from the predication of the universals as genus, which is given only in the intellect. The Falsafa knew since the middle of the 9th century the writing *Questiones naturales*, which is attributed to Alexander and deals with the question of the matter and the genus.[[132]](#footnote-132) Aphrodisius emphasized the secondary status of genus over hylemorphic composition in agreement with Aristotle. However, the Arabic translation gave this book the Neoplatonic accent, which is confirmed by Avicenna in the writing *Kitāb al-Šifā*.[[133]](#footnote-133) The hypostatized genus and species were given the status of a body of the third kind in the Neoplatonism of Asharites and in Alfarabi’s predication of amphibolia. Avicenna changed that new generic substance into the first substance. The properties of the type of feeding and feeling belonged to the “animal” as a universal generic substance and by no means only to the individual dog or cat. This view was resolutely rejected by Aristotelians and the successors of Alfarabi in the Baghdad’s House of Wisdom. We have quoted the reaction of Ibn Adi (ch. 2.2). This type of hypostatized predicates fundamentally changed Alfarabi’s amphibolic predication, which is limited only to the selected properties of the One (ch. 2.1.2). The hypostatical genera in the sense of Plotinus changed the categorial predication. Generic meaning made by the second substance was brought to the level of the hyparchic first substance. The predication of “body” as universal concept lost its imposition from the hyparchic first substance (“this cat”) and merged with it into a univocally given unity of meaning (”the objective cat”). Thus, a new form of objectively given univocity was created between the first and the second substance. The new insight into the meaning of being separated itself both from the universal meaning, which had arisen in the process of Aristotelian abstraction, and from the world of Platonic ideas. The well-known passage in the *Metaphysics al-Shifā* clarifies the difference between the general concept made by Aristotelian abstraction and the new form of abstraction, which forms another type of universality. The adventure of Western objectivity begins in the following quotation that established a new concept of *tertium ens*. Let us quote the first form of objective being in Western philosophy.

“The definition of horseness (*equinitatis*) is given outside the definition of universals and the universality given in this way is not contained in the definition of horseness. Horseness has its own definition, which does not need universality, because universality makes its accident (*non eget universalitate, sed est cui accidit universalitas*). The horseness is in and of itself nothing else than what is as such (*non est aliquid nisi equinitas tantum*). In and of itself it is neither many nor one, nor does it exist in single sensual things, also not in the soul. Nor is it given as something potential or actual in such a way that it belonged in the essence of the horse; the definition is given only by the fact that the horseness is as such (*est equinitas tantum*).”[[134]](#footnote-134)

The singular substantial unity perceived by the senses and the universal essential unity synthesized by the abstracting intellect are rejected in favor of new definition of universality. The horseness (*equinitas*) is proclaimed to be a new form of universality, which produces the definition of the horse as a new metaphysical entity. Avicenna created a new category of metaphysical being. The new class is separated from the categorial predication, which is bound to the second substance. Aristotle’s categorial predication does not form the nature of the essence that makes sense of the new definition. Aristotelian univocal and universal determination, in the context of genus as the meaning of the second substance, is merely a secondary accident to the new definition (*est cui accidit universalitas*). The horseness is neither contained as form in the real substance perceived by the senses (*nec est existens in his sensibilibus*), nor is it given by the abstraction of the passive intellect from the particulars (*nec in anima*). This newly defined being is neither a universal abstraction as generic concept nor an essential determination of the single thing (*nec est multa nec unum*). The new universality surpasses the former categorical determinations by its absolute simplicity. This entity is not abstracted from the real things, but it is directly viewed by the intellect in its ipseity (*ipsa equinitas*) and in its pure form (*equinitas tantum*). This insight, however, does not create a new form of subsistent idea à la Platonism. If *equinitas* were defined as a subsistent Platonic idea, then a horse considered in this way would only occur in a single instance as the fullness of being. But the quotation does not mention any participation of individual horses in the idea of the horse. It directly excludes the Platonic *méthexis* by separating the new determination from the sensuous multiplicity and also from the universality given by Aristotelian abstraction. The new determination of being establishes the last indivisible unity of the substance of the third kind. It is placed beyond the singular things and the universals. Thus, a new form of the atomic unity of meaning (*individuum*) was formed, which originally occurs at the end of the division of universal meaning in the Porphyry’s Tree. Avicenna is historically the first philosopher who “saw” objective *individuum* through the intellectual vision. This modern *illuminatus* sees the general form of the horse in an epochal new way. The vision is placed outside the Platonic ideal being and outside the Aristotelian predication made by the imposition, which is determined by the first real substance.

Avicenna saw the first entity called “the objective horse” and he made its metaphysic description. The definition became a new Western philosophical myth, replacing Plato’s outdated world made by the philosophical fairy tale of the cave inhabited by troglodytes and governed by academic *illuminati*. The new universal being is not a first substance in the reality. Nor is it a second universal substance that is given within the framework of the categorically defined genus and species. Hermeneutics must explain the way how it comes to the “accidency” of objectivity in this new form of being (*cui accidit universalitas*). The singular dative (*cui*) has a principal value. It is the first case of donation of being in the framework of *dativus obiectivus* (OBJ III, ch. 4). The new form of metaphysical dative defines the substance of third kind, to which universal meaning is attributed (*accidit*) in the mode of very peculiar kind of “accident.” The new donation of universality is neither universal in the sense of the second substance nor singular being of the first substance. A new form of *tertium ens* arises through the mix of singularity and universality. Avicenna gives to himself as gift a new being of substance in a way that is defined fully objectively. The quotation has shown that the essential determination of the horse is considered in an absolute way, in the kind of separated simplicity that makes a new form of universality (*ipsa in se*). The first vision of objectivity does not recognize the abstract definition of what the horse is in its essentiality given in the process of abstraction from the first substance. The new unity of being is considered in and for itself, in the new form of universality, which belongs to it in the form of absolute simplicity of the individual (*equinitas tantum*). The new definition of being emerges due to the generic universality and the unique individuality. The new essence is placed beyond the second substance; therefore, it is not the subject of the direct categorical imposition (species) or the secondary essential abstraction (genus). Taken individually, the new definition of the horse as the being of the third kind has its own distinctive content (*equinitas habet definitionem*). Aristotelian determinations are made on the level of the essence and the second substance; therefore they are given *per posterius*. All universal determinations lack the total simplicity on the level of the first substance that is given *per prius*. The new determination of Avicenna concerns the being considered in its primary beingness. The new form of the first substance is defined “*inquantum est prius*.”[[135]](#footnote-135) The first philosophy now exists in the order of the pure priority of being as being (*equinitas ipse*, *tantum*). The being received a new determination outside of Aristotelian categories and Platonic highest genera of being. Avicenna postulates the predication of the ultimate individual meaning of being in the mode of Porphyry’s system of division (διαίρεσις, ch. 1. 3). This new predication *per prius* open the way to objectivity because it stands outside the Aristotelian determination of substance. Avicenna radicalized the amphibolical predication of Alfarabi and made out of it a universal aspect of being. The metaphysics dealing with individual being of the third kind is alpha and omega of the new first science. It is based on the particular kind of essence which is ontologically indifferent because it is outside unity and multiplicity. Aristotelian determination of being arises only in the subsequent operations of the intellect, which add further specifications to the originally given simplicity of being. The identity of the new being of the third kind is based on the fact that it is given absolutely, in its full logical simplicity. Avicenna created a new simulacrum of the individual One and the generic Many, which sent into the world à la Ibn Adi’s incarnation of the divine Trinity (ch. 2.2). The simplicity of the new being is based on the act of intellect that directly “sees” something that does not exist in the reality and it will never exist. That intellectual vision exceeds in its simplicity the definition of essence.

Therefore, Avicenna, like Alfarabi, distinguishes two kinds of intentionality. The first intentionality goes to the sensually perceived species (*repraesentat sensus imaginationi et imaginatio intellectui*) and it contains within itself the universally abstracted determination of humanity given in the mind (*Socrates et Plato sunt una intentio in humanitate*).[[136]](#footnote-136) The second way of abstraction sees the objective being, which is given on a new level of insight. The humanity as individual-generic determination of being can be seen as accident (*aliquando cum illo accidente*) in its pure form as being of the third kind (*aliquando accipiat illam nudam*). The intuition of such a kind of *tertium ens* differs thanks to the process of abstraction as *denudatio* from Aristotelian *abstractio*, in which the universally given humanity is recognized on the basis of the sensually perceived person of Plato and Socrates. Whiteness exists for Aristotle as a universal only in the thinking and in the mode *per posterius* made by abstraction. Any other predication of whiteness outside of the second substance keeps only homonymic character that does not make part of categorial predication. The new insight into being created a new sphere of univocity, wherein whiteness and humanity have the same form of simplicity given *per prius*. Socrates and Plato are perceived within the second intention in the uniqueness of the person created by the objective concept of *humanitas*, which has the same characteristic as the previous *equinitas*. The objectively conceived *humanitas* has the universality of the genus and is thereby considered from the position of the former individual, which has a minimal universal meaning. Therefore, the individual creates an independent entity at the end of the universal predication (*esse diminutum*, ch. 1.3). The new concept of abstraction and intentionality gave to the horseness and the humanity the absolute simplicity a metaphysical determination *per prius*. It previously belonged only to the second substance, in virtue of the imposition. The objectively conceived meaning does not proceed from the first substance to the second, but from objectively conceived transcendentalia as the second objective substance (*humanitas*) to the objective individual (*Socrates*). From the point of view of classical Aristotelianism, this makes a complete paranoia, which Averroes rejects in principle. Avicenna made a mixture of the categorical predication *per prius* and *per posterius* that is typical for Neoplatonists like Simplicius. This misreading of the *Categories* is further mixed with the amphibolic predication done *per prius* on the level of hypostatic transcendentals proposed by Elias. The Second Master would never have made such a gross error. The new definition of genus is given by the universally conceived amphibolical predication. The second substance as *humanitas* therefore allows the division of objectively and *simpliciter* given determinations to the objective individuality taken as “first substance” (*Socrates*). Avicenna does not care that in the original division of Porphyry the *individuum* has absolutely minimal categorial meaning. Avicenna’s division of transcendental meanings is principally separated from the hyparchical predication. The objectively conceived univocity does not go from the first substance to the second. The transcendental determinations objectively define the level of the genus up and down to the *individuum*. To such individuality corresponds in the framework of the universally conceived predication any individual with a minimal concept of being (*Socrates*). Since the individual is objectively universal in the same way as *humanitas*, the predication can continue the way through the realm of being from below to above, from the individual to the genus. Let us recall the wisdom of Parmenides, who rejected the errance of two-headed people there and back. The original truth of the principal dative (*dativus principalis*) is bound to the wholeness of Being (ch. 1). Avicenna created an objective version of Porphyry’s tree outside the Aristotelian predication established in the *Categories*. The vision of a new non-existing entity (*individuum*) is based on the intentionality related to generic determination of being. That modern crossing (*sūmbolon*, *coniunctio*) of individuality and generality made the principal contribution to the emergence of objectivity. Avicenna sees the world exempted from the reality of the first substances and outside the categorical hyparchical predication. The metaphysical dative (ch. 1.1) of Aristotle was fundamentally changed. Modernity let disappeared the metaphysics made *univoce* that is bound to the predication of the second substance as the highest genus. Classic predication of accidents joins the second aristotelian substance exclusively *per posterius*. The accidents have no independent existence, since they are secondary determinations of the second substance. The soul enlightened by the active intellect sees the pure forms of things with absolute certainty, whether it is the determination of a triangle, the whiteness, the human being or the horse. This certainty of illuminated thought relates to certainty of objective being situated in the realm beyond the real things. That non-existing entity is observed by the *intellectus adeptus* through the second intention (*intellectum secundum*). New worldview is based on the ontotheology “*semel—semper”*. Alfarabi and Ibn Adi proposed it exclusively for the definition of divine intellect (ch. 2.2). The new type of abstraction and intentionality postulates a new definition of the thing (*res*), whose being is tied to evidence coming from the subject (*certitudo*). The new definition of the thing is no longer given in the first place by knowledge, which adequately reproduces, in the order of universality, the external and unique being of the existing thing.

Masters of the classic Falsafa as Alghazel and Averroes were shocked by paranoia of modernity that indirectly proclaimed to see the world as God does. The worldview of *illuminati* entails new essentiality of things according to above-mentioned quotations. The certainty of intuitive apprehension is sufficient to provide knowledge of the real thing. Avicenna took the new subject to cover the substance of the third kind that was imported from Neoplatonism. The certainty of subject makes one with the modern nature of being, which is given in the absolute simplicity. The modern subject of Avicenna is led by academic Furies. This completely mythopoetic creation pretends to have divine character of intellect and to recognize the world in a paranoiac way. The first form of modern diacosmos was made by Jamblichus and the following Neoplatonists (ch. 1.3.3). In this mythical parallel world of the spirit, the body received the first formal-ontological determinations, which belong to it quasi-substantially (*materia, extensio, magnitudo*). Avicenna is the first objectivist of the West, who saw this intermediate world directly by the leap of the enlightened thinking. The Prophet jumped on his horse to the sky, the modernity jumped on Avicennian *equinitas* to the age of Anthropocene. By transferring the univocally given certainty from the modern subject to the recognized object and vice versa, a new definition of truth emerges as certainty of enlightened subject. Now the imposition of truth as *certitudo* runs in a “probalistic” way (ch. 1.3.2), i.e. in reverse direction, from the subject to the thing.

“Everything has the act of subsistent certainty (*res habet certitudinem*) by which it is what it is in itself (*que est id quod est*). The triangle has the certainty that it is a triangle, and the whiteness has it certainty that it is whiteness. This may be called the thing’s own being (*esse proprium*); we must understand by this term only that intention which affirms this being (*nisi intentionem esse affimativi*).”[[137]](#footnote-137)

Truth as *certitudo* profoundly modified Aristotelian definition of intentionality. Modern subject directly considers *esse proprium* of apprehended things as Alfarabi’s *esse aliud* (ch. 2.1.2). The illuminate considers a minimal portion of beingness within the framework of the individual, which borders on non-being. Therefore, the *esse proprium* entails the first certainty of being insofar being, since it “is” something individually defined. Everything carries in itself the certainty of the objective being of itself (*res habet certitudinem*). This new determination of the thing in the mode *per prius* seems to be equivalent to the actual *modus essendi* (*qua est id quod est*). It determines the being of the thing in the act of the certainty of its “actual” existence as being in the world (*qua est*). Avicenna created a new metaphysic of being, which is given in the mode *per prius* before the categorial predication. This diacosmos of amphibolical species as substances of the third kind received the status of the new “first substance.” The objective individual makes the “first substance” that is produced by solely the act of the subjectively created meaning and not by the real existence of the things in the world (*Ge-Stell*, ch. 1.2). The affirmation of new “being of the thing” (*Seiendheit*) is not the knowledge of the real thing made due to the abstract notion based on universal thinking. The affirmation of new beingness takes place in the mode of objective certainty that is generalized as transcendental character of being. The affirmation of being in the thing runs in the mode of objective certainty of existence. It established a new form of univocity, which is necessary for the philosophic exploration. However, that kind of being cannot exist in reality. The certainty of the subject was hypostatized and put at the level of predication concerning the amphibolia. Connoisseurs of Aristotelism in Falsafa categorically refused Avicenna’s argumentation. The order of existence (*modus essendi*) was replaced by certainty produced by the modern subject (*modus cognoscendi*). Thereby the categorial imposition was completely omitted, and that makes the way, how we really recognize the world (*modus intelligendi*). Next chapter will examine the criticism of Averroes that annulated metaphysics of Avicenna as a capital mistake. Metaphysical and fully mythopoetic *modus ponens* established a new form of univocity necessary for the scientific knowledge of a non-existent “first substance.” The first Latin modernist Rufus of Cornwall revitalized Avicenna’s correspondence of thinking to the objective thing in the term “*scibile”* (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.2). Avicenna’s concept of intentionality, which considers the objectively given essences, was adopted by Henry of Ghent, then by Scotus and Husserl. The new type of predication follows the vision of mystical *illuminati* endowed with cognition from above made by the enlightened *intellectus adeptus*. They observe the individual with his minimal “existence,” which is given by his first manifestation “from” (*ex*) direction of pure non-existence. That is a kind of divine perspective that reminds of *creatio ex nihilo*. Avicenna shows a new *Lichtung* of the metaphysical suppression of the first substance. The subject does not consider the existence of real things, but the ascertained presence of that which dwells in the very foundation of being as such (*ens inquantum ens*). The new form of being reveals the truth and the untruth of the objective non/being. Avicenna establishes, in the mode of metaphysical *a/lētheia*, the first objective version of modern truth as *certitudo*. This certainty concerns the Aristotelian non-being, which is regarded as an ascertained objective being. That kind of *tertium ens* makes foundation of truth as *rectitudo* of modern Scholasticism and the subsequent Cartesian evidence. First, the recognition of being as *res* is given in the mode of full *rectitudo*, which is given by insight into pure form as *tantum esse* or *esse proprium*. We find the connection of both terms in the first metaphysical deduction of objectivity in the philosophy of Scotus (*conceptus simpliciter simplex*; OBJ III, ch. 5.3.2). The objective certainty of everything is not bound to the existence of the first real substance. The first substance exists *actualiter, simpliciter, per se*. Therefore, it does not need any additional assurance on the part of the recognizing subject. The non-existent objective being, on the other hand, needs this assurance in principle. It is founded on the subjective mode of truth as *certitudo*. According to modernists, there is no full truth in Aristotelian metaphysics, since it is not based on a certain and indisputable subjective knowledge. Indeed, the actuality of knowledge in critical philosophy comes from the real world of first substances. Aristotelian metaphysics based on real world disclaims the truth exclusively based on the intuition of essential forms. After the eclipse of the first substance, the modern subject produces the certainty of knowledge and it forms the hidden foundation of modern metaphysics. Therefore, the modern subject fundamentally needs its own truth as *certitudo*. The model of the subjective truth is inextricably connected to *simpliciter* given modernist worldview. It makes the source of Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason, which we find in different variations at the very beginning of modernity (OBJ II, ch. 3.5). The certainty of the objective existence arises at the level of the second form of abstraction and the intentionality that are bound to the objective vision. The quotation shows a new *Lichtung* of objectivity as parousia of modern intentionality. It is directed to the minimal and undoubtedly revealed meaning, which is given in the form of the absolutely simple essence.

“Each thing possesses its own certainty of being (*res habet certitudinem propriam*), which constitutes its essence (*est eius quidditas*). Then it is evident that certainty of each thing which is proper to it is given outside the notion of being (*est praeter esse*), which is given equivocally in various beings (*multivocum est cum aliquid*). If you say that the certainty of the thing thus given (*certitudo rei talis*) is given both in particular things and in the soul, and that it is wholly separated or communicates with both determinations, then certainty of the thing must be grasped and understood on the basis of such [i. e. “objective”] intention (*haec intentio apprehensa et intellecta*).” [[138]](#footnote-138)

The certainty of the thing replaced the deductive knowledge of its *quidditas* recognized by the categorical imposition. From now on, the modernity contemplates its absolutely simple *esse proprium*, which is separated from the other forms of empirical or intellectually abstract cognition. The separation of modern abstraction and intentionality from Aristotelian proceeding creates the particular character of the second intention. A new form of the metaphysical dative has been formed, in which *ousía* in the reality and *parousía* in the mind merge into a unity of univocal meaning. The concept of such *esse diminutum* makes the basis of the new metaphysics. Avicenna created a new form of *aliud esse*, very different from the version of the Second Master. The new substance of the third kind exists neither really nor universally. The new cognition of the absolutely simple essence arises through direct insight into being. That mythopoetic realm must necessarily “exsister” (*exsistere*) beyond (*trans*) the Aristotelian way of cognition. The categorial and univocal cognition of the essence as the second substance is given in the *Categories* and in the *Second Analytics* by metaphysical dative. It is based on universal cognition determined by the hyparchical first substance. Avicenna created a new path of foresight (*Vor-blickbahn*) directed to the substance. Every modern thing now possesses its own certainty of being (*res habet certitudinem propriam*), which constitutes its essence (*est eius quidditas*). The certainty creates a new beingness of the third kind, which is given *simpliciter* and *absolute*. New determination is separated both from the first substance in reality and from the universal term in thought. The affirmation of the new beingness in the thing (and not being of the real thing) takes place in the mode of objective certainty, which is generalized as a transcendental character of being. It is grasped in the intention of its essential individuality that precedes the plurivocity given in thought or in the reality (*est praeter esse quod multivocum est*). The new being, which is contemplated in the pure beingness, is not an actual substance. It comes into being as the object of the special kind of intellectual and mystical vision.

For this reason, Avicenna had to modify the concept of the first and the second intention (*primum, secundum intellectum*), which he took over from Alfarabi. The new being is grasped in the new form of intentionality given by the act of abstraction as denudation. Avicenna explicitly asserts that this particular form of essentiality possesses its own form of existence, which does not need to be actualized in the first substances (*non habet esse in individuis*).[[139]](#footnote-139) The acquired intellect actualized by the *intellectus agens* reveals the so-called universal nature of things (*ad modum universalis*). That nature is fundamentally different from the particular nature, which is merely given in the first substances and modified by the sensual imagination (*ad modum particularis*). This universal nature plays the role of *causa finalis* in Avicenna’s cosmology (Lizzini 2003b, 135). In Latin modernity, this new intentional being was introduced by Rufus of Cornwall in the term “*scibile”* (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.2). Husserl transfers this universal intuition into postmodernity through the eidetic *Wesensschau*. The foundation of a new metaphysics can be found in writing that relates this particular universality and intentionality to human cognition (*Liber de philosophia prima* V.2–6). Avicenna modified Alfarabi’s amphibolic predication (ch. 2.1.1). He transferred Alfarabi’s amphibolia to the level of categorical predication of the second substance. This gave rise to a new kind of singular entity. Its universal form is singularized beyond the first substance and beyond universal determination of the second substance. Avicenna created a new form of essential nature. Latin West took over that new kind of substance and the school of Porretans made it victorious against the Aristotelian Abélard (OBJ II, ch. 1.4). The following quotation shows the emergence of objective meaning as atomic substance, which acquired similar properties to Simplicius’s cosmic *species* (ch. 1.3.1). Simplicius related indivisibility to the primary cosmic spheres. Due to immateriality of the body, it holds metaphysical primacy over all other first substances. Avicenna founded a new determination of the single thing, which is neither the first nor second substance. The new objective determination of being established a new indivisible substance of the third kind (*individuum*).

“Nature is predicated either in terms of singular thing or general thing. What is predicated with respect to the particular thing belongs to the essence of the actually existing particular thing. What is predicated in the universal mode and, moreover, if the universality is conceived as species, that must have a separately (*absolute*) given universality. The absolutized nature is conceived in terms of this twofold mode of universal nature. It does not exist in hylemorphic things, because it is a universal essence existing only in thought. Therefore, I maintain that the being of this absolute nature exists only individually (*non habet esse nisi particulare*).”[[140]](#footnote-140)

The cognition of nature is no longer bound to the abstraction from the first substance, which determines the emergence of universal meaning (*universalis considerata ut species*). This new species exists separately from the process of cognition through the universals (*genera, species*). The new form of being is given outside the single thing and outside the universals, exists as indivisible substance, i.e., as objective individuality (*esse particulare*). Its existence of the third kind is in the thought, since it has universal character. The real individual thing has singular character and it is to find at the lower level of being. Avicenna created a concept of fully separated (*universalis absolute*) nature, which has singular character in the mode of generic individuals described above. The concept of nature described above bears a singular character of individuals as units of generic meaning. However, the individuum in division of Aristotelian universals keeps a specific and not generic sense. Determination of the thing goes beyond the first substance and beyond the universals. Ibn Adi in the Aristotelian Baghdad school principally rejected this concept of hypostatized nature as pure absurdity in the cited treatise on modes of being (ch. 2.2). Ibn Adi invoked Aristotle’s *Physics*II.1, 193a3–6, which he quotes verbatim against the Neoplatonic interprets of the Second Master (*On the Four Scientific Questions*, p. 90). Aristotle decries ridiculousness of those who want to prove the existence of the real world of first substances (*Phys*. 193a3). Avicenna emerged from this school a generation later. The same criticism is repeated three centuries later in the next round of the gigantomachy about substance by Roger Bacon and Albert the Great against the new wave of Avicennists from Oxford and Paris. Those *illuminati* progressed on *via Modernorum*, which has been given since Falsafa from al-Kindīs school through Avicenna and Descartes to Husserl. The new metaphysics of species as the first substance makes objectivation of nature outside of real substance and introduces the term “indeterminate” or “generic individual” (*šaḫṣ muntašir*). Latin translations of this Avicennian term differed according to the various writings: *species dilatata, individuum vagum, individuum perpetuum* (Libera 1999, 529–32). The absolutely vague and contradictory individuum becomes later an objective substance. It victoriously completed the eclipse of the first substance in nihilistic metaphysics of the West. We find some of these terms in the second volume, which explores the doctrine of the Latin *Nominales*. The Latin Avicennists took up the quoted definition of absolutely given nature (*universalis absolute*) and made of it a new indivisible substance (*individuum*). This school used the term *individuum* for a similar being of the third kind. This singular thing of the third kind arises in the division of universals in Porphyry’s tree from the genus to the *species specialissima* (OBJ II, ch. 1.5). The new form of singularity does not limit the intentional existence in the realm of thought as it is the case of classical universals. The conception of active cosmic intellect as *Dator formarum* caused that the determinacy of individuals in their *quidditas* is given from the direction of superior substance existing as species.[[141]](#footnote-141) The definition of the first form of objective being in the framework of pure insight is adopted in the second half of the 13th century by Pecham, then by Henry of Ghent, and after him by Scotus. These modern Avicennists divide species into an objective entity and a universal concept (*species singularis, universalis*). The modern subject endowed with the absolute certainty of insight separated (see the Latin verb *absolvere*) itself from the hyparchical being of the first substance. Avicenna’s metaphysical absolution sent the first substance into the modern form of epochal forgetfulness of being (*Seinsvergessenheit*).

Denial of the first substance in modern metaphysics can be none other than the absolute one; in the Aristotelian logic, the Law of the Excluded Third is categorically valid. If the first philosophy predicates the being in accordance with the writing *Categories*, there is only the being of a singular thing and the being of a universal concept. Nothing else can be between the first and the second substance, since according to classical Aristotelianism there is no way in which such a being of the third kind could be constituted in any form of substantial nature. Aristotelian logic is determined by the *Physics*, then by the *Metaphysics*, and according to the process of cognition decribed in *De anima*. The modern and postmodern illuminate, unlike the classical Aristotelians, see something other than the first substance in reality or the abstracted universals in thought. Their intuition goes “back to things themselves” (Husserl) in order to create a correspondence of the singular being of the third kind with the universal concept. It can be done because the atomic substance (ἄτομος οὐσία, *individuum*) already shares both singular and universal character since Neoplatonism. The certainty of being in enlightened thought separated itself from all other determinations of being. Modernist compares the “thing” related to absolutely given act of certainty that deals with minimal atomic being of the same thing. This act of delimitation is absolute, because Avicenna’s “Flying Man” is separated from the real being of the first substance. The heavenly intellect created a new ontological determination. Done in that way, twofold absolution came into being, both from the reality of the first substance and from the sensual and intellectual cognition. Avicenna established a new determination of truth as the correspondence of the understanding and the objectively considered thing as modern *certitudo* and postmodern evidence. The truth of *Modernorum* represents a correspondence based on the certainty of cognized substance of the third kind with the certainty of the cognizing subject of the third kind. The modern subject exists as a “thing” (*res*) of the third kind, i.e., as an embodied intellect, which exists in us as an independent substance (*res cogitans*). The modern *intellectus adeptus* recognizes an autonomous species, which objectively exists in demiurgic diacosmos. The new conception of truth is based on the coincidence (*sūmbolon, coniunctio*) of two kinds of certainty. The *certitudo* of objectively given “thing” is compared to the *rectitudo* of the paranoic logic made by the modern subject. It constitutes another substance of the third kind, because it forms a collection of schizophrenic and completely disparate *tertium ens*. The intellect of the “Flying Man” doesn’t need any cognition from the material actual reality. The donation of being in a new form of *dativus metaphysicus* runs from modern subject to the modern subject in a classic logical fallacy called *circulus vitiosus*. Avicenna created the metaphysics *ex nihilo* and he outlined specific paranoia of modernity in complete form for the first time. Avicenna’s metaphysics establishes the relation “subject—object” based on the process of objective cognition and on the new form of truth. It founded the first-known form of Western nihilism. Categorical determination of the substance is necessary for the truth as *adaequatio* and for the foundation of a critical science. The new form of the first science is not based on the existence of the first substance, but on a speculative and logical distinction between a minimal portion of generic being in an objective substance (*individuum*) and pure nothingness. Avicenna founded a new metaphysics by creating the concept of being literally *ex nihilo*. Hermeneutics must interpret the character of this “minimal being” that came over into the subsequent stages of objectivity. This “substance” played a key role in the objective metaphysics of Latin modernity (*esse diminutum, ens diminutum, res a reor reris*). The thing considered in direct eidetic intuition has its own certainty, which is given *per prius*. This insight differs from the real existence of the first substance.

The introduction of the *Metaphysics* *al-Shifā* defines the thing through the collection of accidents (*comitantia*), which pertains to it necessarily in mode *per prius*. The meaning of the verb *comitare* (attend, accompany, escort) designates the comitation with regard to a new way of being in the mode of univocity. The comitation establishes the eidetic insight into the objective substance. This certainty reflects our cognition of objective thing given as being of the third kind. Hermeneutics relate the objective comitation to Heidegger’s term *Ge-Stell*. In the nihilistic epoch of metaphysics *Ge-Stell* makes a subjective supplement of being done by the scientific and technical intellect of the Western demiurge (ch. 1.2). New subject as a general provider of meaning of the world founded a new affirmation of the objectivity through the modern *modus ponens*. Perspective of modern comprehension intends the being of the thing in its essential certainty as A, which is distinct from the other singular certainty given in the thing B. This objective being, given in the mode of objective identity (A = A) and difference (A ≠ non-A), is viewed in the new mode of intentionality whose postmodern version we know from the philosophy of Descartes and Husserl. Modern logic joined the Neoplatonic metaphysics, where the generic hypostases and the transcendentalia exist as primary properties of being (*passiones entis*). The new first science bypassed the disposition of classical logic, which is given by the exclusion of the third genus between the first and the second substance. Avicenna made the framework of new intentionality that produces new metaphysical determination for the being as a modern thing (*res*). There is singular and universal definition of *res* as objective determination of being. That process is later adopted by all theories of transcendentals.

“For if this proposition did not exist, nor this connection between the two, we would not see what the thing is to which we direct our intention. We would also not separate the determinations given by the comitation from the above-derived understanding of being (*nec separabitur a comitantia intelligendi ens*), because the intellect always adds this comitation as determination of being from direction from the recognized thing (*intellectus de ente semper comitabitur illam*). The entity has the being either in the single things or in the imagination or in the intellect. But if it did not have that proper identity made out of comitation, there would be nothing at all (*non esset ita, tunc non esset res*).”[[142]](#footnote-142)

The key passage shows the new kind of being given in the context of “supplements” (*comitantia*). That being of the third kind comes to the real things. The generic beingness founded in this way establishes the understanding of objective *res* as a being of the third kind. It makes a special class besides the threefold form of being either in the real things or in the sensual imagination or in the immaterial intellect. The intellect actualizes not only the form of cognition, but it keeps the minimal portion of beingness that constitutes the essence of the thing as such (*intellectus de ente semper comitabitur illam*). The adverb *semper* has a key meaning because it establishes a new determination of being in the mode of objectivity. Porretans made of it a predication “*semel verum — semper verum”* (OBJ II, ch. 2.3.1). Henry of Ghent assimilated this determination with reference to Simplicius’s *Commentary on the Categories* in the mode “*res a reor reris dicta*” and he created the first concept of objectivity in the Latin West (OBJ III, ch. 5.2.1). Avicenna’s comitation replaced Aristotelian categorical predication. At the level of second intentionality, the new determination of objective things corresponds to the perspective given above, in which a new concept of universality emerges (*accidit universalitas*, ch. 2.3.1). The thing is revealed from the point of view of the minimal portion of beingness that is absolutely certain. Such a being of the third kind stands outside of all other manifestations of being that are either in the unique things or in the universals. The insight into the new substance of the third kind has to be predicated categorically. The comitation makes the base of the new predication. The minimal beingness in the form of comitation accompanies every entity given in the mode *ens* and *res*. These amphibolia are hypostatized as absolutely simple identity related to the last indivisible meaning (*individuum*). Every determinable thing exists as objectively determinable “this *res* here” in the form of a individual content of cognition, which cannot be separated from the generic notion of that being in question (*nec separabitur a comitantia intelligendi ens*). The beingness of the third kind necessarily, always and everywhere accompanies the singular or universal entity in the mode *per prius*. This minimal existence of the thing is always given in some way in the above-mentioned mode of comitation (*cum illa ullo modo*). Then it is completely indifferent whether this objective being is given in the real thing, in the divine Giver of forms, in the imagination or in the intellectual cognition (*in singularibus vel in aestimatione vel intellectu*). If this objective determination of essentiality did not apply, the thing would not exist because it would not be definable from the point of view of minimal beingness (*si autem non esset ita, tunc non esset res*). By introducing the comitation into determination of objective substance, the Parmenides’s wisdom applies to the world of two-headed modern subjects. They follow the path of non-being. What is not in the subjective statement of being determined by the comitation that does not exist. The objective determination of the thing as a new atomic substance is predicated in the mode *simpliciter* for the first and the second substance in a *univoce* given statements. A new form of being of the third kind bypasses the classical determination of second substance that is necessary for categorial predication. Predication of substance runs in the context of comitatively added properties that describe the objective *res*. Such a “predication” does not need the first actual substance and consecutively, no second categorial substance. The objective being can be considered directly, either in the intellect, in modern God or in the real thing. New vision of being received a “hyparchic exsistence” in the mode *per prius* from subject, that is, outside the singular thing and universals. The definition of being is given in minimal measure and in this extent it is also evident and entirely certain. The new form of being necessarily accompanied in the mode of comitation every universal and individual substance. The model of categorical predication changed into a transcendental and univocal nature of every entity. It is recognized in such a paranoiac way (i.e., objectively) and it is in this form provided to the modern subject (*Ge-Stell*). This gave rise to the aforementioned inquisitorial model of modern science as part of the higher reflective intellect (*intellecto inquisito*). Every knowledge has to justify itself before such a paranoid tribunal of “reason” for its “objective exsistence.” Avicenna’s *tertium ens* is given as “a thing” (*res*) and is seen by the objective vision of being (*esse tantum*) in its evident generic individuality. There is the unity of seeing and existing made by *illuminati* at the level of the *individuum* (ἄτομος οὐσία) to create the new form of *ens*, *res* etc.. These amphibolia are related to the secondary intentions that are contemplated in the acquired intellect (*intellectus adeptus*). Predication of transcendental being is made by comitation. Done in that way, the first form of metaphysics as *scientia transcendens* has been born. After the eclipse of the first substance, this transcendental metaphysics can have no other guarantee of unity and ultimate sense of being than a mythical God of *Modernorum*. Paranoid modernity created a deity in its own image. Modern God came into being in the thinking of *illuminati* to be their founding *factum* to create le fondement made out of the ontotheology in order to provide for the new form of deductive speculation. See Heidegger’s determination of metaphysics in the terms “foundation” (*Gründung*) and “ground” (*Grund*, ch. 1.2). Avicenna created God of *Modernorum* that is defined in terms of objective human knowledge. Such a God became an objective fact in Avicenna’s metaphysics and it acquired the character of being of the third kind. This necessarily and quite fatally led to death of this ontotheological construct. That outcome exactly foresaw Al-Ghazālī and Averroes and they rejected such an abomination by issuing their fatwas against Modernism. Avicenna’s monotheistic metaphysics presupposes, in the line of Ibn Adi mentioned above, that being in its objective-specific form must be thought at least by God in order to be a universal thing endowed with fundamental ontological certainty. Therefore, Descartes requires an idea of a causally acting and actually existing God outside of human mind. The certainty of deductive and purely speculative cognition of illuminated troglodyte dwelling in the cave of his own *cogito* must be grounded in pre-existence of something given in the objective mode *per prius*. Hermeneutics emphasize the fact that this mode of divine or some other causality is necessarily objective and not at all real. Avicenna’s scheme of cognition is based on *epokhē* from the body and senses; therefore it dismissed Aristotelian causality that founded the first science. That kind of causality is given by disclosure from the front, i.e., by the apprehension of the senses and it starts in the realm of the real substances. After the death of modern God, in the age of accomplished nihilism of metaphysics and the decay of philosophical thinking, this role of the objective guarantor of beingness is taken over by mathematics and neuroscience. This paranoid carrier of the objective Absolute is given through ever-new metaphysical avatars, because modern progress cannot be stopped. The incarnation of absolute objectivity is the new “*Atlas Shrugged*“ (Ayn Rand, 1957), which carries on its shoulders the mythopoetic irrationality of all postmodernity. Avicenna set the path of thought towards the contemporary post-metaphysical nihilism producing the contemporary matrix world of power, finance and false knowledge.

Avicenna’s metaphysics came into being as *obiectum* of a new cognitive intention. The real thing is manifested through a new perspective (*Vor-blickbahn*) that reveals the ontological meaning of being. The insight into the enlightened intellect (*ilhām, illuminatio*) founded the ontotheological conception of metaphysics as a mystical and philosophical revelation of the world produced in divine necessity and simplicity. Due to the new predication *per prius* made in the mode of objectively given comitation, such a determination of being preceded all other meaning created in the metaphysics. The Neoplatonic One became the body, that objectively began to dwell among us. We are charmed by its certainty, which we ourselves produce as a new unconcealment of *tertium ens* (*alētheia*). The Western modernity inspired by Avicenna’s metaphysics created a new form of *philosophia prima*, which we know from its postmodern form made by Descartes and Husserl. The *tertium ens* proposed by Avicenna manifests itself, on the one hand, by the new form of the absolutely given substance (*equinitas tantum*) and, on the other hand, by the new wholeness of being united in the active intellect. Avicenna found the individual essence as the new kind of the second substance. That pseudo-Aristotelian categorial predication runs through the comitation of the last not further divisible meaning. Such a “second substance” founded a new way of the first philosophy. The determination of metaphysics received a new shape, which only partially follows the Aristotelian tradition of the first science.

“First object of this science is being (*primum subiectum huius scientiae est ens*), and what this first science seeks are [objective] effects of being (*consequentia ens*), insofar as being is in itself, without any determination (*inquantum est ens, sine conditione*).” [[143]](#footnote-143)

The new metaphysics conceives the being in its pure beingness, as it is revealed in the new form of insight in the context of denudation and comitation (*ens inquantum ens*). This new being of the third kind is given in the necessary mode *sine conditione*, i.e., outside the original project of the *Categories* concerning the first and the second substance. Avicenna’s definition of metaphysics in the mode *ens inquantum ens* presents a new form of Neoplatonic deduction of being from the One, which was rejected in principle in the Falsafa by al-Ghazālī and Averroes. In the Latin West, this deduction was introduced by the second Averroism and finalized by Duns Scotus. The following quotation shows the historical possibilities of a new metaphysical design. The new form of *tertium ens* makes its fundament. The first objectively seeing illuminate in the West “sees” a new substance in his eidetic intuition.

“From this being arises neither the genus nor the species nor the single thing nor the one nor the many; but from this being become the animal as such and man as such (*ex hoc esse est tantum animal et tantum homo*). But to the man, like the single thing or the common thing, real being is naturally imputed (*comitatur illud sine dubio esse unum vel multa*), because it is not possible for being to exist or not to exist as something real outside of this twofold determination.” [[144]](#footnote-144)

Avicenna found in the new predication *per prius* a sphere of being which is the primary source of all ontological meanings. The being of the third kind “exsists” (*exsistere*) before the real existence of the single things and the universal meaning (*nec ... nec ... nec*). The substance is no longer considered as a real essence, because Alfarabi’s determination in the third mode of *aliud esse* got the character of objectivity (ch. 2.1.2). The first determination of being passes into objectivity of being (*hoc esse est homo tantum*). Let us now return to the original categorical predication *per prius* with respect to the second substance as the highest genus. That supposition guarantees the ultimate possible univocity of being (ch. 1.3). Hermeneutics must investigate this *hoc esse* and the modern man by comparing new determination of being to Aristotle’s determination of real substance as “this thing here” (τόδε τι). The new determination of being excluded the second universal substance from the system of new predication done in the framework of the special kind of essence. The first determination of being passes into a newly determined objective thing (*homo tantum*). Between the first and the second substance came a new form of the Neoplatonic quasi-substance given as a pure form of beingness (*hoc esse est tantum*). The predikation entails ultimate, not further divisible unity that makes analogy to Aristotle’s hyparchical first substance. Hermeneutics emphasize a clear-cut nihilism of this definition. The new determination of substance is made in the mode *absolute*, that is, by principal separation from all classical meanings of being, which are either done by categorial imposition from single things or by supposition in universal concepts. Again, the fundamental determination of the individual given in the *Isagoge* (ch. 1.3) is valid, but in an absurd modern way. Indivisible universal unity of the meaning, in contrast to the species, carries almost no universal meaning anymore. The new determination of being is neither genus nor species nor single thing nor the one nor the many. It separates the last atomic meaning (*individuum*) as a modern “first substance” only from the nothingness. The metaphysics given by the classical identity of the first or the second substance arises only in the second step, when the absolutely exclusive nihilistic negation “*nec ... nec*” arrived to its ulimate point. Thinking reaches a level that is beyond categorial predication determined by Aristotelian science based on the first and the second substance. On this secondary level, the being of the third kind already loses its original simplicity and certainty. The entity begins to exist on some substrate (matter, mind, God) and it is determined as a single thing in the mode of the Excluded Third. The transcendental determination of being in the mode “*hoc esse est tantum”* is and is not a substance. It is substance because it replaces the classic substance. However, the substitution runs in a new framework of metaphysics, which is neither Aristotelian, nor fully Neoplatonic. The pattern for Avicenna’s comitation of objective mode of beingness derives from Porphyry’s concept of twofold beingness. It tied Neoplatonic beingness of the One to hyparchical beingness of the first substance (ch. 1.3). Avicenna introduced prohyparchical comitation in the similar way as Porphyry in order to create a new prohyparchical predication of doubled Being—One. The difference is only that the point that a new form appears as transcendental predication based on the Aristotelian metaphysics issued from the school of the Second Master and not as mystical vision of *illuminati* from Plotinus’s school. Double being proposed by Avicenna created the first form of the objective metaphysics, which was bound to new determination of the substance of the third kind. On the level of comitation the scenario of Ibn Adi is valid, who separated the intentions of creation from God’s existence in the mode *esse ad* (ch. 2.2). The reflexive capacity of the divine and the human intellect outlined by Ibn Adi founded a new predication *per prius*, which, however, applies categorically. The primary multiplicity originated directly within the divine intellect, because the divine Persons in the Trinity form one substance and differ only by the different act of self-reflection. In the second step, thanks to the divine creative thought, a series of differences emerges, which hierarchically depends on the first act of thought. Avicenna adopted Ibn Adi’s doctrine of the active divine intellect, which produces immanent contents of its own thinking. This doctrine forms a common basis of modern ontotheology. Modern God objectively creates the world as bizarre *creatio ex nihilo* in his omniscient mind. Fortunately, at least un academician is present and he diligently participates in the second step of the demiurgic and completely objective *creatio*. The predication *per prius* given in the mode of the objective being must be followed by a predication *per posterius*; otherwise, no metaphysics of *Modernorum* arises.

Avicenna, just like the Neoplatonists, after establishing the new determination of the thing, must also introduce a new form of physics, which is related to a body of the third kind (ch. 1.3.3). His determination of objective body took up the Neoplatonic tradition of the *Isagoge*, which had been given in the Falsafa since al-Kindī and Hunain Ibn Ishāq. Islamic modernity adopted Simplicius’s theory, which defines the body in the environment of the objective determinations of demiurgic diacosmos, that is, outside the real existence of the material body. The key principle was introduced by Jamblichus as “Limited—Unlimited.” Neoplatonism and after him the Falsafa created a matter of the third kind by adding a substantial determination of the new form to the indeterminate first matter (ch. 1.3.2). Avicenna proceeds in a similar way as Simplicius in the determination of the objective body. Due to the above-mentioned minimal beingness and the comitation of accidental properties given *per posterius*, it came to an objective determination of the body as the new substance of the third kind.

“The real certainty about the objectively substituting body (*ipsum essendi corpus*) and our cognition of this objective body does not need the determined real body (*non eget ut sit finitum*). Finitude is an accidental determination, which is assigned to the material body in the mode of comitation (*finitio enim accidentale est ei comitans*). To be able to imagine a body, there is no need of being finite. He who imagines an infinite body does not create an absurd body, nor does he deny a finite body by creating such an idea.” [[145]](#footnote-145)

The quotation explains the finitude of the body merely as an accident, which is given in the order of formal determination, that is, as an additional property (*accidentale et comitans*). The comitation of substantial determinations made *per posterius* creates the objective determination of real things in the subjective mode *ex nihilo*. That mythopoetic mode of comitation replaced the comitation of Ibn Adi, which is given on the level of the divine creator’s intention and reflection (ch. 2.2). Formally, the body can also be infinite because we can imagine it as such in the imagination even if it does not exist in reality. The only formal condition for such a nonsensical creation of a contradictory body is the theurgic difference between the limited and the unlimited being, originally proposed by Jamblichus. The concept of objectively infinite body contains a subjective definition of a quasi-physical body by means of a formal difference. This is necessary for establishing a minimal existence, which replaces the real body and the hyparchical predication done by the imposition. Objective predication is based on the formal difference that distinguishes one objective body from another. This intention of the objective *res* is a sufficient reason for the intellect to create at least a minimum of beingness for the infinite body. Such a body is given by the difference from the absolute nothingness (*non imaginat corpus non corpus*). In this imaginative operation is hidden the *Lichtung* of truth and untruth of the future infinitesimal number, which is given by derivation and integration (OBJ II, ch. 1.4). Key significance has the use of the twofold negations *non—non*. A double negative gives a positive result. This logical operation established a new *modus ponens*, which created an objective body of the third kind. Introducing the Exclusion of the Third into the dualistic mode of “the minimal being—the non-being” made a decisive step, since a completely formal meaning of the body came into the modern world. That entity that was created *ex nihilo*. Aristotle would certainly have rejected such a nihilist version of the physics and so did the Aristotelians of Falsafa and Scholasticism. Avicenna’s determination of being, on the other hand, was accepted by modern Bonaventure and by Olivi in the predication of minimal portion of being. For this definition, only the formal difference from nothing (*non repugnat esse*; OBJ III, ch. 5.1.1) is sufficient. The last division of the minimal portion of beingness (*corpus—non corpus*) runs through the second intention (*ad imaginandum*). It began to play a key role in the metaphysics of Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus. By introducing the minimal portion of the objective being, Avicenna founded the modern “metaphysics of chimeras,” which was accomplished by Gandavus (OBJ III, ch. 5.2.1). Avicenna took Alfarabi’s intuition of the actual form that is received through *intellectus adeptus.* Avicenna made out of it an objective definition. He granted to the object of second intention a minimal dose of beingness. This minimal quantum of beingness needs nothing more than the determination made by a nominalistic operation in the logic.[[146]](#footnote-146) Modern physics does not need to have an actually given voluminosity of the body to be abstracted from, but only a logically and formally created intention of objective body. Modern body is defined as an indivisible atomic substance of the third kind in the style of Neoplatonism (ch. 1.3.1). Avicenna’s quotation shows that the body of the third kind can be even endowed with properties which are not possible for the real hylemorphic body, par ex. infinity (*corpus infinitum*). The infinite body is possible, because the infinity as modern hypostasis applies the body of the third kind in virtue of the comitation. Avicenna’s objective imagination introduced the concept of physical infinity, which is important for Western objective science. Bonaventure established it for Latin scholasticism (OBJ III, ch. 4.1.1). The real bodies are characterized by the real three-dimensionality. But this property can be separated from the new determination of the corporeality given outside the actual body. Simplicius and Philoponus did it for the first time (ch. 1.3.3). The concept of quantity as pure form existing outside the reality is determined by formal logic “A ≠ non-A”. The non-existent imaginary infinite body is taken in and for itself and even receives a quasi-actual existence by the illumination from the active intellect that acts in the soul through the individual acquired intellect. Avicenna establishes a metaphysical line “Scotus—Descartes” by introducing the primary determination of being on the level of intellect that operates through the scientifically conceived imagination. Under the leadership of Furies, Allegory of the cave got an objective-scientific variant due to the disappearance of the physical body (*Seinsvergessenheit*, ch. 1.2). The intellect finds absolute knowledge detached from the primary existence of both single things and universals within the framework of direct vision into the quidditas of things (*denudatio*). Avicenna changed Aristotelian metaphysical dative from the primacy of the first substance to the action of the Giver of forms. The determination combining Aristotle’s first and second substance has a minimal, purely formal portion of the individual being. It is given at the level of identity as a minimal portion of amphibolical essentiality. New physics starts on the level of logic identity when objective *individuum* revels itself in a basic way (*est id quod est*).

“The body must be understood to be substance and its formal act of objective existence (*qua est*) consists in what it is in itself (*id quod est*).”[[147]](#footnote-147)

The subsistent form entails the objective existence that concerns the body of the third kind (*substantia cuius haec est forma*). Following Simplikios, Avicenna created a new kind of species-substance. The quotation makes use of modernized *modus essendi* (*qua est*) which in classical metaphysics defines only the hyparchical primary substance. The new form establishes the objective existence as a subsistent being similar to Aristotelian *quidditas* (ch. 1.2). The definition of body of the third kind includes the permanent objective form that “exsists” through its own act of minimal being. Afterwards, it makes its contingent occurrence in matter. Avicenna proposes a new form of comitation in the sphere of prototypical divine intentionality. He had to change Aristotelian concept of matter as well. The matter received the dualistic form either that of pure intentional potency or the actual single thing. The result is that the material body has either hylemorphic or objective nature. The matter is determined either in the real body or objectively in the system of hypostatized forms.[[148]](#footnote-148) Matter as pure possibility of receptivity was first identified as *hypodokhē* in a prohyparchical way in the dialogue *Timaeus* (ch. 1.3.3). Avicenna took the hypostatized receptivity of Platonic matter and he complemented it by objective and logical necessity. The ultimate source is modern God as the Giver of these forms. The cosmos of the modernists represents a hermeneutic ellipse with two absurd poles. The first pole is non-existent *materia prima* and the second pole is the non-existent *Dator formarum*. Avicenna’s matter as objective potency was later used in the school of *Nominales*, since the matter of the third kind forms a key component of the objective substance (OBJ II, ch. 1.4). The concept of hypostatized matter was implemented around the year 1240 in the teaching of universal hylemorphism based on the erroneous interpretation of Averroes’s *materia prima*. The modernists interpreted primary matter as pure potency that was hypostatized into the form of substance of the third kind (OBJ II, ch. 3.2). Classical Aristotelianism refused the concept of matter and body as being of the third kind. Ibn Adi criticized the Neoplatonists who hypostatized the qualities of physical substances (ch. 2.2). Averroes strictly rejected Avicenna’s metaphysics of *tertium ens* and he took it for a tragic error of thought (ch. 2.4.1). Roger Bacon, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, and Siger of Brabant criticized the school of Modernorum in a similar way as Ibn Adi did in case of the first modernists. Averroes and al-Ghazālī condemned modern Neoplatonists and Avicennists in the Falsafa.

Aristotelian first real substance (τόδε τι) received purely formal content, which is logically different from another one. The body of the third kind cannot have the quantity related to real body. It became an objectively determined subsistent form separated from reality (*ad hoc ut ipsum sit corpus in effectu*).[[149]](#footnote-149) The quantity is conceived as the pure form, i.e., in the form of an “accident.” Taken in objective vision of the world, it pertains to the imaginative being as its new property (*non est necesse esse in corpore tres dimensiones in effectu*). The definition of the body concerns an objectively determined substance. Avicenna is the founder of the scientific, objectively applied imagination. The imaginary body and its objective infinity invaded the western metaphysics in time of Bonaventura and Duns Scotus. The predication of the minimal, universally given quantity (*sunt ea quæ accidunt quantitati ex hoc quos est quantitas*) does not need a determination of the material body (*in definitione quarum non invenitur species materiae nec virtus motus*; *Liber de philosophia prima* I.1, p. 2.27–28). There is a fundamental difference between Simplicius and Avicenna. Persian thinker no longer needs Jamblichus’s schema “Limited—Unlimited,” which forms the formal determination of substance (ch. 1.3.1). In the dream, in the mystical vision, in the scientific imagination, the illuminated intellect of Avicenna has a direct intuitive insight into the realm of pure forms (*equinitas tantum*). Objectivity creates the determination of substance merely in the order of beingness as such (*hoc esse tantum*). The eidetic intuition works in the framework of new intentionality, which is given beyond the realm of sensual reality. The objective form of being is based on formal difference between the being of anything and the pure nothingness. The *illuminati* observe the world from the position of the divine eye following the mystical descent of subsistent forms. The modernist can penetrate the demiurgic spirit of modern God at the commencement of the creation. In such a divine spirit, the thinking is separated but from the non-being. Avicenna’s conception of deduction as the extraction of forms from the original basis of pure beingness was later adopted by the Latin Avicennists. Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus, following Avicenna’s pattern, added a minimal portion of being in the reflection of modern God. This mythopoetic identity of being (*ens ratum*) creates the objective metaphysics of Latin modernity. Avicennist Duns Scotus, in response to criticisms of Roger Bacon, Albert the Great, and other Aristotelians, must return to Jamblichus’s scheme of “Limited—Unlimited.” Nevertheless, he changed Neoplatonic status of both principles into an Aristotelian one. Avicennists built up the first ontotheological structure of metaphysics by producing a modern God *ex nihilo*. This idol of modernists creates the first determination of being in its infinite spirit and intentionality and he thereby objectively determines the finite creation. Created in this way, the mythologic concept of an objectively determined body founded the objective history of Western science.

The process of secondary derivation (*comitatio*) given *per posterius* runs in the framework of categorical, formal, and ontological determinations. They originate from the objective *esse tantum* and such a derivation and comitation can be understood in various ways. The transcendental determination of being can be understood in the style of Alfarabi as a particular way of predication of pure beingness coming from the One to the eternal cosmic forms and intelligences and then also in the direction to the composite hylemorphic substances. We have analyzed the middle position of the intellect between the world of material and immaterial forms in the work *De intellectu et intellecto*, where Alfarabi located the *intellectus adeptus* in a new way (ch. 2.1.2). See the cited quotation from his work *De intellectu et intellecto*, wherein the recognized being became something else (*aliud esse*). Thereby a new signification of the objective being arose, which was placed beyond the classical first substance and its hyparchical being. Avicenna starts from this form of the acquired intellect and the corresponding diacosmos, which the Second Master proposed as the third form of *aliud esse*. That proceeding is confirmed by the whole cosmological plan of Avicenna’s first philosophy done in the following chapter. The concept of *tertium ens* is generated from ontotheological determination of being, originally done in the framework of the Neoplatonic emanation from the One as the sovereign Giver of forms. A new view of the world emerges in the moment when Alfarabi’s amphibolical beingness changed into a new thing (*res*) of metaphysics. The sense of being is given by the disclosure from behind. See the way above describing a new form of horseness that comes to the thought (*accidit*). The new determination of being concerns the determination of man as well, because it establishes a form of objectively conceived “humanism.” The term “*humanitas tantum”* stands outside the universals as well as outside the real person of Plato or Socrates.[[150]](#footnote-150) The determination of humanity given on the level of “*esse* *tantum*” stands beyond the real Socrates (*extrinsecum est*) and its definition is determined only in the form of pure eidetic vision (*ex hoc quod est humanitas*). This third kind of being was mentioned for the first time by Alfarabi, without clearly defined metaphysical status of such an *aliud esse*. What the teacher merely hinted at that his disciple categorized as a real entity. Enlightened mind takes a course to the individual simplicity of the new object of thinking, which is given by the disclosure of being from behind (*abstractio ab intelligentia agente*). The adapted intellect must accept this pure being (Alfarabi’s *aliud esse*, Avicenna’s *hoc esse tantum*) so that it can reveal itself in its pure identity of meaning, i.e., in the objective universal form separated from sensual abstraction. Objectively thinking and seeing *illuminati* produce a new wholeness of being regarded by the acquired intellect as the quasi-substrate of cognition (*aliud esse*). In this field of illumination, the being is exposed in the objective aspect of beingness as such (*ens inquantum ens*). In the mode of truth as objective certainty and correspondence, the intellect given as an entity of the third kind, since it must recognize another being of the third kind. The metaphysics in the *Kitāb al-Shifā* V.1 shows that the new insight into the being is placed outside the determination of the second substance that is determined in the framework of categorial univocity. The new determination of being runs beyond the first substance and beyond the universality in abstracting thought. But this new individualized being can no longer be a nullity, because it has its own definition and thus also a minimal content of beingness. Avicenna emphasizes in many places that this universal form has no other existence than in the intellect (*haec universalitas non habet esse nisi in anima*; *Liber de philosophia prima* V.2, p. 239.71). The new predication *per prius* relates this being to universal and absolutely simply given meaning of the being. Again, a determination of the type *humanitas tantum* or *hoc esse tantum* appears, which is given by the act of comitation of the simple being to every possible thing. The emergence of a new being of the third type can be demonstrated by the term “*species specialissima”* (*nawʿ al-anwāʿ*). This kind of species will play an important role in the further stages of objectivity. Avicenna first refers the term species to the intellect, where it is conceived in the universal mode defined by the specific difference from the species. But the species signifies univocally the real being of the individual thing (*per quæ natura indiuiduatur et fit designata; Liber de philosophia prima* V.4, p. 264.47). Neoplatonic concept of species as atomic substance is actualized in a new way. Avicenna attributed formalized properties to the new substrate in the way of comitation that determine the material individual thing (*accident ei comitantia ex proprietatibus et accidentibus*, *ibid.* 264.46). The comitation of generic and at the same time individual being ensures that each thing can exist in a minimal portion of beingness and in a certainty of its own existence. The objectivity of the thing (*res*) is given in the order of univocal signification, which has the ability to define even the indivisible individual thing. The thing as such contains a minimal beingness. The objective determination separates itself from all subsequent determinations by the absolute simplicity. Other determinations define being *per posterius*, because their meanings refer to a positively determined substrate (*subiectum*). This new view of being gets a modern shape in Rufus’s predication “*per* *modum concretum”* (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.2). The objective meaning manifests itself in a “concrete” and “individual” way, that is, beyond the being of universals and real individual things. The minimal being subsequently unfolded itself by adding to it further determinations through Aristotelian accidental predication. The modernity founded by Avicenna disregarded Aristotle’s definition of the first substance as the singular thing (τόδε τι), which exists separately from the primary signification of the substance and its secondary accidentals (πρός τι). Porretans and the writing *Dialogus Ratii et Everardi* dated to the second half of the 12th century grasp the revolutionary significance of Avicenna’s determination of being in order to create the first concept of objective individual in the Latin West. They incorporated that substance of the third kind in the division of universals within the framework of the *Arbor Porphyriana* (OBJ II, ch. 1.5). The negating procedure of the new metaphysics in the quoted mode “*nec … nec … nec*” proved that the new determination in the mode *per prius* distinguishes itself from all positive categorical determinations in virtue of the absolute negation. The acceptance of this negation in the modern nihilism gave rise to a new form of metaphysics based on the definition “*omnis determinatio est negatio.”* This definition is developed by the modernist Henry of Ghent and after him by the postmodernist Spinoza (OBJ III, ch. 5.2.1). The modern subject thanks to its insight into being of the third kind guarantees the nihilistic determination of metaphysics after the eclipse of the first substance. The subjective cognition of intellect and the subsequent question of certainty, evidence and intuition replace the science determined by actuality of the first substance.

The new metaphysics received Neoplatonic character that relates thinking to the new kind of universal form. Let us see Avicenna’s concept of abstraction, intellect and truth as the certainty. The illuminated intellect considers the essences correctly (*dispositio intellectus*) and it predicates their identity (*significat dispositionem*). This disposition of identity is, of course, given *per prius*, being contemplared directly. Objective truthfulness is based on the certainty, which is eternally and unchangeably presented in the external and objective thing (*in re*). The preceding analyses of Avicenna’s *res* have shown its determination within the framework of the new being of the third kind. The truth is not the Aristotelian correspondence of the intellect and the real thing that is understood in the process of abstraction. Avicenna is not interested in the changeable first substance, because such determination of truth is not truthful enough. Truth does not relate to the sensually perceived thing, but to a direct consideration dealing with eternal identity of eidetic forms. The comparison of objective essences is accomplished in the process of abstraction as *denudatio*. The trajectory of understanding (*Vor-blickbahn*) is based on the disclosure of being from behind, from the direction of eternal forms. They can be found in the material substances as well. That is why the truth is based on identity of objective formes and not on similarity of intellect and material reality. The school of *Nominales* at the turn of the 12–13th century takes that modern definition of truth in the canonical version “*semel verum—semper verum*” (OBJ II, ch. 2.3.1). This identitarian theory of truth is modified by Rufus of Cornwall by the already mentioned term “*coaequatio”* (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.2). Aristotle built metaphysics on the actuality of the first substance to create the “meta-physical” unity of being. Avicenna has a different conception of the first science. His concept builds on the certainty of the recognition of the minimal being apprehended by eidetic intuition. Vision of objective beingness establishes the modern version of truth as certainty of being of the third kind. It is revealed in the intellect by the insight into objectively given objectivity that is true as such (*veritas respectu comparationis rei ad ipsam*).[[151]](#footnote-151) An absolutely given certainty arises in the separate observation of the objective being, which restores the eternal thing-in-itself in the cognizing subject (*ipsa res*). This identity of eternal hypostatic forms can also be achieved by the research of special sciences and in virtue of hylemorphic substances. But the objective certainty is separated from the lower form of cognition based on the Aristotelian abstraction from the sensual experience that concerns things in the world. Modernity is true in a paranoid and absolute way, i.e., by complete separation (*absolute*) from all previous definitions of truth. The mediating role of diaphanum definitely disappeared and it was replaced by the disclosure of being from behind, from the direction of the hypostatic intellect-sun (*comparatio irradiacionis*, ch. 2.1.1). The newly defined metaphysical knowledge forms the deductive principle of illuminated solar intellect in the mode *absolute*. From this point of Archimedes, all further determinations of science are derived.[[152]](#footnote-152) The absolutely founded first science makes deduction from the evident principle that determines the subsequent knowledge of special sciences (*principium certitudinis sciendi illas*). This event led to the modern foundation of truth (*Ereignis*) as an identity between the two poles of the hermeneutic ellipsis that is established by double concept of *tertium ens*. The first pole of the ellipse is the hypostatic intellect as another substance of the third kind that makes part of the modern subject; the second pole is the objective concept of *tertium ens* produced by that subject that is presented as a transcendental entity. The modern “subject—object” relation englobes all possible being, including the analogic and eternal reflection of modern God. This revelation of modern untruth (*Lichtung*) is of fundamental historial importance in the epochal mode of *Irrtum*, because it was expressly created as absolutely valid theory (*absolute*). It comes to identity of truth and the certainty of being that is considered in pure simplicity. Identitary theory of truth relates to denudated being of objective substances. Objective truth is determined *per prius* by the directly enlightened thinking of the modern demiurge according to the identitary theory made in the mode *aequaliter*. Modern intellect creates the eternal identity of objective thing that is resumed in the mode *absolute* as minimal being (*hoc esse tantum*). This eternal identity is compared to another occurrence of the same individual unity of minimal meaning: in the material substrate, in the human thinking, in the environment of cosmic eternal forms, in the divine reflection. The correspondence moderne (*adaequatio*) does not go to the first substance, but to different hypostatized forms. Therefore, illuminated mind does not seek truth as correspondence, but a full identity of one form with another one. The new concept of truth presupposes universal correspondence of eidetic essences. It pushed the original *Lichtung* of objective un/concealment of being (*a/lētheia*) present in the philosophy of Alfarabi to a new form of completely subjective *alētheia*. Truth is displaced in a metaphoric way from one *tertium ens* to the another (*Ge-Stell*, ch. 1.2). Definition of truth as universal identity of forms is guaranteed exclusively by human intellect not by external things. From the initial un/concealment of the first substance made by Alfarabi (*a/lētheia*) became full unconcealment (*alētheia*) as minimal concept of being. That non-existent mythopoetic entity makes the universal identity of the modern “thing” (*res*) as being of the third kind. It came to the eclipse of the first substance (*epokhē*) in the mode of un/concealment of the *tertium ens*. In that darkness of critical thinking came into being the subjective truth as modern *veritas*. The truth as *veritas* is given in the mode of *certitudo*. The academic tribe of *illuminati* compare the individual essences among themselves in the above-mentioned mode of full objectivity and identity (*respectu comparationis rei ad ipsam*). The establishment of truth as *veritas* implemented the erroneous path of the Moderns (*via Modernorum*). The eclipse of the first substance forms another founding event of Western historiality as fully developed forgetfulness of the first substance (*Seinsvergessenheit*). That kind of fatal error cannot be done in Aristotelian metaphysics. The history of Western civilization is now determined by *Seinsvergessenheit* in the epochal manner of the metaphysical error (*Irrtum*) executed by paranoiac thinking of modernity (*Irre*). This event done on the level of Being itself has an epochal character by establishing nihilism concerning the question of truth. Avicenna created a new metaphysics that inaugurated the Age of modernity.

Let us now summarize the previous findings to complete the hermeneutic triad (ch. 1.2). The hidden historiality of the Being (*Geschichtlichkeit*) establishes the new historicity of philosophy (*Geschichte*). Positive and objective history of modernity (*Historie*) comes out of that twofold hiddenness of Being. Avicenna gave a new form of untruth to the concept of truth coined by the Second Master. Philosophy of Alfarabi became unmodern and it went into the Lethe. His search for a new metaphysics characterizes the complicated balancing between different concepts of intellect, substance and essence (ch. 2.1.2). Avicenna found a new identity of the first science because he found a new object for metaphysics. Modern metaphysics considers pseudo-mystical revelation of the objective being (*ens inquantum ens*). Intellectual soul is actualized through the cognition of immaterial forms. Modern intellect contemplates these forms in two ways. Either the intellect is actualized from the direction of sensually perceived things. Or it contemplates the actual forms and their original identity in the act of direct enlightenment coming from above. The heavenly *intellectus agens* actualizes human soul entirely autonomously through the acquired intellect. In that case the soul does not recognize the first real substance in the mode *per prius*. The comprehension goes to the modern “thing itself” which is a being of the third kind. That non-existent being is seen through the new form of eidetic vision. Modern subject compares one objective being to another (*comparatio rei ad ipsam*) in the mode of identity. It is not derived from Aristotelian first substance. The vision of identity entails the pure essence taken as an individual being. The figure of the possible or material intellect (*intellectus possibilis*) plays a key role in the whole process of determining the being in its new form of beingness. Either the knowledge is founded by abstraction of intelligible forms from real things; or the receptive intellect and the concept of diaphanum are superfluous because the acquired intellect receives intelligible forms directly from the active intellect in the act of illumination. Aristotle’s metaphysical dative is incompatible with the modern form of the metaphysical dative. The latter is based purely on the modern subject conceived as mythopoetic substance of the third kind. This fundamental Law of the Excluded Third constitutes the most important *Lichtung* of Western metaphysics. The truth comes into being either in the mode of authentic Aristotelianism and the associated forms of science. Or the metaphysics follows the path of Apate (*Irre*) and it fabricates modern sophistry, which produces various forms of ontological fallacy (*Irrtum*). The original event of modern metaphysics manifests threefold determination of being. Introduced by Avicenna that event marks the modern oblivion of the real substance (*Seinsvergessenheit*). The metaphysical meaning of Aristotelian substance is revealed in mind of *illuminati* in three different ways (*Ereignis*). Taken together, they make the modern concept of truth and worldview.

* The Aristotelian sense of being is abstracted through causality from the existing thing. The thing is apprehended through the senses and that empiric knowledge actualizes the cognition firstly in passive intellect (*intellectus possibilis*). Thanks to the Aristotelian abstraction, this truth has only the contingent character of a correspondence given in the mind, but it is determined by causality of the real thing mediated by bodily senses.
* Jamblichus considers the existing thing in a gnostic and mystical way through prophetic imagination. The vision can be actualized directly and immediately as connection (*ittisāl, coniunctio*) with the active intellect and by the mystical faculty or gift called *intellectus sanctus*. The world regarded from the perspective of divine intellect establishes the higher knowledge of modern *illuminati* or today’s theoretical mathematician, physicist or expert versed in virtual reality of all kinds. Mystic or virtual knowledge of such *illuminati* needs no reference to the hylemorphic reality for obtaining the truth. Their enlightened mind speculatively produces the assurance of truth. The mind makes the mirror (*speculum*) of virtual reality.
* Alfarabius and Avicenna consider being in an objective way by means of the acquired intellect (*intellectus adeptus*). It receives cognitive forms from the external active intellect in the process of truth as certainty of objective illumination. The truth is given by direct recognition of minimal beingness of the thing (*esse tale, ens diminutum*). Vision of being of the third kind establishes the objective knowledge, since the process of denudation reveals the objective forms. Intellect observes that minimal and certain portions of the essence directly in itself. It can “see” that essence as objective *individuum* in the real things as well, without Neoplatonic emanations and theurgy. The identitarian truth as assimilation and comitation needs the active demiurge to be executed. The objectivist must continually replace in the mode of *Ge-Stell* one sense of objective being by another. Done in this way, the metaphysical nihilism of science and technology makes part of objective metaphysics, since it methodically proceeds in the mode of nihilist *circulus vitiosus*.

Both above-mentioned cases of illumination (mystical, objective) taken together, the real thing perceived with the senses plays only a secondary role. It serves as a prelude to the second abstraction or direct observation, which is more or less an autonomous activity of the mind. Alfarabi insisted on the fact that individual forms of cognition from the first abstraction must actualize the second floor of abstraction (ch. 2.1.1). Avicenna no longer needs this, because he completely separated sensual and intellectual cognition. The role of *intellectus possibilis* was skipped almost completely in his scheme of cognition. According to the writing *De anima*, the receptive intellect is necessary for the reception of the *species sensibilis* to be transformed into formal and universal *species intelligibilis*. In the new scheme, the active component of the intellect (*intellectus agens*) acts directly and immediately on the acquired intellect. The *intellectus adeptus* is actualized in the soul not by its own activity or the activity of the material intellect as individual cognition. This minus, however, is at the same time a great plus. The soul actualized by the active intellect is capable of a higher form of self-reflection and self-consciousness. This opens the realm of certainty of postmodern Cartesian cognition (*certitudo*) related to self-conscious modern demiurge. The new creator is not bound by the reality principle made by the causality of the first substances. The certainty of modern demiurge comes from above and it is predicated in the mode of comitation. The illuminated intellect does not have to recognize the whole of being through the causality determined by empirically recognized world. The soul, just like the divine intellect of Ibn Adis (ch. 2.1), contemplates itself and perceives the object of its thinking in the same actuality.[[153]](#footnote-153) In this self-reflection of modern intellect placed outside the world lies the basis of the Cartesian dualism known since Avicenna’s thought experiment of the “Flying Man.” In this kind of abstraction, the being of the recognized thing and the activity of the individual soul become merely accident, because the abstraction proceeds from the direction of the active intellect. According to Avicenna, the prophet and illuminated scholar as an eminent wise man surpass the practitioner and commonly wise man by an instantaneous and almost spontaneous access to this higher form of intellect.

The disclosure of being from behind established the new figure of the Western intellectual, who is completely different from the original humanism of Alfarabi (ch. 2.1.1). Alfarabi’s version was later updated by Siger and Dante. The acquired intellect of Avicenna enables the ascent to the world of pure forms (*intellectus sanctus*), where it joins the intellectual Giver of forms (*Dator formarum*). To reach that level of cognition, it is necessary to enable a connection of imagination and intellect with the First Active Intellect (*al-’aql al-awwal*). The intellectual mystic must deepen the spiritual imagination and enlightenment (*ilhām*) in order to pass to a full connection with the active intellect of the immaterial substances (*al-’uqūlu al-fa’āl*). The separated *intellectus agens* brings the immaterial and actualized forms into the human soul. Thus the soul acquires prophetic vision (*waḥy*), which enables the prophet’s communication with the world of angelic beings (Gardet 1951, 90–94). In the mysticism of Sufism, the human intellect sees the angel as God’s messenger and listens to his voice just as the Prophet Muhammad did. Neoplatonism takes imagination to be a secondary activity tied to the senses. In philosophical mysticism of Avicenna, the imagination receives an important role. Avicenna follows the revelation in dreams that had a fundamental importance for him.[[154]](#footnote-154) He emphasized that in the dream he got a direct insight into the middle link of scientific judgment. Hermeneutics interpreted the role of *medium* as the basis of his metaphysics placed on the crossroad of acquired and active intellect. The search for the intuitive insight into the objective form of scientific cognition did not proceed in reality, but in dreams. Descartes created its postmodern analogy in the *Discourse on Method* by mentioning his dreams in the night of November 10, 1619. The metaphysical foundation of objective science stands on a twofold dream of the first modernist and first postmodernist. Objectivity is founded by irrational powers through oneiric meaning of reality. Archaic hermeneutics must resolve the question of whether the modern oneirology of Avicenna and Descartes is directed by the music authority of Truth or by the divine powers of Vengeance. Gnostic vision of Neoplatonic modernists was condemned in the age of metaphysical nihilism by Nietzsche. He rejected in principle this parallel world of intellectual “neurasthenics” addicted to various forms of Platonism.[[155]](#footnote-155) The metaphysics of chimeras proposed by Henry of Ghent (OBJ III, ch. 5.2.2) completed the first round of modern interpretation of the world. The foundation of objectivity with the help of the epochal dream of both *illuminati* shows that the power of the objective seeing runs in indirect proportion to the influence of external reality upon modern thinking.

### 2.3.3 Ontotheology and Modern God

Avicenna’s epochal turn of metaphysics runs from the primacy of modern thinking to the secondary real thing. It laid the foundation of first postmodern philosophy, which was updated by Descartes and after him by Husserl. Postmodernism opted for the direct path of recognition to so-called things themselves. Since it bracketed the sensual reality, it is clear that this “thing” cannot be Aristotelian first substance, but the sophistic simulacrum. Objective determination of individuals made in a “singular—universal” mode establishes the objective theory of truth as the evident certainty of knowledge. Avicenna found a new correspondence that connects the illuminated thinking with the objectively determined being of the third kind. The first modern *illuminatus* gave to the West the identitarian theory of truth. It was introduced into Latin Scholasticism via the work *Summa de bono* (about 1230) written by Philip Chancellor. Avicenna does not see the truth as similarity of the thing and the intellect made by the imposition of meaning from the first substance. There is no correspondence between reality and thought, but an identity of two entities of the third kind. Aristotelian abstraction was replaced by modern denudation to see and compare the world of pure essences. The identity is given as objective status in the mode *per prius*. Truth in modernity does not mean an abstraction of intelligibles forms in the intellect, but the equality of objective forms (*aequatio*). They are considered in direct intellectual insight and obtained by denudation. The quotation in the footnote establishes the first modern theory of truth, which understands correspondence as an objective coincidence in mode *per prius* that exists beyond the real thing.[[156]](#footnote-156) The quotation defines the concept of truth in Avicenna and fully confirms the modern sophistry done by equivocation of the term “*res*.” The definition of truth begins with objective beingness separated from real substances (*esse absolute in singularibus*). Quotation then continues with the Aristotelian theory of truth as the correspondence of intellect and the external thing (*dispositio dictionis vel intellectus qui significat dispositionem in re exteriore cum est ei aequalis*). But this definition of truth is the not final step, because it must go the one level higher, where the “truth in itself” is defined, bound to an objectively given necessity (*necesse esse est id quod per seipsum est veritas semper*). At this level a new concept of truth emerges. It makes no more an Aristotelian correspondence, but the full identity in the mode of logically determined certainty (*veritas autem quæ adaequatur rei, illa est certa*). We have a new definition of truth as *adaequatio.* The term “*ipsa* *res*” now acquires an objective character separated from the first substance (*veritas respectu comparationis rei ad ipsam*). Logic and metaphysics form a complete unity for the modernists. Identity based on essential necessity and certainty has an eternal character (*dici vera cuius certitudo est semper*). Western philosophy received the new definition of truth, since the objective identity takes the place of the former correspondence (*dignior est ad hoc est illa cuius certitudo est prima*). This modern truth based on identity takes precedence over Aristotelian truth (*et non per causam*). Aristotelian incomplete truth is based on causality, which is determined by the real interaction of the first substances. The new concept of truth abolished the validity of the metaphysical dative that determined true statement on the past character of causality. The causality as real effect of the first substances came in the hyparchical categorical statement. Avicenna’s definition of truth primarily determines the intellect and not the actuality of the real thing exposed in the mode of categorical imposition. A key role is played by the supposition of objectively conceived beingness that makes a comitation in the mode of objective parousia. Such a unified sense of being manifests itself in the enlightened subject as a parousia of objective entities. These entities of the third kind appear through the comitation of essential meanings in the modern hypostatic and paranoid intellect. The beingness recovered in the mind of *illuminati* has universal-generic and amphibolical character in the mode *ens inquantum ens*. Therefore it is possible to compare all objectively given essences among themselves. Avicenna redefines the truth as equality of observed *tertiums ens* that are taken with respect to the central position of illuminated intellect (*cum est ei aequalis*). This perspective took over the act of seeing made by the divine man Jamblichus. He gathered all opposites into one form of intellectual insight produced by the act of synoptic theurgic seeing (ch. 1.3). Avicenna turned mystical seeing of Neoplatonists into an objective intellectual form for common academic people. Unfortunately, they lack the higher form of mystic illumination transmitted through the activity of *intellectus sanctus*. This default of the divinely illuminated spirit can be compansated by modern education, whose *apaideusía* (ch. 1.2) produces almost divine academicians.

Avicenna transferred determination of being according to Ibn Adi (ch. 2.2) from the divine thought to the human intellect. The modern God began to work on the model of the Neoplatonic theurgy to be active for about a thousand years. That was an evident heresy according to Aristotelian teaching of the Falsafa. The new theurgy has objective character because the first intention of anything is given exclusively in the divine intellect. The monotheistic philosopher builds the ontotheology differently from the late antique Neoplatonism, which combines the mysteries and the divine cults of different civilizations and cultures into a bizarre philosophical syncretism. The concept of *tertium ens* creates a new system that builds up the ontotheological structure of monotheistic metaphysics. Alfarabi and Ibn Adi founded this first science in the mode of philosophical ecumenism that runs on the level of strict monotheism. The concept of intentional pre-existence of the world in modern God is secured thanks to amphibolical predication and certainty of knowledge. The objective intentional contents in the divine mind are carried by the totally unique divine subject. Avicenna logically and necessarily connected the divine subject to the subjectivity of the *illuminatus*. He observes an objectively illuminated portion of minimal being from the divine level. The critical thinkers of Falsafa resolutely rejected such an extreme anthropomorphism. The process of individuation done by Avicenna does not proceed from the first substance given *simpliciter* in actuality, but from the universal world of forms. The intended creation must exist in the intellect of *Dator formarum*. Let us recall the use of the *modus ponens* for a unique heavenly first substance, which guarantees the permanence of the universal meaning of its essence and species according to Simplicius (ch. 1.3.1). The transfer of deduction into the divine sphere of objectivity caused the disappearance of the first substance in the new metaphysics. The real substance has no more the founding character for the new project of the first science. The new substance of the third kind (*equinitas tantum*) exists in the modern God as an objective entity (*individuum*) through the intentional form. The modern God and the academicians protect together this miraculous creation of modernists which is eternal and absolutely reliable. Modern God establishes the permanence of intentions and species by the stream of intentional forms, which are given with respect to divine thinking in the mode *esse ad*. This mythopoetic beingness has its own subsistence in the Giver of forms. He produces the stream of intentions and species constantly emanating from the divine intellect.[[157]](#footnote-157) The hermeneutics of objectivity found the original *Ge-Stell* of modernity, from which takes place the flow of mythopoetic being into the academic diacosmos. The role of the guarantor of the universal species is played by the divine thought. In scholasticism, it is, moreover, provided by human memory as Augustinian *memoria*, which became the keeper of immaterial species (*locus specierum*; OBJ III, ch. 4.3.1). The architecture of the active cosmic intelligences is given from top to bottom, because the actuality of the cosmic forms follows the demiurgic way according to the dialogue *Timaeus*. The cosmic and human craftsman has in his intellect a creative idea and this he pushes into the matter of all kinds. Avicenna took this demiurgic approach to cognition as the basis for his metaphysics made in accordance with the work *Liber de causis*. The higher components of the intellect, by their subsistent actuality, dominate and determine the work of the lower components of cognition.[[158]](#footnote-158) The classical Aristotelianism of Averroes and Latin scholasticism rejects this approach as principally erroneous. Causality and predication in mode “*in artificialibus*” forms a very specific area of human cognition and activity. That demiurgic way of cognition cannot have a universal character. The introduction of denudation and objectively conceived intentionality into the scheme of cognition founded a new diacosmos. Arabic translations of the *Isagoge* dating to the 10th-century followed the tradition of Neoplatonism based on Elias’s *Commentary on the Categories* and abolished the hyparchical difference between the first and second substance (ch. 2.1.2). The school of al-Kindī’s conceived being as the highest genus and it took such a substance to be the terminus of the transcendental predication that univocally relates to the One. This created the possibility of amphibolical predication of generic and individual determinations. Such an Aristotelianism was rejected in principle by the classical school of Aristotelians and by its leaders as was Ibn Adi. The model of predication *ad unum* introduced by Neoplatonists into the Falsafa opened up a modern transformation of substance into a being of the third kind. The first important step in that direction was Alfarabi’s mode of amphibolical predication.

Avicenna created a new determination of being on the level of objective mysticism and physics. He created a modern metaphysics of Islamic monotheism that transcended the horizon of polytheistic Neoplatonism. Avicenna designed a new version of modern diacosmos made of an objective kind of *tertium ens*. Avicenna had to find for the new unity of creation a new monotheistic demiurge and a new pseudo-Aristotelian version of the eternal and wholly separated *causa prima*. He integrated the modern God as objective creator into metaphysics in a complete form of predication *per prius* and *per posterius*. This predication has an amphibolical and transcendental character and it remains beyond Aristotelian first and second substance as the basis of a metaphysical predication. The new version of the first philosophy must contain both the categorically given causal determinations and the ultimate, purely transcendentally given vision of unity of being. Absolutely and eternally exists only one Creator; therefore it is necessary to keep Him out of metaphysics that is made on the level of categorical predication. A detailed analysis of metaphysics in *al-Shifā* shows that Avicenna followed the indication of the *Second Analytics* concerning two forms of scientific proof. Therefore, he distinguished two forms of the first science.[[159]](#footnote-159) The monotheistic Creator cannot be a substantial carrier (i.e., subject) of the new metaphysics in terms of its ontic foundation (*Grund*, ch. 1.2). But a monotheistic God belongs in the first science as its founder and as the ultimate basis of the unity of being in the mode of Heidegger’s foundation (*Gründung*). Avicenna produced the knowledge of modern God in another way than the “meta-physics” of the first substance given in the *Metaphysics Lambda*. It explores the properties of the immobile Mover separated from the scheme of causality valid for the mobile cosmos. Aristotelian metaphysics comes to this source of movement from the realm of physics. Avicenna refused the methodology of the book *Lambda* and he kept but its conclusions. The objective mystic seeks a philosophical definition of modern God beyond the causality of the first substances, that is “beyond” (*trans*) the first science of substance. According to Avicenna, the god of philosophers cannot be known only from the scheme of causality. The physics is bound to the divine causal effect given within the framework of the first substances. The first science must investigate the first cause, as it is given in the unity beyond the substance (ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας, *Rep*. 509b9). That proceeding founded the first modern ontotheology, from which Suárez later formed the postmodern project of *metaphysica generalis*. The quotation shows a new way of “how” (the hermeneutic *Wie*) the Neoplatonic realm of being changed the fundamental meaning. Neoplatonic diacosmos was transferred into the Aristotelian trajectory of ontological understanding (*Vor-blickbahn*). The design of metaphysics as the first mythopoetic and dogmatic ontotheology received the following character.

“The questions of this science, then, are causes inasmuch as every being is given as an effect (*inquantum est esse causatum*), as the causes are accidents of being (*sunt accidentalia esse*), and as the principles of the first science are the principles of specialized sciences. They are founded in this above-mentioned doctrine (*in hoc magisterio*). That doctrine creates the first philosophy because its knowledge concerns the being of the first cause (*ipsa est scientia de prima causa esse*) and this being is the first cause (*haec est prima causa*). Taken in the order of universality, the first cause is being and unity (*prima causa universitatis est esse et unitas*)…” [[160]](#footnote-160)

The cognition of the first science goes to the first cause through the causality of created first substances. The first science of Avicenna has its own task to recognize the objective being of this cause (*scientia de prima causa esse*). The Aristotelian metaphysics of substance unfortunately does not go to the pure and separated ontological *esse* of the first cause, since it refers merely to its ontic causality. The definition univocally confuses real causality with its knowledge made in the order of predication (*accidentalia esse*). This false univocity makes foundation of an objective causality that can be attributed by comitation to any *res* of the third kind. Modern physics is objective, because it has the ontotheological and neoplatonic foundation. Knowledge of divine existence and unity (*prima causa universitatis est esse et unitas*) stands beyond the causality. Aristotelian metaphysics is bound to the causally acting first substance. The new magisterium of modernity dogmatically asserts that physics cannot establish metaphysics. The mythopoetic being of the first cause (*prima causa esse*) is given in the act of direct eidetic vision and not by Aristotelian deduction and abstraction from the material substances. The copula “*est*” univocally connects Aristotelian and Neoplatonic metaphysics to the unity made in the form of logical equivocity. Such logical unity of being can be given only in thought. Avicenna considers it mistakenly to be metaphysical unity of the real being on the level of the first substances. The abstract connection of generic being and logical thinking is given in the objective form of beingness to make the copula of “exsistential” judgment. For the further development of modernity, this definition of metaphysics as objective henology is very important. Avicenna introduced the mystical ontotheology of modernity as a new form of metaphysics. Objective dogmatic teaching arises (*exsistit*) in such a *Lichtung* that makes out the historial untruth of modernity. The error of modern thinking (*Irrtum*) arises from the sophistical ambiguity and equivalence of being of the third kind. The being of the first real substance was created before according to the metaphysical dative of the Aristotelian metaphysics (Alfarabi, Ibn Adi). Avicennian substance was created in the process of deliberate suppression of Aristotelian metaphysics, in the mode of *Seinsvergessenheit* of the Aristotelian first substance. Separating themselves from the Baghdad school of Aristotelians, Avicennist *Moderni* definitely followed the impassable path of Parmenides related to the archaic whole of Being (B 6.8, ch. 1.2). The modern totality of objective and mythopoetic being was created under the influence of Furies. They became absolutely subjective, therefore absolutely modern. The new cosmos became a logical simulacrum of the music form of Being, which had been revealed in the mode of *a/lētheia*. Erroneous unity of the objective being exists only in the thinking of *illuminati*. The original version of the Aristotelian metaphysical dative passed into the epochal metaphysic error (*Irrtum*).

Avicenna created modern God that stands beyond the principle of causality. Its henological and prohyparchic existence is placed outside substance and outside the scheme of first cause. Avicenna abandoned Aristotelian scheme of the Immobile Mover and adopted the ontotheological scenario of Neoplatonism. The modern God exists apart of the creation; fortunately, he thinks through an intentionality that makes analogy to academic thinking. Being knowable objectively and directly, he can be separated from the world and from the principle of causality. Avicenna claims that modern God as the aim of new metaphysics (*quaesitum, ġaraḍ*) is not defined in the same sense as the first principle of Aristotelian first science. The First Mover is determined by physics to be the original basis of causally acting reality. Avicenna, however, regards this as a lower state of being determined by the limited being of the first substance. Modern God cannot be the subject of the Aristotelian metaphysics (*impossibile esse ut ipse Deus sit subiectum huius scientiae*).[[161]](#footnote-161) The fullness of being is unlimited and fully unified. The first Aristotelian science is determined by the principle of causality. Therefore it works with being, which already has certain concrete determinations (*esse causatum*). The modern divine One must become the Many directly in the primordial sphere of being. Avicenna returns to the self-reflexive conception of the divine Trinity and the creative reflection of Ibn Adi (ch. 2.2). The thinking of the First Intellect establishes the plurality in itself because it recognizes his own archetypal ideas in the mode of accidental necessity (*lāzim, comitans*). These intentions of the divine thinking are given objectively and eternally, because they do not contain any external limitation. The fundamental meaning of a new kind of being arose in the sphere of the divine self-reflection that pre-exists as creative possibilities. The introduction of objective (that is, intentional) potentialities in the modern God has principal importance for further history of objectivity. Avicenna’s objective emanation does not follow the Neoplatonic scenario, but Aristotelian difference between actuality and potency. In the sphere of being administered by divine intellect, the conceived essence of any uncreated thing becomes a mere possibility, but not an actual reality. The thing conceived in the divine mind need not exist actually, only potentially. This created the archetypal limbo of objectivity, which “exsists” (*exsistit*) in God’s absolute simplicity. The mythopoetic essentiality and divine intentionality produce an objective *tertium ens* which is infinite, eternal, and necessary. The quotation from the metaphysics *Kitāb al-Shifā* describes the divine reflection of the first created forms as follows:

“The divine essence is unaffected by anything that is merely in potency, as we have shown above. God understands everything at once in original unity (*intelligens omnia ut unum simul*). From what he understands in this way follows the order of good in the realm of being (*ordinatio bonitatis in esse*). God knows, then, that it is fundamentally possible and much more beautiful to execute the wholeness of being according to the judgment of his intellect.”[[162]](#footnote-162)

Aristotle’s difference between the actuality and the potentiality determine a new meaning of being, which became an absolute object of divine thought. So far non-existent world (*intelligit qualiter est possibile*) is co-essential with the divine intellect. At the same time, that thinking already contains the fundamental multiplicity. Avicenna transfers the merely logical possibility of creation into the divine thinking in order to change it into a quasi-metaphysical (that is, mythological) possibility bestowed at the level of the Aristotelian categorial imposition. That objectively created world must have the elegance and the beauty preferred by modern God. Making the bold act of comitation, Avicenna let enter the potential being (*qualiter est possibile ... elegantius*) into the realm of divinity. The cited quotation shows the first project of possible worlds later proposed by Scotus and Leibniz. This solution changed the actual status of the divine being into the objective one. The “exsistence” of created things in their pure possibility becomes a “something” separated from nothingness. The problematic scenario of emanation changed into the ontotheological scenario of the monotheistic creation. It represents even a kind of creation *ex nihilo*, if we take this vision of being from the point of view of actuality. Avicennian and Neoplatonic project of the world correspond to Leibniz’s prearranged harmony (*harmonie préétablie*). The One is the Many merely potentially. At the prototypical level, it is possible to derive the order of being from the original intention of objectively thinking God. Philip the Chancellor adopts and elaborates this view around the year 1230 for the first modern deduction of generic being (*resolutio*). Neoplatonist Philip starts from the objectively conceived simplicity of being as such. That primordial unity breaks down into transcendental determinations under the supremacy of the Good (OBJ II, ch. 2.3.2). The Avicenna’s difference between actuality and potentiality inserted the necessary multiplicity in the divine unity. This solution created the ontotheological basis of objectivity. The predication *per prius* is guided by unitary principle adopted from Neoplatonism. According to Avicenna, from the One only unity can proceed, because this unity is the highest principle of ontotheology (*ex uno, secundum quod est unum, non est nisi unum ; Liber de philosophia prima* IX.4 ; ed. Van Riet, p. 481.50–51). The ontologically neutral and timeless multiplicity of transcendental predications pre-existed in the divine intentionality as formally determined potency (*individuum*). The archetypal minimal beingness is given by a purely negative determination of substance. There is a pure “being something” (*unum*, *res*) outside of nothingness. The intention in the divine mind cannot be a substance, because this would cause an unacceptable subsistent multiplicity in the One. The divine intention does not exist from the point of view of substantial being and at the same time it pre-exists as an intentionally given possibility in divine mind. Avicenna created after Ibn Adi a new version of the prohyparchical One—Being, which introduced Porphyry into the metaphysics. The Persian thinker brought the plurality into the first Being, but differently than Porphyry. Neoplatonic system of emanations was twofold. The One—Being constitutes the whole of different beings due to its supreme Being. That kind of supreme Being exists at the same time due to its reflexivity as a separated idea of the One (ch. 1.3.1). Avicenna considers Porphyry’s concept of the divine intellect to be false. He harshly criticized the Tyrian philosopher in the *Metaphysics* *al-Shifā* and mainly in the work *Al-Isharat wa’l-tanbihat* (Finnegan 1956). The entire new architecture of being is finally presented by the *Metaphysics* *al-Shifā*. The book rejected the scenario of emanations and replaced it with Aristotelian movement within the framework of the creative actuality and potency. But un remake of Neoplatonic intellect still makes the basis of the new ontotheology. Ibn Adi created a new concept of the divine intellect in the Trinity, which Avicenna adapted to a new form of metaphysics. Porphyry’s double Being received a radically new content through its connection to Aristotle’s difference between potency and actuality. Within the modern God as the one necessary essence, differences arise through specific orientation of his thought to this or that essence given intentionally (*esse ad*). The concept of “horseness” has shown that this intentionality contains a minimal portion of beingness and certainty. It keeps its own identity, which distinguishes this content in the divine thought from another entity of that kind. Modern metaphysics transformed the monotheist God into an objective anthropomorphic simulacrum. Avicenna’s modern God became the objective One and Many. Such a profanity was criticized as the fundamental error of Neoplatonic Falsafa. Algazel and Averroes rejected the introduction of intentionality in God made in an anthropocentric way. In the First substance and the First causa defined by the *Metaphysics Lambda*, there can be nothing potential. Avicenna abolished the scheme of causality related to Aristotle’s Immobile Mover. By denying the Principle of the Excluded Third, a special kind of *tertium ens* emerged in the divine thought. Latin scholasticism called it by the term “minimal being” (*ens diminutum*). The interpretation of the commentary to *De anima* and the *Metaphysics* *al-Shifā* has shown that the objective being arises in the process of Gnostic illumination. Ibn Adi noted a formal similarity of the human and divine processes of knowledge (ch. 2.2), but taken only on the human side to be an analogy. Avicenna makes out of the analogy an objective identity. What modern God sees in himself, in his own creative reflection, his enlightened objective servant Avicenna also sees as well, thanks to his prophetic dreams. The cognition made on the level of hylemorphic reality is transferred into the formal cognition of the soul in the realm of pure beingness. It is made out of hypostatic forms situated outside of substantial predication (*hoc esse est tantum*). This pure beingness is considered in the soul by the act of illumination performed from the direction of active divine intellect.

The first science conceives the objective being in its absolute simplicity. The demiurgic intellect of modern God contemplates its intentions in the act of self-reflection. That self-illuminated divine presence of knowledge (παρουσία) makes the metaphysical basis of every future creation. Objectively conceived ontotheology made the eclipse of the first substance. Aristotelian *ousía* becomes through the process of demiurgic anthropomorphization the parousia of rightness and universal equality of everything with everything in the mode *ens inquantum ens*. Ontotheology produced a new object of cognition in the quasi-form of beingness and of objective identity. Instead of the real Aristotelian substratum (ὑποκείμενον), the sphere of divine intentionality became the new subject as of this *tertium ens*. The objectivity is constituted by the fact that modern *tertium ens* was placed outside of nothingness and it became the object of divine thought. Subsequently, there is a difference between two modes of existence. There is the potential comitation in the divine thinking as being of the third kind. Because of already realized comitation, that divine *tertium ens* “exsists” (*exsistere*) in the world as the first irreal substance. Metaphysics of Ibn Adi brought forth this kind of comitation for the first time by defending the divine Incarnation into the world. The divine Person entered the creation as hylemorphic substance and therefore it is always given in the form of the Excluded Third: Either it exists or it does not exist. Avicenna generalized the scenario of the Incarnation for every intentional object in divine intellect. The potential pre-existence of the non-created thing in the modern God does not have the same ontological valence as created things in reality. The self-reflexively made intentions in divine thought have the same nature as the divine subject, but there are given only intentionally. This was shown by the terms of second intention in Alfarabi or the conception of the Holy Spirit as an internal object and performance of the Trinity in Ibn Adi. Ibn Sina reworked these Aristotelian concepts of potentiality and intentionality into an objective form of the diacosmos given in divine thought. Objective intention in the divine sphere of thought created a bridge between necessity and contingency. The necessity as divine intention is always true and eternal. The logical valence of possibilities is not yet determined in the real mode, “It happens—It does not happen.” Nevertheless, the divine intention has already a determined logical meaning, which is related to the necessity given in the new metaphysics. Whether the objective idea is realized or not, its intentional being in the modern God has the character of objective necessity. In the modern God as the Giver of forms, the unchanging logical value of truth and untruth are eternally present. The modern logic originated by contesting Aristotelian logic, because it has to ensure the validity of being of the third kind. The divine realm of *tertium ens* must be true in sense *absolute*. That is why Avicenna introduced new concept of truth to separate from Aristotelian truth as correspondence. The actualization of primary contents in the divine thought is accomplished by the cosmic *intellectus agens*. The Giver of the creative forms (*wāhib al-ṣuwar, Dator formarum*) performs the act of their comitation as well. Grosseteste took over Avicenna’s project of ontotheology and he introduced it in the circle of modern *illuminati* in Oxford (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.2). Avicenna’s version of the objective being made the foundation of metaphysics (see Heidegger’s *Gründung*) that determines the course of metaphysics for another millennium. After the death of modern God that “suffocated himself by theology” (Nietzsche dixit), le nihilism changed the production of *tertium ens* into a Cartesian or Husserlian *cogito* situated in the realm of transcendental egology. Instead of dead modern God, un bonvivant *illuminatus* guarantees the truth of being. He makes another divine subject of the nihilistic form of postmodern metaphysics and technical science. As far that tragicomedy is concerned, the famous proverb applies: *Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose.*

The sphere of intentionality in the modern God created *Lichtung* of truth and untruth of modern objectivity. Its untruth was rejected by Algazel and Averroes; its truth was accepted by all subsequent modernists who founded the epoch of nihilistic thought. Theory of emanation based on demiurgic intentionality completed Aristotelian scenario of actuality and potentialities. This connection is predicated through categorial comitation conceived as quasi-Aristotelian categories. The modern God observes his intentional objects through archetypal and objectively conceived denudation. That mythopoetic project created the fundamental *Irrtum* of the objective metaphysics. That first *think-tank* modern and therefore completement divin manages all ontotheological determinations of being. The intentionality of modern God makes him to be the primary producer of being of the third kind (*species specialissima*), since every potential, individual and generic being is connected to the creative active intellect. That kind of pseudo-mystic speculation established the ontotheological structure of modern metaphysics defined by Heidegger (*Gründung*, ch. 1.2). Avicenna as an Islamic believer confessed the doctrine of *creatio* *ex nihilo* done by the absolute omnipotent and separated Creator. He could not accept Neoplatonic emanations. Necessarily, he had to make of God a modern subject in shape of the later *res cogitans*. Ibn Sina took Aristotelian scheme of potentiality and shifted Jamblichus’s diacosmos directly into divine thought. That enabled him to proceed before the act of creation that has already substantial and real character. The original form of intentionality and comitation created a new thing (*al-šaj*) with minimal extent of beingness. The modern God intents it objectively in order to create it really or not. The divine intention is an Aristotelian potency, which already possesses its own identity, but so far does not exist as created substance. Every potential or real thing entails a minimum of existence within the divine archetypal intentionality. That miraculous source of modernity produces a primary objective existence provided with absolute necessity and academic certainty. This is shown by the act of comitation quoted above, which establishes the “exsistence” of individual things in their original identity of being of the third kind. The modern God accomplishes this comitation of objective existence in an archetypal way by creating a minimal beingness of each thing thanks to the demiurgic intentionality in his intellect. This minimal portion of the intentional beingness (*hoc esse est tantum*) waits in the metaphysical and theological limbo if it gets an actual existence as a creative gift. In this pure formalization regarded through the second level of abstraction, everything receives an ontotheological meaning. The connection to the so-called “third world” (*’ālam al-mithāl*) passes through the intellectual imagination of soul that is enlightened by the active intellect. Avicenna created an objective demiurgic world by a radical transformation of the dialogue *Timaeus*. He modernized Jamblichus’s diacosmos and supplemented the “intermediate world” (*barzach)* in the Quran by another mythopoetic version made in the metaphysics. Minimal being of the third kind is mystically connected with the intermediate sphere of cosmic intelligences and with the world of the heavenly angels (*mala'ikat a-l’izza, angeli coelestes*). This mystical “*mundus imaginalis”* of Sufism according to excellent translation (Corbin 1964) became the birthplace of the objectivity. Avicenna revised in the Persian Falsafa threefold division of the cosmos in the Quran: the mundane world (*donya*), the intermediate world (*barzach*), and the celestial world (*akhira*). The connection of the three worlds (the created world of material and immaterial forms, the separated immaterial and eternal celestial substances, the one uncreated necessary and eternal being) is carried out through different actions of the intellect. According to Avicenna, the lower form of cognition is given in the sensual soul. It is bound to the material body; therefore it stands outside the world of pure actual forms and separate celestial substances. The truthful cognition arises from the connection of the microcosm of the human soul with the macrocosm of heavenly spheres through the highest form of intellect (*intellectus sanctus*). This intellect comes from the higher spheres and he elevates the soul to a new form of abstraction made in the world of actualized and separated forms and angelic souls. The intellect given from above to the sensual soul enables it to ascend to the world of angelic souls and then to the floor of intellectual cherubim and other spiritual intelligences. They dwell in the realm of eternal and unchanging *intellectus agens* of the stellar spheres. Illuminated mind makes relation to the First Intellect in the act of the highest humanly possible contemplation (*al-'aql al-qudsi, intellectus sanctus*). Divine intellect as the Giver of forms and the act of human intellect are joined together. The internal object of knowledge is therefore actualized in the mode of *intellectum primum*. The subject and object merge in a single extra-temporal act of *intellectio* that is understood as mystic *coniunctio*. According to Avicenna, the full union of the soul with monotheistic God is completed by the act of mystical conjunction, wherein the human intellect is transformed into the form similar to the divine substance.[[163]](#footnote-163) That new form of existence enables the spiritual man to proceed from this material world into the cosmos of separated forms and intelligences and back again. The objective construction of metaphysical being complemented the mystical stories about the leap of Mohammed’s horse al-Burak from the Jerusalem Al-Aksa mosque into the Seventh Heaven (*Quran*, Sura 17) or the biblical vision of the cosmos connected to heaven through Jacob’s ladder and the walking of angels up and down (*Genesis* 28:12–18). The highest spiritual vision is accomplished mystically in the gnostic form of communion with the modern God through the act of direct illumination of the human intellect (*intellectus sanctus*).[[164]](#footnote-164) In the act of illumination, the human intellect joins the Giver of forms. He gradually actualized the intellectual potency of the soul from the primordial state of sensual cognition to the fullness of thought. Modern Furies are absolutely subjective, in addition objectively schooled. Settled in their intellectual hubris, academicians want to be mystics as well. *Quod licet Jovi non licet bovi*.

The new metaphysics postulates the knowledge of God from the concept of the universally conceived being given in the mode of univocity. God as a modern simulacrum is objectively necessary for the coming out (*deductio*) of the objective being from the modern God into reality. It is a fundamental reason why Aristotelian theologians of Falsafa criticized modernists like Avicenna. The modernists misinterpreted the scientific proof according to the *Second Analytics;* their metaphysics is built on a fundamental error.[[165]](#footnote-165) Al-Ghazālī and after him Averroes clearly saw this heresy given on the level of objective anthropomorphism. They solemnly rejected the modernist teaching in their fatwas. Al-Ghazālī created a list of Avicenna’s errors in the work *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah* (*Destructio philosophorum*, ca. 1095). His theological criticism can be summarized in three basic errors of Avicenna. Modernism denied God’s creation of the world in mode *ex nihilo* by introducing the emanations; deformed the divine attributes; did not recognize the resurrection of the body. The philosophers showed in their ambivalence and sophistry (*talbīs*) that the Most High does not recognize the world that He created. Al-Ghazālī fundamentally rejected the univocity of the divine and created being for the definition of monotheistic God. If potentialities in any form are introduced into God, his being enters the sphere of the first intelligences and it is given on the level of creation, since “this quiddity will be common to God and all the intelligences.”[[166]](#footnote-166) Al-Ghazālī clearly stated that the modernists of his time, such as Avicenna, had created an anthropomorphic image of God through the objectivist version of their ontotheology. The Creator could not be distinguished from the creation. The modernists invented a univocal concept of the divine being and its causality (“reality will include God and its first effect”).[[167]](#footnote-167) In response to the criticism of Algazel, Averroes created a new form of philosophical theology according to the *Metaphysics Lambda* (ch. 2.4). By eclipsing God as the first substance defined in *Metaphysics*, modernists lost divine causality because they abolished Aristotelian predication based on the hyparchical first substance. The modern God was deprived of fundamental attributes such as life, wisdom, or will, and became virtually a dead being through the fault of philosophy. Algazel saw the beginning of the death of objectively defined God in the metaphysics of *Modernorum*. He considered modern metaphysics a tragic error for this reason, just as Averroes did. This dispute reappears around 1225 in the Latin West. Blund’s school referred to Averroes to defend the doctrine of the person against the Porretans (OBJ II, ch. 2.2.1). The scenario of Neoplatonist emanations and Avicennism defined the modern God as a pure intellectual form, which makes part of the objective diacosmos consisting of substances of the third kind. The modern God lost the creative causality given to the first substances. He became a demiurgic dreamer and an objective theorist without actual and real existence. Algazel defends Aristotelian conception of the first science based on the unity of substance. Mathematical analogy and the similarity in the framework of hypostatized accidents cannot establish metaphysics. Avicennian and Neoplatonic project of the world produce Leibnizian *harmonie préétablie*, which would have abolished the sovereign divine creative will. This will is tied to the uniqueness of the existing constellation of the world created as such. Speculations about possible worlds do not have the value of the metaphysical reflection, which is derived from the real state of the first cosmic substances and their causally and temporally given order.[[168]](#footnote-168) Al-Ghazālī’s criticism of Avicenna rejects the use of a hypothetical syllogism in the modern proofs (*ibid.*, 55–56). Following Avicenna, Grosseteste and Scotus introduced that kind of syllogism in the Latin modernity. By condemning modern errors with references to Galen’s *Physics*, the writing *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah* rejects in principle Neoplatonic concept of the body, time, and circumstantiality as nonsense. The list of criticized errors in the work *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah* (*ibid.*, p. 11) reveals in advance all key points of contention between the first and second Averroism in the Scholasticism around 1270. Aristotelians of Falsafa defended the arguments of *Metaphysics Lambda* against the first modernists. Without real causality and without the real world, the thinking has no possibility of reaching the absolutely different being of the Immobile Mover. The modern concept of being has nothing in common with the real being of the first substance and even less, with the God of Prophets. Theologians and philosophers as al-Ghazālī and Averroes saw, in contrast to postmodern and nihilistic theologians of the Latin West, that the ontotheological unity of being is given only in the thought of the modern *illuminati*. The anthropomorphization of God, especially as founded on a flawed metaphysics, was absolutely unacceptable to the learned Aristotelian theologians of the Kalām. Al-Ghazālī, Averroes and after them the Latin Aristotelians criticized the sophistic use of predication *in artificialibus*, which made of monotheistic God an objective agent of modernistic emanations.[[169]](#footnote-169) Therefore, it is absolutely impossible to make any generic predication that links divine and human intellect. Ibn Adi already rejected such a heresy in debate with Neoplatonists of the Asharite school which defended Neoplatonic emanations. In the Latin West, this epochal error was brought to a climax by Leibniz’s *mathesis universalis*. In the age of metaphysical nihilism, the agony of modern God is prolonged by speculations of *Reformed Epistemology*. In the course of the 10th and 11th centuries, the educated Aristotelian theologians of Kalām and Persian Christianity rejected the univocal metaphysics proposed by Avicenna. In the objective metaphysics, anthropomorphic God of modernists was deprived of his unique being and he arrived at the level of the fictitiously given objective entity. Therefore, Mutazilites and Aristotelians rejected together the objective anthropomorphism of modernists like Avicenna. Al-Ghazālī’s criticism of Neoplatonists follows Aristotelian line of thought. There is no unity of metaphysics outside the causality of first real substance. If God works in the world, then his theologically defined being must be separate from mythopoetical tales of modernists that observe God’s predicating mind. The natural cognition of God as *causa prima* predicates, according to the *Second Analytics*, the scientifically acknowledged causality at the level of the first substances. What the divine Being is in and for itself, that does not belong to philosophy, which investigates only the world of the actual first substances and their causality. Therefore, the ontotheology of Avicenna and, consequently, of all modernity is flawed in principle. Al-Ghazālī is the first representative of the theory of two ways to one truth, which distinguished different fields of explorations concerning theology and philosophy.

The ontotheology of modern God originated in the Baghdad House of Wisdom, which staged the first act of the tragicomedy of objectivity in the time of Neoplatonic Asharites. Any thought is necessarily given in the modern God, which ensures a minimal portion of beingness to any content that can be thought. Every objectively necessary being has a reason for existence only in itself, because it forms a component of the divine Being. The singular possibility “to think something” (*hoc esse tantum*) therefore “exsists” in the mode “*semel—semper.”* In the divine thought, there is eternally an intentional determination of each thing in its identity. The emanation scenario of modernity entered Aristotelian version of monotheism. Avicenna rejected the philosophical pantheism of Plotinus’s *Enneads*. Neoplatonic emanations are admitted as an actual form, whereas Avicenna changed the emanations in Aristotelian potency. The intentional identity of a thing exists in the divine mind. Intention is given only potentially and it is fundamentally separated from the real created thing. The minimal concept of the individual intended in this way is different from another intentional content, because this non-existent A is necessarily different from the other non-existent Non-A. The minimal beingness of each thing in the divine thinking is actualized as divine creation or human production. The creative process proceeds through the comitation of *tertium ens* downward when the divine demiurgic will takes up an actual process of creation. We find the original framework of comitation in Jamblichus’s trinitarian model. The emanations of intellectual contents proceed from the direction of the One—Being (ch. 1.3.1). The Falsafa knew the way of Neoplatonic comitation through the work *Theologia Aristotelis*. The first emanation from the One coexist the Intellect, the Being and its Hypostasis.[[170]](#footnote-170) Ibn Adi fundamentally reworked the Neoplatonic interpretation into Aristotelian theology by introducing the concept of comitative predication. That Aristotelian philosopher created the first model of categorical predication in the sphere of the One (ch. 2.2). It is based on the consideration of pure mental difference, which is given either self-reflexively for the divine Trinity (actuality) or reflexively for creation (potentiality). The model of comitation entered in the new phase described as metaphysical mode “*esse ad.”* In modern God there is a new sphere of *tertium ens*. It was created by the difference between the immanent essence in the divine Trinity and the transcendental divine wisdom projected into the world. The power of the Holy Spirit as the third divine Person is brought out of the sphere of divine immanence in the mode of intentionality. The new form of purely intentional Incarnation of Jesus Christ goes into creation as the real Incarnation of the second divine Person.

Avicenna took up the trinitarian ontotheology of Ibn Adi in a new way. First, he established the unity of divine substance according to al-Kindī’s Neoplatonic school, because the Asharite school accepted the strict Islamic monotheism in the maximal way, in the Neoplatonic henology separated from the creation. Avicenna, however, needed the Christian multiplicity of three divine Persons and creative pneumatological transcendence of biblical God to create the original concept of objectively conceived intentionality. Modern God intends the being of creation as Aristotelian potency given in the objective mode *esse ad*. The project of Islamic ontotheology created a new meaning of intentional being of the third kind. In modern God, the minimal and necessary beingness, generic determinations of the type of animality (*animalitas*) and humanity (*humanitas*) are always available. The real creation comes from the fact that the eternal and necessary comitation of objective existence intended in modern God receives another specific attribute called “actual existence” (*esse in actu, esse in effectu*).[[171]](#footnote-171) The objective generic determination changes from a potential status to an actual one by the fact that objective *animalitas* now makes the essence of existing substance of this or that animal (*esse in effectu per successionem essendi proprie*). God makes this difference between the generic and the objective determination in the mode *absolute*, by creating a new thing. A mortal modernist does this merely intellectually, because he contemplates *ens rationale* in his illuminated thinking. The first model of comitation of actual being to a pre-existent essence-form was created in the Latin West by the school of the Porretans (OBJ II, ch. 1.4). Avicenna and after him Leibniz know mystically and logically that the being of the third kind can exist objectively in the creation only because it pre-exists in some primary form in modern God. Those characteristics of *tertium ens* later establish Leibniz’s Principle of sufficient cause (OBJ II, ch. 3.5). The non-existent does not exist and, according to Parmenides, cannot even be thought. Therefore, every potential being must get a sufficient reason for its existence from the sphere of primary ontotheology, in the objective mode *esse ad*. After the death of modern God, the mathematics took over his legitimatizing function. The mathematicians occupy the vacant place of modern God and they replaced Christian doctrine of divine justifying grace (*sola gratia*). After the death of modern God, the academic and white collars carry on their shoulders the digital meaning of the world through the supercomputers and derivative markets. Instead of dead God of the modernity, the age of nihilism worships its own virtual reality created *ex nihilo* and divine qualities have been made in its own image. The critical thinking given by the metaphysical dative follows the path of the first substances and defines the God of philosophers through the activity of the first cause. Avicenna elevated mathematics to metaphysics in accordance with Neoplatonism, but rejected the mathematical and analogical determinacy of the forms given by Plotinus’s emanation. Our intellect comes to the mythopoetic diacosmos of the imagined divine forms by the way of the second abstraction when it reveals the universal nature of things (*ad modum universalis*). The recognition of this intermediate world of intellectual forms in the divine intentionality leads to a mystical intuition which contemplates the universal generality of things (*universalis absolute*). The soul is enabled by the *intellectus sanctus* to direct seeing of divine potentialities. The lower kind of cognition actualizes the transient material intellect (*intellectus possibilis*), which is essential in the individual soul. The human insight explores an ideal world, which existed in the divine thinking before the actual creation and still exists. The new concept of abstraction reflects the realm of cosmic intelligences. In the human soul arises a specific reflection of this mythopoetic realm through being of the third kind. The new scheme of Avicenna’s first science made the natural theology to be subordinated to the unitary ontotheology. This first objective determination concerns the generic being as such (*ens inquantum ens*) in the West. The modern God was objectively incorporated into the metaphysics of the *Modernorum* as first cause, as sovereign being and as a Giver of forms. He died at the end of this tragicomedy in the same objective way. The funeral accomplished the brilliant antiplatonist Nietzsche, who philosophized with the hammer and not with faulty academic ideas. The modern God, in his anthropocentric thinking and intentionality, bravely carried for centuries all the determinations of being that were possible in objective thinking in the mode *semel—semper*. In the epoch of nihilism, he handed over this Herculean task to the mathematicians as Leibniz and today’s supercomputers. He could finally die in peace, while being absolutely unemployed. Avicenna opens this development leading to the death of modern God, who had been created *ex nihilo* as the first *subiectum* of modern metaphysics. This simulacrum was rejected by the Falsafa and the theology of Mutakallim in the 11th century. That gigantomachy marked the subsequent objective history of Western metaphysics in a fundamental way. The terminal phase of modern God began through the death of theology in the philosophy of objectivity. The first representative of postmodernism, Francisco Suárez (†1617), subsumed the natural principles of theology under a new determination of being given within the framework of *metaphysica generalis* (Courtine 1990, 429). This determination of being is made in Avicennist mode *ens inquantum ens*.

Avicenna stands at the beginning of ontotheological construction of modern metaphysics. Algazel and Averroes diagnosed the fundamental errors of the modern metaphysics that led to its downfall. The project of substance of the third kind needs the unified ontotheological design of being. The individual as the first and second substance received a new objectivity in the predication *per prius* and manifests itself as quasi-genus and quasi-essence. Entering the epoch of metaphysical nihilism and secularization, this ontotheology lost the last remains of autonomy and its historical meaning. See Nietzsche’s, Feuerbach’s and Marx’s justified criticism concerning postmodern theology or secular ideological constructs of postmodern avicennism. Avicenna created objectively considered sense of being in the following steps, which show the epochal event of an eclipse concerning the first substance (*Ereignis*). Let's recapitulate first steps of modernity that took its initial cours.

* Alfarabi’s receptive intellect (*intellectus in potencia*) is superfluous, because its function is taken over by the reflexivity of immaterial soul as an independent substance. Its receptivity includes the lower forms of reasoning (*cogitatio*), the common imagination (*imaginatio*), and memory (*memoria*). These forms of cognition show only the external resemblance to the material thing perceived by the senses.
* The individual essence of human intellectual soul comes into being thanks to the act of sensory reasoning (*cogitatio*) and thanks to the enlightenment of the intellect by the acquired intellect (*intellectio*). The soul is connected with the body only accidentally by the sensual and bodily *cogitatio*. The higher intellect is separated from the body in an act of immaterial, hypostatic and actual reflection (*intellectio*). This weak connection between the substantial body and the substantial intellect is sufficient for a justification of a permanent individuality of the soul even after death. The identity of man is supported by immaterial and eternal components created directly by modern God.
* The soul endowed with sensual cognition takes up the emanation of the actualized intellectual forms originally given in the detached active intellect (*illuminatio*). Abstraction runs as the process of cognition concerning the detached forms (*denudatio*). It passes in the mode actuality and potency from the separated active intellect to the human acquired intellect.
* At the interface of active and acquired intellect, a universal individual substance arises as a new object of metaphysics (*equinitas tantum*). This being of the third kind can be recognized by abstraction from reality, but only accidentally. The cosmic active intellect generates this essential and actualized form in the mode *semel—semper* and imprints it into the individual hypostatic soul in virtue of the acquired intellect.
* This imprint of *tertium ens* objectively “exsists” within the subjective certainty of the modern subject (*certitudo*). The subject observes in this certainty an objectively given minimal part of the being (*esse diminutum*). The imprint of being of the third kind on the objective memory (*locus specierum*) is given by a new form of the Neoplatonic anamnesis.
* This minimum of beingness is given in the “subject—object” mode. Thereby it is evident both in the thing and in the thinking. Truth entails objective identity of twofold certainty of being both in reality and in the cognizing intellect (*hoc esse est tantum*). According to *Met*. VI.2, Avicenna conceives the univocally and transcendentally true being to be original aim of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*.
* The categorial predication of this absolutely simple beingness in the mode *per prius* generates the mythopoetic realm of essences as generic and specific *quidditas*. Done in that way, the first object of transcendental metaphysics is born as a generic being (*ens inquantum ens*).
* The minimal beingness of this *tertium ens* ensures the ontotheological determination in the mode of potential comitation. It is accomplished by the actual creative active intellect (*Dator formarum*). Neoplatonic mythological scenario of One—Being and its emanations are fundamentally revised.
* Modern metaphysics arises through the process of univocal comitation of this minimal intentional being from the modern God to objective creation (*esse ad*). This process is accomplished on the basis of the formal similarity of divine and human intentionality. The divine intentionality is infinite, the human intentionality is finite, but both exhibit an essential similarity in the mode of objective analogy (*analogia entis*).
* The ontotheology based on modern psychological anthropomorphism offers the final justification for objective sense of being. Done in that way, metaphysics as the first general and objectivist science (*metaphysica generalis*) was born. This project includes the monotheistic theology of the objective demiurge (*theologia naturalis*).

With these steps, the philosophical mystic Avicenna gave humanity a new subject (*ġaraḍ*) of metaphysics as the first science. Modern God became a paranoiac subject, which brought him inevitable death for above-mentioned reasons. This view of metaphysics as objective ontotheology was rejected in principle by theologians as al-Ghazālī. His criticism of fundamental errors in modern philosophy was corrected by Averroes, the best Aristotelian of all time. Averroes understandably tackles the weakest (and therefore most mystical) part of Avicenna’s univocal predication *per prius* and *per posterius*. The Commentator rightly understood on the basis of Alfarabi’s and Aristotle’s reading that Avicenna’s being of the third kind does not exist. We know the existence of all possible only from the first real substance and not from the mystical seeing of the pure being as such. As we shall see later, Western scholasticism after 1250 underwent a similar dispute made out through concepts of angelology, matter, and the relation of the human intellect to the celestial *intellectus agens*. Unfortunately, it is not Avicenna who becomes the enemy of the scholastic West ensnared by the spell of mystical objectivity, but Averroes.

## 2.4 Unity of the First Science and Cognition (Averroes)

The controversies between the school of Islamic traditionalists and philosophically educated theologians reached the next stage of serious conflict. The school of Mutazilites was divided into the Aristotelian Neoplatonists and the critical Aristotelians. The key dispute of the different Quranic schools shows the work of a Persian theologian named Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī (†923), who lived in Baghdad. Very important is his disagreement with the school of the theologian Dawud al-Zahiri (†883), which was given in the line of Sunni jurists and theologians (Abu Hanifa, Malik bin Anas, al-Shafi’i, Ahmad ibn Hanbal). This school of Law (*maḏhab*), founded on the orally transmitted traditions of the Quran (*ḥadīth*), distinguished itself from the rational school of theologians (*al-muʿtazilah*), which had already been criticized as heretical by the time of Abbassid caliphate (ca. 850). The key difference between the two schools was the view of the Quran as a word given directly by God. This view was advocated by the legalist schools of theologians that uphold ancestral traditions of Islam (Bangert 2016, 100–103). The theological schools in line of *maḏhab* nevertheless distinguished quite critically between the mythopoetic and the music figures of truth.[[172]](#footnote-172) Both types of archaic unconcealment (*a/lētheia*) were at work in the early history of Islam. They formed oral tribal traditions, which acquired the character of an authoritative, locally determined doctrine (*ḥadīth*). The original truth of the Quran had an archaic character, since it was necessary to distinguish precisely between divine truth and human deception. This meant translating the true form of the Word of God preached by Muhammad into a canonical version of unified teaching. After the critical work of the sages of all schools and directions at that time, these traditions passed into the written Quran in a fully distinguished and therefore critical form of truth. After the emergence of the written Quran, the further history of Islam began and the original historicity of the first prophecy passed into the epochal Lethe. For the philosophical school of Mutazilites in Baghdad, it was unacceptable to deify any text created thanks to human understanding and interpretation. The Asharite thinkers from the school of Mutazilites followed the compilation of written corpus of the Quran. The most important editorial phase started at the beginning of the 8th century after the end of the reign of Caliph Abd al-Malik (†705). These scholars were experts in the archaic Arabic script, which was without punctuation and with unclear meanings of many characters (*scriptio defectiva*). These scholars were involved in the authoritative interpretation of Islamic traditions at that time. The transition to new punctuation of Quran with diacritical marks (*scriptio plena*) was finalized in the 10th century. This was the reason for critical attitude of Mutazilites towards dogmatic interpretations of theologians. In line with the theologians as Ibn Kullāb (†855), the Mutazilites distinguished between the content of revelation and its human expression (*ʿibāra*). With respect to other religions, they defended the moderate doctrine of the “inimitability of the Quran” (*iʿjāz al-qurʾān*) as the superior word of God. The rational school of Asharites defended human nature and critical thinking. Neoplatonic Asharites from the school of the Christian philosopher Hunain Ibn Ishāq (†873) of the Baghdad House of Wisdom, however, ended in Platonic dialectics. The most important representative of this Neoplatonic school was Avicenna, whose modernist philosophy was criticized by the theologians of the rational school of the Mutakallim led by al-Ghazālī. However, problematic Platonism of Asharites was also rejected by the school of Aristotelian Falsafa led by Alfarabi and by the Jacobite Christian Ibn Adi. These two thinkers headed the Baghdad House of Wisdom (*Bajt al-Hikma*) after the Asharite school. The school *Ilm al-Kalām* defended the one revealed truth of the Quran. According to the scholars of the Mutakallim, the Baghdad House of philosophical wisdom created a division in the teaching of Islam. The brilliant Sufi theologians and thinkers like al-Ghazālī considered the Baghdad House of Wisdom to be a seat of silliness because it was dominated by modernists such as Avicenna. Islamic caliphs, jurists, and theologians intervened against the modernists in the interest of the one revealed truth. The representatives of Kalām poured out the Aristotelian child from the tub together with the modern water. But the theological jurists of the *ḥadīth* schools at least saved the theological wisdom of Islam. This wisdom was given by centuries-old tribal and cultural traditions of thought. The caliphs stepped in favor of the theological school of Kalām and Sharia. The caliphs' encroachment of power against the modernity of the time ensured that the modern God did not prevail in Islam. It is also the reason why the modern God did not die the same death in Islamic civilization as in the postmodern West.

Averroes was undoubtedly the most brilliant thinker of the Falsafa, for he created a unique and so far unsurpassed synthesis of Aristotelian metaphysics. He started the next round of polemics with modernist Islamic philosophers like Avicenna and corrected their errors. It was already too late to save Falsafa. After the death of the Commentator, the Islamic theologians definitely prevailed and they imposed *damnatio memoriae* on Averroes teaching. The Latin West repeated the disputes of the brilliant thinkers of the Falsafa two centuries later, in the years 1250–70. The metaphysics of the Commentator was correctly understood in the Latin West by the school of the first Averroism, which founded the University of Paris (John Blund, William of Auvergne). The authority of Aristotelian metaphysics was upheld in the next generation by Roger Bacon, Albert the Great and Siger of Brabant. But this group followed the fate of Falsafa and they lost their battle against the modernists. The Latin modernists prevailed over the Aristotelians through Avicenna’s objective philosophy. The modern God succeeded through the objective thought in the monastic schools of the mendicant orders at Oxford and Paris. This struggle is veiled in the title *sophistae Latini*, which in the mode of Apollonian semantics points to the unconcealed fate of theological Aristotelianism (OBJ II, ch. 2.3.1). The wise Parisian bishop William of Auvergne played a similar historical role in the modernists’ critique as the scholar al-Ghazālī did in the Falsafa. The tragic role of the Aristotelian school in defending Averroes’s philosophy played the so-called Averroists at the Artist faculty in the Rue du Fouarre. Their tragic decline and expulsion from the University of Paris conclude the first round of the objective tragicomedy of the West. The hermeneutics will follow especially the thought of Siger of Brabant. He became the best ever commentator of the Commentator and then shared his philosophical fate. Avicenna’s version of metaphysics follows the path of one mythopoetic truth in the path of *via Modernorum*. Both schools had only one truth, which was imposed on the West. This divine truth was divided into two realms. In the first realm ruled wise and victorious theologians of Islam; in the second realm unwise, modernistic and victorious theologians of Latin Christianity. As we know, modern God is dead and the era of Anthropocene arose only in the Latin West. In the Falsafa, a whole dispute about the statute of the modern God was going on two centuries earlier than in the Latin West. Hermeneutics will follow in the further stages of this gigantomachy of substance in the Latin West. Western ontotheology had been separated from the Islamic theology since the 13th century, and this separation was sealed by the repeated Crusades. The objective simulacrum known as God of *Modernorum* was created according to Avicenna’s metaphysics and it founded a way of thinking known as *via Modernorum*. The philosophical sophists won the power struggle for the one truth by denouncing the Aristotelianism in Paris and in Oxford in 1277. The role of critical Averroes is taken by some Aristotelian representatives of Averroism (Alvernus, Bacon, Albert, partially Thomas Aquinas), who criticize the Avicennists of the second Averroism (Rufus, Kilwardby, Bonaventure, Pecham). Latin modernist Duns Scotus repeated the whole deduction of metaphysics after Avicenna (OBJ III, ch. 5.3.2). The result of the first deduction of objective metaphysics was a modern God without own existence. This supreme academic creature is lost in his objective thought and therefore has no time for real creation in the world (*Deus otiosus*, ch. 1.1). Nihilistic metaphysician Nietzsche was the philosophical gravedigger of the modern God after al-Ghazālī and Averroes.

Avicenna's introduction of modern metaphysics through new forms of *tertium ens* brought the search for the unity of being in Persian Neoplatonism to a climax. Modernity combined Neoplatonic henology and Aristotelian categorial predication into a new project of the first science. The previous chapters have shown that transcendental metaphysics places the unity and meaning of being beyond the world of real substances. Avicenna became the father of the Western objectivity because he left to the successors the first insight into the objectively conceived meaning of being. The conflict between Avicenna and Averroes started from Aristotelian contentious point concerning the concept of truth, which Alfarabi had already dealt with. The quoted passage *Met*. 1026a33–b2 (ch. 2.1) considers the statement about truth and the determination of first substance as ontologically equivalent (ἁπλῶς λεγόμενον, *Met*. 1026a33). If truth can be predicated in the mode of amphibolical predication, then it belongs in the categorial statement at the level of second universal substance and to the first real substance. This gave rise to the concept of truth as assimilation in Avicenna and in subsequent modernity that changed Aristotelian concept of truth as correspondence. The modern intellect creates the truth as the depositary of being of the third kind. Direct vision of objective being replaced the metaphysical dative. It came to destruction of Aristotelian categorical correspondence based on the imposition of the meaning from the hyparchical first substances to the second universal substance. The connection of beings of the third kind takes place through the direct connection (*coniunctio*) of the acquired intellect (*intellectus adeptus*) with the active intellect (*intellectus agens*). This connection proceeds in the process of the enlightenment (*illuminatio*) of the acquired intellect of humans illuminated by the separated active intellect of the cosmic intelligences. On the other hand, there is the assertion of the same book *Metaphysics* E, which excludes the determination of the truth as hypostatic being from the first science. Truth and untruth are not in things (οὐ γάρ ἐστι τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν) but in thought (ἀλλ' ἐν διανοίᾳ, *Met*. 1027b25–27). The determination of truth made only in thought is fundamentally different from the real substance, which contains the original unity of existence. The division of being within the universal categorical predication is given with respect to the first substance (διαίρεσις ἐν διανοίᾳ ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι, *Met*. 1027b30–31). Aristotle therefore explicitly says at the end of this paragraph that the problem of being as the truthful must be set aside and that research must focus on existing substance (*Met*. 1027b34). Le concept of truth cannot replace the actual existence of the thing, which is revealed as immediately and simply in itself. The criterion of truth taken as the secondary determination confirms the primacy of the first substance. That question presents the core of the gigantomachy between Platonism and Aristotelianism. The principles of the first science must be in the things themselves according to *Physics* and *Metaphysics*; otherwise the search goes back to the various forms of Platonism. The predication *per prius* refers to the first substance to answer Socrates’s question about existent essence: What that is (τί ἐστι; ch. 1.2)? The search for the first science in the books *Metaphysics* Γ, Z, H, and especially the book *Lambda* goes this direction. They explore the primary determinations of existent substance as the ultimate source of the unity of being.

Alfarabi stands at the crossroads of both lines of metaphysics because he sought to harmonize the teaching of both founding authorities. Abunaser’s precise summary of the first and the second substance in the *Commentary on the Categories* (*Cat*. 2a11–16) has shown the fundamental importance of this thinker (ch. 2.1). Alfarabi confirmed the importance of categorical predication for the first science. But he did not renounce the Neoplatonic conception of truth as fundamental determination of the One—Being. Averroes took this step and created a new version of metaphysics. He rejected the dualism given by the twofold interpretation of metaphysics and gave primacy only to the actual substance as the only source of univocal predication. Philosopher Manlius Boethius (OBJ II, kap. 1.1) and the Commentator in the Falsafa were the first philosophers in the West to conceive metaphysical choice related to the first substance as a fundamental project of *Physics* and *Metaphysics*. That kind of metaphysics presupposes the way of cognition according to *De anima*. Averroes’s early commentary on *Metaphysics* knows the cited aporia concerning truth from the book E; the writing *Epitome* explains it according to the hyparchical imposition from the first substance.[[173]](#footnote-173) The reason for this interpretation of *Metaphysics* is given according to the primacy of Aristotelian metaphysical dative. The predication *per prius* goes first to the actual substance, because without its real existence we would not know anything about the truth. The existence of the actual thing cannot be ambiguous or erroneous in itself. The thing is what it is. According to that interpretation of *Metaphysics*, the error arises only in the thinking of the knower (*Met*. 1027b30–31).[[174]](#footnote-174) There is nothing actually real beyond the first real substance. The objective being has no possibility of actualization on the level of the first substances whether the material or the immaterial ones. The knowledge begins with the existence of the bodies perceived with the senses and transcends to the immaterial and separated cosmic substances. This direction of Aristotle’s philosophy we have called “the disclosure of sense of being from the front,” i.e., from the direction of the real substances. The hyparchical predication *per prius* made by the imposition establishes the last level of the univocity of being. That univocity exists only within the framework of the genus, that is, on the categorial level of the second substance. The further determinations outside the first and the second substance are given only equivocally. They are determined by universal meaning given only in thinking and not in the reality of the first substances. The signification of homonymic universality is not causally determined by the imposition from the reality. This homonymic unity (par ex. in the mode of analogy) remains truthful only on the level of logical or mathematical abstraction. We have designated this direction with the term “disclosure of being from behind.” The supposition of this unity is given only in thinking, since the imposition of meaning from the reality is missing. The above-mentioned difference between imposition and supposition have fundamental importance in order to explain the dissimilarity between the metaphysics of Avicenna and Averroes. Avicenna’s unity of being is given through the *tertium ens* ordered in the system of the first objective ontotheology. According to the Commentator, such a first science lies outside the world of real substances. Avicenna unjustifiably spreads the univocal predication beyond the realm of first substances. He includes in his project of the first science equivocal and analogical meaning, which is given only in the thought. The analysis of a mere homonymy of ideas and definitions separated from real substances cannot establish the unity of knowledge necessary for a kind of critical science. Therefore, there is no Neoplatonic, analogical, mystical, gnostic, etc. predication of the unity of being related to the first science as Avicenna proclaims. The objective unity of being is presented in the mode *ens inquantum ens*. From the point of view of categorical Aristotelian predication, Avicenna’s universality and his objective formalization represent an equivocal categorization made on the basis of analogically conceived similarity of being. But this form of analogy exists only in thought and it has no causality in the reality. Things are related to an abstract concept, just as nutrition or the body is analogically related to health according to *Nicomachean Ethics* (ch. 1.3.1). There is a predication *per prius* in the homonymic analogical order, because we can find the original accident, which is bound to the first substance (ch. 1.3). But this unity is firstly merely accidental and secondly it is created only in the thinking on the level of potentiality, since it is imposed from the real substance. According to Averroes, the intuition into the realm of Neoplatonic universals does not establish scientific cognition based on deductive or at least on inductive proofs. They are based on the investigation of the real substance and its properties. Due to erroneous interpretations of Aristotle, Averroes considers his predecessor as a very problematic philosopher, who committed fundamental errors in the metaphysics. The determination of the truth as hypostatized being runs according to the second line of the *Metaphysics* VI.2 in the things themselves. But it exists only in the thinking, where the meaning of being is predicated categorically according to the causality of the first substances. The real thing as existing and the potential being as true, they represent metaphysically quite different realms. Both ways of existence must be clarified with regard to the apodictic predication of the first and the second substance. Their truth can be unified by the logical judgment made on the categorial level. It is but homonymy made on the level of the pure concept. However, at the level of scientific research, apodictic truth is guaranteed by the demonstrative deductive syllogism according to the *Second Analytics*. Demonstrative proof is based on the predication of causality among the first substances. After Boethius, Averroes is the first thinker of the West who radically separated the original interpretation of Aristotle from the Neoplatonic tendencies. After him, this work is repeated by the firsts theoreticians that followed the teaching of Averroes in Paris. These excellent philosophers are represented by the Chancellor of the University of Paris, the bishop Alvernus, Roger Bacon, and Albert the Great. Their struggle against the modern “Asharites” in Oxford and Paris forms a forgotten chapter in the history of philosophy, ironically edited by victorious modernists.

The hermeneutics of objectivity retrospectively seek the original place from where the new type of metaphysics starts. It is represented in the Latin West by the school of the first Averroism. The French edition of Averroes writings dealing with the beatitude of the soul, which survived in Hebrew translations from the 13th century, outlines two basic alternatives that can be found in Averroes’s philosophy. The first ontological choice (*décision ontologique*) concerns the physical body, which must be a material one (Geoffroy&Steel 2001, 47–48). Averroes’s metaphysical choice follows the teaching of *Categories* and clearly separates the indivisible first substance from our conceptual cognition. The same is true for the determination of existing man and human cognition. The soul is a form of the existing body, not at all Avicenna’s separated objective substance. The human body is one, living and cognizing through the intellectual soul, which is the actualized form of “this” body determining the unique person. This concept excludes the duplication of the form or the substance in human beings, since we exist as the first substance. The hylemorphic unity of the existing person is real; therefore, it cannot be disturbed by any conceptual twist that would introduce a multiplicity of hypostatic forms into the human person. The second ontological choice mentioned by the French commentators concerned the modified status of Alexander’s material intellect. Since the intellect absorbs intelligible forms, it must have an immaterial nature, similar to the cosmic active intellect. Averroes, in agreement with Alexander, claims that intelligibilia are immaterial in nature. At the same time, he asserts with Themistius that the intellect is the disposition of the soul, which is bound to the individual material body subjected to birth and death (Geoffrey&Steel 2001, 64–67). The connection of thinking to the unique substance of man with the soul as the entelechic form of the body is very important. Such a unique material body as unique substance is incompatible with Alexander’s conception of the material intellect. Alexander’s hylic intellect would become an independent substrate of thinking as a kind of an actualized form. Alfarabi inadvertently introduced this fatal modernist solution. He tried to reconcile Aristotle and Plato and through this syncretism created a new receptive component of cognition (ch. 2.1.1). In the *Great Commentary on De anima* (CMDA) Averroes placed Alexander’s material intellect in the sensual part of the soul. He transformed Alfarabi’s *intellectus in potencia* into a new form of the soul’s receptive faculty (*intellectus possibilis*). The immaterial soul endowed with the faculty of intellectual cognition takes over the sensual forms based on the existence of external things. It makes an abstraction in the environment of the passive intellect to create the immaterial forms of recognition. The resulting unity of sensual and intellectual cognition is given by the fact that the immaterial intellect present in the individual soul is determined in the mode *per prius* as pure potency. The receptivity tied to the action of *intellectus possibilis* makes the intellect receive all immaterial forms. Neoplatonic multiplicity of forms as substances would make the cognition added from outside. Such a scenario of cognition cause that the thinking would be in the human being merely an accident. Then the immaterial intellect as separated form would sometimes act in the body and otherwise not. The theory of the separated intellect disrespects the experience of voluntary thinking that we have in full control. Alfarabi already saw this point of dispute and solved it within the framework of *intellectus in potencia*, which represents the individual ability of abstraction (ch. 2.1.1). In the animate body as the only substrate exists the immaterial cognition of the intellect and not the autonomous intellect as another added form or substance. Otherwise, thinking is not a free act of will of the unique existent person, which is defined as Aristotelian first substance (τόδε τι). The receptive performance of thinking is bound to the senses. It constitutes the immaterial part of the individual soul and establishes the passive and active capacity of the intellect. By changing the statute of metaphysics and intellect, ingenious Commentator definitely separated himself from the previous Arabic tradition (Alfarabi, Avicenna, Ibn Bajjah), which defined man in a dualistic way. The modernists of the Falsafa conceived the cognition as connection of two immaterial substances. The detached and independently existing part of human soul connects the equally detached active intellect in the act of enlightenment (*ittiṣāl, ittiḥād*). The concordance of the acquired and active intellect through the *coniunctio* of two kinds of hypostasis enabled the recognition of immaterial forms. The body and the senses did not play, and still do not play, an important role in this Neoplatonic, Avicennist, and Cartesian scheme. Hermeneutics claim that the interpretation of truthful cognition makes the alpha and the omega of Averroes’s philosophy. The preface to the English translation of the *Great Commentary on De anima* (LCDA) reminds us that at least eight extant works of Averroes were concerned with the nature of intellect and with the question of cognition (Taylor 2009, XXII). Patient process of gradual abandonment concerned all philosophical authorities of the time. That fact explains why Averroes wrote at least three commentaries on *De anima*. The minor commentary was written in 1158–60 (ed. Nogales 1985), the middle commentary sometime around 1181 (ed. Ivry 2002), and the major commentary around 1186 (ed. Crawford 1953). The generally accepted dating of the commentaries on *De anima* is based on the premise that the middle commentary belongs to the late middle commentaries of Aristotle’s major works, whereas the *Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De anima libros* (CMDA) is the most recent in the series of so-called great commentaries, which culminated in the commentaries on *Physics* and *Metaphysics* (Glasner 2004, 59). The definitive figure of the metaphysics was completed by the series of major commentaries on *De caelo* and on the *Metaphysics*, which were almost certainly written after the year 1190. Suggested dating indicates the key position of the writing on *De anima* in the genesis of Averroes’s metaphysics. The composition of CMDA belongs to the beginning of the last creative period, which was crowned by both great commentaries on *Physics* and *Metaphysics*. The present hermeneutics of CMDA is based on the above-mentioned dating. The Middle and especially the Great commentary on *De anima* created the fundamental trajectory (*Vor‑blickbahn*) to understand the first science that the Commentator was looking for the whole of his life. It is necessary to evaluate CMDA prospectively, because it opened the insight into a new meaning of being. The new shape of the first science was brought to its climax by the great commentaries on the key works of the corpus, such as the *Physics*, the writing *De caelo* and the *Metaphysics*. The dating of CMDA confirms its key position for emergence of new metaphysics. The newly created *Lichtung* of truthful meaning of being in the process of cognition completed the search for a new perspective already latently present in both previous commentaries on *De anima*. The maturation of the new form of metaphysics reveals the composition of the middle commentaries and the short treatises on the intellect (*La béatitude de l’âme*, Geoffroy&Steel 2001). The new project is accomplished in the *Great Commentary on De anima*. Latin scholars knew only that commentary of the whole trilogy in an anonymous translation dated back around the year 1220 (Hasse 2010). The scholastic knew Avicenna’s commentary on *De anima* (*Liber de anima seu Sextus de naturalibus*) from the translation of the Toledo school (ch. 2.3.1). The preliminary understanding of Aristotle’s *De anima* was given in the Latin West by Neoplatonic Avicenna and only afterwards by Aristotelian Averroes. Unfortunately, that order of interpretation directs today’s objectivist approach, since the metaphysical nihilism emerged from the Avicennist postmodernism of Descartes. The interpretation of emerging objectivity strives to find a baseline in Ibn Rushd’s interpretation of *De anima*. It is much easier today, because some authors emphasize the undeniable continuity of all three commentaries.[[175]](#footnote-175) Commentaries of Averroes advocate an individual form of knowing through the activity of our intellect (*intellectus qui est in nobis*). The common denominator is the critical approach to Alexander’s and to Themistius’s interpretation of *De anima*. In the first phase of interpretation *De anima*, the theory of intellect supports the position of Ibn Bajjah and Alexander Aphrodisias. The material intellect forms a component of sensual cognition and intelligibilia are separated from sensual cognition due to their immateriality. The connection of both contents in the individual act of cognition is made by disposition of the material intellect with respect to the sovereign activity of the detached *intellectus agens* (Taylor 2005, 32–33). The second phase of Averroes’s attentive reading of *De anima* shows the gradual divorce from both thinkers. The basis was the reading of Themistius and the revision of hylic intellect, which Alfarabi already rejected (ch. 2.1.1). The new shape of material intellect as *intellectus possibilis* excluded the separation of receptive *intellectus materialis* from active intellect.[[176]](#footnote-176) This stage is already present in the *Epitome to Metaphysics* and in short treatises on the soul. The separation from preceding tradition is finally crowned by original synthesis of cognition in the CMDA, which is adopted by the final great commentaries on *Physics* and *Metaphysics*. Hermeneutics must explain the way how the final conception of Averroes’s metaphysics came about in his final reading *De anima*. Ibn Rushd harmoniously combined Aristotelian physics and metaphysics into one goal (σκωπός, *ġaraḍ*) of the first science. Their unity is crowned by a series of subsequent great commentaries on key works of the Aristotelian corpus. They reveal a new and today forgotten figure of metaphysics. Objectivity triumphed, among other reasons, because there was no longer systematic thinking of the philosophical schools of Falsafa in the Muslim West at the beginning of the thirteenth century. Hardly anybody critically explored the unity of the first philosophy in the first Western universities such as the House of Wisdom in Baghdad. The new concept of intellect founded by Averroes discovered a different *Lichtung* of metaphysical being.

Let us now quote the sentence of CMDA concerning the statute of *intellectus possibilis*, which is the place of the original truth and falsehood of the dispute about the so-called Averroism. The quotation contains the core of future dispute about objectivity in the schools of modernists and postmodernists. Those schools adopted the metaphysical project of Avicenna as the authentic disciple of Aristotle’s quest for the first science.

“This is the opposite of what happened to the modern thinkers (*quod contingit Modernis*). Between them, no one is considered a perfect thinker (*nullus enim est sciens et perfectus apud eos*) unless he is an Alexandrian (*nisi qui est Alexandreus*). The reason for this is the reputation of this man and the fact that he is considered one of the truly good commentators.”[[177]](#footnote-177)

Ibn Rushd takes Avicennists as modern adherents of dualism according to Alexander’s interpretation *De anima*. These Alexandrians, as we will continue to call them, were unable to solve the fundamental discrepancy in Alexander’s and, after him, in Avicenna’s contentious project of metaphysics. This situation happened two centuries later in the Latin West, which refused to accept Averroes’s challenge. His work became a new bone of contention from 1230 onwards, because the Latin sophists at Oxford and in Paris were unable to grasp the Commentator’s thought in depth. Albert and Bacon, following Averroes’s pattern, classify the Latin Avicennists, who professed the erroneous unity of the intellect, under a similar figure called *Moderni*. The Latin modernists united in the school of the second Averroism formed instead of Averroes’ doctrine a sophistical simulacrum, which is introduced at the Oxford and at the Paris University. The hermeneutics of objectivity fully and without reservations confirms the well-known remark of S. G. Nogales and A. R. Gauthier that Averroes was not an Averroist.[[178]](#footnote-178) The present reading, which shows the emergence of objectivity, must be anti-averroistic in a very different sense from the controversy over Latin Averroism. Therefore, it is necessary to respond in this and other volumes to the fundamental questions that emerge from the hermeneutic triad of historiality, historicity and history concerning objectivity.

* How the *alētheia* of Aristotelian first substance was restored in the major works of Averroes?
* What sense of being does reveal the writing CMDA through the new figure of *intellectus possibilis*?
* How did it happen that Averroes’s form of *intellectus possibilis* was mistakenly interpreted in the Latin Avicennism?
* How did Averroes become an Averroist and what did that mean for the development of objectivity in the Latin West?

The philosophical history of the gigantomachy concerning the substance is determined by transformations of metaphysical being. Each change of this kind establishes a new form of historicity of thought. The history of the concept of being in the metaphysics of Avicenna and Averroes is of fundamental importance, for their controversy was taken up in the Latin West. The first gigantomachy concerning the objective substance took place in Falsafa, then in schools of the first and second Averroism. Result of this struggle objectively created the historical figure of Western science and education in the mode of epochal metaphysical error (*Irrtum*). The hermeneutics of objectivity must interpret the twofold ontological foundation of metaphysics given in Avicenna’s and Averroes’s version of metaphysics (*Gründung*). The Commentator’s metaphysics completed the Aristotelian tradition of the first science. Averroes’s explanation of cognition according to *De anima* entails the unity of the person that the original text explicitly does not contain. As we will see further, the Semiaverroists from the school of the first Averroism rejected the ingenious solution of Averroes concerning the unity of the person. Thomas Aquinas and Aegidius Romanus were influenced by Avicenna’s scheme of cognition. They followed the line of objective Aristotelianism to keep the discrepancies given in the original of *De anima*, especially the dualism of the two hypostatized forms in the soul. Siger of Brabant, the best commentator of the Commentator, clearly saw these errors of Avicennism and Semiaverroism and rejected all dualistic theories of his contemporaries. Therefore, school of *Modernorum* rejected this magister as an “Averroist” and they imposed on him the academic *damnatio memoriae*. The untruth given in the dispute about the so-called Averroism opened the way to the objective metaphysics, interpreting Averroes’s metaphysics in a sophistical way. Averroes experienced this untruth himself at the end of his life, when in 1197 the Moroccan caliph Al-Mansur ordered his writings to be publicly burned as heretical.

With the project of the first philosophy, the Commentator responded to al-Ghazālī’s criticism (*Tahāfut al-Falāsifah*) by composing the antinomian work *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut*. This polemical work contains a critique of Islamic modernists, which is later adopted by the school of the first Averroism against the Latin modernists of the second Averroism. Let us now quote the core of Averroes’s gigantomachy, which concerned modern necessity tied to the essence rather than real substances.[[179]](#footnote-179) Averroes correctly saw that by separating existence from substance in the metaphysics of *Modernorum*, the death of modern God is inevitable. He defended against Avicenna the first science of Aristoteles, which had been outlined before him by Alfarabi. Nevertheless, Alfarabi was unable to complete it because of Neoplatonic influence. Alfarabi’s conception of metaphysics was given a new form by the fact that Averroes gives an answer to all Avicenna’s key errors. Averroes rejected the fundamentalist and dogmatic thesis of theologians about God’s inscrutable omnipotence. That theory tries to refute Avicenna’s anthropological conception of modern God (ch. 2.3.3). The world explained by divine providence could not follow the course of natural causes. In the final analysis, these causes depended entirely on divine providence and its inscrutability. The abolition of causality would make the natural sciences and metaphysics impossible. Averroes, in response to Algazel’s criticism of the modernists, upholds only one truth for theology and philosophy and one goal of knowing according to the *Metaphysics Lambda*, but he emphasizes two different paths to the First Cause and two forms of knowing the Immobile Mover. This debate over the autonomy of philosophy and theology prefigured the Western controversy over the twofold truth in the Latin West. See the following analyses devoted to controversy of the year 1277. Through this dispute, an analogous univocal Avicennism of Latin *Modernorum* came into the world, as it was the case of Neoplatonic Falsafa two centuries earlier. At the center of the interpretation stands the metaphysical status of the first substance and the correct determination of *intellectus possibilis*, in which the first substance is adequately revealed for our cognition. Both central questions about substance and its cognition provide the basic structure of Averroes’s metaphysics. The dispute between the two conceptions of metaphysics began after the arrival of Averroes’s writings in the Latin West around the year 1220–30. Aristotelians in the Blund’s school in Paris revised Aristotle’s metaphysics in the spirit of the Commentator. Their conflict with the Latin sophists and modernists started another round of gigantomachy about substance.

### 2.4.1 Metaphysics of the First Substance

Gigantomachy concerning substance of two Arab greatest philosophers must be interpreted in accordance with the analysis of different schools in Falsafa. Averroes’s philosophy fundamentally rejected any deviation of metaphysics towards Neoplatonism. According to Averroes, the modern metaphysics contradicts the Aristotelian school of Falsafa represented by the Second Master. Averroes separates his project from Alexander Aphrodisias, from Themistius, and understandably from Avicenna. See the synoptic survey of key passages from the *Tafsīr* (*Long Commentary on the Metaphysics*), wherein Averroes criticizes Avicenna (Bertolacci 2014, 114–20). There can be found three main themes Averroes’s criticism concerning Avicenna and the modern studies of that subject. Interpretation of objectivity follows two points of Averroes’s polemic. First, Avicenna abolished the hyparchical character of the first substance by building metaphysics on the universal supposition *ens inquantum ens*. Averroes objects that Avicenna destroyed the definition of metaphysics as the first Aristotelian science. Second, the concept of the person is flawed in principle, since Avicenna introduced inadmissible dualism into human cognition. The commentaries *De anima* establish a new way of cognition. Averroes excludes all forms of being of the third kind by introducing a new form of *intellectus possibilis*. Both postulates show that his aim of metaphysics stands on a different value of the predication *per prius* and *per posterius* that fundamentally rejects the ontotheological model of modernity. The Commentator defined the first science, which follows the same unity of being as Aristotle’s writings *De anima*, *Physics* and *Metaphysics*. The path follows original unity of the existing substance in form “substance *qua* substance.”

The controversy between the two thinkers concerns the basic orientation of the first science. Averroes’s great commentary on the interpretation of the *Metaphysics Lambda* (*Met*. 1069a18–1072b16) is based on the translation of Baghdad Christian and Aristotelian Abu Bishr Matta (c. †940). He translated the commentary of Alexander Aphrodisias on *Lambda* into Arabic. Alexander’s original commentary on *Metaphysics* says that the physics cannot see into the principles of divine and purely intellectual substance (ἡ δὲ νοητὴ καὶ θεία οὐσία τῆς φυσικῆς), because only philosophy can do that (ἀλλὰ τῆς προκειμένης φιλοσοφίας, *Alex. In Met*. 671.12–13). The physicist cannot contemplate the principles of the substance (μὴ τῆς φυσικῆς εἶναι τὸ περὶ αὐτῆς θεωρεῖν, *ibid.* 671.13). The following argument points out difference between the physics and the metaphysics from the point of view of the first principles of being. The movable substance explored by the physics has no common principles, which included the immutable substance as well (οὐδαμῶς κατ' οὐδὲν ἡ αἰσθητὴ οὐσία κοινωνεῖ τῇ νοητῇ, *ibid.* 671.15). The movable substance recognized by the senses and the immovable substance recognized by the intellect have no common principle, which could be recognized by the physics of moving bodies (οὐδέ ἐστί τις αὐταῖς ἀρχὴ κοινή, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τῆς φυσικῆς, *ibid.* 671.16). Alexander deduces that the two sciences must be fundamentally separated, which Avicenna accomplished in his project of the first science. The first science, in Alexander’s and Avicenna’s view, became the absolute science in the sense of the Latin word *absolutum*, because it is separated from the physics. Averroes’s interpretation follows Alexander’s commentary to a key point where Aphrodisias radically separates the study of physics and metaphysics because of dissimilarity of their principles. Averroes criticizes this thesis fundamentally and he rejects Alexander’s and Avicenna’s metaphysics. Aristotle formes the unity of investigation concerning the first science. The writing *Metaphysics Lambda* begins where the book *Physics* ends, namely with the investigation of separated substance as the last source of movement. The quoted text from *Metaphysics* XII.3 ends with the fact that the thinking of physics must stop (ἀνάγκη δὴ στῆναι, *Met*. 1070a4) at the moment when it passes beyond the motion, the becoming and passing away of natural bodies. The question is whether this stopping of deduction concerning the first principle of motion means a break between physics and metaphysics (Alexander, Neoplatonism, Avicenna) or whether it represents the start into thinking of the first substance beyond physics (Alfarabi, Averroes). According to Averroes, the unified nature of being in the metaphysics sought by Aristotle (πρὸς ἓν καὶ μίαν τινὰ φύσιν, *Met*. 1003a33–34) ends at the substance as the ultimate source of univocal meaning. Avicenna’s metaphysics, according to Ibn Rushd, found the meaning of being in the model of analogy, whose original source is Alexander Aphrodisias.[[180]](#footnote-180) Being is not a genus that transcends substance to some form of false univocity given by analogy. On this key point, Averroes keeps a critical distance from both predecessors, from Alexander and from Avicenna.[[181]](#footnote-181) The *Middle Commentary on Metaphysics* (*Epitome*) criticizes Avicenna for establishing being as the highest genus. Avicenna puts together fundamentally different things. The *Great Commentary on Metaphysics* explicitly rejects the eclipse of being in the metaphysics of Avicenna. The commentary mentions the darkness (obscurity) which confused Avicenna.

“Accordingly, one must understand that the principles of the two sciences are different, I mean in the manner one envisages them only, not in their being. This is why the commentary of Alexander on this point is very ambiguous unless one establishes this distinction. It is this obscurity that misled Ibn Sīnā as we have said.” (*Comm. Magnum in Met.* 1436; ed. Genequand, p. 80)

The critical distinction established by Averroes against Alexander concerns connection between physics and metaphysics. The eminent interpreter of Aristotle conceived disjunctively their relation to each other. Averroes’s *Great Commentary on Metaphysics* assumes a different view from Avicenna (“this obscurity that misled Ibn Sīnā”) and corrects Alexander’s view (“unless one establishes this distinction”). Averroes claims that there is a common object of the first science (“two sciences are different … not in their being”), which is the study of three kinds of substance. Ibn Rushd speaks of a threefold division of first real substance: the perishable movable substance, the eternal movable substance, and the immovable substance as the first cause of motion. The monotheistic God, known through revelation, exists separately from the knowledge of the first philosophy. Metaphysics, in the order of natural cognition, answers only the question of the first causes concerning the substances. There are material and immaterial substances and finally one immobile immaterial substance. All three substances exist in the order of the first substances as defined by the *Categories*, that is, in their original and real simplicity (ch. 1.3). The separated first substance possesses a unique being of its own and thereby it is the source of movement for the other subordinate spheres. Into this separated and immobile first substance, given in full mode *per prius*, two different views are possible, because in general two different scientific investigate the being of the first substance (“Two sciences are different … in the manner one envisages them only”). The physics gives the first view on the immobile immaterial substance and the metaphysics mediates the second view. The physics investigates the first separated substance from the view of the causality as the first cause of the cosmic movement as far as coming into being and disappearance of real substances are concerned. Metaphysics defines this first substance from the point of view of the first principles of cognition. This unity of the object of study of the first science provides a twofold insight into each first substance from the viewpoint of motion (physics) and the first principles of the universe (metaphysics). The first science dealing with the real unity of the first substances exists because its research starts from the physics of the real bodies. Therefore, metaphysics is the Aristotelian first science according to the scientific methodology of the *Second Analytics* and not by Avicenna’s speculation given by the mystical intuition into the amphibolical nature of being. Therefore, these sciences cannot be different from each other, as Avicenna erroneously postulated and as Alexander did not explain properly. Both thinkers muddled the relation between thought and the first substance. The Commentator completed Alfarabi’s project of metaphysics that already contains Alfarabi’s writing *De ortu scientiarum* (ch. 2.1). We have an eternal, separated and immobile substance, which is explored both in the last eighth book of *Physics* and in the book *Metaphysics Z, H* and in the book *Lambda*. Averroes examines the first substance at first according to the *Physics* and then according to the *Metaphysics*. Avicenna, on the other hand, separated the first science from the physics of the bodies. He lost the scientific character of the first science that is connected to the first real substance. Avicenna’s denudation confuses the concept of substance as genus with the existence of the unique single thing. Such a being of the third kind arose from the fact that Avicenna combined the categorial predication *per prius* related to the substance and the predication *per posterius* related to accidents. Moreover, he created a false analogical unity of being. The concept of “*hoc esse tantum*“ connects the universal essence and the unique being of the real thing. According to Averroes, these fundamental errors resulted in an obscure metaphysics that did not respect the principles of actual substance in reality and its potential and universal signification in cognizing intellect. Ibn Rushd established in full force Aristotelian metaphysical dative, which the Second Master did not sufficiently respect. Averroes proclaims that beyond the second substance there is but plurality of an equivocal meaning. Done in this way, the unity cannot be categorically predicated as a metaphysical concept. The unity of being behind substance can be conceived either on the level of homonymy or analogy. There is no univocity at the level of transcendental predication made *per prius*. The investigation of generic being as “*ens inquantum ens*”, which Avicenna’s metaphysics presupposes, is fundamentally false. The existence of real substance as the source of cosmic motion points to the first principles of metaphysics, which are sought in the context of scientific proof based on the real causality of physical bodies. Therefore, it is necessary to inquire “substance *qua* substance,” as Averroes’s *Great Commentary on Metaphysics* repeats in many places. Let us now quote the brief summary of the main argument against Avicenna in the Latin translation of the book. The Latin text is important because the generation of sophists named *doctores Latini* had this text before their eyes; nevertheless, it had no meaning for them. Unlike the modernists, the school of the first Averroism recognized the fundamental metaphysical error of Avicenna. The comitation of hypostatized essences given only in thought is not an Aristotelian predication of categories. That kind of predication follows the necessity according to the metaphysical dative that is predicated in the mode of imposition.

“Avicenna erred in principle (*peccavit multum*) to assume that the unity and the existence are distinct dispositions added to the essence of the thing (*unum et ens significant dispositiones additas essentiae rei*).” [[182]](#footnote-182)

What is the fundamental error of Avicenna? It concerns erroneous supposition that transcendental or amphibolical determination such as unity and being (*unum et ens*) represent the properties that can be arbitrarily assigned to any existing real thing (*dispositiones additas essentiae rei*). The generic unity is separated from the critically examined metaphysic unity. This one is built on the Aristotelian correspondence of the first and the second substance. The so called “thing” (*res*) of Avicenna is defined as being of the third kind. It received a categorial determination through the hypostatized comitation. These elementary properties (*unum et ens*), which are related to the essence of the real thing itself (*essentia rei*), are attributed to a new being, which is neither the first nor the second substance. This is possible only in the case of the introduction of the substance of the third kind (ch. 1.3.1). We have analyzed this procedure in Avicenna’s metaphysics on the example of the comitation of minimal intentional being (*esse diminutum,* ch. 2.3.3). The representatives of the school of *Nominales* and later the modernists of the school of the second Averroism repeated the same critical error. According to the *Categories*, the predication of universal concepts on the level of the actually existing first substance is absolutely unacceptable. The first substance has a hyparchical position for the categorical predication because it is absolutely simple and actual, it exists *simpliciter* and *per se*. The real thing cannot assume any universal determinations. The first substance enables categorical predication by its actual existence. Causal effect on human senses and intellect is mediatized in virtue of the *dativus metaphysicus* (ch. 1.3). Substance, in Avicenna’s view, became a conglomerate of individual and universal determinations of the third kind. Predication of *tertium ens* establishes the final stage of unity on the level of generic being in order to create a new metaphysics.[[183]](#footnote-183) Averroes precisely sees the fundamental metaphysical error of Avicenna, which finds expression in the Oxfordian Fallacy (OBJ II, ch. 3.1.1). Duns Scotus completed it in his metaphysics. Modernists do not create a metaphysical, but merely a logical or essential unity of being. Postmodernism repeated this epochal error (*Irrtum*) in Suárez’s version of *metaphysica generalis* and subsequently in the nihilistic version of the same tragicomedy, which is given as Unified Science. Averroes preserves against Avicenna the theory of the twofold method and the one truth. He separates the level of metaphysical abstraction that is necessary for the concept of the first science. It is metaphysics of substance *qua* substance based on the study of moving substance in the physics. The metaphysics of substance opposes Avicenna’s mythopoetic metaphysics based on logical abstraction *ens inquantum ens*. Let us now go to the last representative of the first Averroism, who knew and quoted exactly this difference between Avicenna and Averroes. William Ockham, on behalf of critical scholasticism, quotes the canonical summary of Aristotle’s metaphysics according to Averroes against Avicennists of his time that were represented by modernist school of Duns Scotus at Oxford.

“It is evident that the first determination to which the term ‘being’ pertains in full simplicity and primarily, is that which responds to the question: What is this indivisible which exists evidently by itself ? This question concerns the first substance.” [[184]](#footnote-184)

The substance existing in reality keeps the first and fundamental determination of being in the mode *simpliciter* and *principaliter*. Only the entity as “this thing” answers fully the question “*Quid est ?”* thanks to evident existence of the real thing (*hoc individuum demonstratum*), since it exists by its own act of actualized being (*existens per se*). Again, the fundamental dispute of Porphyry with the Neoplatonists about the statute of indivisible first substance is on the table. Ockham’s thesis corresponds to Averroes’s commentary on *Met*. VII that asserts following proposition.

“And if we investigate what is that entity that exists indivisibly in reality, then there is no other answer to this question outside the actual existence of the thing.” [[185]](#footnote-185)

We find a similar thesis in the central part of Averroes’s commentary on the *Categories* that interprets key part of hyparchical predication *Cat*. 2a14–16 which was previously commented on by Alfarabi. The Commentator, like the Second Master, principally upholds the difference “*secundum modum similitudinis”* between the first and the second substance.[[186]](#footnote-186) The imposition of signification in the second substance would cease to exist if disappears the hyparchical status of the first substance. The correspondent and therefore categorical relation is made at the level of cognition. It is given according to the causality expressed by the metaphysical dative. Since the phenomenon exists in the reality, its cognition can exist in the thought. Let us now return to the original division of the first and second substance, which was outlined by Alfarabi as the basic program for metaphysical exploration. The key quotation from Abunaser’s *Commentary on the Categories* (*Cat*. 2a11–16) took a new meaning in the metaphysics of Averroes. Substance is defined by the predication *per prius* and *per posterius*, which is related in one way to the first substance and in another way to the second substance. Averroes investigates substance *qua* substance and therefore explores the universal determination of substance done by Alfarabi (“*die allgemeinen Begriffe der Substanzen*,” ch. 2.1). Averroes, like Alfarabi, holds to the classical conception of existing substance *per se* (ch. 2.1.1). From Averroes’s point of view, the term “higher” in Alfarabi’s definition of substance (“*des Namens 'Substanz' würdiger als die Individuen“*) clearly means the fulfillment of the line of *Phys*. VIII and likewise of *Met*. IV, VIII and XII. From the research of movable substances (perissable, imperissable), the first science passed to the research of the immovable and wholly unique substance. That unity can be researched both by the physicist and especially by the metaphysician. The term “higher substance” does not mean a separated, transcendentally conceived being (*ens inquantum ens*) as Avicenna proclaims. The classic metaphysician can explore the apodictic principles of the first material substance, which the physicist working with material substances only presupposes. Averroes therefore ranks the metaphysics behind the physics; one science cannot perform without the other. The proceeding ist correct, since it follows the fundamental teaching of the *Categories*. The first substance is the original source of meaning. It goes at first to the species, that is, to the physics, since the species and the physics stand next to the first substance. The imposition from the real world having been done correctly (*Physics VIII*) the reflection can start on the level of general supposition that is, to investigate the highest principles of being at the level of genus (*Metaphysics Gamma, Lambda*). Both apodictic paths of investigation of the first substance have a one real object, which is investigated from two sides. The specific imposition of meaning is supplied by physics, the generic supposition of meaning is supplied by metaphysics. It is now clear why metaphysics cannot do without physics and why the projects of Alexander and Avicenna are fundamentally wrong. They created an unrealistic metaphysics of modernity. The metaphysics of Averroes as “substance *qua* substance*”* and the metaphysics of Avicenna as “*ens inquantum ens”* are two fundamentally different projects of the first science as to the ultimate unity of being. Therefore, we refer to Averroes’s conception of the first science by the term “meta-physics.” The name was originally used by Andronikos of Rhodes to classify Aristotle’s writings devoted to the search for the first science of substance. Avicenna’s “metaphysics” becomes the simulacrum of Averroes’s “meta-physics.” The hyphen symbolizes archaic semantics in the mode of Apollonian connection (*sūmbolon*) with the commencement of metaphysics (*Anfang*). Muses influence the birth of modern metaphysics (*Beginn*) through hidden effect of the goddess of Vengeance (ch. 1.2). The cognition in the mode of *adaequatio* goes from the first real substance by disclosure from the front in the direction of categorically predicated second substance. Therefore, the *Great Commentary on De anima* (CMDA) emphasizes that at least one really thinking human being must exist to ensure the existence of the material intellect as universal species. In this case, the existence of philosophy as a general science is made by the imposition of meaning from a really existing thought. This correspondence to the reality ensures the deductive proof of universally given intellect (ch. 2.4.3).

What confused Avicenna and caused his project of metaphysics to be flawed in principle? We find the basic argument against Avicenna in the *Great Commentary on Metaphysics*, which we quoted above. The conclusion of the quotation mentions an obscurity that confused Avicenna. Averroes refused to make the separation of physics from metaphysics. Avicenna had not grasped correctly the original architecture of Aristotle’s thought. He nullifies the metaphysical aspiration of *Physics* VIII with the assertion from the *Metaphysics* that it is impossible to prove the first principles in a special science. An infinite regress would arise and the very possibility of scientific proof would become invalid.[[187]](#footnote-187) Averroes agrees with Alexander’s and Avicenna’s reasoning that the study of motion belongs in sensually conditioned cognition, as opposed to the intellectually given first science. The subordinate status of physics, however, gives no reason to exclude it from the claim to be the first science. The physics investigates some universal aspects of the first substance, such as causality. Averroes claims that the questioning of the first science does not begin with the abstract principles of being, but by analyzing the existing substances.[[188]](#footnote-188) The metaphysics follows the physics to find scientifically grounded principles of substance. In doing so properly, it becomes the first science. Once again, the hermeneutic path of ontological understanding (*Vor-blickbahn*) returns to the scene. We must follow the direction from which the meaning of being is regarded and understood (*Bezugssinn*). The Commentator founded metaphysics from the direction of the first actual substance in its act of being (substance *qua* substance). Avicenna founded modernity from the direction of the logical concept of generic beingness (*ens inquantum ens*). Averroes’s position on this point clearly follows the imposition of meaning according to the metaphysical dative (ch. 1.1). Therefore, he criticizes the Neoplatonic project and Avicenna’s metaphysics as fundamentally flawed. Based on the understanding of being disclosed from behind, the project of the first science failed because Avicenna committed several grave errors at once. He left the investigation of substance, which makes the original aim of the first science.[[189]](#footnote-189) He created the hierarchy of hypostatic being based on the equivocity of the meaning of “to be.” The investigation of the ultimate unity of being thus became completely confused, since it is not studied in an apodictic and scientific way. Following Alexander, Avicenna separated the study of physics and metaphysics and abolished the unity of the first science. Averroes sees clearly that Avicenna has no Aristotelian categorical identity tied to the reality of first substance. Avicenna considers identity of substance in purely logical terms as supposition of meaning. In both cases it is true that the identity of the substance is given in the logical mode A=A in the same sense. Nevertheless, the identity of logical substance and metaphysical ipseity of the second substance are fundamentally different, since they make part of different modes of predication. Metaphysical predication is based on the imposition of unique meaning from the first substance; logical predication works with the supposition of generic meaning from the second substance. Hyparchical modality “*qua”* is given by the disclosure of metaphysical being from the front, i.e., from the first substance. The “meta-physics” takes the causality in a real sense. The logical modality “*inquantum”* is given by the disclosure from behind, that is, from the generic meaning. In such a case, the mind makes abstraction of the real causality. These two ways of comprehension cannot be combined in one class of *modus ponens*. The predication of substance does not take place in the same sense (metaphysical versus logical meaning). The epochal error of modernity hides in this falsely unified version of *modus ponens*. The logical statement was confused with the metaphysical statement. Avicenna called into being the modern *Irrtum* of Western metaphysics, which Averroes categorically rejected. The logical thinking of the modernists therefore contradicts in that fundamental point Aristotle’s project of the first science. Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* forbids that research could start at the wholeness of abstract being.[[190]](#footnote-190) Platonic realm of the highest genera exists only in the thought. Such abstraction cannot produce a scientific proof that is based on the causality of first real substances. The first science cannot be founded on the logic speculation. On the level of logical abstraction, there is no metaphysical certainty of the first principles that concerns the real world. According to the quoted passage from the book *Gamma*, there would be an infinite regress of cognition.

Metaphysics of Avicenna, Scotus and Descartes took this faulty foundation of the first science placed outside the reality of first substances as the basic program for constituting a first modern science about being. Modernity started from a general determination of being in the mode “*ens inquantum ens.”* Avicenna found a new evident principle of non-contradiction in and for itself and not in the first real substance (substance *qua* substance). Let us recall Averroes’s key phrase, quoted below, that Avicenna began metaphysics by himself (*incepit quasi a se*, ch. 2.4.4). Thereby metaphysics arose as modern *episteme*, which examines entities of the third kind and secondarily verifies their contingent existence in the reality. This fatal turn of the *Modernorum* in the Latin West is analyzed in the passages dealing with the Oxfordian Fallacy. The ultimate Aristotelian search for the unity starts in the *Physics*, as Andronikos of Rhodes called the writing of Aristoteles dedicated to this research. The metaphysics seeks the first principles of being behind physics (*tá metá tá phusiká*), in the science concerning the unmoving immaterial substance. The classical metaphysics follows the way of the metaphysical dative as correspondence of the first and the second substance. The first science is bound by the principle of reality; therefore, it has no absolute truth like modern logic, which is separated in principle from the reality in the mode *absolute*. Modern logic can be paranoid about reality while thinking in an absolutely correct way. It can never happen in the metaphysical concept of truth. Averroes claims that here is the second error of Avicenna, which arises from his first error, that is, from the devaluation of the physics.[[191]](#footnote-191) The metaphysics can be apodictically founded as the first science only in connection with the physics. It investigates the first principles of the substance like the causality and the movement. The real substance is primary and it exists *per se*. An infinite regress does not exist in a first science, because the book *Lambda* explores these principles in relation to the first separate immaterial substance of the Immobile Mover. The first principles exist, since there is always a kind of the first real substance. That’s why there can’t be an infinite regress at a correctly made correspondence of reality and thinking. Metaphysics has to find a predication that starts on the level of the second substance and corresponds to the existence of the first substance. The principles of the science deal with the first actual substance, but they manifest themselves in two forms of science. The physics presupposes *a posteriori* the fact that are the first principles of substance given *a priori*. The metaphysician proves the twofold procedure of physics and metaphysics in an apodictic way, i.e., by analyzing the immobile and immaterial substance as the ultimate source of cosmic motion.[[192]](#footnote-192) Averroes explicitly remarks that this neglect of architectural nature of the scientific proof from physics to metaphysics forms the fundamental ambiguity in Alexander and it led Avicenna into his fatal error.

“Perhaps this aspect is what Alexander means when he says that the specialist in this science investigates what the principles of the eternal substance are, but that the natural philosopher does not have to postulate that sort of inquiry, nor does he need it. Perhaps he also means that the natural philosopher inquires into what the principles of the substance subject to generation and corruption are by the method proper to it, that is to say into its proximate principles, declaring that the immovable substance is the principle of the movable. This is how his words must be understood; otherwise, they are very obscure; this is what led Ibn Sīnā into error.” (*Comm. magnum in Met*. 1426; ed. Genequand, p. 75)

The substances really exist and in three basic genera (substance material, immaterial, immobile and separated first substance). Therefore, their scientific investigation is possible both in the physics and in the metaphysics. The predication of being as a genus placed outside of the substance is only homonymous according to Aristotle. The research of unity done in that way leads the cognition to end in the infinite regress. That path expressly forbids the quoted passage from the *Metaphysics* IV.4. The first science deals with the actual unity of being. Therefore, it cannot stand on any doubtful univocity, which is situated beyond the categorical meaning of existing substances. The physicist proves that the separated immobile substance establishes the principle of motion for all perishable and imperishable substances. The metaphysician searches the principles of substance *qua* substance made of properties concerning the immobile and separated first substance. Then, there is the twofold research of the actual existing substance, which is examined in physics (substance in various kinds of movement, becoming, passing away, eternal permanence) and in metaphysics (substance *qua* substance). Averroes rejected Avicenna’s flawed project of metaphysics through an analysis of the categorical and generic determinations of substance. He supplemented this negative thesis with the positive possibility of combining the investigation of substance *qua* substance into a unity of the first science.[[193]](#footnote-193) His approach follows Aristotle’s exploration of the causes of motion, which leads up to the first cause (*Phys*. VIII). This first cause ends with the exploration of the principles of this immobile substance (*Met*. XII). Taken from the point of the order of predication *per prius* and *per posterius*, it is true that the physics follows the path of the imposition of meaning from the first substance.[[194]](#footnote-194) Thomas Aquinas proceeded in the same way because he had the same vision of metaphysics as Averroes in that point. We find the precursor of Aquinas’s well-known five ways (*quinque viae*) in this quotation from Averroes’s *Great Commentary in Metaphysics*.[[195]](#footnote-195) The term “proof” (*dalā'il*) was later defined by Siger and Thomas as a path (*via*) towards the separated existence of God, who shows himself to apodictic thought in the mode of causality as the First Mover. The scientific references to the first immobile substance or the ways to it are based on the movement and the causality that we know originally from the physics of the real bodies. This causality, however, must be understood within the framework of the predication *per posterius* related to the separated divine substance. We can consider it only indirectly, in the metaphysics thinking. The book *Lambda* devoted to the Immobile Mover accomplished the exploration *per prius* related to the principles of the first substance. The proofs made in the physics keep the apodictic validity in the metaphysics, since the existence of the first principles of any science is unprovable. Therefore, physics precedes metaphysics and it converges into metaphysics. Physics and metaphysics complement each other, because the predication *per prius* and *per posterius* has a different level of truth, which relates to the real thing existing outside of human mind. The inductive research goes from the direction of the movable substance to the immovable substance that lies beyond the physics. Deductive research of the principles of substance begins in metaphysics, which seeks the primary determinations of substance as such (substance *qua* substance) and works with them on the level of the first principles. Averroes introduced the epochal difference in the mode of metaphysical education between the classical *paideía* and the modern *apaideusía* (*Met*. 1006a6). Modernity does not require a imposition of meaning from the reality of the first substance (ch. 1.2). Averroes’s approach to metaphysics can be summarized by following sentence from the *Second Analytics*: “Investigating what the thing is, while not knowing whether it exists or not, is no research at all” (τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν τί ἐστι μὴ ἔχοντας ὅτι ἔστι, μηδὲν ζητεῖν ἐστιν, *Anal. Post*. 93a26–27). Commentator’s criticism of Avicenna shows the modern *Lichtung* of Western metaphysics. In the eclipse of the first substance comes the epochal madness (*Irre)* of modernity that founded the first science in a principally erroneous way.

The Commentator considers Avicenna’s metaphysics to be the fundamental error of thought. Therefore he cannot accept his theory of truth as intellectual assimilation and illumination (ch. 2.3.3). Such an identity arises in the diacosmos of objective forms and puts together beings of the third kind. Avicenna illuminates the whole of being from the principles which are situated beyond the categorial meaning of the first substance. Averroes insists on the fact that metaphysics must seek a categorical unity derived from the first hyparchic substances. Both founders of Western metaphysics start from unconcealed metaphysical being (*alētheia*), which Alfarabi handed over to the West. The determination of metaphysics from the direction of the first substance determines the correspondence theory of truth, which is fundamentally different from Avicenna’s approach. The West knows Averroes’s definition of truth much later than Avicenna’s. It dates back to Averroes’s work *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut* (*Destructio Destructionum*, Venetia 1492), which was adopted against al-Ghazālī’s writing *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah* on the errors of philosophers.[[196]](#footnote-196) Averroes’s theory of truth is formally the same as in *Liber de Philosophia prima* I.8 by Avicenna. Hermeneutics follow Heidegger’s question about “how” (*das hermeneutische* *Wie*) the correspondence of thought and reality is given. That concept of truth differs fundamentally from Avicenna on the level of *Bezugssinn* and *Vollzugssinn* (ch. 1). Averroes takes absolutely seriously the fact that the truth, according to *Metaphysics* quoted above (ch. 2.1) is in thought and not in the thing. Substance exists; therefore, we can truthfully know and scientifically predict its causal action and motion. The unity of substance is the first genus in the order of univocal predication of being and the first categorical determination of accidents. That is why there is a metaphysical determination of the substance predicated in an apodictical way. Avicenna’s definition of truth goes the opposite direction, i.e., from intellect to the real thing (ch. 2.3.2). The hermeneutics of objectivity investigate two fundamentally different perspectives of understanding (*Vor-blickbahn*), because the metaphysical truth is not the logical one. In the identical definition of truth, a principal difference exists in the primacy of the singular being (*individuum* of Porphyry) and the first actual substance (*ousía* of Aristotle). The determination comes from the real world and it directs classical metaphysics into the trajectory of vision in the *qua*-mode. This is the path indicated by the *dativus metaphysicus* through the donation of comprehension (τό τί ἦν εἶναι, *quidditas*) that comes from the real causality of existing things (τό τί, *qua*). Classical metaphysics names this hyparchical perspective of understanding by the term “*modus essendi.”* The determinacy of meaning comes from the real world and it ascertains in classical metaphysics the primary trajectory of comprehension in the mode *qua*. In the second step comes the general and potential cognition of intellect in the mode *inquantum*. Classical metaphysics names this logic perspective of understanding by the term “*modus cognoscendi.”* The imposition of the metaphysical sense of being in the hyparchical mode *ipse* is not the supposition of logical meaning in the mode *idem*. The first science considers the unity of the real world, because the logical identity is only an imperfect unity made of abstraction of second degree. Hermeneutics consider the concept of truth of Averroes and Avicenna to be principally incompatible. Both thinkers represent a fundamentally different perspective (*Vor-blickbahn*) to grasp the meaning of being. Truth, according to Averroes, arises in the mind at the level of conceptual judgment, and this kind of signification depends on the existence of first substance. The determination of truth goes from reality through the senses into the concept. Averroes commentary on *Metaphysics* shows the secondary position of truth with respect to the existence of first substance.

“Truth and untruth are not in things, any more than good and evil, if truth is like good and error like evil; they are in cognition.” [[197]](#footnote-197)

In contrast to Avicenna, the *intellectus possibilis* forms a necessary condition to create correspondence of reality and thinking. The proceeding will be explored in the next chapter. Thereafter, the investigation of being as true proceeds according to the second rule of the *Metaphysics* (*Met*. 1027b30–31). The first science explores the first existing substance; therefore error and truth arise only in understanding. On the contrary, Avicenna confirmed after Alexander that physics cannot look into the first principles of substance. Therefore, he takes the truth as basic determination of being according to the passage quoted above from *Metaphysics* VI. 2 (ch. 2.4). Avicenna claims that no science can prove its own principles. Therefore, metaphysics is the first science separated from the other ways of inquiry to investigate being as “*ens inquantum ens.”* Averroes, on the other hand, cannot establish metaphysics at all without the study of physics. The first science about real substance would have no apodictic and causally given presuppositions and principles to be built upon. The metaphysics must consider being through “substance *qua* substance.” The real substance is unified as absolutely first simple substance according to *Cat*. 2a11–16. But there are two ways of investigation. The metaphysics indicates *per prius* the principles of the substance, the physics investigates *per posterius* its movement and causality. The existence of the first substance forms the basic cause of the unity of research. Then there are two perspectives of hyparchical signification (*impositio*), the one in the physics and the other in the metaphysics. The twofold meaning of the first substance remains, because we have an object of research, that is the first simple substance in three genera (material, immaterial, totally separated immaterial). The imposition of meaning from the real substance differs in physics and metaphysics from the point of view of cognition. There are two generically different perspectives how to predicate the meaning of the first substance. On the one hand, there is a categorically predicated genus in the realm of physical properties at the level of the body and, on the other hand, there are ultimate metaphysical principles at the level of separated immaterial substance. The introductory quotation dealing with Alexander’s commentary on *Metaphysics* emphasized that physics and metaphysics refer to the first substance. The principles of both sciences are different, but have the same object of research, namely the being of the first substance. Since cognition begins with the senses, the twofold perspective established a twofold predication, which we know from the analysis of the *Categories* (ch. 1.3). First, the cognition *per prius* of the (material and immaterial) movable substances arises, then follows metaphysical investigation *per posterius* of the purely intellectual principles of the first immaterial, unchangeable and immovable substance. The research in the book *Lambda* clearly indicates this way of proceeding. It begins with the empiric substance and it ends with the investigation of the Immobile Mover. The important quotation in the *Metaphysics* VI.1 clearly determines the place of both sciences with regard to the unity of cognition. The metaphysics of the immobile substance establishes the last hyparchical level of the research of the unity of being.[[198]](#footnote-198) Averroes interprets the metaphysical determination of substance (ὄντος ᾗ ὂν, substance *qua* substance) in an entirely Aristotelian way (*qua*) and not in a Neoplatonic way of generic and analogic similarity (*inquantum*) as the modernists do. Avicenna’s tautological error (see the term “ὂν ταύτης” in the footnote) was evident for the critically thinking Aristotelicians. The logical identity of substance in mode *inquantum* is not the metaphysical ipseity in mode *qua*. Avicenna did not conduct an apodictic exploration of the first principles of substance as substance. Moreover, he confused the formal exploration of the principles of abstract being as a concept with actual existence of the real substance.

This principal difference concerns the metaphysical concept of person as first substance. Siger of Brabant as brilliant Aristotelian defended the hyparchical predication of the person against the modernists and against Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas (OBJ III, ch. 4.4.1). Against the modern Avicennists and the Semi-Averroists, Siger proposed the unity of the person according to Aristotelian metaphysics in the mode *qua* (τῆς τοιαύτης ψυχῆς ἔργον, *De generatione animalium* 736b12). Avicenna and modern metaphysics believe in the omnipotent power of the logical supposition. They mystically and later objectively observe the realm of mythopoetic concept, instead of going to the path of the metaphysical imposition of meaning from the real causality of the first substance. The confusion in the imposition and supposition of substance caused the destruction of metaphysics in Avicenna. That line of criticism is present already in his short commentary on the *Metaphysics* (*Epitome*) written around the years 1180–86. The rejection of contemporaries like Avicenna is connected with the criticism of *tertium ens*. The controversy with the modernists concerned Neoplatonic statute of the body. Averroes rejected the Neoplatonic primacy of mathematics as did Alfarabi (ch. 2.1.2). Mathematics is based on mental abstraction and its object is only the second intention, in contrast to the independently existing substance.[[199]](#footnote-199) The work *Epitome* explicitly rejects Simplicius’s thesis according to which some primary qualities and corporeality exist independently of the composition of form and substance (ch. 1.3.3). The error concerns the determination of the primary matter, which is formed through arithmetical relations and geometrical figures. Avicenna proclaimed in his above-mentioned *Tafsīr*-commentary that there are objective properties of a physical body at the level of being as being. These hypostatized properties can be attributed to any existing real thing in the mode of comitation (*dispositiones additas essentiae rei*, ch. 2.3.2). The previous chapter shows that such a mental determination of being was sufficient to define the minimal portion of beingness that ensures the identity of each possible substance. Avicenna made of corporeality and primal qualities a quasi-form that directly determines *materia prima*. Determination of *materia prima* by the formal principle “Limited—Unlimited” appears for the first time in Jamblichus (ch. 1.3.1). The criticism of Neoplatonists makes use the teaching of Aristotelian Alexander Aphrodisias, who ties any existing matter solely to the real body. The writing *Epitome* treats Porphyry as true interpreter of second substance according to universal meaning related to hyparchical predication of *Cat*. 2a14–15 (πρώτως οὐσίαι λεγόμεναι ὑπάρχουσιν, ch. 1. 3). Porphyry’s interpretation of the *Categories* therefore differs from the later development of Neoplatonic thinkers based on *tertium ens*.[[200]](#footnote-200) The quoted passage criticizes Avicenna’s definition of the body that disregards existing material things. For Averroes, similar definitions are merely a dialectical play with words at the level of paronymy. That is exactly Aristotle’s view of universals that are placed outside of the categorical predication. We have quoted the opening passage of the *Categories*, which conceives of the whiteness of man and horse as merely a nominal difference between words, which does not permit the common predication because of the difference in substance (*Cat*. 1a12). Averroes read the *Categories* as an Aristotelian, not in a way of Neoplatonists nor modernists. He claims that there is no categorial predication of substance as a body without real substance. According to Averroes, the Neoplatonic body given as Simplicius’s *tertium ens* makes the great error. The following quotation from the short commentary on the *Metaphysics* critically summarizes the development towards the abstract conception of the body already presented in Dexippos, Philoponos and Simplikios. These Neoplatonists are not directly named by Averroes; nevertheless, he counts Avicenna among them.[[201]](#footnote-201) A confirmation of this criticism contains Averroes’s writing *De substantia orbis*, which distinguishes between the abstraction of the Neoplatonists and the deductive science according to the *Second Analytics*. The explanation is based on the causality of the first substances that exist in reality. The mathematical determinations fall into the logical abstraction *per posterius*, which is given in the logical identity as *inquantum*. Therefore, this form of abstraction must be separated from the actions of real substance. The metaphysical abstraction of the first science proceeds from the existing real substance (*actus essendi*). This kind of hyparchical predication made by the imposition is given *per prius*. The first science concerns the substance in the categorical determination *per prius*, thus it is necessarily executed in the metaphysical mode *qua*. The metaphysical dative establishes the predication according to *actus essendi* of real things. Therefore, the metaphysical abstraction determines all other ways of cognition and predication, since they do not follow the course of real causality.[[202]](#footnote-202) The use of analogy to define the primary dimensions is possible only secondarily, because it makes logical or mathematical abstraction from the real relations between substances. The metaphysical predication *per prius* relates to the first substance. All the abstract determinations of substance make a kind of Neoplatonic determination that presupposes some kind of hypostatic form. They present only analogical determinations given in the order of mathematical abstraction *per posterius*. Therefore, their relation to reality does not entail the hyparchical value made by the imposition that relates to reality by means of the scientific proof (*demonstratio*).

Averroes refuses mathematical entities that acquired the properties of a quasi-substance, as it is the case of Avicenna.[[203]](#footnote-203) This vision presupposes that some substantial determinations exist outside the first substance as Platonic ideas. The writing *Epitome* explicitly rejects Avicenna’s primary qualities that relate to Neoplatonic definition of the body as *tertium ens* (*non est necesse esse in corpore tres dimensiones in effectu*, ch. 2.3.2). Averroes rejects all physical determinations of being beyond the first substance that could be predicated in mode *per prius* with respect to some quasi-substance.[[204]](#footnote-204) Such categorical predication established the parallel diacosmos of Neoplatonists. Predication of hypostatized properties according to Avicenna led to the formation of the first concept of objective being in the Latin West around the year 1240. Averroes criticizes the Neoplatonists and Avicennists for the determination of the body of the third kind and for the predication of “quasi-physical” properties given in Jamblichus’s and Simplicius’s objective diacosmos. The following quotation rejects the future development of modernity towards objectivity.

“Their mistake was to assume that corporeality is generically stable, that is, to think that it is imperishable or stable on the condition that it is an accident and to think that it is stable on the condition that it is a form. According to this view, it is necessary [to assume] that prime matter is informed not only through the dimensions but rather through a multiplicity of accidents which are inseparable from prime matter and common to [all] simple bodies.” (*Averroes On Aristotle’s Metaphysics*, ed. Arnzen, p. 92.328)

The first matter cannot play the role of quasi-form as Neoplatonists, Avicenna and Latin modernists postulated it. Avicenna skipped Aristotle’s *Physics* and found apodictic principles in the universal determination of being as being. Therefore, he postulated *materia prima* as pure potency, making it a quasi-substrate, so that the matter given in the form of quasi-substance can assume all further determinations. The Commentator strictly rejected all basic presuppositions that can lead to the emergence of *tertium ens*. See the following passage where the *Epitome* rejects the basic presuppositions of the *tertium ens*, i.e., the quasi-body and the quasi-substance according to Avicenna.[[205]](#footnote-205) There is no categorial predication of being of the third kind, but only the determinations given with regard to the real substance. Avicenna put the formal and final causality at the level of the existence of the real substances and he reduced the metaphysics to a dialectic. The transcendental predication of indivisible substance (*individuum*) and the comitation of the hypostatized accidents are not based on the hyparchical relation to the first substance. The substrate of modernity is an abstract concept of *ens* in the mode of logic supposition. Averroes does not take the abstraction at the level of Avicenna’s second intention to be metaphysically true. The suppositions postulates but the homonymy of being at the level of the second (i.e., logical) intention in mode *inquantum*. Such an erroneous proceeding gave rise to a system of modern metaphysics built on the analogy of the objective being (*analogia entis*). The interpretation of metaphysics follows the line of Ibn Adi’s criticism of modern Neoplatonism (ch. 2.2). Averroes asserts that the supposition of the essence at the level of universality cannot replace the imposition of the categorical meaning related to the reality of the first substance. Analogic predication exists only in thought. It is incompatible with the imposition made by the predication of the categorical determinations of the second substance. The writing *Epitome* establishes a clear difference between the first and the second intentions on the basis of the difference between the categorical and the logical predication.[[206]](#footnote-206) Universals do not exist outside of thinking; therefore, metaphysics as first science cannot be founded on such fancy determination of being. Avicenna founded metaphysics precisely in this dubious way; therefore his project of metaphysics is flawed in principle.

The commentaries on *Metaphysics* reject Avicenna as a fallible dialectician who in no way reaches the level of Aristotelian theologians as al-Ghazālī.[[207]](#footnote-207) The dialectic cannot establish the first science. The knowledge of the first principles must be built upon an apodictic proof, as it is postulated by the *Second Analytics*. The apodictic proof of the immobile First substance and the study of its principles is possible exclusively on the premise that the first substance exists in the reality and that it is predicated in general judgments by unique causality and motion existing in the reality. The existence of the First Mover is proved on the basis of the motion already in Aristotle’s *Physics*. The effect of material and effective causality makes the first proof. Otherwise, there would have been no apodictic construction of metaphysics in the book *Lambda*, which elaborates the definition of the first science. Avicenna lacks the imposition to establish the metaphysic proceeding from the reality; therefore, his metaphysics is a great disaster. Averroes definitely overcomes both Avicenna’s modernized Neoplatonism and its correct but philosophically inadequate dialectical criticism of al-Ghazālī. The same point of view regarding the apodictic statute of the first science substance is provided in far more thorough elaboration in the *Great Commentary on Metaphysics*, written sometime after the year 1190. The study of the first principles adds to the criticism of Avicenna supplementary criticism of Alexander Aphrodisias as it was mentioned above. The core of criticism is the same as in the Epitome but the *Great commentary* creates a complete architecture of the first science based on the apodictic research. Avicenna’s trajectory of metaphysics missed the real substance and went to the abstraction of “*ens simpliciter”*. Universals created in that way exist only in thought and nowhere else. Averroes’s *Tafsīr* emphasizes this in many places, and moreover, in direct reference to Averroes’ preceding commentaries on the writing *De anima*.[[208]](#footnote-208) The hermeneutics of objectivity states that Averroes’s early commentaries on Aristotelian corpus reject in principle all ontological presuppositions of Avicenna’s concept of objectivity. The same position confirms CMDA for the trajectory of cognition. Let us take a look at the key declaration of CMDA, which summarizes all principles concerning determination of being.

“Further, Aristotle said *everything that is living being* etc. This means that the definition of genus and species are not for him definitions of universally conceived things, which exist outside the human soul (*existentium extra animam*). They are definitions of real things, which are given outside the intellect; it is an intellect that produces universality in these things (*qui agit in eis universalitatem*). The universally conceived living being is either nothing at all (*aut nichil est omnino*) or it is its universal being, which is given only after the existence of the real thing (*esse eius est posterius*), provided the universal has any possibility of existence at all.” [[209]](#footnote-209)

In reality there are but the first substances. The universals exist only in human thinking, since they are made by abstracting intellect. The final sentence is quite categorical: either the universals do not exist at all or they exist only in human thought. The existence of the universals postulated by Avicenna through the objective predication given in the mode *per prius* is not possible. There are only the first substances in the mode *per prius*. All human understanding is predicated *per posterius* with respect to the primary actuality of the first substances. Avicenna, according to Averroes, destroyed the unity of metaphysics by a twofold fundamental error. He bypassed the study of the first real substance and abolished metaphysics as a science based on physics. These two presuppositions of the first science were rightly postulated by the Second Master; hence the Commentator considers himself his successor. Avicenna’s transcendental predication on the level of “*ens inquantum ens*” forms, in the best case, an analogic predication and, in the worse case, merely a homonymic unity of being. Analogy makes an exemplification, not a science; homonymy makes but an academic fairy tale. Aristotle clearly rejected both forms of predication for the first science concerning substance. They do not make any science based on apodictic proof, but a kind of Neoplatonic speculation as mythopoetic tale in the dialogue *Timaeus*. The first science cannot be built on the dialectic of the highest genera of being as in Platonism. The theory of cognition must find original nature of the world. That presupposes the foundation of a “meta-physics” in relation to the first substance and the truth as correspondence of reality and thinking. Gigantomachy between both thinkers of the Falsafa led in the Latin West in the school of the *Modernorum* to an eclipse of the firts substance in the objectively founded metaphysics. Heidegger’s term *Irre* relates to the eclipse of Being in Plato’s metaphysics (*Seinsverlassenheit*) in a sense of Greek tragedy conceived by the deities of Chaos and Vengance. But so far, there is no complete interpretation that explains the paranoiac and tragic wandering (*Irre*) of modernists in the West. This error arose by deliberate eclipse of the first substance in modern metaphysics (*Seinsvergessenheit*). The choice of the first objective science became a deliberate act of a certain group of thinkers of the West who did not see or did not want to see the fundamental error in Avicenna’s metaphysics. The hermeneutic proceeding interprets the modern form of objectivity through the unconcealment (*alētheia*) of gigantomachy concerning the substance. The thinking of erroneous modernity founded postmodernity and finally the nihilistic stage of present thinking. The hermeneutic archaeology must find the founding event (*Ereignis*) that initiates the wandering of the modernists in the Falsafa (*Irre*) in the mode of the objective error (*Irrtum*). The sophists of the Latin West adopted the Avicennist insight into generic being despite the explicit criticism of the Aristotelian school based on the metaphysics of the Commentator. Averroes called the thinkers following Avicenna with a generic term “the contemporaries” (*moderni*). After him, this term was adopted by the Latin connoisseurs of Averroes as Albert the Great and Roger Bacon for the new school of Avicennists in the Latin West.

### 2.4.2 True Knowledge of Reality

Averroes, by a careful study of Aristotle, came to the only possible conclusion that fundamentally marked the dispute over the first form of objectivity. It is necessary to study the causal relation, which is given both on the level of the material bodies and on the level of the pure forms of the immaterial substances or the cosmic intelligences. The first science must find a corresponding form of predication for all existing first substances. The only candidate for this type of correspondence between the thinking and the actual thing is the metaphysical predication. It is related to the first substance, which is trully recognized in the apodictic investigation of physics and metaphysics. The theory of truth as correspondence excludes both being of the third kind and ontotheological structure of metaphysics. By rejecting Neoplatonic conception of metaphysics represented by Avicenna, a new gigantomachy concerning substance took place in the Falsafa, which was later repeated in the Latin West. Averroes accomplished a new synthesis of metaphysics according to primacy of the first substance, which Alfarabi defended to some extent. The mode *per prius* follows the path of the metaphysical dative. Imposition of meaning comes from the first substance that exists in a hyparchical way. The last actual substance is the Immobile Mover, which is separated from the first sphere of cosmic intelligences by its exclusive existence. This form of categorical predication rejects analogical and dialectical model of the ontotheology made by Avicenna. Ontological trajectory of the Commentator goes to material substances in the first place. The path of understanding (*Vor-blickbahn*) follows the causality of real being. It begins with the first material substance and ends with the first immaterial substance. Averroes saw the unity of being through the connection of *Physics* VIII and *Metaphysics* XII, because he looked for the first principles of the existing substance. The previous chapter described his separation from both metaphysics of Falsafa (Alfarabius, Avicenna) due to different paths to reach the ultimate aim of metaphysics. The imposition adopted by Averroes runs in the mode “substance *qua* substance” and the supposition of Avicenna in the mode “*ens inquantum ens.*” Aristotelian predication postulates that the imposition is not a supposition and the logical *ens* is not a metaphysical substance. Investigation goes first to the physically explored first substance and then to the metaphysical principles of this substance. The Immobile Mover represents in the new unity “*ad unum*” the last instance of the Aristotelian principle “*ex inmediatis*” (ch. 1.3). This principle defines the truth as correspondence in the *Categories*. It follows the causality through the metaphysical dative at the level of universality (*quidditas*, ch. 1.1). The embodiment of causality in the middle section of demonstrative scientific judgment (*medium*) is given in the universal mode *per prius*. The real causality of the first substance is respected to the highest degree.

Averroes began the era of his great commentaries on Aristotelian corpus with a work that introduced an original way of knowing according to Aristotle’s reinterpreted philosophy. The new interpretation of writing *De anima* returns to original metaphysical and categorial form of metaphysical dative. The true recognition of the world in human intellect must be harmonized with the main orientation of Averroes’s metaphysics. The Commentator rejected both Alexander’s disjunction between physics and metaphysics and Avicenna’s abstract approach that bypassed the real substance. Both metaphysics are based on the fundamental error of cognition. Modern Alexandrians divide reality into a sensual (physics) and an intellectual (metaphysics) realm; therefore they lost the unity of first science. Averroes’s *Middle commentary on Metaphysics* (*Epitomé*) rejected Avicenna’s metaphysics as a Neoplatonic construct (ch. 2.4.1). The previous chapters have shown that objective vision originated in the intellectual environment of Neoplatonic teachings based on the acquired intellect (*intellectus adeptus*). Avicenna took over this way of cognition from the Neoplatonists of al-Kindī’s school and from Alfarabi. He proposed the direct recognition of minimal being, because the modern substance as an objective *individuum* stand outside of sensual experience (ch. 2.3.2). Avicenna radicalized original scheme of Alfarabi in *De intellectu et intellecto* according to Alexander’s dichotomous interpretation of *De anima*. Alexander’s and Avicenna’s metaphysics detached themselves from physics. The mythopoetic vision of modern illuminates no longer needed the categorical imposition made by the actualization of mind from the first substance. By finishing the middle commentaries, Averroes saw clearly that the metaphysics of the modernists is based on an invented substance as *individuum*. In the second step is necessary that segregated physics and metaphysics produce the separation of sensual and intelligible cognition. The destruction of unified construction of physics and metaphysics modified the act of understanding to get a dichotomous character, according to modernist version of the disintegrated first science. Cognition of pure intelligible forms proceeds through the acquired intellect enlighted from *intellectus agens*. Therefore, modern cognition does not need sensually perceived reality to establish the truth. The demonstration of objective being made by Avicenna runs from the separated *intellectus agens* (ch. 2.3.1). Modern mythopoetic rejected the causality of Aristotelian thinking, which adequately follows the real events. The metaphysics takes place in the realm of first substances and makes universal sense out of them. This process changed into an ontotheological foundation of metaphysics. Its mythopoetic fundament (*Grund*) is presented in the form of *tertium ens*. Algazel derived from the ontotheology of modernity correct conclusion that such a modern God must inevitably die, since it never existed (ch. 2.3.3). Neoplatonic abstraction (*denudatio*) forms the ontological perspective (*Vor-blickbahn*) that established Western objectivity. We have interpreted the introduction of this modern form of abstraction in Alfarabi and Avicenna. Averroes, on the other hand, build metaphysics on the apodictic recognition of the first principles of real substance. His version of the first science connects the last book of *Physics* with the *Metaphysics Lambda*. The first science, which explores the determinations of the first substance behind physics, rejects any projection of the *tertium ens* into metaphysics. The entity of the third kind cannot exist in the first science concerning the real substance. Such an entity is not the real first existing substance. It is not true to make thinking coincide with something that does not exist. Therefore, *tertium ens* cannot obtain the metaphysic truth, which is given by correspondence of thinking with that which really exists. Averroes’s “meta-physics” founded on the primacy of first substance rejected direct insight into the essentiality of first substance. The intuitive insight grasps only the universal substance in the mind. The universal concept of causality in the logical mode *idem* does not entail the real causality in metaphysical mode *ipse*. The identity of logical substance is not metaphysically true*,* as it presupposes the false *modus ponens* of modernists. The causal influence of the metaphysical dative on thought is missing in the modern explication. It caused the abolition of truth as the correspondence of the substantial being with the thinking. The substance is composed of matter and form, except for the existence of the First Mover, which exists as a pure act of thinking and being. Every construct of cognition made outside the real substance nullifies Aristotelian univocal signification and categorization. They relate to the first substance. Instead of the real unity based on the existing substance, Avicenna and modernists build the academical fairy tales of generic and logic unity of being. According to Averroes, such a unity is given analogically in the best case. Aristotelian cannot create a minimal existence of the thing in the divine thought, as it was the case with Avicenna and after him with the school of the second Averroism in the Latin West. Thought is common to all men on the basis of their naturally given disposition determined by the real state of the world. Averroes’s interpretation of *De anima* rejects speculations of modern interpreters. There is no intellect as being of the third kind, which exists equivocally for all people. Either a real and true unity of human cognition exists or merely an analogical and therefore metaphysically untrue unity of an objective intellect. The intellect represents a faculty of the soul and this potency is determined by sensual cognition of the real thing.

The preceding analysis of Averroes’s metaphysics has shown that the commentaries on *Metaphysics* rejected the concept of *tertium ens*, which Avicenna created in the line of Neoplatonism. Therefore, there is no Avicenna’s intellect producing these non-existent simulacra. Averroes rejected Avicenna’s architecture of different intellects of the third kind made out of hypostatized forms of self-reflection. The first science is determined by the first substance. The same approach is preserved in Ibn Rushd’s commentaries on *De anima*, which follow the fundamental line of Aristotle’s thought. The writings of Aristotelian Corpus devoted to cognition come from sensual apprehension of hylemorphic substance (*De sensu et sensato*) and go up to intellectual apprehension of the world (*De anima*). The path of the Sun in the firmament and the cognition by metaphysical dative go in one direction. Therefore we must read *De anima* from the first to the third book and not vice versa, as the modern *illuminati* do. The new project connects three layers of cognition: the being of the real thing; its sensual and therefore material cognition; the immaterial intellectual cognition. As to the divine thinking, we know philosophically absolutely nothing about it, because we are mortal and sensually determined beings. The cognition follows the disclosure from the front, from the direction of the first substance, which is given *per prius* thanks to its actuality. The resulting unity of cognition is made by the fact that all three levels of cognition form the hierarchically structured faculties of strictly personal (and not only individual) soul as immaterial form of the body. These three levels of cognition are interdependent, following the predication *per prius* and *per posterius*. According to the CMDA, the structure of the human intellect looks like this:

* The sensory cognition, its storage and processing (*wahm, cogitatio*) within the framework of lower faculties of judgment, imagination, and memory, called *intellectus in habitu*. This cognition establishes the animal identity, that is, specific and individual nature of the soul.
* The abstraction of immaterial forms from external things in the framework of passive or material intellect (*abstractio, formare per intellectum*). The abstraction proceeds by the new form of *intellectus materialis*. It was former Alfarabi’s *intellectus in potencia*, which Averroes changed into a new form of *intellectus possibilis*.
* The process of abstraction of immaterial form culminates in the intellectual cognition (*intellectio*) through a newly defined *intellectus agens* . This cognition establishes the ipseity of the person as an indivisible, *per se* existing first substance (Boethius).

The new architecture of cognition responded positively to the dichotomy of sensual and intellectual cognition in the teaching of *Modernorum*. Averroes proceeds in the following steps. First, he establishes a new figure of material intellect (*intellectus materialis*) against Alexander and Themistius. He rejects the theories of Arabic contemporaries called *Moderni* or Alexandrians, mainly Avicenna and Ibn Bajjah. The great commentary CMDA places the *intellectus materialis* in the categorical predication *per prius* and *per posterius*, according to the logic of *Categories* (ch. 1.3). We know the world, first of all, in an empiric way, because the actuality of the real thing exists in the first place. The imposition of meaning is done by the metaphysical dative. The first stage of knowledge passes by human senses, which are actualized in mode *per prius* by the sensory organs in the body. Intellectual cognition runs *per posterius*, since the universal concept presupposes the immaterial human intellect. There is absolutely important difference between the metaphysical imposition and the logical supposition in the predication of intellect. This difference between both modes of cognition can be observed in the figure of the intellect defined as *tertium genus* and *quartum genus*. The material intellect exists in the mode *ipse*, since we are the first living substance when we personally recognize something (*tertium genus*). Afterwards we can make an abstraction of it, including our own intellect (*quartum genus*). This division corresponds in the scheme of the CMDA to the categorical difference between the first and the second substance and to the twofold figure of predication given either in a hyparchical or universal way (*Cat*. 2a11–16). Averroes ingeniously transferred the above-quoted interpretation of the *Categories* according to the Second Master (ch. 2.1) into the doctrine of the two genera of intellect. The last part of the *Great commentary* interprets the resulting epochal figure of *intellectus possibilis* in a new relation to the metaphor of the sun. The analysis of the diaphanum (*diaffonum*) is necessary for the cognition of colors and the analogical explanatory cognition of intelligibilia. Averroes explained how it came to the cited “obscurity” in the modern metaphysics that he criticized in Avicenna’s teaching. There is a dark place in total brightness of Neoplatonic metaphor concerning the solar intellect. Avicenna’s analysis of *De anima* determined the fate of Western metaphysics by rejecting Aristotle’s and Abunaser’s solution of the receptive intellect. Avicenna’s commentary on *De anima* set the disclosure of being from behind. The cognition runs from direction of immaterial active intellect as *Dator formarum* into hypostatized form of acquired intellect in the human soul (*intellectus adeptus*, ch. 2.3.1). Averroes explained the fundamental blindness of this scheme of cognition that modernity passed into oblivion. The interpretation of Avicenna’s theory of cognition as an eclipse of the first substance brings the search for a new form of metaphysics in the Falsafa to a climax. Modernity and postmodernity perform a displacement of the scheme proposed by the Commentator in the framework of the above-mentioned Freudian mechanism of inversion into the opposite (*Verkehrung ins Gegenteil,* ch. 1.2). Mythologically gifted Avicennists created the objective simulacrum of Averroes’s teaching in the figure of Latin Averroism. Such an epochal error (*Irrtum*) unfortunately produces a real *damnatio memoriae* concerning his metaphysics. The modern Latin sophists, under the leadership of the academically educated Furies, produced a perfect simulacrum of Averroes, which was damned and today rehabilitated to a tragicomic caricature. This sophistical product of modernists and postmodernists obscured both the original meaning of Averroes’s work and the tradition given by the real connoisseurs of the Commentator’s thought until the end of the 13th century. Due to the victory of Avicennist modernity in the metaphysics of the Latin West, arrived the epoch of forgetting the first substance (*Seinsvergessenheit*) in the mode of the objective *Irrtum*. The satisfied Erinyes went to the objectively non-existent underworld, where they have permanent residence in the archaic Lethe. In the times of postmodern ignorance (ἀπαιδευσία, *Met*. 1006a6), contemporary nihilistic model of metaphysics completes divine work of the Furies.

Let us now proceed to the analysis of gigantomachy between Avicenna and Averroes according to the writing CMDA. The revelation of being in the human intellect depends on correct interpretation of abstraction. Averroes’s commentary on the key excerpt in *De anima* II.5 (417a1–2) has a different meaning than Avicenna’s denudation. The Commentator exposed being from the front, that is, from the empirical cognition of the hylemorphic first substance. The quotation from *De anima* on the character of the senses given *in potentia* defines the abstraction as follows:

“Further, he said; *Therefore there are no senses in actuality, but in potency*, etc. To this we reply that sensual perception is not given as an active faculty (*sensus non est ex virtutibus activis*) which would act out of itself (*que agunt ex se*) and without any external mover that is necessary for cognition based on the senses. The senses are passive faculties, which require an external mover (*sunt ex virtutibus passivis, que indigent motore extrinseco*); therefore, out of themselves they possess no sensing. Nor does wood burn of itself, but requires an external factor for this, namely fire.”[[210]](#footnote-210)

The senses have as their basis no actualized faculty (*non est ex virtutibus activis*), which would act in the soul of itself. This would mean that the senses contain their own actuality given as a kind of substance (*agunt ex se*). In such a case, the subsistent senses needed the external thing only as a supplement to their own actuality. This contradicts the real trajectory of cognition. It is initiated in the mode *per prius* by the first substances that exist outside the senses (*provenit ab eis motore extrinseco*). The senses and after them the intellect have a fundamentally receptive character (*sunt ex virtutibus passivis*). Therefore, the senses need an external actual substance to be able to recognize (*indigent motore extrinseco*). Done in this way, truth can arise as relation (*proportio*) between the first actual substance and its sensual and then intellectual reception. According to the cited quotation, it is evident that CMDA puts sensual cognition at the first place. Averroes must ensure a causal effect of the first substance on the senses and on the intellect, because his metaphysics assumes the causality of the bodies explored by physics.

Themistius kept this nature of cognition according to the metaphysical dative. His *intellectus materialis* implied the transition of sensual actuality to the receptivity of the soul. By adopting Themistius’s scheme, Averroes made sure the key fact that cognition is fully within our power and that the receptive intellect is not the detached cosmic substance à la Alexander. The commentary to the quoted part from *De anima* 429a18 confirms that a correspondence runs from the direction of the real substance to its cognition (*sicut sensus apud sensibilia, sic intellectus apud intelligibilia*).[[211]](#footnote-211) The correspondence of intellect with the real thing begins as sensual recognition of external first substance, which proportionally determines its universal recognition in the intellect. This causal and therefore true bond between the first and the second substance is confirmed by the numerous terms of CMDA: *proportio, dispositio* or *similitudo*. Averroes’s concept of truth within the framework of *proportio* relates to the text of *De anima*, which emphasizes the bond between sensory and intelligible cognition. The justification of this *proportio* follows *De anima* 429a14–18 in the form of correspondence (ὁμοίως ἔχειν) between empiric and intelligible cognition.[[212]](#footnote-212) The Oxfordian translation of the last sentence in the footnote makes the key to the interpretation of *De anima*, since it is made in the mode of the Oxfordian Fallacy. The perspective of understanding (*Bezugssinn, Vor-blickbahn*) runs from the mind of the *illuminati* to the material thing. The interpretation of this similarity (ὁμοίως, *similiter*) between the senses and the intellect points to the fundamental difference between the Commentator and the modern Alexandrians. The translation reversed the order of cognition, which in the original runs from the direction of the senses and not from the intellect. Moderns explain the connection in Neoplatonic way as a conflict “material sensible cognition versus immaterial intelligible cognition.” Avicenna isolated two components of cognition and set them against each other. Modernism connects the senses and the intellect only propaedeutically and metaphorically, in the manner of extern *coniunctio* of soul and body. Averroes is fundamentally against such a separation, because he is not a modern Averroist à la Avicenna. The path of cognition from the bodily senses shows that the receptive intellect cannot be conceived as Alexander’s hylic intellect. It is a mythological potential substance (*hoc aliquid*) externally connected to the body. This view of the hypostatized *intellectus in potencia* already rejected Alfarabi in his interpretation of *De anima* (ch. 2.1.1). Cognition does not arise from any added hypostatized or acquired intellect of Alexandrians. In that case, it had its own actuality given in the guise of an immaterial form. The introduction of a new substance or hypostasis in the definition of human soul as innate first principles of Avicenna or the Cartesian *cogito* would make impossible universal cognition. It contradicts the basic principle “*anima est quodammodo omnia”* (*De anima* 431b21). Therefore, Averroes cannot accept the argumentation of Themistius and Theofrastus. They confirmed the actualization of cognition from the senses, but finally isolated the intelligible sphere from the senses. Their *intellectus materialis* is separated from the immaterial *intellectus possibilis*. This immaterial receptive intellect was conceived as a Neoplatonic hypostasis and substance common to all men. The acquired and therefore receptive intellect of Neoplatonists takes universal and hypostatized intelligible forms in the mode of assimilation.

Averroes cannot admit any form of *tertium ens* in his metaphysics and in the process of cognition. The argument against Neoplatonists and their modernist version in the Falsafa (Ibn Bajjah, Avicenna) emphasizes that human intellect is not an actual immaterial substance or form. Receptive components of the soul must adequately (i.e., truthfully and universally) recognize all actual substances in their material and immaterial forms. This component of the soul must be receptive in the absolute sense of the word, that is, as intelligible potency separated from any actuality. Therefore, the receptive faculty of the soul cannot be actual in itself, because human cognition ceased to be universal. The argument excludes the receptive intellect as an independent substance or hypostasis in the manner of modern and postmodern Alexandrians. The commentary defends the division of two faculties of cognition (νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι, ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν, *De anima* 430a14–15) into a receptive (γίνεσθαι, *potentia*) and a synthetic (ποιεῖν, *actus*). Modernists lack this fundamental division of the existential *act* of knowing in the mode *ipse* into *two* faculties of the soul as an *immaterial* form of *this* body. As we shall see further, each italicized word has a fundamental significance in subsequent disputes of scholasticism concerning so-called averroism. Because of poorly understanding of Aristotelian metaphysics, the hypostatized intellect of modernists represents another pseudo-substance. This entity of the third kind joins the objective determinations called “human being” in the mode of avicennist comitation or mythopoetic collection of hypostatized qualities. The divine comedy of modernity divides human being into two or even more substances. According to the modernists of all groups, the active intellect (*intellectus agens*) acts on the hypostatized passive intellect (*intellectus materialis*), in the way as the active craftsman, with the help of his idea, processes the material into the form of the finished product or cognition. Such explanation reminds of Platonic *poiésis* according to Heidegger’s production of the object, which is presented to the metaphysical subject (*Ge-Stell*, ch. 1.2). Philosophy of modern Neoplatonists represents a mythopoetic mode of demiurgic production of the world. Modernists in the Falsafa introduced platonic metaphor of a seal imprint in the wax into the explanation of cognition, which adopted Cartesian postmodernism. The metaphor of the imprint of the cosmic form into the receptive wax as intellect individualizes the *intellectus possibilis* according to the Platon’s *hypodokhē* (*Tim*. 48e–53c). The intellectual form is pressed into soul passively, in the manner of a seal into the wax (*Theait*. 191d7–9). From the perspective of hermeneutics, the ontological path of comprehension (*Vor-blickbahn*) follows the disclosure of being from behind, from the direction of hypostatized active intellect. In this model, the passive intellect is necessarily the substance or at least some form of hypostasis of the third kind. Aristotle replaced the Plato’s mythology for academic tribe with a precise description of cognition according to the metaphysical dative (τό τί ἦν εἶναι, *quidditas*, ch. 1. 1). Human understanding keeps the universal presence of the first actual substance. Its unique existence has passed into the past and it is present through its meaning given first sensually and then intellectually. Averroes refuses to substantiate the passive intellect in any way because the person ceases to exist as an indivisible, first hyparchic substance. The substance is the material body and the soul makes its animating form as most important actualization of the body (*quia est prima perfectio corporis naturalis organici*, CMDA III.5 ; 396.282–83). The commentary takes the premise of Themistius that the passive intellect is immaterial and has the same nature as the active intellect (δυνάμει νοῦς πάντα νοήσει, εἰ μὴ πρῶτος πάντα νοεῖ ὁ προάγων αὐτὸν εἰς ἐνέργειαν; *In Aristotelis libros de anima paraphrasis*, 103.30–31). Unfortunately, Themistius completely separated the material intellect from the lower form of cognition, which is given within the framework of the sensually determined *intellectus materialis*. Themistius combined the material intellect with the habitually present innate principles of cognition into a receptive intellect (*intellectus in habitu*), which he took as a kind of substance.[[213]](#footnote-213) This receptive intellect takes the cognitive forms from the cosmic *intellectus agens*. The cognition of the habitual intellect is in our power, but it is hypostatized and such a substantial intellect only secondarily relates to sensual cognition. Founder of Latin modernity Rufus of Cornwall took over that concept of intellect through Avicenna (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.3). Modern *intellectus possibilis* acts as another hypostatized substance or form in human being and the cognition is actualized from external cosmic intellect. Themistius makes the cognition to actualize from behind in the series “sun—ray—eye,” that is, from the direction of the active intellect-sun (πρώτως ἐλλάμπων εἷς, *ibid.*, 103.32). The mediation of cognition via diaphanum is completely absent because the intellect does not require an empiric cognition. Platonic model mythopoetically asserts that truthful cognition proceeds in the mode of illumination from the direction of the intellect-sun. The possible intellect is illuminated directly from the separated cosmic intellect, because it shares with it the same immaterial and hypostatic nature. Themistius’s immaterial, receptive and habitually given intellect is not a pure potency, as is the case of Alexander.

Ibn Rushd distinguishes himself from the Neoplatonic Themistius and modern Avicenna. The receptive intellect forged by the Commentator has no external and hypostatized character. It makes an integral part of human soul as a unique form in the body. It is evident that *intellectus possibilis* cannot be a substance as it presupposes Themistius’s teaching. The receptivity of soul is pure potency, as *De anima* and Alexander confirm. Again, the metaphysical dative applies, which defines the fundamental effect of real causality for human cognition. The receptive immaterial intellect (*intellectus possibilis*) is given as faculty or potency in the intellectual part of the soul. Thanks to this immaterial faculty, the soul recognizes the real thing that is already actualized by senses. Neither Alexander nor Themistius had this fundamental order of human knowledge. New type of receptive intellect plays the role of immaterial *tabula rasa* in relation to the material senses. They activate the receptive intellect through the process of abstraction. The possible intellect represents the pure potency towards the active intellect as another faculty of the soul. Therefore, the *intellectus agens* as a further component of the soul remains only in the human being and cannot be a separated hypostasis or substance. Averroes categorically rejects the order of cognition as Neoplatonic illumination by some kind of solar intellect. Dual capacity of the soul confirms Aristotle’s thesis about the passive and active components of cognition. Averroes profoundly modified the definition of passive and immaterial intellect of Neoplatonists and especially that of Alexander. Receptive intellect must be capable of receiving all abstracted contents thanks to its immaterial passivity. But the Aristotelians of Alexander’s type made the passive intellect an independent substance outside the individual soul, thus separating it from sensual cognition. Such an intellect was no longer purely passive and became a modern substance. That kind of intellect comes to human soul as an independent substance or hypostasis from outside. The same is true of the active intellect. Neoplatonists and Avicenna made out of it a cosmic form substance or hypostatized species. In Alexander’s view, the receptive immaterial intellect (*intellectus possibilis*) is separated from sensuous cognition, which is also the case with all Cartesians.

Averroes defends the Aristotelian unity of the person as the first actual substance against the modernists as Avicenna. Therefore, he criticizes Themistius’s concept. Themistius rightly described the receptive intellect from the point of view of sensual potency, but then he separated it as a cosmic hypostasis.[[214]](#footnote-214) The unclear connection between material and immaterial receptivity (τὸ πάσχοι) in Themistius’s definition of material intellect determines the dispute both between Averroes and Avicenna and between the first and second Averroism in the Latin West. The metaphysical dative determines the cognition from the direction of senses as it is the case of Aristotelian signification in *De interpretatione* (παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς; OBJ II, ch. 1.1). But the emergence of immaterial cognition is not carried to its conclusion in the Corpus because Aristotle does not distinguish clearly enough the transition of cognition from empiric part of the soul to the intelligible faculty. It is necessary to quote the key part of Themistius’s *De intellectu*.[[215]](#footnote-215) It presents the objectivity in mode of *alētheia* to determine all next rounds of philosophical gigantomachy concerning the intellect. The main points concerning the *intellectus materialis* as it was adopted in the new form in CMDA, are kept in the Greek original. The Commentator takes two basic ideas of *intellectus materialis* made by Themistius. The cognition is in our power because the receptive intellect forms a part of our soul and it is activated from sensual experience. As far as the cognition is concerned, the sensual experience makes the only part that is in actuality, since it is causally bound to bodily organs. Immaterial receptive, habitually given intellect is, unfortunately, in Themistius’s teaching a cosmic substance, which determines the human cognition by disclosure from behind, from the direction of the world of autonomous cosmic forms. The active cosmic intellect presses intellectual forms into the passive part of the *intellectus possibilis* just as autonomously as the craftsman presses the form into a passive material. This is the model of cognition according to Platonist predication *in artificialibus*. On the contrary, Alexander’s *intellectus possibilis* is immaterial separated substance, which contradicts the Aristotelian line of the CMDA. However, compared to Themistius, Alexander’s concept of *intellectus possibilis* has the fundamental merit that his receptive intellect is immaterial faculty and a pure possibility. The teaching of Alexander and Themistius is based on separation of immaterial intellect as an independent entity. It made impossible in principle the concept of truth as the *proportio* between the empiric and rational understanding. Moreover, they introduced the plurality of substances into the person. The capital error of modernity came into being by disclosure of immaterial cognition from the direction of eternal intellectual forms. Averroes summarizes such nonsense in the following formulation: “If the active and the passive intellect is eternal, then the result of their activity must also be eternal” (*quando enim agens fuerit eternum et patiens fuerit eternum, necesse est ut factum sit eternum*; CMDA III.5, 392.152–53). Adopting Avicenna’s thesis about the intellect as a detached hypostasis in man would lead to absurd consequences. The modernist conception of intellect as an actual substance or hypostasis is, according to Averroes, wholly paranoid for many reasons (CMDA III.5, pp. 406–409). The effect of the detached intellect making the individual act of human cognition meant that an imagined identical content would arise for all people. The individual thinking would recognize only itself with respect to its everlasting actuality. The associated contents abstracted from the senses had to be equally eternal and unchangeable like the intellect, because its permanent actuality would imprint the same intelligible form on the cogitations. There would be no independent act of recognition according to out personal willing. The separated intellect would recognize through us, just as the craftsman deals with his tool according to his demiurgic will. The human being would exist as independent eternal species outside the existence of the actual individual. The passive intellect in the human being cannot be a substance, because it would have its own actual form. It would have recognized only itself, or maybe the contents of active intellect. But it never would have the receptive intellectual recognition of material, sensually recognized things.[[216]](#footnote-216) The process of cognition would not be described as abstraction from the senses, which terminates in the intelligible cognition in “this man” (*ipse homo*) as the unique first substance engaged in the exercise of personal thinking. Averroes’s unity of the person in the mode *ipse* defends the acting of intellect in us (*continuatio*) as a disposition of the soul, which is actualized only from the senses. Siger of Brabant was the only philosopher in the West that fully understood this ipseity of the person, as it confirms his commentary on CMDA. He defended it against the Semi-Averroists like Thomas Aquinas (*homo ipse intelligit*; OBJ III, ch. 4.4.4). The writing CMDA makes constant criticism of the modernists. They stand under influence of various forms of the *tertium ens*, therefore are unable to distinguish between the intellect as the first and the second substance. The universal concept of intellect (*quartum genus*) is given as *idem*, that is, in the logical identity of the concept. The real cognition is given in the mode *ipse* and it is experienced in the first person. The ipseity of the intellect is given in its actuality only in the person as first actual substance. Therefore, the predication of cognition must be given only in form of the imposition, that is, on the basis of the incorporated performance of the intellect of the corporeal soul (*tertium genus*). The preceding chapters have shown that the form of the thing cognized in the soul is understood by Neoplatonists and by modern Avicenna only by the disclosure from behind, from the direction of separated active intellect. Therefore, sensual cognition has for Alexandrians only a propaedeutic function (ch. 2.3.1). Both forms of immaterial and secluded intellect (*possibilis, agens*) guarantee a necessary, eternal and universal cognition. That mythopoetic fairy tale makes the main devise of paranoiac modernity which combined the act of thinking and its predication into one form of *tertium ens*. Modernists contemplate their own world through the mythological concept of intellect-sun as substance of the third kind. Averroes cannot make the passive component of the intellect to be an actualized pseudo-substance. Then, he would lose the causality between the material senses and the immaterial intellect. The intellect cannot be separated from the sensual cognition in the mode *separatus*. The concept of truth as correspondence would become invalid and a modern truth as assimilation and identity of being of the third kind came into force. The intellect is not a *hoc aliquid* in the manner of Cartesian postmodernism determined by modernists such as Alexander, Themistius, and Avicenna.[[217]](#footnote-217) Such an intellect would be actualized either by itself or from the active intellect. The active intellect was at home in the cosmic spheres, or as innate ideas, or in the postmodern imagination of the matrix world created by contemporary mathematics. The Commentator as Aristotle’s critical reader knows that any substantial actualization of the receptive intellect would cause, that the mind no longer recognizes the world in terms of *tabula rasa*.[[218]](#footnote-218) Averroes is no way an Averroist, neither according to Themistius nor Alexander.

The birth of cognition follows three steps according to the metaphysical dative. The cognition begins with the real hylemorphic substance, which acts on the senses and on the intellect in the soul as *tabula rasa*.

“Therefore, in the soul are the intentions and the comprehensions, and outside the soul there is neither the one nor the other, but only material things, which in no case are the comprehensions.”[[219]](#footnote-219)

There is a clearcut division between the first actual substance in reality and its *quidditas* as recognized second substance in the soul. The further part of the quotation ties both forms of intentionality to the existential act of the personal soul, which is given in the mode of ipseity (*in hac dispositione*). Thus, a unitary act of cognition is created in the soul as immaterial form of unique body. The intentional *quidditas* of the thing (*secundum quod est*) is given in twofold intentionality, which is completed by universal cognition.

“Further, *De anima* says, ‘*to what extent this is the disposition of the soul and in its intentionality*,’ because it thereby separated it from the intentions which the intellect takes up. These intentions are universal (*ille enim sunt universales*) and only by them is the intellect true.”[[220]](#footnote-220)

The first intention relates to sensory cognition, which is common to human beings and to animals. The second intention is immaterial and given only to humans as intellectual faculties concerning the concept of the thing. Truth as an Aristotelian correspondence is ensured by the fact that cognition is actualized from the real thing through sensual and then intellectual intentional reception of the separated first substance. Therefore, Averroes insists on principal difference between the act of intentionality in thinking and the existence of the real thing (*extra animam nun sunt neque intentiones neque comprehensiones*). He proposed a system of cognition that distinguishes three basic components: 1) the real thing (*modus essendi*); 2) the act of cognition in the unity of the body and the soul given as existential *ipse* (*modus intelligendi*); 3) the twofold content of cognition in the mode *idem* given by the two components of reception and intentionality, sensual and intellectual (*modus cognoscendi*). Avicenna, Descartes and Husserl do not respect this difference between the identity of the cognized thing and the ipseityof the cognizer, and between the twofold intention and the external thing. Both ways (*modus intelligendi, cognoscendi*) make a false unity of objective intellect that cannot exist, since *intellectio* and *intellectus* make two fundamentally different forms of being (the first and the second substance). The modernists do not have this threefold structure of cognition. They take intentional objects univocally with the objective being of things according to Avicenna’s noematic concept (*hoc esse tantum*). The modernist and the objective intellect “is” the one thing, which makes modernity really cute. The concept of minimal beingness forms a new version of the “species—substance” of the third kind. In the immanence of fully actual consciousness emerges the transcendence of the primary meaning. This is Husserl’s “actual thing” (*die Sache selbst*) in the specific mode of being of the third kind. The identity model of truth proceeds in the avicennistic mode of Rufus’s *coaequatio* (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.2). Avicenna made the first model of modern truth as assimilation founded in the subjective certitude (*veritas autem quæ adaequatur rei, illa est certa*; ch. 2.3.2). Aristotelian correspondence was replaced by subjective *certitudo* based on objective identity of being of the third kind as modern substance (*res*). Avicenna and the Western modernists cannot have a concept of truth as correspondence between real things and the intellect, quite unlike Averroes. Cartesian and Husserlian postmodernism takes the truth as assimilation of one and the same objective form, which is evidently observed in the intellect and contingently given in the thing. Modern intentionality is based on denudation of being of the third kind, which the *illuminatus* takes into direct eidetic vision. The quotation from the CMDA shows something radically different. The causally given correspondence relates to the metaphysical dative. Truth is founded in relation to the “*res*” as first substance existing in the reality. Aristotelian intellect is actualized from the sensually recognized first substance. It takes the intentions in the immaterial act of recognition (*ab intentionibus quas recipit intellectus*). The identity of cognitions (*intellectum*) is therefore to be distinguished fundamentally from the ipseity of the intellect (*intellectio*). Intentional contents must be universal, because the receptive intellect is by its nature the immaterial faculty of the human soul. In that important point, Averroes upholds Alexander’s definition of the receptive intellect as full potential faculty. The above quoted definition confirms that knowledge advances from potentiality to actuality (εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἐκ δυνάμεως προαγόμενος). It is obvious that cognition in intellect starts from pure potentialities (ἐκ δυνάμεως δῆλον). Averroes highly appreciates Alfarabi’s definition of the potential intellect according to Alexander. His new form of *intellectus in potencia* represents the capacity of the intellectual part of the soul. Receptivity begins *per prius* at the level of sensory cognition, when occurs the first impulse of real causality and actuality in the process of cognition. The act of cognition proceeds through immaterial reception (*intellectus possibilis*) and through active abstraction (*intellectus agens*) to final immaterial knowledge. This concept of the receptive intellect in the *impositio*-mode of *ipse* (*tertium genus*) is distinguished from the universal content in the *suppositio*-mode of *idem* (*quartum genus*). That fundamental difference completely disappeared in Avicenna’s modernity. Hence the modernists do not have the conception of truth as *proportio* introduced by the Commentator. But Neoplatonist Themistius correctly defined the course of knowledge which is based on the actualization of the material intellect given individually. But such a modern individual is the substance of the third kind, which Averroes rejected. Therefore, he clearly defined the human soul (*anima intellectiva*) as a form of a unique material body. This sensual body constitutes the person as an indivisible first actual substance according to the *Categories*. An equally differentiated attitude as to Themistius exists towards Alexander’s commentary on *De anima* that the Second Master reinterpreted. Alexander, unfortunately, cannot have a complete Aristotelian scheme built on the concordance of the external thing and the human intellect. He fatally interrupted it in a transition from sensual to intellectual cognition. Alexander made the material intellect a lower component of cognition at the level of the senses (*intellectus materialis*). According to Alexander, only this intellect exists in mode of ipseity, because it forms a component of the person as a hylemorphic first substance. The commentary corrects the erroneous view of Alexander, which the modernist Ibn Badja introduced in the Falsafa. The receptivity according to Alexandrians makes a part of hylemorphic body. There is no receptive form of immateriality given from the senses. However, it is precisely this immateriality of thought that Themistius holds in the concept of sensually determined material intellect.

“Alexander said in his writing *On the Intellect* according to Aristotle’s interpretation that the material intellect is a faculty given on hylemorphic substratum (*intellectus materialis est virtus facta a complexione*).”[[221]](#footnote-221)

Alexander and after him Ibn Badja, in contradiction to the work *De anima*, made of the receptive intellect only a material faculty, which is bound to the body as the first substance (*virtus facta a complexione*). Thus they separated the sensory and the intellectual cognition and abolished the *proportio* between the senses and the intellect. This solution, however, was orthodox Aristotelian in all other respects, because it maintained immaterial cognition within the framework of truth as *proportio* of forms abstracted from the senses. Alexander and after him Ibn Badja attained the individuation of the intellect by disclosure of meaning from the front. Unfortunately, their receptive intellect was no longer immaterial and acquired the character of empiric cognition. Man would then cognize completely like animals, which is the nihilistic position of contemporary neuroscience. Such a view in no way corresponds to Alfarabi’s real humanism endorsed by the Commentator. Alexander defined the receptive intellect in contradiction to the material intellect. His conception of the separate receptive intellect as a pure intellectual potency does not allow for any material action by the body (οὔτε σώματος δύναμις ὤν), and therefore it was pure potency (ἔστιν δύναμίς τις ἁπλῶς, ch. 2.1.1). This gave rise to the concept *intellectus possibilis* as immaterial substance; however, it was entirely separate from the hylic intellect incorporated in the body and determined by the senses. Averroes, in the last stage of his thought, was no longer a modernist and an Alexandrian. This Aristotelian held the immaterial *intellectus possilibilis* in an animate body and not at all as Alexander’s independent Neoplatonic hypostasis. The unity of the person requires that the possible intellect make part of immaterial potency of the soul, but not as an external component of the body, in the manner of Alexander and Ibn Bajjah. The hylic intellect of Alexander or material intellect of Themistius must receive properties, which has the immaterial *intellectus possibilis* defined as pure potency.

Ibn Rushd brings Alfarabi’s criticism of Alexander with the help of the terminus *intellectus in potencia* to a final conclusion. We have quoted from Alfarabi the key passage in Alexander’s commentary on *De anima liber cum Mantissa* (107.15–20), which defines the hylic intellect (ch. 2.1.1). Alexander tied the passive cognition to the material body. This fully material intellect had no possibility of actualization because the receptive immaterial intellect was given to it in the secluded mode (*separatus*). Thanks to the existence of the matter, it is not a problem to define the first stage of cognition in the framework “potency—act,” which operates through the body as a unique substrate. One can even perform it within the framework of univocal predication. However, Alexander’s receptive intellect is purely material, which contradicts the actual course of universal cognition, which is immaterial in its nature and begins after sensual cognition. A key contribution of Alexander’s commentary for Averroes was that he abolished for the human intellect the statute of Neoplatonic and Avicennian substance (*hoc aliquid*) and made it merely an intellectual potency of the soul, which is the immaterial form of the body. According to Averroes, the individual performance of the intellect emphasized by Alexander has its own quasi-matter (*intellectus materialis*), which is actualized by its own intellectual quasi-form (*intellectus agens*).[[222]](#footnote-222) The little word “quasi” has an absolutely principal meaning in the following development of the disputes. It was used for the first time in this special meaning in the interpretation of the receptive component of soul by the Second Master (*quasi materia et subiectum*, ch. 2.1.1). Averroes rejected the twofold unity of cognition given by disclosure of being from behind, made by the intellect as a separated immaterial substance. We find the first form of understanding from behind in Themistius and the second in Alexander. Both creators of modern and therefore mythopoetic version of cognition created separated forms of the intellect as substance and changed the intellect from a psychic potency into an actual Neoplatonic form or substance of the third kind. The commentary CMDA defines the immaterial receptivity of the intellect in the mode *separabilis*. It is a special faculty of the soul determined by material receptivity of the senses and as such, it cannot be separated from the body.

The new solution of the material intellect connects Alfarabi’s conception of the possible intellect after remastering Alexander’s pure potency with Themistius’s concept of the material receptive intellect. Receptivity is twofold, material and immaterial, which ensures a basic form of individualized cognition given by actualization of understanding from the front. Intentionality plays a key role in the whole process of cognition. It makes possible individual empirical knowledge (animals) and at the same time establishes the first form of intellectual judgment as the basic form of true statement (humans). The same attitude was adopted in the Latin West by the school of the first Averroism and Siger of Brabant brought to a summit in his philosophy. The best commentator of the CMDA of all times grasped the fundamental importance of the terms *separatus* and *separabilis* for the concept of intellect within the framework of the full unity of the person as Boethius’s single indivisible first substance. The modern or postmodern Alexandrians lost the Aristotelian *proportio* between the senses and the intellect due to the separation of the intellect from the senses. Modernists do not have theory of truth as correspondence. They adopted Alfarabi’s and Avicenna’s concept of intentionality, which is given by actualization of the acquired intellect from the direction of the separated active intellect. Averroes, thanks to the conception of *intellectus in potencia* adopted from the Second Master, established a new conception of intentionality, which is fundamentally different from the modern Avicenna.[[223]](#footnote-223) The intellect is actualized in the mode *per prius* from the first actual substance. The structure of intentionality as understanding from the front is principally different from the intentionality of modern *illuminati*. The cognition follows the metaphysical dative and respects the real donation of meaning. Human intentionality is therefore different from the animal *sensus communis* done on the sensual level. The sensual cognition of humans establishes the first possibility of categorization.

“The senses perceive what is sensual and recognize the individual intentions, which are different from the genera and species. Therefore, the senses perceive intentionally within the framework of this individual person (*intentionem huius hominis individualis*), as the intention of this concrete horse and the universal intention of each of the ten categories that predicate individuals (*universaliter intentionem uniuscuiusque decem predicamentorum individualium*).”[[224]](#footnote-224)

Intentionality initiates the language related to general meanings (*significatio*). In contrast to the animals, human abstraction is linked to the immaterial intellect and it creates universal meaning. Intentionality distinguishes two components at the level of individual sensual imagination. On the one hand, the sensual form is given within the framework of receptive imagination. Subsequently, an immaterial synthesis proceeds through the process of intelligible abstraction, which creates for the human being a categorical meaning of this recognized form given by meaningful speech. The language influences the process of abstraction as a whole; therefore, the resulting act of abstraction is both receptive and active. The phenomenon of human speech has a key significance for Averroes because it shows the unity of cognition based on the intentionality coming from the senses to the concept. This unity rejects mystical illumination of the modernists and the postmodern language games made without the correspondent relation to reality. The system of twofold intentionality does not separate the first intention from the second as it is in Avicenna’s separation between the sensuous process of *abstractio* and the pure intuition of the essence as *denudatio* (ch. 2.3.2). The interpretation of cognition in the CMDA through dual intentionality accomplished the teaching of Aristotelian school constituted in the Baghdad House of Wisdom (Alfarabi, Ibn Adi). This school of Falsafa handed over to the West the concept of truth as correspondence and the definition of human being as a unified person in the existential mode of *ipse*. Gigantomachy concerning the intellect took up anew in the Latin West. The new protagonists in the Latin West were the schools of the first and the second Averroism. The second branch of Averroism ended in the contemporary nihilism.

Hermeneutics must return to the original source of Western gigantomachy on substance. That is the reason why it is necessary to take up the above-mentioned Averroes’s criticism of his contemporaries (*quod contingit Modernis*, ch. 2.4). The Commentator proposed a new form of *proportio* made in the intentional mode *per prius* and *per posterius*. The resulting correspondence mediates the process of cognition in two ways. On the one hand, there is the individual orientation of the senses towards an external object and, on the other hand, the orientation of the intellect (*intentio*) towards a sensual cognition.

“It has been proved that the faculty of cognition in the intellect is nothing else than the faculty which distinguishes the intention of a sensibly perceived thing from its knowledge given in the imagination (*virtus que distinguit intentionem rei sensibilis a suo idolo ymaginato*). This faculty is proportionally related to both intentions (*proportio ad has duas intentiones*), that is, to the sensuous apprehension of the thing and to the intention of its imago (*ad idolum rei et ad intentionem sui idoli*). The same similarity is given at the level of sensual imagination and senses (*sicut proportio sensus communis ad intentiones quique sensuum*). The intellectual faculty is given generically at the level of the faculties existing in the body (*de genere virtutum existentium in corporibus*).”[[225]](#footnote-225)

The quotation distinguishes the perceived real thing (*res*) from the receptive component of the soul (*forma ymaginata*) and finally from the active synthetic faculty of the soul or intellect (*virtus cogitativa*). The similarity necessary for the constitution of truth as *proportio* exists in a threefold register: the external thing (*res sensibilis*)—sensible knowledge in the imagination (*idoli ymaginatae*)—intentional activity related to the sensory idea (*intentio ad idolum rei*). The order of cognition determines the necessity given by the metaphysical dative (*quidditas*). The already absent actuality of the first substance is apprehended (i.e., represented) in the process of sensual cognition. The first and most important synthesis in terms of actuality and the correspondence to the reality is described in a brilliant way. The receptive power of the *sensus communis* establishes the resulting active form of the sensible species (*ad idolum rei*). This purely sensual species must be apprehended in the new form of intentionally made receptivity (*ad intentionem sui idoli*). The second intention is proper to the intellect, which takes in the sensuous species on an immaterial level. Averroes adopted Alfarabi’s terminus *ma’qūl ṭhānī* (*intellectum secundum*) and its conception of dual intentionality. The Commentator, however, reworked teaching of the Second Master in such a way that he let disappeared the act of mythopoetic intentionality coming from illumination (*primum intellectum*, ch. 2.1.1). On the vacant place of modern mythopoetic cognition, he put proportionally given correspondence between sensible and intelligible intentionality. The quotation emphasizes that only in this way the proportionally, i.e., causally given similarity between the material senses and the immaterial intellect is possible. Two directions of sensual cognition meet together in full description. The actuality of cognition comes from the senses and its receptive sensible intentionality comes from the soul as one of its potentialities. The transition from the actuality of senses to the potentiality of intellect follows the fundamental scenario of *Categories*. The process of cognition runs from the imposition made by the first real substance (imago) to the supposition of general meaning in the passive intellect (concept). In this way, it is valid that the proportionally, i.e., causally given similarity between the material senses and the immaterial intellect is kept within the unified cognition as ability of the soul (*ista virtus est illa cuius proportio ad has duas inentiones*). Imaginative and intellectual intentionality and the resulting cognition are unified in one cognitive capacity. Within the framework of intentionality, it is therefore necessary to distinguish first material sensorial perception and the subsequent synthesis of the *species sensibilis*. This species is also given to animals at their specific level of intentionality, cognition and judgment (*vis aestimativa*). In the framework of the correspondence of the thing and the intellect, it comes to the synthesis of *species sensibilis* as a basis for the language. The second intentionality comes from the immaterial component of cognition and it creates a new form of the *species intelligibilis*. Human cognition differs from animal cognition already at the sensory level because it works in a different scheme of intentionality. The second form of intentionality is accomplished only by the immaterial receptive faculty of the human soul (*species intelligibilis*). The resulting abstraction runs through the faculty of *intellectus agens* as an active component of human soul. The twofold conception of intentionality corresponds exactly to the canonical text *De anima* on two faculties of cognition (νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι, ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν, *De anima* 430a14–15). The commentary CMDA introduced these two faculties into the relation on both sensual and intellectual levels. The thesis about the correspondence of the sensuous and the intelligible species in the framework of the two processes of intentionality (sensual, intellectual) forms the basis for Averroes’s conception of truth as correspondence (*proportio*) between the sensual and the intellectual cognition of the external thing. As mentioned before, both acts are unified in one faculty of the soul in the mode *ipse* (*modus intelligendi*, *intellectio*). Intentionality of animals creates cognition at the level of *vis aestimativa*. That kind of animal ipseity is given sensually and individually. Averroes’s description of cognition is based on the exact definition of twofold intentionality. The sensual species arises in the general imagination, which synthesizes the orientation of the senses towards the real thing. The second intentionality proceeds from the immaterial faculty of human soul. At first passive and then active intellect direct the attention towards the already synthesized intentional object in the imagination. Truth as correspondence arises with respect to the external thing through the process of twofold intentionality (*proportio ad has duas intentiones*) in the context of holistic intentional reception and synthesis.

Averroes took up the model of illumination based on the actualization of intellect from the front, from the intelligible intentionality. The intention goes in the mode *per prius* first to the sensual species, which are taken up in the first intention. It is received in the second step by the immaterial and purely potential *intellectus possibilis*. Such an intellect is merely a faculty of the soul because its act runs in the mode of pure, immaterially given receptivity. The conception of the twofold intentionality, which is distinguished on the level of the correspondence of the twofold species (*sensibilis*, *intelligibilis*) prevented the emergence of all entities of the third kind. The knowledge is governed by production of the sense of being within the categorial imposition, which confirms the basic thesis of the *Categories*. It confirmed the actualization of cognition from the front, from the direction of sensually perceived first real substance. This correspondence of reality and intellect founded the truth as proportionality between thing and intellect. Therefore, the Commentator is the author of correspondence theory of truth and not Avicenna. The modern intentionality of Avicennists changed the receptive character of *intellectus possibilis* into a kind of actualized hypostasis. Averroes asserts against Themistius’s concept of bodily material intellect that the abstracted form of the single thing is immaterial. Against Alexander is valid that immaterial and fully potential *intellectus possibilis* receives its intentions from the first intention through its own second intention. The material intellect remains an individual component of the soul through the combination of Themistius’s *intellectus materialis* and Alexander’s *intellectus possibilis*. At the same time, this receptive intellect works in Themistius’s mode of immaterial *intellectus possibilis*, which this Neoplatonist, unfortunately conceives as an actual substance separate from the individual body. Therefore, the CMDA must reject Themistius’s conception of the receptive intellect as substance and holds against him Alexander’s conception of the receptive intellect as pure potency. In this way, the *intellectus possibilis* must be separated from the material intellect of Alexander. Averroes changed the receptive intellect of Alexander by ingenious interpretation of intentionality according to the Second Master. The resulting correspondence between the material and immaterial act of intentionality creates no modern duality of cognition of material senses and immaterial intellect as *tertium ens*. New metaphysics and gnoseology does not allow a paranoid mix of reality and recognized objects in the mind, as it is the case with modernity. The reception of the senses is passive and individual. The first actual substance in the mode *simpliciter* and *per se* acts directly on bodily organs. Each link of the chain of intentionality and abstraction has a different status. It establishes a system of correspondence of intellect and thing in the mode actuality and potency.

First, the actual thing is given *simpliciter*. Then, in the act of the sensually first intentionality, the actual and individual *species sensibilis* arises. The orientation of the immaterial intellect in its receptive component relates to the real thing by the first intentionality. The second actualization of cognition arises on the basis of the second intentionality, which produces a universal and potential *species intelligibilis*. The act of this intentionality is made by the purely potential component of *anima intellectiva* that is defined as *tabula rasa*. Averroes excluded every Aristotelian substance and Neoplatonic hypostasis from internal processes of cognition. The intellect as pure potency is able to receive any actuality given from the direction of the senses. This ability of the soul being purely potential, it takes up everything in its own way, that is, in the immaterial mode of intentionality. This already immaterial mode of cognition goes through the process of abstraction situated in the active component of intellect. The result is a categorical concept (*conceptus*). Averroes created a new kind of intellect through this synthesis, which characterizes its ingenious and hitherto unsurpassed interpretation of Aristotle.

“If we look at the whole of Aristotle’s definitions and put them together, it is clear that he has the following in mind. When the possible intellect is actualized, the active faculty of cognition (*intelligentia agens copulabitur nobiscum*) unites with us. Thanks to this ability, we also understand things outside ourselves (*per quem intelligemus alias res*). Through it we make sensible things actually intelligible (*per quam faciemus res sensibilies esse intellectas in actu*), when this active faculty becomes form in us (*secundum quod ipse efficitur forma in nobis*).”[[226]](#footnote-226)

The key phrase of the passive and active intellect as “*forma in nobis”* signifies a twofold rejection of separated intellect as substance. Neoplatonists and Aristotelian Alexander created an immaterial *intellectus possibilis* as a modern hypostasis, and they associated it with a completely separate *intellectus agens*. Themistius took a similar approach by including the material intellect in sensory reception and separating both *intellectus possibilis* and *intellectus agens*. Averroes rejected the traditional Neoplatonic solution (Themistius, Alexander Aphrodisias, Theofrastos) and modern solutions of his contemporaries, which separated the material or receptive intellect from the sensual cognition after the manner of Alexander (Avicenna, Ibn Baddja). He conceived new mediation as the performance of immaterial soul in two faculties (receptive and active) on the level of sensual and intellectual capacities of human soul. New definition of truth and cognition requires no more an acquired intellect (*intellectus adeptus*), which serves as a hypostatic and material form of receptivity in the individual act of cognition. Neoplatonists and Avicenna took up the acquired intellect as a hypostasis and its external activator as separated *intellectus agens*. This brought into individual human cognition the world of immaterial forms emanated from the sphere of cosmic active intellect as *Dator formarum*. The modern scheme of knowledge needs even two non-existent hypostatic entities of the third kind. Averroes was not a mythopoetic modernist and *illuminatus*, therefore he could not accept such a defeat of critical thinking. The new form of material intellect founded a new history of Western metaphysics. The later tradition of the first and the second Averroism knows this intellect as *intellectus possibilis*. The hermeneutics of objectivity must determine in what way this epochal event of knowing (*Ereignis*) determines the historicity (*Geschichte*) of metaphysics and consequently the history of Western thinking.

### 2.4.3 Intellect and Unity of Person

A connoisseur of Averroes could have objected that many quotations from the CMDA can be legitimately read in the way of Avicenna or that of Neoplatonism. The material or possible intellect (*intellectus possibilis*) appears as a separated entity. It can be understood in a univocal sense and causes the same universal cognition in all human beings. The individual act of cognition forms a connection (*copulatio, coniunctio*) of this hypostatized intellect to the individual knowledge. This is the well-known Averroistic interpretation of CMDA inspired by Avicenna. Thomas Aquinas endorsed it, but not Siger of Brabant. Hermeneutics must interpret the occurrence of *intellectus possibilis*, which is universal in individuals and also in all humanity. Averroes was not an Averroist like previous and contemporary modernists. The twofold notion of intentionality solved the deficiencies of Themistius and Alexander and created a new concept of intellect as receptive and synthetic cognition in the animate body. The theory of separated receptive intellect denies the possibility of a concordance of the intellect with the senses, thus making individual cognition impossible. Moreover, the human intellect as an independent substance leads to a plurality of substances in a man, which contradicts the experienced real unity of being and thinking done in “my” body. Being of the third kind cannot exist in classical metaphysics. Human person cannot contain several substances, because everybody and everything exists as Aristotle’s first substance *simpliciter* in the reality. Philosophy must adequately recognize this existential unity of the person and predicate it according to the metaphysical dative. The true interpretation of *De anima* must consider the phenomenological way in which the person recognizes herself or himself as the first substance. Siger of Brabant grasped in depth this interpretation of CMDA and the connoisseurs of Averroes at the University of Paris inspired by him. It is no wonder that Avicennist modernists turned them into so-called Averroists and thus transferred the whole gigantomachy concerning the intellect into an objective wandering (*Irre*). Medieval Avicennists and the modern objectivists created a homonymous concept of *intellectus possibilis* with reference to CMDA. They conceive it to be an independent entity placed outside the architecture of dual intentionality and outside the existence of real person. The capital error of modernism given in the figure of the so-called Averroism is made by erroneous categorical predication of the receptive and active intellect in man. By introducing the logical version of *modus ponens*, modernists changed the intellect into a kind of Neoplatonic hypostasis. They accomplished the objectification of intellect as mythological substance of the third kind. Avicennists neglected the metaphysical difference that formed the hyparchical predication. The architecture of classic metaphysics is built up on the imposition that relates to the ontological perspective of comprehension on the level of “substance *qua* substance.” The artificial construct of modern metaphysics is built up on the supposition that relates to the subjective perspective of objective comprehension. This trajectory of understanding produces objective knowledge on the level “*ens inquantum ens*.” Avicennists neglected the metaphysical difference which formed the hyparchical predication of the first substance by means of the metaphysical dative (*qua—inquantum*). The defense mechanism of *Modernorum* organized by academically educated Furies projected the modern simulacrum called “*intellectus possibilis*” in Averroes’s metaphysics according to the Freudian “inversion in the opposite” (*Verkehrung ins Gegenteil*). Hermeneutics must clarify the mechanism of this erroneous projection. Let us look at a typical case from the CMDA regarding the twofold intentionality commented above. The separation of cognition from the real thing establishes a twofold conception of intentionality producing the sensible and intelligible species, which played a key role in the disputes of the first half of the 13th century. One and the same soul given in the person as the first substance has two different dispositions and two different faculties. First, the soul takes potential forms through the abstraction mediated by the senses. Afterwards the soul recognizes these abstracted forms in an immaterial way. Then it is true that the immaterial intellect in man is formally the same faculty of receptive and synthetic cognition as it is the case of sensual cognition.

“It was necessary to put these two activities in our soul (*has duas actiones anime in nobis*), so that the one activity receives the intellectual knowledge and the other one produces it (*recipere intellectum et facere eum*). The agent and recipient are the eternal substances (*agens et recipiens sint substantie eterne*), and this because they are subject to our will. We possess the ability to abstract intellectual contents, and also understand them (*abstrahere intellecta et intelligere ea*). Abstraction is nothing else than the ability to make sensual intention intellectually recognized in the act, because they were previously recognizable only in potency (*facere intentiones ymaginatas intellectas in actu postquam erant in potentia*). Cognition is nothing other than the reception of these intentions (*intelligere autem nihil aliud est quam recipere has intentiones*).”[[227]](#footnote-227)

In view of the preceding interpretation, it must be argued that the text rejects the conception of the intellect as an independent substance. This aberrant modernist conception of the receptive intellect as being of the third kind lacks both autonomous form and autonomous matter for above-mentioned reasons of principle. But the fundamental problem for the scholastic interpreters of the CMDA caused the quoted sentences of the type: “The agent and recipient are the eternal substances (*agens et recipiens sint substantie eterne*), and that because they are subject to our will.” Avicennist interpretation of CMDA, known especially through Thomas Aquinas, combined both determinations in such a way that he created an Averroist conception of the one passive intellect for all humans as eternal substance that is connected to the material human intellect through *coniunctio* (OBJ III, ch. 4.5.1). Avicenna’s receptivity proceeds by the disclosure of meaning from behind. Individual *intellectus adeptus* given as a real hypostasis in the soul is illuminated by the separated *intellectus agens*. The actualization of the acquired intellect as that kind of *intellectus in effectu* dates back to Avicenna’s interpretation of Alfarabi (ch. 2.3.2). It was uncritically applied to Averroes’s proceeding that concerns his concept of *intellectus possibilis*. The receptive faculty of the soul was defined as Avicenna’s immaterial hypostasis (*hoc aliquid*). This gave rise to the potential intellect as a Neoplatonic species according to Alexander and Themistius. That Averroistic interpretation of the CMDA appeared in the circles of Latin modernism. Modernists defined the hypostatic intellect as a different form of *tertium ens* and wrongly attributed this nonsense to Averroes. They applied theory of illumination and the pantheistic conception of David of Dinant to the Commentator’s theory of recognition (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.3). This tragicomic interpretation has caused the simulacrum of Averroes’s *intellectus possibilis* to be understood to this day in the Avicennist mode of *copulatio*. Avicennist thinkers make together in an objectivist manner the separate substances of the third kind into a schizophrenic unity of the person. From the point of view taken in CMDA, they are not capable of seeing the phenomenon of *continuatio* in the real act of cognition. The exercise of cognition runs in the mode *ipse*, that is, in the unique hylemorphic person who cognizes through different potentialities of immaterial soul. The receptive intellect of the modernists represents an objective entity in the form of *tertium ens*, which, according to Averroes, is absolute nonsense. The previous chapter gives the reasons for rejecting a hypostatic union of different forms of the substantial intellect. The intellect is not an objective hypostasis, because such nonsense cannot exist in the reality. The intellect is an immaterial potency in the living person and it determines the fundamental way “how” (*das hermeneutische Wie*, ch. 1) we recognize universal meanings and forms. Averroes is fundamentally and primarily interested in the way “how” we cognize (*Bezugssinn*). The modern and postmodern question of “what” this or that form of intellect is entirely secondary to him (*Gehaltsinn*). If this secondary question is done in the mode *per prius*, it represents a fundamental error. It introduces the exploration of the soul from the direction of the essence instead of the act of the person as the first substance. Solely Siger of Brabant saw and completely defended this unique position of the CMDA. This Christian philosopher therefore ended as tragically as the Islamic connoisseur of Aristotle. Heidegger took up the controversy anew without knowing the whole story. Hermeneutics follow the hidden activity of Furies in the age of academic modernity. The exegesis of erroneous objectivity cannot accept the Avicennist interpretation of Averroes, which ends with the grading of this thinker as the originator of “Averroism” or “Semi-Averroism.” The emergence of Averroistic interpretation of Averroes must be explained in such a way to trace the cited “obscurity” which this thinker rejects in his predecessors (ch. 2.4.1).

Let us start with the question of the numerically one intellect for all men, because it will play a key role in the rejection of CMDA in the context of the second Averroism, which emerged in Oxford around 1235. Averroes, unlike his eclectic contemporaries, read Aristotle’s Corpus in its original spirit and he rejected in principle all Neoplatonic solutions. The writing CMDA demands in the context of the *proportio* that the material intellect must be a quasi-matter for the quasi-form of the active intellect. The little word “quasi,” repeatedly emphasized in key passages of the commentary, rejects the unitary theory of the intellect as a separated substance. Both previous chapters have shown that Averroes in his “meta-physics” rejected all theories that obliterate the uniqueness and separateness of the first substance. Neoplatonists and modern Alexandrians like Avicenna did not respect Aristotle’s critique of the Neoplatonic definition of the soul determined by superior intelligible forms as the highest genus of being. Another error arose in the material pantheism of Pythagorean cosmic elements, where the soul was defined according to the divine pneuma. Aristotle criticized Thales for the conception of the soul as an original substance which animates the body (*De anima* 411a8). Then the soul ceased to be an entelechic form of the body. It became a separated immaterial or material substance, which determines the subordinate parts and functions of the soul. That solution offered both Themistius and Alexander.[[228]](#footnote-228) These answers do not form a real unity of soul and body. Averroes rejects the Neoplatonic definition of the soul according to Alexander and introduces a fundamental question for philosophy.

“Further, Aristotle said, *that* *if* *life is in one of these faculties*, etc. Therefore we must determine whether what he calls life is based merely in one of these faculties, or whether one faculty is composed of the parts, or whether it is one faculty entailed in all the others.”[[229]](#footnote-229)

What is life as a performance of the soul? Either it makes the one of many components of soul, which is superior to the sensuous activities (*in una aliqua istarum quinque virtutum*). Or it makes the whole composed of parts (*in pluribus una*). Or it makes an entelechic unity of the organism, which is given by the parts (*in omnibus*). Only ingenious thinkers can find the principal questions to look for correct answers. The soul is somehow one and everything originates from it. This question represents Heidegger’s *Lichtung* as a revelation of truth and untruth (*a/lētheia*). We find answers to these three questions in various historical figures of objectivity in scholasticism (the so-called matrices), which the second and the third tome of this study analyse in depth. The writing CMDA investigates the Aristotelian soul as entelechic form of the body in a way that respects the unity and the real proceeding of its functions and faculties. The unity cannot be given from outside as Neoplatonic *anima intellectiva*, since it is the superior genus or hypostatized form. The unity “*in omnibus”* must proceed from the being of the person whose soul constitutes “this being” of the animate first substance, because “this crerature” is the entelechic unity of soul and body. The solution of materialists takes the body and its functions as the only source of cognition and completely ignores the acts of cognition given by the immaterial soul as the entelechic form of the body. Or modernity takes the Neoplatonic definition of the immaterial soul as separated substance, which is connected by the original *coniunctio* with the universal intellect situated on cosmic level. The intellect-sun actualizes through illumination the acquired intellect in the soul as a modern hypostasis of the third kind. Making the collection of the different hypostases (*in pluribus una*), the modern and postmodern concept of person is composed of different incompatible substances. The reduction of the human soul to pure animality was rejected by all classic thinkers as a total loss of the critical thinking, which disrespects the basic facts of human wisdom. Only the contemporary epoch of nihilistic thinking, after complete abolition of metaphysics, can allow itself to deny the specificity of thinking in its immaterial component. Today’s *intellectus materialis* of postmodern Alexandrians is biologically the same as that of animals. But man defined in the mode of mathematical computations, unlike the less computationally capable animal, has a more complicated structure of neurons and perhaps a better model of chemical neurotransmitters. In this conception of “unity” the specific cognition of man already did not exist. Contemporary definition of person is reduced to the quantitatively improved animal characteristics of the type of autonomous modular units of thought.[[230]](#footnote-230) Avicenna’s animal *vis aestimativa* returned and has objective and quite deserved success in the age of metaphysical nihilism thanks to its disguise in the artificial intelligence based on the definition of man as Cartesian *bête-machine*. The immateriality or even the immortality of the human soul is defended by philosophical and theological arguments of all metaphysical schools of thought in the West, until their decline in the contemporary nihilism. The intellectual soul distinguishes man from the animal, which the generation of educated people of previous epochs considered a principled and self-evident fact. Conversely, in the time of the reign of the classical mind and education at the end of the Falsafa, there was a priority of the intellectual component of soul, which is immaterial. Avicenna and the later scholastic modernism and Cartesian postmodernism simply separated this immaterial component from the physical existence. After the arrival of Averroes’s writing in the West, the Aristotelian group of Avicennists influenced by the school of *Nominales* interpreted this part of the CMDA in such a way that plurality of substantial forms (*in pluribus una*) replaced the entelechic unity (*in omnibus*). They changed the Commentator into an Averroist. The Latin Avicennists isolated sayings about the unitary intellect in all men from the overall context of CMDA’s polemics against Themistius and Alexander and put them together in a sophistical way. The second part shows how the modern Avicennists interpreted the passages exploring the unity of intellect and why they passed over the real conclusions of CMDA, which form a new form of metaphysics. The second Averroism turned Averroes’s concept of *intellectus possibilis* into a being of the third kind à la Avicenna. The passive and at the same time active part of the immaterial *intellectus possibilis* supposedly functions continuously and universally only in such a way that it is numerically one for all human beings. It makes unity with the individual person in the mode of *copulatio*. This specific connection of the receptive intellect to the separated and numerically unitary *intellectus agens* ensures the recognition of universal content in the mind.

Robert Kilwardby, in the letter to Peter of Conflans, justified the plurality of substantial forms in a human being referring to the controversy that concerned the unity of forms (*positio de unitate formarum*). The letter written against the Thomists of that time contains the following interesting sentence: “What they say by the term ’thesis on the unity of forms in a man,’ I really do not understand.”[[231]](#footnote-231) The Archbishop of Canterbury speaks in the name of all generations of modernists and postmodernists, which did not grasp the doctrine of the CMDA. They conceive the person as schizophrenic collection of different incompatible substances. The most important Oxford modernist failed to understand even the Semi-Averroists like Thomas Aquinas, who no longer see in the person a plurality of substance, but “only” the plurality of hypostatized forms. This understandably did not escape the Aristotelians and connoisseurs of Averroes of the time, who considered the school of *Modernorum* to be a group of philosophical illiterates and sneered at them as sophistical thinkers (*sophistae Latini*) or they called them ironically to be “learned Latinists” (*doctores Latini*). These scholars influenced by Avicennism called the real connoisseurs of Averroes by the pejorative title “Averroists” (*Averroistae*). The quarrel who is or is not an Averroist, or in what way, is what the second part of essay tries to clarify. Averroes leads the search for the unity of cognition and existence in different direction than the Neoplatonic school and Avicenna as founders of modernity. The intellect is immaterial, it cannot be a substance and is individualized by the soul as a unique form of the unique body. It is possible in the existential mode “*in omnibus.*” Defined in that way, the phenomenological concept of cognition emerged as *continuatio* of intellect. The writing CMDA respects the existing person as Aristotelian indivisible first substance. But on the other hand, the immaterial act of thinking is in some way common to all people. The unity of the material intellect is not taken in terms of substance, as modern and postmodern commentators suppose. However, Averroes admits that the soul is somehow everything in the sense of its universal receptivity (*anima quodammodo est omnia*, *De anima* 431b20–21). Every definition of the rational soul must be common to all human beings insofar as it grounds the universal knowledge. But at the moment when the *intelligibilia* are produced, it is a strictly personal act. The unity of the intellect within the universal species and humanity is a secondary problem (*quaestio secunda*). Averroes starts the proof from the hyparchical position of the first substance.

“The second question is whether the material intellect is one in all men (*unus in numero in omnibus individuis hominum*), neither generated nor destructible; whether the cognitions which really exist in it and which constitute a speculative intellect differ from one another in different men, and whether they are given by birth or by perishable individuals. This question is very difficult and contains a maximum amount of ambiguity (*questio valde est difficilis, et maximam habet ambiguitatem*).” [[232]](#footnote-232)

The quotation speaks clearly of one material intellect common to all men (*intellectus materialis est unus in numero in omnibus individuis hominum*). This intellect has all the basic signs of the immaterial intellect (*non generabilis neque corruptibilis*). But the next proposition adds that this unitary intellect becomes a real *intellectus speculativus* at the moment of its activity, when it is producing real intelligible contents (*intellecta existentia in eo in actu*). In this case the intellect is wholly individualized according to the persons (*numeratus per numerationem individuorum hominum*). It must join in its performance the act of transient existence (*generabilis et corruptibilis per generationem et corruptionem individuorum*). Averroes considers this connection of both components of the intellect as a very difficult question, which contains in itself many ambiguities. The further analyses of objectivity and the whole quarrel concerning Averroism fully prove his words. The text distinguishes between the universal specific capacity of immaterial intellect to produce the same contents of thought for all men, and the actual act of this intellect given in the strictly personal *actus essendi* of the first substance. There is a fundamental difference between the phenomenology and therefore continuity of the intellect in the existing person and the abstract definition of the intellect given in mankind as a universal unity. Let us first return to the original argument in the Falsafa when the Commentator opposed the modernists of his time. Alfarabi’s conception of rational human nature must be refunded and set against Avicenna’s and al-Ghazālī’s erroneous conception of nature given by illumination that is formed by *intellectus adeptus* (ch. 2.1.1). Humanism must stick to the existence of a real person and not to the position of a non-existent modern *individuum*. The next passage is often used for the Averroist interpretation of the numerically unitary intellect. It ties in with the preceding quotation and we find it a few pages further on.

“On the basis of this definition we have asserted that the material intellect is one for all men (*intellectus materialis est unicus omnibus hominibus*), and the same reasoning has asserted that the human species is eternal (*species humana est aeterna*), as we have stated elsewhere. The material intellect must contain the natural principles (*non sit denudatus a principiis naturalibus*) which are common to the whole human species (*communibus toti speciei humane*), namely, the first principles of cognition and the unique concepts common to all men. These cognitions, in fact, are unique (*intellecta sunt unica*) from the point of view of the individual receptor (*secundum recipiens*) and distinct from the point of view of the assumed intention (*multa secundum intentionem receptam*).”[[233]](#footnote-233)

The first sentence draws attention to the two principles that Averroes emphasized earlier. They explain the immateriality of the intellect and the universality of intellectual content. The unity of the material intellect for all human beings (*intellectus materialis est unicus omnibus hominibus*) is at the level of abstraction associated with the humanity as a species (*species humana est aeterna*). From the point of view of the Averroists, Averroes dusted off Avicenna’s concept of habitual intellect (*intellectus in habitu*) in this quotation. Hypostatized habitual intellect exists in all human beings as an innate immaterial capacity to form judgment on basic intuitive inferences from premises. The first form of that material intellect can be found in the animals in the form of *vis aestimativa*. Humans actualize it in the individual act of thinking (*intellectus in effectu*, ch. 2.3.2). The material intellect made into actuality must receive the immaterial contents as well; therefore it became an independent substance or a substantial species separated from the body. This “unity” of thought is based on the action of separate intellect that is connected to the existent person. Such an explanation is erroneous in principle. Averroes’s concept of the receptive intellect in the framework of *continuatio* does not have the same status as Avicenna’s, thanks to the disclosure of meaning from the front and due to the different way of abstraction and dual intentionality. Avicenna made out of intellect a being of the third kind. The previous quotation from the CMDA concerning the unity of the intellect as a universal species has shown that some universal continuum of the *intellectus materialis* exists on the level of mankind as the species. It is given by the immateriality of this intellect and by the separation from the senses. The first principles of cognition are the same in all men thanks to universality (*intellectus materialis non sit denudatus a principiis naturalibus*). Only man possesses the specific cognition of universals, which, however, is based on the individual sensory cognition. The receptive part of the intellect, in this immateriality, must be common to all human beings in the sense of the nature given to humanity as a species (*principiis naturalibus toti speciei humane*). Let us consider the question of one intellect for all humans from the point of view of previous interpretation of the work *Categories* based on the metaphysical dative.

The CMDA established in the first step the causal action of intellect in the mode *ex inmediatis* given from the direction of real thinking person as the first hylemorphic substance. The ipseity of the intellect is categorically predicted in the mode of imposition, that is, by disclosure of meaning from the front, from the hyparchic first substance. The intellect is the only form of the unique body (*anima intellectiva*). The first predication of the intellect is given on the basis of the *actus essendi* of the hyparchic first substance. The performance of this intellect proceeds thanks to the immaterial soul as the only form which animates “my” body. The intellect makes the actual form of this bodily existence (*Dasein* of Heidegger). The first step of abstraction determines *univoce* the specifically grasped intellect as the second substance, which is closest to the existing first substance of this or that person. Now, in the second step, it is possible to follow the supposition of the intellect as species in the universal mode (*Cat*. 2a15–16). Now the CMDA goes to the level of second universal substance and predicate meanings from the genus in order to arrive to the species. The hyparchical imposition of the intellect as *species* becomes a universal supposition of the intellect as *genus*. It is again a predication *per prius*, but its ontological perspective (*Vor-blickbahn*) arises from the illumination from behind, i.e., from the universal meaning of intellect as second substance (*genus—species*). First, Averroes examines the act of thinking in the first person, when the intellect enters into a categorial imposition given causally (*intellectio*). Then he moves to the plane of abstraction (*questio secunda*) and here he examines the intellect as a universal concept in its generic form of the second substance (*intellectum*). Such predication of intellect defines its universal meaning. The second step in the quotation relates the meaning of intellect as universal species to the next and higher universality given at the level of humanity as a genus. Then we have another example of categorial predication *per prius*, but in a different mode than the previous hyparchical imposition. In this case, we are dealing with logical supposition. Because of the correct imposition, made from the real causality in the thinking body, the universal intellect has become a species made by metaphysical imposition. Thus, it contains the universal nature of humanity conceived as a genus that is made by a logical supposition. The meaning of reference (*Bezugssinn*) of metaphysical ipseity and logical identity is double and it is necessary to distinguish it very carefully. Modernity does not think in such a critical way, since Avicenna. Modernists do not respect metaphysical imposition, since they completely erased the metaphysical predication from their enlightened mind. The *illuminati* “see” a mythopoetic Averroistic intellect given *per prius*, which is in fact an Avicennist substance of the third kind. Averroes is in no way a modern Averroist. He investigates the really thinking person and not the “intellect” as a modern chimera. The correctly secured and predicated causality for human cognition is done as correspondence of senses and the mind. It enables the correct universal conclusion on the level of scientific deductive proof according to the *Second Analytics*. We can see the fundamental difference from Avicenna’s perspective, who conceived the intellect as actualized substance of the third kind, which is actualized from the direction of the separated *intellectus agens*. Averroes states exactly the opposite. He passed from the individual act of thinking to the level of abstraction and explores the intellect as universal species in its generic form of the second substance. On the level of the abstracted species, the intellect has only the statute of a universal entity in the abstractly thinking intellect. The text does not explore, like Avicenna, the individual and actual substance called “intellect”. The CMDA makes an abstraction from the existential act of intellect (*Bezugssinn*) to create the general human faculty in its specific form (*Gehaltsinn*) that produces immaterial thought and cognition of the world. The species exists only as a universal meaning in human mind. Therefore, a principal difference exists between two insights into the act of intellect as an existential act and as a conceptual abstraction. Both forms of intellect are given through Averroes’s real *continuatio* and not the Avicenna’s mythopoetic *coniunctio*. The intellect exists only as an individual capacity of the corporeal and uniquely existing person. This act of the person in its ipseity can be taken into the process of abstraction, because the thinking exists as real indivisible first substance. In the properly accomplished deduction, we obtain the generic level of *continuatio* of this personal intellect. The universal intellect became the species and therefore is bound to the universal nature of humanity conceived as the genus. Humanity does not exist in reality, only Socrates exists. The intellect exists at this level as a specific, universally and potentially given capacity of humanity. Both forms of predication of the intellect differ from each other in principle, just as being of the first and the second substance differ from each other in the *Categories* (ch. 1.3). The first substance represents the personal act of recognition, the second substance represents the universal concept of cognition.

The human intellect differs from the celestial intelligences as well as from the sensual reasoning of the animals. The cosmic intelligences are pure intellectual beings. The animals have no intellect at all, only the basic *aestimatio* or *cogitatio* bound to the senses. But this capacity of making conclusions is already fully individual, because it forms an entelechic form of the living body. The human being possesses the ability of higher immaterial cognition, even if it is sensually determined. If we as human beings did not have this receptive intellectual ability from the point of view of our nature (i.e., outside the real thinking and personal disposition), then we would not recognize universally equal contents and science would be impossible. But cognition within the framework of humanity exists and so do philosophy and science because there are humans that exist as first real substances. Therefore, at the level of conceptual definition, the person is abstractly determined as an intellectual being on the level of second substance. The quotations about the unity of intellect in the framework of human beings have a precise meaning in the new predication of possible intellect, which we will examine further. The third and last part of the Averroistic puzzle of the CMDA we find in the further extracts of the same chapter.

“Then it is clear that man really understands (*intelligens in actu*) because the actually given mental process continues in himself (*continuationem intellecti eo in actu*).” [[234]](#footnote-234)

Understanding like any other movement proceeds from potentiality to actuality because no scholar fell from heaven (*homo non est intelligens in actu nisi*…). The process of cognition needs a driving force, which is in actuality with respect to the potential intellect. This actualized part of cognition must directly influence the intellect. The intellect represents a permanent faculty, which guarantees a continuity of cognition (*propter continuationem intellecti*). This continuity of cognition takes place only on the first actual substance (*congregatum ex eis sit unicum*). Averroes says that the intellectual act of animate body is unified in the living human being. Secondly, it is a personal act (*ipse*) because it is determined by disclosure of meaning from the uniquely given bodily senses. They ensure recognition of the fundamental actuality from the direction of the first real substance. The first and the second point concern the metaphysical imposition. As third, the intellect predicated as supposition is specific to humanity in the universality of thought. That kind of intellect is related to the abstract definition of man as a thinking species distinct from the animal species. However, this specific continuity of intellect (*intellectum*) is fundamentally different from the existential continuity of the act of thinking (*intellectio*). The imposition of intellect needs the act of the thinking person (*tertium genus*). Completely different is the continuity of thinking guaranteed by the intellect on the level of mankind, where it is given as a universal and therefore eternal concept (*quartum genus*). The difference between the two kinds of intellect is principal, since logic is not metaphysics and imposition is not supposition.

Objective interpretations of “intellect” as a being of the third kind have completely bypassed that difference. Again, the epochal error of Avicennism is to be seen, because modernity sets the simulacrum called “intellect” in the mythopoetic *modus ponens*. Modern logic sees only the identity of substance in the homonymic mode of “*secundum quod.*” Founded on the principle of logical abstraction, modernity cannot recognize the ipseity in the metaphysical mode “*quo est*.” The commentary clearly states that there are two generically distinct acts of understanding. The understanding is given either as existential ipseity or as universal identity. Between actuality and potence, there is no mythopoetic “copulation” in the form of some being of the third kind. Hermeneutics refute the speculative *copulatio* of the modern and postmodern Averroists (so-called Mind–Body Problem). The exegesis considers with Averroes, Siger and Heidegger the existential phenomenological way, how this or that form of intellect is given in its actualized permanence (*continuatio*). The real process of thinking is not a mythopoetic copulation of various entities of the third kind. The hermeneutic trajectory of comprehension relates to the existential unity of the person and intellect; therefore it distinguishes two different points of view. The intellect as *tertium genus* presupposes the existence of the hylemorphic substance, because the predication concerns *per prius* the thinking of the existing person. An act of thinking controlled by the separated intellect would not be an act of our will and personal freedom. The unified intellect for all mankind as *quartum genus* does not think at all. It is pure abstraction that exists only in the thinking of real people. Ipseity of intellect is given as first actual substance. The predication as *tertium genus* is made by imposition of the meaning from the causally acting reality. The thinking of the person is predicated by the imposition following the metaphysical dative (*quidditas*). The metaphysical identity of the intellect is given as a universal second substance in the mode of supposition is in that case determined by the *univoce* given imposition of the possible intellect as *species humana* in the framework of *tertium genus*. The substrat of generic signification concerning the intellect is not the living person (the first hyparchic substance), nor *species humana* made by metaphysical imposition (the second metaphysical substance). It is a classic *individuum* situated at the end of dialectic division according to Porphyry. There are three substrats of meaning (*subiectum*) that make sense of *univoce* exerced aristotelian definition of “person.” The carrier of generic meaning of the intellect is not a person, but an *individuum*, which is no more divisible into other universal meanings. The individual does not make the definition of the person, because its meaning is specific. The predication of subjectively, individually and specifically given intellect is given from the direction of abstracting intellect as *quartum genus*. This notion of individually given intellect represents a universal meaning which comes into existence by the supposition concerning the abstracted intellect. Therefore, it is given as a pure potentiality. This fundamental difference between both forms of permanence of intellect given by twofold way of intellect in the mode of actuality and causality (person) and potentiality and universality (humanity). For objectively thinking contemporaries there is hardly any difference between person, individual, humanity and dead corpse, because these being of the third kind represent more or less the same thing. Modernity and postmodernity are objectively and therefore fundamentally blind to the difference between two kinds of intellect in the CMDA. The modern and postmodern Alexandrians “see” an objectively given “intellect” as being of the third kind. Such a mythopoetic “intellect” does not exist because it has no proper mode of existence. Really exists only the first actual substance or the second substance as potentially made universals; there is no being of the third kind given in a false objective univocity. The learned Latins made Averroes an Averroist in the mode of sophistical *continuatio* of their own epochal error. This is another ironic trait of academically instructed Furies that promote modern ignorance (*apaideusía*). It is given by the ignorance of the metaphysical reasoning of Aristotle, the Second Master and the Commentator. Metaphysics of modernity became an enigma on the level of demonic Sphinx. The tragic question, “What is man?” got a completely modern and therefore fundamentally wrong answer. Modernity, in the mode of objective *paideía*, no longer knows who man is. Therefore, the first modernists demonized Averroes and Siger (OBJ III, ch. 5.5). Averroists of all kinds entered the tragic phase of the “Oedipus objective complex” under the leadership of Furies (OBJ III, ch. 7). The generically distinct intellect as *tertium* and *quartum genus* makes no unified concept, because this would deny the principles of Aristotle’s metaphysics and categorial predication.

The controversy about the Averroism of Averroes is completely nonsensical from the point of view of the Aristotelian interpretation of the CMDA. Its mythopoetic “exsistence” shows in the mode of tragic *alētheia* the objective error of modernity and postmodernity. The Principle of the Excluded Third holds; therefore, the intellect cannot be “numerically one” or “numerically many,” as modern and postmodern Averroists proclaim. They define the so-called numerically given intellect as an objective *tertium ens*. For such individuation the intellect would have to be an actual substance and its form would have to be individuated by some matter, or it would have to be a separated cosmic or angelic intellect given as a hypostatized immaterial form. No species given as universal meaning in thought can be individualized in such a way, let alone a human intellect as thinking potency of the substantially existing person. In the key points of the “numerically one intellect for all men,” the sophistry of Latin *Modernorum* agrees with the solution of Themistius and Alexander, which Averroes criticizes in principle. Albert the Great was the first Latin philosopher who, around the year 1240, interpreted the concept of the material and the speculative intellect according to the correct teaching of the CMDA (OBJ II, ch. 2.4.2). The classical Aristotelians of that time explained to the confused Alexandrians from the Oxford and Paris schools of *Modernorum* that their Averroist solution of separated *intellectus possibilis* is an absolute nonsense from the point of view of the CMDA. The possible intellect as the pure *possibile* became the actual substance. Moreover, the modernists separated this substance of the third kind from the hylemorphic unity of body and soul and gave it the statute of the numerically different substance by the doctrine of universal hylemorphism. Finally, they connected this nonsense in the mode of *copulatio* with the schizoid modern person defined as plurality of substances. This complete paranoia is endorsed until today by postmodernism. After the death of the modern God and the modern subject, a fundamental crisis of the objective transmission of meaning broke out again. It is carried by a new absence which concerns this time the objective truth made as subjective evidence (*certitudo*) of Avicenna. Paranoiac thinking of modernity is logically quite rational, because it is guided by the academically educated Furies. These divine powers are the guardians of hidden musical and mystagogic truth. The second part of the interpretation shows that this solution of the *Modernorum* was seen by Bacon as insane. Albert refused to lead an academic discussion about it because of the ridiculousness of arguments. Each of these reasons denies the argumentative structure of the CMDA and the central aim of Averroes’s philosophy, *a fortiori* all three mistakes taken together. The writing CMDA is aware of contemporary debate about the plurality of substantial forms (Avicenna’s fourfold objective intellect, Ibn Bajjah’s material intellect), but it rejects the arguments as nonsensical. The immaterial intellect is not bound to the bodily parts like the senses; therefore, it cannot have a substantial character.

“Therefore it is impossible for the intellect to take place in any part of the body. It is clear that the problem is not only whether the intellect is one in relation to the many subjects and plural according to its faculties (*utrum sit unica secundum subiectum et plura secundum virtutes*), as if the soul were divided like fruit into the perception of scent, color, and taste; or whether it is one on the basis of universally defined nature (*una propter unam naturam communem*) and manifold because the man possesses various faculties (*ista natura habet diversas virtutes*)…”[[235]](#footnote-235)

The soul is the immaterial form of the body; therefore, it cannot be localized in the body like a sensorial organ. The quotation rejects both alternatives, which are later adopted by the second Averroism. The unity at the level of *anima intellectiva* cannot be a substantial one within the framework of the first actual substance and at the same time plural in the sense of various activities which in some peculiar way subsist outside the original substance. Taken in the letter, any theory of separated and hypostatized Platonic soul or the Neoplatonic intellect is impossible, neither in the manner of Avicenna or Descartes. This mistaken and complete “Averroist” solution appears in Oxford around the year 1240 simultaneously with the introduction of universal hylemorphism and leads to the plurality of substantial forms in man (OBJ II, ch. 3.2). Likewise, the soul cannot be only an abstract universal because it makes the body as living being. The intellect cannot be reduced to the abstraction that is based on some hypostatized unity. Moreover, other abstract properties of that “intellect” should be derived from it in the same erroneous way. All this is nonsense, because human beings exist as hylemorphic thinking substance. The specific division of the soul into genera, species and individuals is possible only within the framework of the soul as a universal concept according to the Tree of Porphyry. That is, however, a purely mental operation. In reality, a person exists with different cognitive faculties, which are realized personally (*unica secundum subiectum et plura secundum virtutes*). The soul represents the *actus essendi* of the concrete first substance which exists, recognizes and thinks in the first person. The intellect is an immaterial faculty of the soul, which is the immaterial form of the body (*actus intelligendi*). But this does not mean that the intellect as *tertium* or *quartum genus* is a separate substance according to Avicenna’s being of the third kind. This solution created the universal and singular intellect of modernists as “*hoc aliquid*” of the second Averroism or “*res cogitans*” of Cartesian postmodernism. There is a single, truly Aristotelian possibility of unity, and that is the unity of the immaterial intellect in the one entelechic and hylemorphic substance.

The question of intellectual soul as the personal *subiectum* of cognitive existential acts (*tertium genus*) or the abstract *individuum* of the specifically human acts (*quartum genus*) has a principal importance for the determination of the Western concept of the person. The ipseity of the person in classical metaphysics is not the same as the identity of the modern individual. The term “subject,” which is used for both cases of predication of the person, refers either to the hyparchical imposition of meaning from causally acting reality (*subiectum* of metaphysical abstraction and scientific proof) or to the universal supposition of meaning from abstracting thought (*subiectum* of logical abstraction and objective proof). The two different generic meanings have no common subject. Therefore, they cannot be united in a definition of man as an “individual” of the third kind (*tertium ens*). The transition from one genus to another is forbidden in classical Aristotelian metaphysics because it meant the abolition of the *univoce* given categorical predication of which the genus is the ultimate bearer. The syncretic West prefers mythopoetic tales to scientifically true humanism. Modernity has created a non-existent human subject as a substance of the third kind. The academic Furies organized the disappearance of the person into the underworld together with the eclipse of the first substance in the objective mode of oblivion of being (*Seinsvergessenheit*). There is but the simulacrum of the person and the corresponding contemporary humanism of dead corpses. Abelard, as an outstanding expert of Aristotelian metaphysics and predication, explained in vain to the modernists of the Platonic cathedral schools of that time that the metaphysically adequate and thus true meaning of man can only be derived from the person as the first existing substance (OBJ II, ch. 1.3). Thus, it is clear that the statement “This corpse is a dead person” (*hoc cadaver est homo mortuus*) is metaphysically false because it has no imposition of meaning from a real person in modus *ipse*. The logical supposition will produce only the humanism of a human corpse in mode *idem*. Aristotelians conceive the person in the sense of Boethius’ indivisible first substance. The person cannot be a schizophrenic plurality of mutually incompatible substances composed into a false unity of being of the third kind. Aristotle’s *De anima* rejected such a proposal and his biological writings as well, since they are devoted to the real study of animals engaged in the individual act of life. Averroes adds to this teaching that the person cannot be a sophistical cocktail of Avicennist substances of the third kind. According to the CMDA, the human intellect is neither a material nor an immaterial substance. Faithful to his “meta-physics,” Averroes explains to Alexandrians that manifold faculties of the soul and the soul itself as an entelechic form of the body have a material substratum that ensures their real existence. The person exists *simpliciter* as hylemorphic first substance and forms a substrate which subsists *per se* in the ensouled body (*subiectum*). That entelechic unity of the person establishes the act of hyparchical predication, which, through the act of existence given in this way, refers to all components of the human being, that is, to the soul and to the intellect. The absolutely unique *actus essendi* of this one substance ensures the plurality of various acts of the soul. The soul is the subsistent and immaterial form of the body and founds the multiplicity of faculties (*actus intelligendi*). These faculties can then be recognized and predicated in the form of deductive proof (*actus cognoscendi*). Averroes’s commentary emphasizes that the solution of the unity of the person as distinct from the animal organism is found only in the third part of *De anima*. The univocity of the intellect with respect to the predication of the body as the first substance cannot entail Themistius’ material intellect, which appears on the level of the sensual faculties of the soul. Neither can Averroes upheld Alexander’s solution. He conceived the receptivity of cognition only through matter; therefore, he separated from it the immaterial receptive intellect as a pure hypostatic potency. The imposition of the intellect into the categorical mode of *tertium genus* is absolutely crucial, which is not seen by avicennist and objectivist interpretations of the CMDA. The body and the senses have a hyparchical character for the predication of the intellect as a species, because they are the actual and material substrate for the performance of the passive and immaterial receptive intellect (*intellectus possibilis*). The previous chapters have shown that Averroes’s *intellectus materialis* is not an individualized substance (*hoc aliquid*) in Alexander’s or Themistius’s style.

“It has already been explained that the first actualization of the intellect (*prima perfectio intellectus*) is distinct from the actualization of the other faculties of the soul, and that the term ‘actuality’ (*perfectio*) is pronounced only equivocally with respect to them (*dicitur de eis modo equivoco*). This is the opposite of what Alexander asserted.” [[236]](#footnote-236)

Averroes takes Alexander’s notion of receptive intellect related to the body as substance only in equivocal sense. The effect of the generic distinction between two different kinds of intellect imposes that we cannot mix the material and immaterial determinations of intellect into a univocal concept. The Commentator must precisely determine the relation of immaterial intellect with respect to the body, which is a very difficult task. Dualism offered a simple solution; however it is flawed for many reasons. The relation between the sensual and the intellectual cognition must create a unity within the framework of the concept of truth as the *proportio*. Both components of cognition must go together on the level of the person and on the level of humanity. The new solution determines the unity of cognition in such a way that it constitutes the *intellectus possibilis* as a generic concept (*quartum genus*). The Commentator defines this generic form of the possible intellect at the level of humanity and the specific form at the level of nature in the individual. The concept of *intellectus possibilis* deviates from the predication of the same intellect as an actual and personal act of thinking (*tertium genus*). People have a common intellectual nature in the sense of Alfarabi’s natural disposition (*fiṭra mushtarika*, ch. 2.1.1). It is common to all human beings capable of the normal use of the intellect. Metaphysically, it is the right solution. The possible intellect as *tertium genus* is pure potency and it therefore entails a universal concept of the same nature in all conceptually defined humanity and in every conceptually defined individual as well (*quartum genus*). The generic form of the immaterial general capacity of human soul is abstracted in the scientific mode of *demonstratio* from the first real substance, that is, from the real cognition at the level of the living person (*tertium genus*). By distinguishing two predications of the intellect (specific and universal, singular and actual), the CMDA created an analogy of the categorical difference between the genus and the species on the side of the second substance (*quartum genus*). Now we predicate the meaning of the intellect from the direction of generic universality, which is given *per prius* in the direction to the further indivisible unity of the universal intellect as a concept. This intellect is given in the abstract individual (and not in the existing person) as a human disposition (and not as an existential act). The generic intellect ensures the second level of *continuatio* concerning universal contents of cognition. Such an intellect is considered within the framework of the *Arbor Porphyriana* and it can be divided as a universal concept. The division starts on the level of the genus as the generic ability of mankind to think universal contents through philosophy. It goes to the individual making its specific faculty of intellectual reception. The human being as a thinking individual (*individuum*) does not differ numerically from the other, because the individual has a purely specific character (ch. 1.3). The species given only in thinking as universal has no matter, which can establish a real singularity on the level of the hylemorphic first substance. To be real one or two exemplars presupposes to have the matter that can make the numerical difference between real substances. The Commentator saved the unity of the person by taking the imposition of this unity according to the primacy of hyparchical predication related to the first substance (*tertium genus*). Moreover, he created the predication *per prius* and *per posterius* with respect to the intellect in the act of cognition, both in the mode of hyparchical actuality and in the mode of potentially predicated universality. A human being as an individual and as a person is fundamentally different because the imposition of metaphysical meaning is not the supposition of logical meaning. Averroes presented two different predications of the material intellect in the key part of the commentary according to the quoted canonical part of the *Categories*. He grouped these meanings under the terminus *tertium* and *quartum genus* cited above. The status of the intellect as a particular form of the second substance is determined by species or genus that entail the living body as the first substance. The prehistory of objectivity examined the corresponding text from the *Categories* (ch. 1.3). In the case of predication *per prius* related to the first substance, the species is closer to the first substance than the genus (*Cat*. 2b7–8). Thus, for CMDA, the question of categorial predication concerning potential concept of the intellect either as species (*tertium genus*) or as genus (*quartum genus*) is the principal matter. In order to investigate the proper meaning of the concept “intellect,” the cognitive process of the existentially recognizing person as the first substance must be established at first. From the point of view of predication *per prius* related to universality, it is just the opposite. The genus as *intellectus possibilis* in all humanity is more universal than the species of *intellectus possibilis* in the individual. That is confirmed by the following predication that follows from it (*Cat*. 2a15–16). Through the twofold path of *Vor-blickbahn* comes into being the twofold order of predication *per prius* for the intellect as third genus (existential fact) and fourth genus (universal fact).

Avicennist tradition of the CMDA interpretation passed over this ingenious solution to the unity of intellectual forms in man because this school holds Neoplatonic interpretation of the material intellect as substance. The Commentator rejected that interpretation in principle because it contradicted the basic aim of Aristotle’s metaphysics. The obscurity of scholastic Averroism dates back to Rufus of Cornwall and postmodern Averroism since Ernest Renan. The Latin sophists passed over the difference between the two generic forms of intellect since they traded logic for metaphysics. Text of the CMDA clearly distinguishes and defines metaphysical imposition and logical supposition. The third part of the CMDA proceeds according to the classical passage of *Categories* 2a11–16, which has been annotated by Alfarabi (ch. 2.1). Averroes performs a fundamental distinction between the two forms of the one and the same intellect. This difference appears in the most important part of the commentary on *De anima*, which describes the above-mentioned twofold generic component of cognition in the soul. Averroes takes Alexander’s *intellectus materialis* in its new twofold form, that is, as an immaterial existential act and as a universal concept.

“Then Aristotle said: *therefore it is necessary…* etc. By this he meant the material intellect and its description supplied before. Then he said: *and … this intellect is insofar capable of understanding everything* [νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι, ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν, *De anima* 430a14–15]. By this he means the intellect, which becomes the intellect in the actuality (*illud quod fit*) and thus receives its habitus (*quod est in habitu*). The pronoun ‘this’ (*ipsum*) can refer both to the concept of material intellect indicated above (*hoc pronomen 'ipsum' potest referri ad intellectum materialem*) and to the person who understands (*ad hominem intelligentem*).”[[237]](#footnote-237)

The double ipseity has the main importance in the exegesis of *De anima*. It is based on the causally conceived metaphysical dative (*hoc pronomen 'ipsum'*) that defines the univocal predication of material intellect. Averroes predicates the ipseity as *suppositio* with respect to the generally conceived material intellect (*ad intellectum materialem*) and as *impositio* with respect to the concrete existence of the person who performs the act of understanding (*ad hominem intelligentem*). In both the cases (potential universal concept, actual human faculty) is the ipseity given by the fact that *intellectus materialis* is a pure potentiality. The dual nature of *anima intellectiva* defines the person according to metaphysical *proportio*, which is precisely related to the key definition in *De anima* 430a14–15. The unity of the person as hyparchical first substance establishes the deductive scientific definition of human person according to the Aristotelian Corpus. If we carry out this predication in the mode of the metaphysical dative of *Metaphysics Z* (τό τί ἦν εἶναι), it is true that the real existence of the person acquires a past character. The unique existence cannot be conceived in the order of language. But the categorial predication can express the past character of the first substance in the *impositio*-mode that entails the *quidditas*. Such an apophantic statement is valid in the metaphysical mode of abstraction. This statement is determined by the imposition of meaning from the ipseity of the first substance (*quo est*). Siger of Brabant was the only thinker in the Latin West that fully understood and defended that original meaning of the person (*ipse homo intelligit*; OBJ III, ch. 4.4.2). The academically able Furies have ensured, through modern hybris and ignorance of Aristotle’s metaphysics, that the person has disappeared from modern thought. The main reason was that the past character of its existential causality disappeared. The Commentator as wise and critically thinking philosopher precisely distinguishes the original intention of Aristotle, which is given in the context of *De anima* 430a14–15. The living person is predicated in the mode of scientifically deduced *proportio*. The imposition of intellectual thinking from direction of the existent person in the mode of *tertium genus* is clearly separated from the supposition as the concept of intelectual thinking that pertained to a man as individuum or the whole of humanity in the mode *quartum genus*. The uniquely thinking individual is predicated in the metaphysical mode *ipse* (*impositio*); the universally thinking individual and the humanity are predicated in the logical mode *idem* (*suppositio*). But this supposition of intellect always keeps the character of previous imposition as “*ipse homo intelligit.”* Without the imposition, there is no supposition. It means that the generic intellect as an *univoce* given concept that exists as potential being in human mind. The mediation from living and thinking person to specific “man” (*tertium genus*) and generic “humanity” (*quartum genus*) is based on the fact that the intellect is an existentially determined mental faculty that exists only as a potentiality in human mind. In this case we have the deductive proof and the procedure of the *Second Analytics* applies. The metaphysical dative determines the imposition of the intellect on the basis of the metaphysical predication (*tertium genus*), and the latter determines the generic predication of the intellect as a universal concept within the *univoce* determined metaphysical predication (*quartum genus*). The homonymy of the term “intellect” is thus completely excluded from deductive proof, in contrast to uncritical and schizoid modernity. Socrates, as a person, is the one who understands something, not his specific intellect, which is merely a faculty of the soul conceived in the mode of abstraction. In the process of cognizing, the intellectual faculty of the soul becomes everything and thereby produces intelligible content in its own act of thinking. But the intellect is neither a substance nor a form, but some kind of ability, that is, potency. Therefore the resulting unity of thinking is subsistent only in the first substance. Then, in the mode of universal supposition, it is possible to conceptualize this ipseity for the generic and specific conception of intellect, which is given in the framework of the abstract individual and the human species. This intellect is distinguished from the animal species by a specific difference. Albert the Great as the first scholastic understood the fundamental importance of Averroes’s twofold ipseity that is primarily related to the person and not to the intellect as a universal concept (OBJ II, ch. 2.4.2). Siger of Brabant brilliantly defended this difference, even against Albert himself (OBJ III, ch. 4.4.2). Both connoisseurs of Aristotle and of CMDA carried out the resolute critique of Latin modernists.

Let us now take the second case, where ipseity refers to *intellectum materialem* taken in the general sense. That is, we follow the univocity on the level of a concept made by the progression from metaphysical imposition to logical supposition. Later Averroism and Avicennism, fascinated by modern logic, know only a homonymic form of Averroes’s material intellect in the sense of the universal, separated, individual species of the third kind that actualizes the cognition in the soul from outside. Averroes, as an authentic Aristotelian, knows well that universal concept exists only in mind. His interpretation criticizes Avicenna for the erroneous conception of universals as *tertium ens* (ch. 2.4.1). But on the other hand, it is true that the intellect in man is immaterial in nature and derives from its “quasi-substance” the ability to know general determinations. Alfarabi argues against Alexander that this intellect is material thanks to its “potentiality” because it forms a quasi-matter and a subject for the actual form of the acquired intellect in the person (*est quasi materia et subiectum intellectui adepto*, ch. 2.1.1). Aristotelian Alfarabi knows that pure potency in and of itself can never be substance, because then it would cease to be potency. The potential intellect of the Second Master (*intellectus in potencia*) acts as substance which has the capacity to take some form. Averroes undertakes the interpretation of the key part of *De anima* II.2, which clearly affirms the separation of the immaterial intellect from the sensuous properties of the soul. Sensual cognition, unlike the intellect, is located in different organs of the body.[[238]](#footnote-238) Aristotle asserts that the intellectual component of the soul is immaterial. Therefore, it has no receptive organ of its own and, for this principal reason, cannot possess the same way of cognition as material sensory cognition. The little words “like” and “quasi” are absolutely important. They exclude Avicenna’s intellect of the third kind given as modern substance—species. The intellect as *quartum genus* has universal character, which can be defined within the framework of a predication taken universally as species and genus. This generic form of the material intellect is common to all men as individuals, but not as persons. It cannot be otherwise because intellectual cognition produces a form of universal predication that establishes universal possibility of philosophy and science. Since the imposition of a specific meaning of *intellectus possibilis* have been properly performed (i.e., in a deductive and apodictic way), it is possible to create the supposition of the same intellect at the level of generic and univocal meaning as well. The scientific deduction can pass from the personal to the individually conceived intellect. The intellect, as the personal cause of thinking, provides a general definition since it makes causal connection in the middle part (*medium*) of scientific proof. The intellect given in the body acts causally and thus gives a general definition of the intellect as consequence. Averroes analyzes that kind of receptive intellect in terms of the fourth genus. He separates the generic intellect from the objective and completely erroneous solution of Avicenna. Moreover, the intellect as *quartum genus* ist different from the Aristotelian soul as form of the body and from the person as the hylemorphic first substance.

“The third question concerns the way in which the material intellect is in some sense a being and yet neither a matter in the hylemorphic form nor the first matter. The solution is as follows: The being of this intellect must be considered as a fourth genus (*iste est quartum genus esse*). As the sensible thing is divided into matter and form, so intelligible being must be similarly divided into something similar to these two (*in consimilia hiis duobus*), that is, into something similar to form and something similar to matter (*scilicet in aliquod simile forme et in aliquod simile materie*). It is must be necessarily given in every intellect conceived abstractly (*in omni intelligentia abstracta*) which understands something.”[[239]](#footnote-239)

Besides the classical threefold generic division of being (compound substance, matter, form), there is a new type of the general thing, which, however, is not an autonomous being, as the Avicennism and the later Averroism wrongly presupposed. The text does not say that the universally taken intellect exists as a real substrate or as a single thing (*hoc aliquid*). Done like this, the interpretation of *De anima* would have returned to the Neoplatonism of Themistius or to the dualistic Aristotelianism of Alexander. Averroes is not a modern Averroist. The later unnecessary dispute about Averroism should be aware as clearly as Averroes of the statute of that “*in aliquod simile*.” The intellect becomes similar to form and matter in the act of its thinking. This concept of the intellect as a special entity separated from substance was already present in Alfarabi vis-à-vis Alexander (*intellectus in potencia*, ch. 2.1.1). The concept of the generically conceived intellect merely represents a “similar in something” in terms of form and matter. The key offers the little word *simile*, which the subsequent interpretative tradition entirely skipped and therefore translated the term *intelligentia abstracta* in a distorted way. Hermeneutics reject the contemporary Averroist translations of this passage (*separate intelligence*, LCDA, p. 326). Such a translations erroneously took the predication of intellect as an independent substance and pushed the exegesis of CMDA to Avicennism and Cartesianism. The *impositio*-mode of intellect as a continuous faculty given in mode of *separabilis* does not cover the objective mode of modern Avicennists, in which the intellect functions in the copulative mode as *separatus*. Classical metaphysics avoids any analogy with modern, quite “pornographic” thinking. Every abstraction according to Averroes exists only potentially, in the mind of the real person. In contrast to Avicenna, Averroes considers the act of abstraction only by the frontal genesis of meaning, that is, from the direction of the first substance via the receptive components of the soul. Thereby truth arises as *proportio* and *similitudo*, which are given between things, senses and intellect. This sequence describing the actualization of cognition has fundamental character because it follows the effect of Aristotelian metaphysical dative. There is a real thing first; secondly, it causally influences our sensorial faculties and afterwards it is received through the possible intellect. This is the only concept of the cognition, which ties together all key facts of the truth as correspondence concerning the intellect and the real thing. Siger rediscovered the importance of this sequence of actualization in his commentary *De anima* (OBJ III, ch. 4.4.2). Modernity rejected the primacy of the *species sensibilis*, which is the basic form of human cognition. Individualized sensual actuality establishes intellectual cognition of the soul as *tabula rasa*. If there is a human being that thinks (hyparchic intellect as *tertium genus*), then we can abstract from that act of intellect in order to form the everlasting species (conceptual intellect as *quartum genus*). The intellect as *quartum genus* represents the theoretical concept, which is valid only for the universally conceived intellect. This is not a Neoplatonic quasi-substance (ch. 1.3.1). Averroes speaks of the intellect as the fourth genus in connection with the previous interpretation of *De anima* 430a14–15, where he investigates twofold ipseity of the act of thinking. The passive and active capacity of immaterial character of *intellectus possibilis* as the faculty of soul means that it is composed of quasi-matter and quasi-form. There is no being an autonomous substance (*hoc aliquid*) or a purely abstract concept of potency like *materia prima*. The latter is given only on the level of theoretical supposition, whereas the human intellect can be predicated on the basis of causally determined imposition. The human intellect acts through the existential act (*actus intelligendi*) due to the bodily determined causality of the first substance (*actus essendi*). This causally given relation can be afterwards stated by the imposition in the modus *per prius* (*actus cognoscendi*). Now it makes evident that the prefix “*quasi-*” means the direction of predication (*Bezugssinn, Vor-blickbahn*) that in the case of the predication of intellect is to be taken from aktuality of the first substance to potentiality of the second substance. If the deductive proof is completed, the secondary generic predication comes into play. The generic universality of the intellect is defined as a capacity to think that relates to an abstract humanity. In the next step of abstraction made by division of universals in the framework of the supposition, we can relate this generic capacity to the human species and then, on the last level, to an indivisible individual. That kind of *individuum* designed at the end of the Porphyry Tree is not a real person because the *continuatio* of this universal meaning is given only in human thought. Unlike confused academic individuals in the age of modernity and postmodernity, the Aristotelian *individuum* does not think because it does not exist in reality.

Let us take the ipseity of the understanding on the basis of the imposition of the meaning “intellect” from the real man (*ad hominem intelligentem*). Done in this way, we state the hyparchical primacy of the first substance in the existential mode *per prius*. In the process of individual cognition, which is given in the person as the first substance, the receptive intellect, according to *De anima*, becomes everything in the soul and thereby it produces intelligible content. This existential ipseity defines in the subsequent predication *per posterius* (i.e., in the mode of generic abstraction) the general intellectual capacity of the humanity. This universal concept of intellect makes possible, in the order of potentiality, the categorial predication of intellect within the framework of the genus and then the species. Thereby, in the second step, on the level of humanity, arises a specific unity of human beings as receptive beings capable of thinking. Thanks to the universality of fully receptive *intellectus possibilis* is human genus specifically different from the cosmic intelligences. They are immaterial, fully actualized substances on the level of the *intellectus agens*. Moreover, this purely human nature distinguishes itself from animals, which do not have this specific capacity of the receptive intellect. Consequently, the supposition of the possible intellect defines the humanity as genus as well as the individual on the level of species. This property forms an absolutely specific characteristic (*differentia specifica*) based on the human *intellectus possibilis*. It makes the specific definition of man, in contrast to the animals and the cosmic intelligences. The possible intellect is stated in relation to the person endowed with the *anima intellectiva* (*impositio, tertium genus*) and in relation to the concept of man in general (*suppositio, quartum genus*). The universally abstracted intellect forms in the modus *quartum genus* the concept based on the act of real thinking (*in omni intelligentia abstracta*). That concept makes a component of human nature and it determines the unity of humanity from the point of view of cognitive potency of man. Siger of Brabant correctly understood and interpreted this univocity of the human intellect as a universal. His disciple Dante made out of it the first project of real humanism in the Latin West. This universality ties in with the first universal determination of *intellectus possibilis* for all people proposed by Alfarabi (ch. 2.1.2). Dante as Siger’s student understood the meaning of Averroes’s terminus *quartum genus* for the unity of humanity. Dante used the concept of *quartum genus* as universal supposition of the receptive intellect to create the humanistic concept of *intellectus possibilis* (OBJ III, ch. 4.4.3). The receptive intellect as *quartum genus* makes a specific difference between man, the animal, and the cosmic intelligences. Dante takes the specificity of the receptive intellect as a universal concept that defines the fundamental characteristic of man as a species. By this deduction, the unity of humanity is properly established scientifically in the mode of apodictic *demonstratio*, and not merely analogically or mythopoetically as in the modernity. In the line of “Averroes—Siger—Dante” emerged an antimodern form of Western humanism, which makes the concordance of human intellect as *tertium* and *quartum genus*. There is no “intellect” as a modern being of the third kind. All kinds of previous and contemporary Averroists explained Siger and Dante in a sophistical way. They again confirmed the error of Avicenna’s humanistic solution. His concept of objective *humanitas* stands on the disclosure of cognition from the direction of the acquired intellect of the third kind. According to the Commentator, this substantial and hypostatized intellect does not exist in real person; therefore, its modern bearer as a subject does not exist either. The punishing Furies led paranoid modern humanism into the mythopoetic delirium of objective postmodernism and into the extermination camps of twentieth-century nihilism.

The writing CMDA rejects for the material intellect any form of its own actuality. It is essential to establish a minimal entity and univocity of being of the third kind. Let us return to the key quotation analyzed in the previous chapter. There are two continuous processes of sensuous and intelligible intentionality (*proportio ad has duas intentiones*, CMDA III.6; 415.62–68). The commentary rehabilitated intentionality and abstraction in terms of Aristotelian *abstractio* from the first real substance. Avicenna rejected this view through the process of Neoplatonic *denudatio*. He constituted a minimal portion of beingness for the tertium ens (*esse diminutum*, ch. 2.3.2). The following passage characterizes the *intellectus materialis* in relation to the thinking at general level of meaning that cannot be further divided (*intellectus secundum quod sunt entia simpliciter*). The speculative intellect as a natural faculty of man and mankind now appears as a universal concept. It ensures the univocal content of thinking for all people conceived as specific individuals.

“On account of this concept (*ex hoc modo*) we can say that the speculative intellect is one in all men (*intellectus speculativus est unus in omnibus*). In this case we conceive the cognitions of this intellect as pure universals (*secundum quod sunt entia simplicitier*), which have no relation to the concrete person (*non in respectu alicuius individui*). Then it is correct to say that this intellect is eternal (*dicuntur esse aeterna*), because it thinks not according to its willing or unwilling, but always (*sed semper*).”[[240]](#footnote-240)

The quotation about the intellect as a genus follows the context of universality in the framework of the second substance (*secundum quod sunt entia simpliciter*). Thus, it is not about the first substance, which is actually *simpliciter* in the hyparchical of existence mode that establishes the *impositio*-predication *per prius*. The intellect as a substance would be given as hypostatic form and it would displace the unique first substance. It is given as “this thinking Socrates” in the hyparchical mode of ipseity. The categorial predication proceeds within universal predication *per posterius* from the direction of the superior genus toward the species (*Cat*. 2a15–16). According to the *Arbor Porphyriana*, it is a classical division of universals, when the genus is divided into subordinate species by the specific difference (*animal—rationale—homo*). We have an *intellectus materialis* as a genus in the framework of univocal predication, which is related to the general human capacity made out of receptive intellect. Predication made out by the supposition is nevertheless univocal (that is, metaphysical and not logical), since it is based on correctly created imposition. This abstraction is given *simpliciter* as a generic universal and the intellect represents the immaterial faculty of the whole humanity. The intellect on the level of genus is given as *intellectus speculativus*. This kind of resulting intellect arises thanks to the specific difference given by the difference “act of current thinking” versus “universal content of thought.” The quotation deals with the character of this intellect as a universal (*intellectum*), which arises thanks to the abstraction from the activity of the individual intellect (*intellectio*). The difference between the *intellectum* and the *intellectio* is absolutely principal, because it separates both categorical predications of the intellect. This intellect is given either existentially (*impositio*) or specifically (*suppositio*). Albert the Great around the year 1240 (OBJ II, ch. 2.4.2) clearly understood the difference between the universal *intellectum* and the personal *intellectio* to create the resulting understanding (*intellectus speculativus*). The intellect as universal represents the potential species, which is common to all human beings. This generalization on the level of mankind is possible, if at least one actualization of the material intellect exists in the form of the existing human being, who is capable of thinking within the scope of her or his personal *intellectio*. Thereby, making an abstraction from it, the intellect as *quartum genus* can be proportionally defined. It is predicated as universal species that correctly derives from the existence of the first substance. The predication is given in the mode of truth as the correspondence, that is, from the direction of the hyparchical existence of the living person. Manic modernity, on the other hand, created a non-existent Averroistic intellect as a hypostasis or substance of the third kind in the mythopoetic mode *ex nihilo*.

The prehistory of objectivity drew attention to the key passage in the *Isagoge* where Porphyrius uses a specific form of *modus ponens* and *modus tollens* (ch. 1.3). The real substance is given *per se*, whereas the thought contents arise secondarily in thought, thanks to the existence of the first substance that founded the act of thinking. The receptive intellect at the level of the *species humana* plays the role of the middle member (*medium*) in the *impositio*-syllogism. If the species is given, then necessarily the genus exists. This is true because only man as a species possesses the *intellectus possibilis*, in contrast to the animals and to the cosmic intelligences. The negation of the species (“man”) causes the non-existence of the predicated individual (“Socrates”) as well. The *modus tollens* applies in the mode of *destructio primis*, which is given by the metaphysical dative. The predication follows the original donation of the universal meaning from the direction of the existing person. If there is an actualization of the personal cognition in the synthetic ability of the intellect at least in one person (*tertium genus*), this is sufficient to guarantee the definition of the intellect as a general thing (*quartum genus*). It is enough if an existing person thinks universally (*intellectio*), because in his thinking he has actualized the thought as species (*intellectum*). By the imposition we have ensured the certainty of the abstraction of the intellect at the level of “man” as an *univoce* given metaphysical (and not logical) species. The role of the species as an intermediate member of the deductive syllogism (*medium*) is provided by the *intellectus possibilis*. The imposition of the *intellectus possibilis* entails the real causality from the real person to the specifically defined “man” and generic humanity (*tertium, quartum genus*). It is now necessary to take the final step to establish, at the level of imposition, the transition from “man” as a metaphysical species (*intellectus possibilis*) to wise humanity as a generic unity of meaning that possesses a permanent capacity for philosophical speculation and wisdom (*intellectus speculativus*). Finally, at the level of mankind as genus, a general form of speculative thought, provided by philosophy, has been established at the third level of the metaphysical imposition. At the level of humanity appeared the generic form of thought, which is provided by philosophy. The deductive proof of anti-modern humanism ist now complete: the imposition of possible intellect entails “man” as species; than it comes to the higher unity of mankind that possesses the permanent faculty of reflection (*intellectus speculativus*). Taken in the perspective of *destructio primis* there is valid conclusion on the level of the imposition: if there is no species (*homo*), there is no genus (*humanitas*). Again, and fundamentally, the correct determination of intellect as *quartum genus* must be executed on the basis of imposition, because otherwise there is no deductive judgment for the scientific proof of thinking. Modernity has a mythopoetic “objective intellect” as a logical concept within a homonymous and mistaken supposition that has no metaphysical imposition of meaning from a really thinking person. Then, it is evident that the modernity “does not think” in a real way. The possible intellect actualizes the cognition thanks to the individual receptive ability, which is given by disclosure from the direction of the *species sensibilis*. Because of the existence of a causally founded activity of the receptive intellect in the single person, the deductive syllogism also applies in a reverse way, i.e., in the perspective of the supposition. The deduction goes through the exposition of meaning from behind, starting with the final general unity of intellect given as a genus. The syllogism then establishes the universal nature of the speculative intellect for humanity as a genus and for all human individuals as a species. The unity of mankind is necessarily true in both ways of predication. It is made in virtue of the specific form (*intellectus possibilis*) and of the generic form (*intellectus speculativus*), both being situated within the scientific deductive syllogism. The receptive intellect brings the causality in the middle part of judgment, because each of us thinks according to the personal willing. At the same time, however, the *intellectus possibilis* produces universal contents of thought. They can be conceived universally for the whole of mankind as genus and for individual human being as species. But we want to recall again that a specifically determined human being (*quartum genus*) does not think in real terms. The humanity does not think as intellectual faculty being active in the real thinking person (*tertium genus*). Averroes gave to mankind a scientifically recognized unity in the form of a deductive proof, which had already been anticipated by his teacher Alfarabi. This proof was annihilated by anti-humanistic modernity seduced by academic Furies. The modernists proceeded in a tragic mode of an objective *damnatio memoriae*. The above quotation (CMDA 407.587–96) defined the *quartum genus* by distinguishing it from the individual act of knowing (*non in respectu alicuius individui*). Averroes, as a true Aristotelian, reminds that at least one first substance must exist *per prius to* establish the hyparchical predication *per posterius* in the order of the second substance. The continuous existence of true wisdom proves that there is always at least one existing human being, which is capable of the actualization of the speculative intellect.

“Wisdom is given in a certain way as the fundamental character of all men (*sapientiam esse in aliquo modo proprio hominum est*), as well as different skills according to their abilities. Then it may be said that it is impossible for mankind as a whole to obliterate the philosophy (*impossibile est ut tota habitatio fugiat a Philosophia*), just as it is impossible for mankind as a whole to cease to operate the various crafts.”[[241]](#footnote-241)

For the formal existence of the universal genus, it is sufficient that at least one first real substance exists to ensure an adequate and true imposition of reality within the framework of the second substance as species. At all times and in our nihilistic epoch hopefully as well, there is at least one really wise person. The wisdom of this real person guarantees the generic form of philosophy on level of human species. The predication from the real intellect on the level of the wise first substance is deductively ensured. According to the accomplished *demonstratio* and in the framework of supposition, it is possible to postulate the generic speculative intellect at the level of man (“*homo*”) as a species and the mankind (“*humanitas*”) as genus. Immortal Muses hold wisdom in the highest esteem. The existence of *alētheia* postulates in the worst case a single lover of wisdom who contrasts to all confused modernity. The punishing Furies, on the other hand, must lead all objectivists as objectively knowing and indexing crowd of academic individuals. Unfortunately, individuals don’t really think. The speculative intellect actualized at least in one person enables the predication of the generic knowledge called philosophy. This precise predication of intellect, unlike the modern mythopoetic “philosophy”, is necessary to describe the most important universal faculty of all humans. This gave rise to the humanistic determination of the person, which is tied to the first figure of the Western intellectual. This is a real person and not an unreal modern subject. Averroes, following his teacher Alfarabi, brilliantly established the natural unity of humanity. After the birth of humanism in the Falsafa and a one century later, Siger and Dante recreated the universal unity of human species by establishing the figure of the Latin intellectual (*tertium genus*) to be the truthful speaker of the real humankind (*quartum genus*). The receptive intellect as *quartum genus* proves its priority in the order *per prius*, in accordance with the formal and universal predication according to the *Arbor Porphyriana*.

The new form of the material intellect in the mode *per prius* reminds the Alexandrians that the real process temporally and causally precedes any abstraction. The existential act of thinking having been established in the first substance, the abstract cognition can follow at the level of the second substance, or the composition of concepts into categorical propositions. Alexander, all modern Alexandrians and the postmodern Cartesians proceed according to the CMDA in an erroneous way, all the way round. They fabricate universally defined intellect as a special entity in the mode *per prius*, which they predicate in the mode *per posterius* in the direction of the real human being. The modern antihumanists proceed according to the disclosure of being from behind; therefore, they establish the determination of man and mankind in the mode of epochal *Irrtum*, that is, on the basis of the determination of the individual as the being of the third kind. The modernists lost thereby both the *proportio* between the senses and the intellect and the univocal predication concerning the unity of the whole mankind. Moreover, they do not even know about this disaster of true cognition. They are fundamentally, that is, objectively, blind to the truth as Aristotelian *proportio* between the first and the second substance. The intellect taken universally in man keeps a univocal meaning and not an equivocal one. This makes the basic difference between Averroes and the modernists. His conception entails no substance of the third kind, since it makes the true conclusion of scientific deductive proof (*demonstratio*). The abstracted intellect is engaged in the Aristotelian categorial predication like any other universal. Therefore, in the categorical predication *per prius*, it can be stated univocally in the context of genus and species, where the ultimate level of universality applies. But not at all in the way of the separated entity, as later Averroism, influenced by Avicenna, misunderstood it. The sophists do not need a deductive syllogism for the universality of the intellect. Under the manic influence of Furies, they “observe” the objective intellect of the third kind directly, in the form of sophist simulacrum. Averroes is a critical scientist and metaphysician and not a modern *illuminatus*. Each of us thinks for oneself in the existential ipseity; therefore, the universality of intellect can be truthfully deduced in the universal identity. The result of the judgment made out according to the metaphysical dative assures *univoce* given nature of humanity based on the true cognition of the thinking person. Thanks to the immateriality and the universality of cognition, two concepts of intellect exist. The first concept relates to the singular and actual intellectual person (metaphysical *quidditas*); the second concept entails generic and universal meaning of intellect (logical *essentia*). The academic tribe of *illuminati* observes the simulacrum of separated intellect, par ex. Cartesian *res cogitans*. They “see” the intellectual puzzle of the type of Avicenna’s “Flying Man” or the present “Mind—Body Problem.” This is a typical example of the Cargo cult, when scholars worship the simulacrum of metaphysics that was made by Averroës. After his death, this authentic metaphysics ceased to exist and Averroës became an “Averroist.” The philosophy of the real person and specific unity of mankind were swept off the table by the Western Crusades and then by both World Wars.

It remains to find an analogy to the categorical second substance, which establishes a new predication *per prius* with respect to the first substance as the existing person in the style of “this thinking Socrates.” From the preceding critique of ancient and postmodern Alexandrians, it is clear that the role of substance as the first member of predication cannot be taken over by the sensually conditioned *intellectus materialis* of a Themistius nor by the *intellectus possibilis* of an Alexander. Against Themistius and Ibn Badja, the CMDA introduced the new concept of *intellectus possibilis*. These authors regarded it as a purely sensual *intellectus materialis*, whereas Averroes tied it directly to the personal *intellectus agens*. The contents of the *intellectus possibilis* are already immaterial and thus separated from the material body. Averroes therefore returns to Themistius’s receptive intellect tied to the senses. Then he places it in the scheme of intelligible cognition instead of hylic cognition, which Alexander conceives merely as an individual and sensual faculty of the soul. That is why he separated the receptive and the immaterial components of the intellect from the senses. We have cited Averroes’s criticism regarding the equivocity of the material intellect because this view of Alexander is unacceptable to the Commentator (CMDA III.5; 405.528–533). All of these types of so-and-so hypostatized receptive intellect represent an incomplete solution with respect to human cognition of intellectual forms. The universally given intellect can truthfully exist only as a general conclusion of a correct scientific judgment. Our thinking, thanks to the sensual basis and thanks to the conception of the intellect as *tabula rasa*, does not belong to the sphere of separated cosmic intelligences. The intellect conceived generically as *quartum genus* must get a categorial definition in the modus *per prius*, which is related to the first substance. The path of the metaphysical dative goes only in one direction, namely from ipseity to identity. The direction of predication cannot be turned in the way round. Imposition in the mode *per prius* does not predicate the intellect from the generic universality, but from the actual and causally given singularity. Modernity entirely erased the *impositio*-predication of the intellect as *tertium genus*. Modernity and postmodernity mean the intellect in the concrete hylemorphic person not truthfully in an Aristotelian way, but objectively, that is, in a Neoplatonic and Avicennist concept of *tertium ens*. Averroes explores the intellectual cognition in the existing person and not the cognition of the separated intelligence substances within the cosmic spheres. We come to the determination of the intellect as the fourth genus only through the determination of the intellect within the framework of the third genus. The existential imposition makes foundation for every determination of the intellect cast in some general meaning. The fatal error of modernity is based on the fact that it took the hypostatized intellect as a simulacrum in the mode of objective supposition and not through the hyparchical imposition. Then words like “man” and “person” do not sound proud at all, but unfortunately only objectively, that is, in the epoch-making wandering of paranoiac modernity (*Irre*). The objectively conceived intellect does not exist as *tertium genus*, because it is either a strictly actual act of the person or a pure abstraction defining the generic unity of mankind, or that of the man as species and finally an *individuum* as well. In the order of predication from the direction of the hyparchical first substance holds Averroes’s remark above that the general conception of the intellect is a secondary question (*quaestio autem secunda*). This definitely invalidates the possibility that the human intellect as an independent entity *per se*, which Latin Averroism later introduced. The newly emerged predication *per prius* refers to the actual cognition given in time and in the animate body (*in complexione humana*).

“According to Alexander’s interpretation of Aristotle, the ‘intellect in potency’ (*intellectum in potentia*) is a disposition that exists in the hylemorphically constituted person (*preparationen existentem in complexione humana*), because in the man there is capacity and inclination to grasp intelligible contents before the active intellect processes them (*est prior tempore intellectu agenti*). The active intellect, however, occupies the first position in the order of general things.”[[242]](#footnote-242)

The receptive intellect precedes any form of the active intellect (*prior tempore intellectu agenti*) in the temporally established order of actual cognition. The last sentence clearly shows the difference between the active intellect taken in the order of universals (*modus per posterius*) and the new predication, which is related to the cognition in the ensouled body as the substrate (*modus per prius*). The intellect is primarily given in the way how the real man thinks in her or his ipseity. This ipseity exists in the hylemorphic first substance (*existentem in complexione humana*). Probably for the first time in Western metaphysics, the quotation outlines human existence in its ipseity, since it relates to the new form of the possible intellect (*intellectus in potencia*). Siger of Brabant follows this path. Modernity therefore had to impose a double *damnatio memoriae* on the true determination of the person, which Heidegger removed in the hermeneutics of facticity. Predication *per prius* refers to the act of personal cognition. The passive form of intellect comes first and active synthesis takes but a second place. A little further on, the commentary explicitly connects this new form of existentially conceived intellect with Themistius’ conception of the passive intellect tied to the body and places it in the place of Alexander’s hylic intellect. The possible intellect of Alexander remains as pure potentiality, but it replaces the material intellect of Themistius. In doing so, the CMDA removed the contradictions and shortcomings of both previous solutions, which considered the intellect as a separate substance in man (*opiniones Alexandri et Themistii esse impossibiles*).[[243]](#footnote-243) The Commentator rectifies both thinkers in the main point: the intellect can be a general concept, but never a substance. Averroes clearly states that it is a matter of his personal choice (*secundum nostram expositionem*) in order to truly interpret the original meaning of *De anima*. Aristotle’s writing is true in what it proclaims without any Neoplatonic embellishment (*est vera in se*). The new interpretation of *De anima* was definitely demarcated from all previous errors and even from the interpretation of Alfarabi. The new meaning of being constituted a special form of the material intellect (*intellectus qui est in potentia*). This form is named by the Latin scholasticism with the term *intellectus possibilis*. We will now analyze Averroes’s third way between Themistius and Alexander, which does not create a concept of intellect as *tertium ens*. The quotation shows the final synthesis of all three thinkers that avoids their erroneous way.

“Aristotle said: *What is given in potency is temporally first before the personal act* (*quod est in potentia est prius tempore individuo*). This phrase can be interpreted for all three opinions like this. According to our and Themistius’s opinion, the intellect, which is in potency, is connected with us earlier than the active intellect (*intellectus qui est in potentia prius continuatur cum nobis*). According to Alexander, it happens that the intellect in potency is the first in the order of existence and birth, but not from the point of view of its activity (*intellectus qui est in potentia erit prior in nobis secundum esse aut generationem, non secundum continuationem*).”[[244]](#footnote-244)

According to Themistius, the receptive intellect is the first in the order of the actualization because it is connected with sensory cognition. Averroes agrees, but argues against Themistius that the *intellectus materialis* must be immaterial. The quotation therefore takes Alexander’s *intellectus possibilis* (*prior in nobis secundum esse*) as the first stage in the creation of knowledge (*generatio*), which is given as immaterial potency. But Averroes cannot admit its hypostatized priority in the order of intellectual cognition. Alexander erroneously secured the immateriality through the external character of the receptive intellect. The intellectual cognition given from outside as some hypostasis would not have a continuous, existential cognition (*continuatio*). The cognition determined by the separated active intellect would not be in our power. Moreover, it would produce a mythopoetic *copulatio* of three objective substances, i.e., the separated cosmic intellect, the intellectual soul and the sensual body. The classical metaphysics does not follow the modern pornographic scenario, when non-existent entities of the third kind make together a *coitus* objectif (see the terminus *colligatio* later on) in order to create a modern “humanism.” The externally determined cognition would be based on the connection between the separated immaterial potential and the active intellect (Alexander); or, it would be determined by the immaterial solar intellect, which is separated from the hylic intellect being material and sensual (Themistius). Both mixtures of the intellect made out of incompatibles substances makes impossible the *proportio* based on the personal cognition. This personal cognition is given from the direction of sensually perceived things. Averroes, faithful to the original text of *De anima* (νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι, ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν, 430a14–15), states that the receptive and active function of the intellect in the body must be immaterial, which Alexander and Themistius saw differently. This transformation of the hylemorphic intellect into the immaterial *intellectus possibilis* is necessary to secure the truth as *proportio* of the senses and the intellect. Averroes takes Alexander’s intellect as an absolute potency to keep the receptivity and transforms it into a new *intellectus materialis* according to Themistius (*in hoc convenit nobiscum Themistius*). The new receptive intellect must make part of the process of cognition determined by sensory experience, which was present in Themistius’s hylic intellect. By the synthesis of both conceptions, a new kind of receptive intellect arose in the real man, because this potency is given as an immaterial act of the soul. Averroes obtained for the demonstrative syllogism the new middle member (*medium*) that is acting as a real cause in the processs of real cognition dealing with the real person. The much later ekvivalent is the existential mode of *Verstehen* that incorporates the *Dasein* in the Heidegger’s hermeneutics of facticity. Therefore, Averroes can made the deductive judgment for the work of *intellectus possibilis.* The cognition is now immaterial, fully receptive, and fully in our power. The intellect is now inserted in the hyparchical order of reality provided with the effective causality that founds the most important categorical prediction made as imposition *per prius*. The possible intellect thus expresses the existentially given cognition in a truthful way, thus in a way fully adequate to the reality. The deductive scheme thus ensures the *proportio* between the material senses and the immaterial receptive intellect. Thus, it comes to the actualization of the immaterial passive intellect from the direction of the already-actualized material sensual cognition through twofold intentionality. The contents of the receptive-active intellect predicated in this way are personal (*tertium genus*), because they belong in the order *per prius* to the hylic intellect, which belongs to the body as hylemorphic substance. The passive intellect, however, can also be universally predicated in the mode of deductive judgment (*quartum genus*). This species is given by the abstraction from the individual (and not personal) act of thinking and it exists as a pure potentiality. It exists only in the soul; therefore it is immaterial and establishes univocal and universal thought contents, which in this specific universality are identical in all human beings. Everybody thinks through the existential capacity of receptivity (*tertium genus*) and at the same time produces potential universal contents (*quartum genus*). The proportion is given between the personal immaterial potency of the soul and the universal potential concept, which is also immaterial. The same process of abstraction applies to the receptive intellect itself. On the one hand, in its ipseity, it represents the immaterial act of the soul (*intellectus possibilis as intellectio*); on the other hand, in its identity, it represents the general concept and the specific determination of humanity (*intellectus possibilis as intellectum*). The synthesis of the cognition is ensured by the *intellectus agens* and the *intellectus speculativus* as further intellectual faculties of the soul. The Neoplatonic solution given by Alfarabi does not fully solve the Aristotelian *proportio* from direction of the sensually founded abstraction to the immaterial receptive intellect. This connection was successfully solved in Alexander, because he considered the soul as a material substrate for the pure potency of the intellect. However, Alexander’s possible intellect cannot be located in the personal soul, since it is a segregated cosmic hypostasis. Therefore, it had to assume the properties of Themistius’s material intellect. The original step of the CMDA (*secundum enim nostram opinionem*) shows the resulting synthesis of cognition in time and in the person thanks to a new predication *per prius* for intellectual cognition. The new synthetic intellect, contrary to the previous tradition, is built on new reading of *De anima* 430a20–25 as *tertium genus* of one and the same intellect, which is given as a faculty of the existing human being. This time, however, following the pattern of Themistius, the receptive and empiric character of this intellect is emphasized, which cannot be substantially separated from the sensual and material component of the soul. The phenomenological reading of *De anima* follows the existential act of cognition (*intelligentia agens*). The interpretation explains the passive intellect by the act of thinking of the real person.

“Aristotle first interpreted the character of the intellect, which is in the potency and in the act, and provided the difference between this intellect and the faculty of imagination. Then he began to explain that there is a need for a third kind of intellect (*necesse est tertium genus intellectus esse*), namely, the active faculty of understanding, which transforms the intellect given in potency into an intellect given in the act (*intelligentia agens, que facit intellectum qui est in potentia esse intellectum in actu*).”[[245]](#footnote-245)

The process of actualization shows the intellect as *tertium genus* in the process of personal activity. The imposition of intellect is based on the existential act of understanding that follows the temporal order (κατὰ δύναμιν χρόνῳ προτέρα ἐν τῷ ἑνί, 430a21). This singular intellectus possibilis is a property of the person (*secundum quod accipitur in respectu individui*, CMDA III.20; 449.158). Its activity entails the existential process of cognition. Thanks to Themistius’s material intellect, Alexander’s separated possible intellect became an existential act of the person (*intelligentia agens*). This Aristotelian *intellectus possibilis* makes the transition from potential to recognized forms. Their potency is given in the material things perceived by the senses. These merely potential forms are grasped as immaterial intentional contents in the receptive intellect. These immaterial intentional meanings are finally synthesized into the resulting intellectual cognition by the internal *intellectus agens*. This ability of synthesis creates another faculty of the one cognizing soul. The unity of both faculties of the soul as the unique form in the hylemorphic substance was confirmed earlier in *De anima* 430a14–15. The copula “*est”* predicated with respect to the material intellect expresses fully (*propinquissime dictum*) the material intellect, which is conceived *simpliciter* within the framework of the fourth genus as pure universal (*non in respectu individui*). Its actualization runs in the framework of the third kind by the actual act of abstraction from the senses to the intellect (*in respectu formarum ymaginationis existentium in unoquoque individuo*, CMDA III.5; 448.134–139). The predication *per prius* entails this passive and active intellect of the third genus related to the real course of cognition in the hyparchical first substance. The receptive intellect, as a species, is more the second substance than genus in the context of hyparchical predication because it is closer to the corporeal person (*Cat*. 2b7–8). This form of ipseity of the intellect engaged in the personal act of recognition differs from the preceding *suppositio*-predication *per prius* given only within the framework of universals. Following the “meta-physics” of Aristotle, Averroes performs a genial exegesis of *De anima* 430a20–25, in which he distinguishes both kinds of intellect according to the interpretation of the *Categories*. Now he can quote verbatim the original of *De anima* 430a20–25 to explain a new interpretation of the intellect. This intellect connects both models of Themistius and Alexander through the existential act of understanding (*tertium genus*). Alexander’s hypostatized *intellectus possibilis* now became merely an abstract concept (*quartum genus*) which ensures the unity of conceptually conceived intellects.

“What is in potency, that is, from the point of view of temporal succession, at the first place in the individual; but this universal does not exist, nor is it primarily given in the real course of time (*universaliter autem non est neque in tempore*). Moreover, it is not true of the universal intellect that it understands something once, and then no more. If the intellect is taken as an abstraction (*cum fuerit abstractus*), then it is taken merely as such (*est tantum*) and in this abstract form (*est iste tantum*) it is eternal and immortal (*est immortalis semper*). Through this intellect we cannot think (*non rememoramur*) because it is not capable of receiving anything personally (*iste est non passibilis*). The personal receptive intellect is vulnerable (*intellectus passibilis est corruptibilis*) and without it we cannot think (*sine hoc nihil intelligitur*).”[[246]](#footnote-246)

Averroes builds predication *per prius* for cognition in the first and the most important step. He gives priority to Alexander’s intellect as potency (*quod est potentia*). This possible intellect is actualized as the first thing in the real course of cognition according to Themistius’ material intellect (*prius est tempore in individuo*). The disclosure of the sense of being from the direction of the first substance fulfilled the requirement of the real trajectory of cognition according to the metaphysical dative given in *De anima* 430a21 (κατὰ δύναμιν χρόνῳ προτέρα ἐν τῷ ἑνί). The quotation clearly distinguishes the activation of the receptive component in the person. After the process of abstraction is completed, there is the predication of the intellect as concept related to the whole of immaterial cognition. This universality is given in the mode *per posterius*. The abstraction leads to the cognition of the universal concept given outside of time. The same is stated by the original (ὅλως δὲ οὐδὲ χρόνῳ, *De anima* 430a22). The commentary follows exactly the letter of the text and not the speculations of the modern *illuminati*, who refuse to reflect on the original meaning of *Corpus Aristotelicum*. The receptive intellect is given *per prius* in the person (*in potentia prius est tempore in individuo*). Its permanent generic form is given only in the finished act of cognition (*cum fuerit abstractus*). The perfect form of the future tense given by the conditional subjunctive clearly states that the process of abstraction must be carried to its end on the level of active synthesis. This synthesis temporally and therefore causally precedes predication *per posterius*. The intellect as concept cannot be done *per prius*, as modernism and postmodernism erroneously interpret it. After all, the platonic “intellect” as *eídos* is always in the perfect state. Modernism and postmodernism conceive of this process, called “abstraction” in the original *De anima*, by the entirely different style as “separation.” If modernism and postmodernism know what they are talking about (i.e. “intellect” as *quartum genus*), then fine. But the history of the dispute over Averroism has shown the character of this epochal error of Western metaphysics. The universally conceived receptive intellect is eternal in the modus *per posterius* (*iste tantum est immortalis semper*). This abstraction, however, arises secondarily because it is determined by the individual act of recognition given *per prius* (κατὰ δύναμιν χρόνῳ προτέρα, 430a21). Then it is true that the *intellectus in potencia* predicated through the supposition as simple universal (*iste tantum*) is given as an eternal species. It makes according to Alexander a separated *intellectus possibilis*. The concept of predicated “intellect” exists outside of time and after the finalized act of understanding. It is an intellect as *quartum genus*. The generically given intellect is signified by the perfect tense, that is, in the consummate act of recognition in the universal general concept. The wording “*cum fuerit abstractus*” follows exactly the original, also the timeless sense of the intellect as a general concept (ὅλως δὲ οὐδὲ χρόνῳ), which is given as a universal in the detached manner of predication (χωρισθεὶς δ' ἐστὶ μόνον, 430a22). According to the Commentator, this capital passage from *De anima* establishes *per prius* and *per posterius*, which is valid for material intellect (*tertium, quartum genus*), in the above-mentioned types and perspectives of predication. The trajectory of predication (*Vor-blickbahn*) can be twofold, see the quoted passage from the *Categories*. Either we state the intellect in the mode *per prius* by the imposition from the real person. Then, the hyparchical and thinking Socrates makes the basis for the predication of *intellectus possibilis* as the third genus. In the second step, we make abstraction from the personal thinking. Now, we state the intellect in the mode of universal imposition in time (also *per posterius*) as a metaphysical univocal determination of man (“*homo*”) as a species. Then, in the course of time, we predicate *intellectus possibilis* as the universal concept to create the fourth genus. Another procedure made by the supposition begins in mode *per prius* with the generic humanity (*universitas humana* of Dante). Then the predication of the *intellectus speculativus* goes in the “eternal” mode *per posterius* to the man as a species (*homo*) and finally to the individual (*individuum*). The status of the *intellectus possibilis* in the twofold “man” as species is fundamentally different in each case, thanks to the trajectory of the imposition (*tertium genus, intellectus corruptibilis*) and that of the supposition (*quartum genus, intellectus immortalis*). And of course, the hyparchical Socrates has almost nothing to do with his individuality. Socrates’s individuality (*individuum*) exists only as a specific meaning given by supposition. Modernity flattens the corpse, Socrates and his individuality into the one objective sophism.

The twofold categorial predication of the immaterial intellect in the act of cognizing will and intellect is missing in both Alexander and Themistius. They did not keep Aristotle’s *proportio* and separated the immaterial intellect from the act of cognition right at the beginning of the process of cognition. Or better said, the separation runs again and again in the mythological primordial time of the Neoplatonic fairy tales for illustrated academics (*in illo tempore*). The mythological genesis of the modern intellect produces it as a simulacrum and a being of the third kind. The production of such academic fairy tales runs under the influence of the Furies and has a mythopoetic and therefore thoroughly modern character. It is completely different from the abstract eternity of the intellect as *quartum genus*, which is based on the process of cognition of the mortal intellect (*tertium genus*). This deductively conceived genesis of the intellect as a species has scientific and therefore Aristotelian character. The original separation in the writing *De anima* does not concern the intellect as an objective being of the third kind, but two modes of predication, which is firstly related to the intellect as the first substance and differently to the intellect as the second substance. Here, quite understandably, the model of separation applies, because both kinds of intellect differ from each other generically. There is a principal difference between the third form of intellect as specific faculties of real man (imposition) and the universal generic form of passive intellect at the level of abstract humanity (supposition). The universal form of *intellectus possibilis* arises only after completing abstraction (*cum fuerit abstractus*), see above text from *De anima*. The abstract form of the possible intellect (*quartum genus*) is connected with the thinking of humanity, which is endowed with the universal ability to formulate univocal contents of thought and cognition through the universal potential faculty. In contrast, the third form of potential intellect (*tertium genus*) is the factual capacity of the physically given soul as the first substance. Its potency is actualized to actuality in the real time of cognition of this or that person (*in potentia prius est tempore in individuo*, *De anima* 430a20). Contemporary Cartesian postmodernism repeats this error of Themistius and Alexander taking the intellect in the mode of *separatus*. New definition of the material intellect makes farewell to the former hypostatized intellect of Alexander and Themistius. The new concept of receptivity is no longer sensuous matter of the third kind, which is Themistius’s hylic intellect. Neither it is the separated hypostatized potency of the soul, what is, unfortunately, separated cosmic *intellectus possibilis* of Alexander. The interpretation ensured the unity of the thinking person. Each of us, thanks to the new status of *intellectus possibilis*, has in his power the thinking through the act of the “material” mode of the intellect as *tertium genus*. It is clear that the material intellect of the Themistius has the prefix “quasi” because this existential act is Alexander’s pure potency. Likewise, the *intellectus agens* takes the prefix “quasi,” since it makes the form in this existential act of understanding. The separation from Neoplatonism gave rise to the new interpretation of human cognition. Following the exact meaning of the word “*revolutio,”* Averroes returned the process of cognition to original Aristotelian source.

“And when Aristotle said about this intellect: *it is not that it understands once and not another time*, this literal meaning cannot be found (*impossibile est ut iste sermo intelligatur secundum suum manifestum*) either in Themistius or in Alexander.”[[247]](#footnote-247)

In the scheme of CMDA given by disclosure of meaning from the front, from the direction of the sensuously perceived first substance, the *intellectus adeptus* is superfluous and has no function. Its role is taken over by the last synthetic instance called *intellectus speculativus*. Its most important role runs at the level of *quartum genus* because it ensures the unity of all humanity at the level of common philosophic nature. Averroes abolished the Neoplatonic *intellectus adeptus*, which was still present in Alfarabi, because he believed in the disclosure of intellectual cognition from behind, from the direction of the autonomous forms and the cosmic intelligences. On the contrary, writing CMDA exposes this synthetic faculty from the front, from the direction of the immaterial and fully potential *intellectus possibilis*. It is the only faculty of the soul in the body that receives the immaterial forms from the senses. But this faculty of the soul is our own according to the pattern of Themistius’s *intellectus materialis*. The abstract form of all three forms of intellect (*possibilis, agens, speculativus*) is permanent and separated in the sense of Porphyry’s universals (*separabilis*). The modernists are influenced by Avicenna’s conjunction of the acquired and the active intellect. This conjunction is given in the scheme of illumination according to Neoplatonism and not by cognition within the framework of hyparchical predication according to the *Categories*. Founded on the principle of his “meta-physics”, Averroes cannot recognize the modern and postmodern copulation of the intellect and the body as two subsistent forms. He follows the investigation of the unity of the first substances and not of the objective being of the third kind. The first chapter has shown that on this point Averroes negated Avicenna in principle and called his Neoplatonic metaphysics a fundamental error (ch. 2.4.1). In the individual guise, Averroes’s concept of *intellectus speculativus* represents the consummate form of passive and active abstraction. This concept is given at the existential level, that is, as a *tertium genus*. The twofold statute of the intellect within the whole architecture of the CMDA was correctly grasped by Albert the Great as the first integral connoisseur of Averroes in the Latin West around the year 1240. The twofold generic concept of *intellectus possibilis* contains in CMDA all the fundamental relations at the level of first and second substance (hyparchical versus universal) and at the level of the corresponding predication given by the act of existence and then abstraction (*per prius* versus *per posterius*). The human body is first substance, the soul is a form animating this substance. The entelechic substantial being given in this way forms the basis of the hyparchical predication *per prius* for the actual act of intellect as *tertium genus*. The material intellect predicated as *tertium genus* remakes the primacy of the *intellectus possibilis* within the personal act of recognition. The universal predication of this ability forms the basis for the humanistic determination of the unity of mankind. The generally conceived *intellectus possibilis* shows the potential ability to recognize everything possible within the naturally given immaterial receptivity of the intellect (*quartum genus*). If we take this accomplished imposition of possible intellect as universal fact created by the supposition, then in the mode *per prius* we get a *univoce* made determination of humanity as a genus, than the specific man as a species and in the last step a specific determination of the individual. This procedure was for Averroes secondary, due to the logical abstraction and supposition. This double process of abstraction has been sophistically mixed into a single analogy of “intellect,” then it was absolutized by modern logic and declared as true interpretation of the CMDA.

The hermeneutic reading of the great commentary on *De anima* has shown that the Avicennist scenario of the separated intellect as substance (*hoc aliquid*) has no place in Averroes’s philosophy. The twofold mode of categorial predication expresses ipseity and identity of intellect in the real exercise and as the universal concept. In accordance with the preceding Averroes’s interpretation of *Metaphysics* and *Physics*, the commentary *De anima* presents two different insights into the one phenomenon of cognition, which are not identical (ch. 2.4.1). The difference between the *tertium genus* and the *quartum genus* refers to the one and the same act of the individual intellect, which is conceived in the framework of the twofold categorical predication. The cited *intellectus possilibilis* as *tertium genus* is given *per prius* on a real substrate. But from the point of view of universality, its statute is given in modus *per posterius* with respect to the speculative intellect, which is given as a possibility of cognition of all mankind. The *univoce* given definition of a scientific term called “intellect” requires a first actual substance, which establishes a general categorial generic signification of the second substance. The generic form of *intellectus possibilis* is given *per prius* only from the point of view of a universal predication given in the deductive syllogism, which later Averroism did not comprehend. There must be done a complete predication of the intellect in all directions (*potentia—actualitas*; *prius—posterius*, *singulare—universale*; *simpliciter per prius—simpliciter per posterius*). After that, the truth as *adaequatio* can be restored, since it is based on the proclaimed *proportio* between things, the senses and the intellect. The act of intellect in the body forms an eminent virtue of the soul (*tertium genus*). Whoever correctly sees the *intellectus possibilis* as a universal *idem* within the framework of the insight given *simpliciter* and within the framework of abstraction (*quartum genus*) cannot confuse it with the act of intellect of the third kind, which is bound to the ipseity of the existing person. There is no “intellect” as mythological *tertium ens* of modernity and postmodernity. Contemporary nihilism has only artificial intelligence as a human pattern, which is a complete defeat of critical thinking. The distinction between the predication *per prius* and *per posterius* shows the original form of “obscurity” (Averroes *dixit*), which gave birth to the later Averroism. This is nothing else than a masked Avicennism, which had not grasped the specific of Averroes’s complex predication of the different forms of intellect. This predication is given by the authentic reading of Aristotelian project of the first science. The CMDA does not provide an objective and essential description of the intellect as Avicenna did. It is the first phenomenological description ever to show the way how the intellect works in a concrete person at different levels. Hermeneutics therefore consider the *Great commentary on* *De anima* to be the first complete draft of Averroes “meta-physics,” which is completed at the level of the first science of substance by the two great commentaries on *Physics* and *Metaphysics*. This synthesis of cognition was needed to encompasses the whole of the first philosophy. It is manifested in the course of the factual cognition of the unique person. This fundamental truth was fully grasped by the philosopher Siger of Brabant, but not at all by the theologian Thomas Aquinas. Their dispute about the nature of cognition according to the CMDA will be shown in the third tome. The scholastic and modern commentators read Averroes’s interpretation with objectivist eyes, i.e., within the framework of the presupposed objectivity of *intellectus possibilis*, which is conceived as a sophistical “substance—species” (Simplicius). This interpretation of CMDA is Averroistic, i.e., principally erroneous. The fatally misleading ontological perspective (*Vor-blickbahn*) of modernity goes from the generically given unity of mankind to the abstract individual. This mythological nature of “man” represents the historially (*geschichtlich*) constructed figure of modern man (*Ge-Stell*) in his initial nihilism, since the human being is determined by modern metaphysics. The classical and modern deduction of the intellect thus represents the *Lichtung* of truth and falsehood for the metaphysical unconcealment (*alētheia*) of the first Latin determination of humanity within the framework of *universitas humana*. Dante followed CMDA presented by Siger and he correctly saw, that the person must first act causally ethically and politically through the practical intellect as *tertium genus*. Then it is possible to make an abstraction towards *species humana*. This humanistic conception of Dante was understandably called “Averroistic” by the modern and postmodern objectivists in the context of the epochal error of Western metaphysics. The original interpretation of CMDA in modus *tertium genus* was hidden in the epochal Lethe. The nihilistic humanism of the present time derives from a non-existent simulacrum. Modernity took the Averroistic determination of *intellectus possibilis* as hypostatized species in mode *per prius*. Then it began to divide this general idol called “*species humana*” according to the Tree of Porphyry up to the last indivisible individual (ch. 1.3). Under the influence of the Furies, the modernity declared this mythopoetic individual without its own existence and even without its own universality an objectively valid and true definition of the “person.” The representatives of the first Averroism considered this modern way of defining the person to be “foolish” (Alvernus) or “insane” (Bacon) or “ridiculous” (Albert). The second volume analyzes the controversy of the first and the second Averroism after the year 1220. After the victory of modernity upgraded into a maximum of objectivity, this humanism of the individual is taken as normal and academically global value. Therefore, the Furies could return to the underworld after the advent of manic modernity. The academic index, secure, operate and control their objective mania scientifically with their own forces paid by the rest of grateful humanity.

At the end we quote the important message of the wise and therefore tragic Averroes, which characterizes the fundamental view of metaphysical being bound to the sense of real things. The metaphysical dative characterizes the conception of truth in theoretical sciences by disclosure of meaning from the front, since the sense of the world comes from the real things.

“From this it follows that understanding is not a being that has arisen in speculative sciences (*non est aliquid scientiarum speculativarum*), but follows the course of things that have arisen naturally (*aliquid currens cursu rei generate naturaliter*), and that from the direction of the cognition of the speculative sciences (*a disciplina scientiarum speculativarum*). Therefore, this cognition is not distant to men and they can cognize in this way, just as they form themselves in the theoretical sciences. But it is necessary that this understanding given in this way comes from the speculative sciences and not from others. Erroneous thoughts have no connection with natural events, because they do not follow the natural course of things (*non sunt aliquid currens cursu naturali*) and are not connected with the natural order. This makes them something erroneous (*aliquid quod non intendebatur*) such as the sixth finger or monsters in nature (*sicut digitus sextus, et monstrum in creatura*).” [[248]](#footnote-248)

The general notion of intellect exists in relation to the trajectory of metaphysical understanding of the world (*in hac intentione*). The philosophical understanding follows naturally given order of things (*currens cursu rei generate naturaliter*). The cognition of things constitutes the fundamentals for the theoretical sciences (*a disciplina scientiarum speculativarum*). The quotation confirms that we have to see the world from the viewpoint of the speculative sciences. Its source is understandably the first science about the principles of the substantially given being. That critical and realistic “meta-physics” is given by the disclosure of the sense of being from the front; therefore the first science presupposes biology and physics. Therefore the Commentator rejects Avicenna’s speculative conception of science, which is given by the production of being of the third kind. The quotation emphasizes the fundamental *proportio* between the intellectual and the sensual cognition. Without this continuity, the cognitions missed the truth as correspondence, which is given by the senses and actualizes the process of abstraction at the level of the intellect. The disclosure of the world from the front shows the birthplace of scientific cognition and therefore of metaphysics as the first science. The error has no continuity from the direction of the actual reality and perishes necessarily due to the lack of true agreement (*impossibile est ut habeant continuationem*). The product of false intellect are monsters, because the sleep of the modern objective mind causes Goya’s capricious nightmares. The ontological trajectory of comprehension follows the direction of correctly interpreted cognition and therefore it determines the way we recognize the world. This hermeneutic fact has a fundamental consequence for cognition, because the epoch of *Modernorum* created the first form of metaphysical nihilism. As we see today, the fundamental simulacra of modernity — the modern divine subject, the modern human subject, the truth as objective evidence — gradually disappear into the realm of Lethe. The being of the third kind and similar “visions” of Neoplatonic *illuminati* do not follow the order of reality in the concordant model of proportionality (*non sunt aliquid currens cursu naturali*), thus they are only contingently valid (*aliquid quod non intendebatur*). In the mythopoetic realm of the intellect of the *Modernorum*, which is directed by goddesses of Revenge and Chaos, the universal cosmic order is no longer permanently valid, but only by chance, which begets monsters by deviation from the order of nature (*monstrum in creatura*). The production of intellectual monsters did not come immediately. Thousand years of history of effects (*Wirkunsgeschichte*), which refer to the interpretation of the CMDA, founded first the sophistic thinking of the *via Modernorum*. The sleep of the Neoplatonic enlightened mind begets the world of modern simulacra based on Avicenna’s *denudatio* (ch. 2.3.1), on Descartes’s postmodern *cogito*, or on the contemporary “thought experiments.” Alexandrians of all kinds go from the abstract formal object given in enlightened thought to reality. Hence they have no unified theory of the intellect, only Avicenna’s problem of the “Flying Man” or the contemporary “Mind—Body Problem.” Averroes would say that Cartesian objectivists are incapable to see the metaphysical *proportio*. This *proportio* of the metaphysical dative determines the holistic predication of the sense of being, which is related to the unity of the real being of things in nature. The project of Avicennist metaphysics was actualized in the thinking of Latin modernity done in the framework of the Oxfordian Fallacy. Those modernists constituted the contemporary concept of objectivity. By the end of the second millennium, the totalitarian movement came with two World wars and with the annihilation of the world through global warming and through the virtual world of debts given *ex nihilo* through financial derivatives. Postmodernism, led by objectivity in the mode of *Irrtum*, now entered the epoch of Anthropocene, which became an actual nightmare of the whole humanity. According to the critical metaphysician Averroes, cognition begins in nature and from the direction of the senses. For Avicenna and modernity, the universal essence or mathematics is enough to guarantee the fullness of cognition. That vision follows the trajectory given by the disclosure of the intellect from behind, from the direction of the world of ideal forms. The thinking of the modernists of the Falsafa of that time determined the Latin modernism and the Cartesian postmodernism. The astronomer Kant passes from physics to metaphysics, as did Averroes. Kant similarly corrected Hume’s and Leibniz’s postmodernism in the Dialectic of Transcendental Appearance (*Vom transzendentalen Schein*, KdRV B 308–310). According to the postmodern Kant, the understanding is exposed from the front, from the senses (transcendental aesthetics). But Kant defines the process of abstraction on the basis of Avicennian innate principles. Kant’s categories of transcendental logic represent an *a priori* form of Avicenna’s hypostatized *intellectus in habitu*. Kant returned to the Second Master’s concept and created an objective cognition of the world through the synthesis between Leibniz’s objective speculative and Hume’s pure objective empiricism. The unity of the intellect given after the CMDA by disclosure from the front was forgotten again in the context of postmodern forgetfulness of being (*Seinsvergessenheit*). The first forgetting occurred in Avicenna’s metaphysics through the eclipse of the first substance. So far, it is not clear how Averroes’s form of *intellectus possibilis* has been interpreted in the history of philosophy after introduction of Latin Avicennism. We must find the way how Averroes as glorified Commentator became a “pagan” and “Averroist” around the year 1250. This question is answered in the second part, which traces the development of metaphysics in the Latin West.

### 2.4.4 Diaphanum and Life World

The previous chapters described the metaphysics present in the concept of *intellectus possibilis* in order to show a new form of intellect that shaped Commentator’s understanding of Aristotelian metaphysics. Finally, we must establish how the cognition presented as *tertium genus* in the realm of animal identity and human ipseity creates a common world of living beings (*Lebenswelt*). Averroes establishes metaphysics as new *Ereignis* of thinking because he gives new meaning to being and establishes a new concept of truth as correspondence. The intellect began to respond adequately to the challenge of real substance according to the metaphysical dative. The disclosure of the sense of being goes from the direction of the thing to the newly defined *intellectus possibilis*. Alfarabi separated cognition from Neoplatonic interpretation in Alexander’s *De anima* by introducing a mediation between the senses and the intellect through the diaphanum (ch. 2.1.1). Averroes adopted the teaching of his teacher in this matter, thereby he separated himself from Avicenna and Ibn Badja (CMDA II.67; pp. 230–36). The essence of the diaphanum was investigated in *De anima* and in the CMDA at the first place. Hermeneutics put it as the last problem, after the clarification of the intellect. The objective invisibility of the diaphanum grounds the *Lichtung* of truth and untruth that shapes the subsequent figures of the new metaphysics. The analysis of the diaphanum shows the mediation of light in the nature. Other kinds of mediation secure the transition from the external thing to the sensual cognition and finally to the purely intelligible cognition of man. By that triple kind of mediation, the understanding of the world comes into being. From the point of view of light, the environment is actualized as the first thing through which travels the actual ray. The role of the transparent environment is of fundamental importance for vision. The diaphanum is actualized by the sun ray in the process of the revelation of the things as the first phenomenon of the perception. Therefore, thanks to this particular receptivity, it differs from the actively shining light. The light has its own substantial actuality given by the sun. The passive diaphanum does not change the substance of the material bodies, but it causes them to be seen. Participation in the process of reception of light made by the diaphanum separates the act of seeing from the existence of the real thing. The recognized form (“I see a colored body”) belongs only accidentally to the hylemorphic actuality of the thing, since the first substance is given *per se* and *simpliciter*.

Aristotle took as evident the fact that the diaphanum exists only as a potential entity. Since the world is material and our cognition immaterial, cognition must somehow be mediated. The real thing actively acts on our receptive senses and then on the intellect through the transparent environment. The transparent environment ensures mediation by actualizing the cognized form (κατ' ἐνέργειαν διαφανοῦς, *De anima* 418b1). The accidental property of “being irradiated” acquires a new form of “being seen” and subsequently of “being recognized.” This process passes through the change of the diaphanum from the potential to the actual state. The change of the potential form and the reception of this actuality takes place in the sensual and intellectual intention. The singular way of being of light as the first substance is fundamentally different from the potential way of cognition in thought and from the universal meaning of this cognition. The accident of radiation related to the external first substance is something different from the perception and understanding of this externally irradiated thing. The cognition is merely an accident in relation to the physical being of the thing. Moreover, it belongs to a completely different order because it is given in the soul by the intentionality. Aristotle holds as evident fact that the illuminated bodies are visible thanks to the actualization of color by the diaphanum (χρῶμα κινητικόν ἐστι τοῦ κατ' ἐνέργειαν διαφανοῦς, *De anima* 418a31–b1). Seat of vision is a sense organ, which forms a component of the first substance as a body. The diaphanum accords to it the possibility of seeing by actualizing the color on the body. Thanks to the twofold process of mediation from the sun to the senses and from the senses to the intellect, the diaphanum cannot be substance in any way. The potentiality of the diaphanum receives the actuality in the environment of the mediation within the framework of the accomplished seeing and recognizing of the illuminated body. This mediation possesses a fundamental importance for the Western metaphysics by the fact that it was forgotten. The last vestige of Averroes’s dualism “substance—diaphanum” can be found in the ontic science. The quantum physics knows this twofold property of the light in the objective mode as the duality of photon particles and quantum waves. The physicist Louis-Victor de Broglie raised the dualism “wave—particle” to the general principle of quantum physics after Albert Einstein. The mediation of light expresses the original property of the diaphanum by the wavelength, while the photon as a particle represents the actuality of the substance. The question about the nature of diaphanum creates the same problem as the ambivalent question about the nature of the receptive intellect. The mediation (physical, sensual, intelligible) by the threefold process can pass the world of things to the vision made by senses and to the cognition made by intellect. The interpretation of the diaphanum must explore three ways of mediation. They can be translated into three phenomenological questions concerning the way how the recognition of color takes place through the diaphanum. First, the light of the sun is transmitted to the surface of the body through physical mediation (*perspicuum*). Secondly, the irradiated surface can be perceived by the sensual mediation that runs from perceiving eyes to the sensual imagination (diaphanum¹). Finally, there is a possibility that the colored surface is intellectually recognized in the concept of color by the immaterial mediation that runs from the sensual imagination to the *intellectus possibilis* (diaphanum²). The *perspicuum* in nature and the twofold *diaphonum* in the human cognition represent, for these three reasons, the environment of pure potentialities, which are actualized in a threefold way (natural color, sensual imagination, immaterial intellect). The actualization of the passive diaphanum forms a decisive factor to get know the world.

“It is clear that light, even if it is actualized from the direction of the luminous body (*fiat a corpore lucido*), differs from it both by definition and by its being (*differt ab eo diffinitione et essentia*). As has been said, color is a finite state of motion of diaphanum (*color enim, ut dicitur, est ultimum diaffoni terminati*). Light forms a complementary component of the diaphanum, but by no means its finality (*lux autem est complementum diaffoni non terminati*).” [[249]](#footnote-249)

Averroes states in an Aristotelian way that the seeing must be realized through the continuity of causally determined movement, that is, through the transition of color from potency to actualization in the environment of diaphanum (κινητικόν ἐστι ...κατ' ἐνέργειαν διαφανοῦς, *De anima* 418b1). The various forms of causality make the actuality of the sun and the rays to pass first into a transparent environment, then into the colors on the exposed body, then into the eye, into the imagination, and finally into the intellect. The diaphanum transfers the light towards the exposed color on the body, because the actualized color is the final operation of any mediation process (*terminus*). Therefore, the diaphanum forms a mediator between the ray as the determining factor for the diaphanum (*complementum diaffoni non terminati*) and the resulting irradiated body (*ultimum diaffoni terminati*). The diaphanum create a potential receptive environment that allows the real forms of the irradiated surface or body to manifest. The role of the diaphanum in cognition process concerns formal causality, and not the efficient one. The light from the sun is an efficient cause of the fact that things can be seen accidentally. However, they exist substantially by themselves. The sun shines from itself and represents a first actual substance in the order of the effective cause of seeing. Likewise, the ray of the sun is also actual from itself. The things exist and act in the framework of effective causality. Now, they are to be seen by the transmitted light that makes them recognized in their accidentally given colorfulness. The illuminated surface and its recognition represent with regard to the substances an accident given in the human or animal soul. It is clear that the mediation of these accidents cannot be done by substances themselves. They do not possess a receptive character that can establish the cognition. Averroes, referring to Aristotle, draws attention to the fact that the role of the diaphanum concerns the formal side of vision.

“It is clear that if we adhere to Aristotle’s words, given at the beginning of the interpretation (that he called evident by itself), then light is necessary to bring about the actuality of colors. This is accomplished by the light giving a certain form to the diaphanum (*secundum quod dat diaffono formam aliquam*). Through this form it is possible for the diaphanum to receive the actualization from the colors (*qua recipit motum a colore*), that is, the illumination.” [[250]](#footnote-250)

The key component for recognition is not the sunbeam or even the sun itself, but the transparent environment, which is described at the same level of importance as the colors and the sunbeam. The diaphanum transfers the ray to the colors and, in the second step, it enables the humans and the animals to see them. This twofold mediation has principal character both in the physical transmission of light and in the process of cognition. The quotation shows the process of disclosure that is principally different from the Neoplatonism. In contrast to the Neoplatonists, the sun is not mentioned at all, only the ray of light (*lux*). The sunbeam actualizes the diaphanum as a universal receptive form which receives and transmits light (*dat diaffono formam aliquam*). The potential diaphanum receives that form thanks to the action of the solar rays. Through the diaphanum, the exposed colors are actualized on the things. The colored things, in turn, are transmitted through diaphanum to our perception in the form of the irradiated colors (*recipit motum a colore, scilicet illuminationem*). The irradiated or transparent bodies assume visibility through the movement of irradiation by the colored ray, that is, by the diaphanum given in physical form (*perspicuum*). First the ray must come through the diaphanum into the colored stain glass, so that it can radiate through the formally changed diaphanum up to our eyes. Diaphanum gets its actuality from the light, which passes through it as through the stain glass. But in and of itself the diaphanum is given as a pure potency which can receive the light changed in this way. Averroes, with reference to Aristotle, claims that this way of mediation is absolutely obvious and clear (*manifesta per se*). Averroes draws the attention of Islamic modernists as Avicenna (and postmodernists as Locke) to the fact that in nature there are no primary properties and qualities as being of the third kind.

“(…) as the light in the colored body (which is a material body) and in the mediating diaphanum (which is an immaterial mode of existence), the odor has the double mode of existence (*habet duplex esse*), namely, existence in a material body and in a mediating environment; the former is material (*esse corporale*) and the latter is immaterial (*esse spirituale*), the former is in the natural substance and the latter is outside the substance.”[[251]](#footnote-251)

The diaphanum forms a medium in which the material thing (*esse corporale*) acts on the senses and the intellect in such a way that an accident as “a recognized object” arises in thought. There is the same categorial difference between both concepts as between the first substance given in reality and the second substance given in thinking. The diaphanum is pure potency because it plays the role of mediator between two different acts. It makes the physical body be “colored” and be recognized in the soul as “colored.” Therefore, the color, like the odor, has a dual status of being (*duplex esse*). With respect to the existing substance, the diaphanum is an accident because colored things exist even in the dark. With regard to the cognition of things, it is a form given only intentionally, that is, within the framework of sensory and intelligible cognition. Modernity and postmodernity made of this potency another substance of the third kind, that is, a hypostatized primary quality. Aristotelians do not have a mythopoetic world of being of the third kind like the objectivists, because they critically distinguish what is actual and what is given only in the thought. In this scheme, the intermediate world of *illuminati* is not possible, as it was the case of Avicenna (ch. 2.3.3) and after him Descartes, Arnauld, Locke, Husserl and other thinkers. The bodies exist around us as first substances. We perceive them accidentally and recognize them as colored, smelling, sounding and so on. The role of the mediator between this twofold way of being of the first substances is absolutely principal for definition of the diaphanum. We have the diaphanum as a formally determined potency which, from the point of view of transmission, establishes two functions. Made in the mode of mediation as *perspicuum*, diaphanum creates a new accidental property of the external body, which is the colored surface. Another mediation establishes in the mode *diaffonum* the sensual act of recognizing this colored surface. The last operation changes the diaphanum into an immaterial mental faculty (*intellectus possibilis*) and this enables conceptual recognition. All three modes of determination are, with respect to the ray and to the thing, merely accidents. Diaphanum establishes the possibility of this accident. The diaphanum does not exist as actual substance or form, because otherwise it would be deprived of fundamental attribute consisting of full receptivity and it could not transmit anything at all. It is not a substrate (*subiectum*) neither for the origin of the colored surface nor for its recognition in the sense organ. In this, the diaphanum resembles the definition of *intellectus possibilis*. Therefore, the thematization of diaphanum in *De anima* precedes the exploration of the human soul.

Neoplatonists and the objectivists did not and do not see the role of the formal causality of diaphanum in the process of seeing. The modernists live in the illusion that the light and the intellect do everything alone. But then they are not able to connect the sensual and the intelligible cognition because they lack any kind of mediation between them. For them, the possible intellect as a phenomenon exists in the mode of the *tertium ens*. The real course of the manifestation of light, linked to the phenomenology of vision, was an absolutely evident phenomenon for Aristotle. It makes contrast with the dogmatic modernity that is blinded by the sun of the hypostatized intellect. The Commentator, referring to *De anima*, precisely described the hermeneutic way in which light becomes the colored phenomenon in the world and the recognized phenomenon for us. In contrast to Avicenna’s view of intentionality erroneously added to the real thing or hypostatized to the kind of the substance of the third kind, the CMDA puts the question of *intentio* and *comprehensio* exclusively on the side of the sensible and intelligible species.[[252]](#footnote-252) The CMDA defends the position of Aristotelians of Ibn Adi’s school. They rejected a hypostatized nature and quality outside the real given first substance, as was the case with the Neoplatonists from al-Kindī’s school (ch. 2.2). The real being cannot act directly on sensuous and intelligible cognition. Therefore, it requires a twofold diaphanum. The mode of “being irradiated” is fundamentally different from the mode of “being perceived” and the latter is different from the already merely human act of “being recognized.” Without the mediation of the actual world by potential diaphanum, truth as correspondence is not possible (*proportio*). Therefore, Aristotle takes the diaphanum to be the evident presupposition of cognition. This fundamental *Lichtung* made by the diaphanum establishes the unconcealment of the world according to the theory of proportionality and similarity hold in *De anima*. The ray taken in and of itself has no sufficient means to bring about cognition, because this is an activity of a completely different kind and is given by the animal or the person as the first actual substance. The error of Avicenna’s intentionality is based on the fact that he does not distinguish between the external thing and its intentional object and establishes a being of the third kind.[[253]](#footnote-253) Avicenna, who followed Simplicius and other Neoplatonists, introduced the being of the third kind into reality and cognition, such as physical qualities existing outside of the real body (*exsistere*, kap. 2.3.3). In the Avicennian scheme of the revelation of substance by direct illumination of the intellect, the diaphanum cannot reveal itself. It became an empty concept standing in the limbo of the late scholastic dialectic between *esse intentionale* and *esse naturale*. This sophistic interpretation was adopted by the modernists as the common reading of the Aristotelian Corpus probablement about 1240. Neoplatonists, objective modernity and postmodernity cannot see the phenomenon of mediation. The diaphanum has no possibility of existence in the modern scenario of objective cognition, which is given by a mix of substances of the third kind. The diaphanum is not a substance (“something shining by itself”), but only a possibility of mediation (“how does it happen that something is illuminated for us”). It is a way of how the light spreads and how we recognize.

Agostino Nifo (†1538) made the transition from Averroes’s concept of the diaphanum to postmodernism in his commentary on *De anima*. His modernist interpretation seems to follow the procedure *ad mentem Averrois*, but in the flawed Averroist manner. Nifo, a Neoplatonist, and the Renaissance interpreter of Averroes, summarizes the diaphanum according to the confused interpretation that links the reading of Averroes with that of Themistius. The erroneous Averroist interpretation of CMDA connects the diaphanous with the Neoplatonic theory of vision given without mediation, i.e., by direct contact of atomic substances of the third kind. Quote from Agostino’s *De intellectu* shows the diaphanum connected with the Neoplatonic doctrine.[[254]](#footnote-254) The seeing of color is given without mediation and by the mere actuality of light. Nifo does not need the diaphanum at all to produce color on the body and to provide for its cognition, because he does not know what function the diaphanum has in the Aristotelian system confirmed by the Commentator. The referrence to Aristotle (*ut Aristoteles ait*) is a pure sophistry. Nifo has combined the sunbeam as substance and the diaphanum as medium into a being of the third kind (*lux quasi de natura perspicui ac ipsius naturalis perfectio*). The same Neoplatonic model applies to cognition, as the *intellectus agens* as Neoplatonic sun directly actualizes the receptive intellect and produces the cognition of color as the resulting form. The quotation shows that the illumination on the colored surface comes directly from the ray, because the color is directly actualized by the ray. In the same way, the *intellectus agens*, like the Neoplatonic sun, directly actualizes the receptive intellect and brings forth the cognition of color as a resultant form. Nifo takes for his model the Themistius’s scheme of cognition, which Averroes fundamentally criticized. The color is brought about directly by the light and does not need the diaphanum. The result is the recognition of color as a species of the third kind. The hypostatic qualities “exsist” in that case outside of the physical body. It contradicts Aristotelian definition of sensual recognition given by the disclosure from the front. This interpretation of the diaphanum established the objective vision of the world in the postmodernism. Nifo abolished mediation and linked the act of seeing to atomic substance according to Democritus. However, he criticized his doctrine of causal effect caused by the vacuum, like all Aristotelians. Introduction of Simplicius’s Neoplatonic physics displaced Averroes’s interpretation of diaphanum. The postmodern eclipse of the first substance started in the Renaissance epoch. Nifo’s theory was taken over by Descartes’s doctrine on optics. The act of seeing is performed by the atomic substance as being of the third kind and thereby the role of the diaphanum related to intentionality is explicitly abolished. Light and color are transmitted in Descartes’s conception purely mechanically.[[255]](#footnote-255) The blindness of postmodernism with regard to the original function of the diaphanum is complete in the mentioned quotation of Descartes. He had abolished the possibility of correspondence between the thing, the senses and the intellect. For Descartes it is evident that the diaphanum does not exist because it is not a substance. But then we know the world through the being of the third kind. The postmodern subject separated itself from the first substance. There is no proportionality of knowledge that is guaranteed by the formal causality. Descartes’s conception of optics follows the schizophrenic division of man into two substances and this twofold dualism concerning the world and the man completed the eclipse of the first substance. Antoine Arnauld, inspired by Descartes, is the first postmodernist after Avicenna and after scholastic modernism who sees ideas directly in things. Arnauld invokes the aforementioned text *Optics*, where Descartes abolishes intentional objects and proceeds with the polemic with Descartes’s third *Meditation on Right and Wrong Ideas*.[[256]](#footnote-256) The intentional species are only chimeras (*espèces intentionnelles ne sont que des chimères*) and the soul sees the material ray directly in itself, since it makes a immediately given object of cognition (*l’objet immédiat de notre esprit*). Arnauld knows that he does not have the external sun in his mind, but its idea. The quotation shows that Arnauld, following Descartes, performed a postmodern eclipse of the real Sun, which he exchanged for the direct and therefore wholly unquestionable seeing of the idea. We find the first modern form of this sun eclipse in Duns Scotus (OBJ III, ch. 5.3.2). The material sunbeam and the things now directly enter the immaterial human thinking, which is absolute nonsense. After the abolition of the diaphanum and of intentionality, the subject of postmodernity had no other choice than to see what cannot be seen, that is, the objectively given idea as being of the third kind. This being passed first into physics in Cartesian postmodernism via Descartes’s inflection of light and optics and later into Locke’s primary qualities hypostatized directly in the first substance. In the darkness of the modern intellect, it was no longer a problem for the postmodern Locke to fill this empty space of mediation, thanks to the disappearance of the diaphanum, with new hypostases in the form of primary and secondary qualities.[[257]](#footnote-257) The postmodern Locke introduced these beings of the third kind in the form of hypostatized primary qualities as the first substance. Locke produced another kind of autonomous secondary quality in the subject. These being of the third kind exist primarily in the body (solidity, extension, motion, number, figure) and subsequently enable subjectively and sensually perceived secondary qualities (color, taste, smell, sound…). Projected to the things and to the subject, Locke’s twofold hypostases replaced Averroes’s twofold formal causality of cognition, which is given by twofold function of the diaphanum. According to Simplicius’s scenario, which was adopted by Nifo and Descartes, two substances of either the first kind (sensible cognition) or the third kind (intelligible cognition) act directly causally on each other. A greatly appreciated by Avicenna, productive imagination of postmodernism multiplied *tertium ens* to much greater extent than previous periods of thinking. They were limited by last remnants of Aristotelianism. New *illuminati* overcame the lagging scholastic modernity, which was still constrained by Aristotelian thought in some way. Again, the fundamental schizophrenia of modernity between body and mind is valid, because both kinds of properties are not connected by a cognition causally founded from the direction of the first substance, but by the dualistic system based on being of the third kind. These mythopoetic entities are given primarily in the world and secondarily in the subject. The diaphanum disappeared in the Neoplatonic diacosmos of the modernity. Real interactions of the first substances and their knowledge were transformed into a substance—species according to Simplicius.

The modernists abolished the mediation of light through the diaphanum, and necessarily they created a dualism of two separate worlds, the sensible and the intelligible. After the abolition of diaphanum the formal causality disappeared. The modern intellect strated to see non-existent entities of the third kind. Through the introduction of the solar intellect in the process of the intelligible cognition, it came to the metaphysical blindness related to the sensually recognized reality. It created a major metaphysical *Irrtum*. The direct seeing of the beings of the third kind is accomplished by objective cognition of the world. The immaterial hypostatized qualities received the status of the first substance. Such being of the third kind does not exist in Aristotelianism, because it has no possibility of existence. The primary and secondary quality is investigated by postmodernism on the same level as the existing real substance. Modernism and postmodernism do not need mediation because they use a mythological model of cognition. This type of cognition is not able to explain the emergence of immaterial cognition in human thought as *proportio* according to the CMDA. There is no correspondence between the senses and the intellect that universally cognizes the real material world. Modernism explores the objective diacosmos of primary and secondary substances defined as the objective individual (OBJ II, ch. 1.3). The philosophers of the first averroism constantly rejected the paranoia of the first *Modernorum* until destruction of Aristotelianism in the Paris condemnation in 1277. The Islamic and Latin moderns founded by Simplicius and Avicenna see a completely different world than the critical thinkers of the Falsafa such as Averroes and the Latin Aristotelians. The concept of the intellect as diaphanum shapes the way how we see the world. Either the world manifests itself through the metaphysical dative and through the mediation of the diaphanum; or, the world manifests itself through a modern parousia of the third type of entities that manifest themselves directly in the reflective consciousness of the *illuminati*. Modernity and postmodernity have displaced formal causality due to the forgotten diaphanum, therefore, through the concept of truth as assimilation, it sees only those chimeras that they produce themselves. Descartes rejected intentionality and changed the diaphanum into a corpuscular and therefore subsistent substance—species of the third kind. See above quotation from the *Optics*, which establishes a new way of seeing the world. That vision ties in with the Cartesian dualism of soul and body. Cartesians like Arnauld therefore see ideas and hypostatized properties directly in things because they have dropped the formal mediation between the real material thing and immaterial universal knowledge. Modernity and postmodernity perform the correspondence of non-existent beings of the third kind in the mode of truth as objective assimilation. See Rufus’s assimilation theory of truth as *coaequatio* (OBJ II, ch. 3.3.2). This worldview of objective modernity conquered the world in the epoch of the Anthropocene. Modernity changed the knowledge of reality according to a nihilistic and paranoid image of the world based on the modern dualistic subject. In the New Age founded by Avicenna, mediation through the diaphanum passed into the epochal Lethe.

The sunbeam does not directly cause seeing, as Neoplatonism and Modernism thought. Critical Averroes was not a philosopher blinded by the solar intellect. In the scheme of metaphysical cognition, he never rejected the mediation between the senses and the intellect as did Avicenna and postmodern mathematicians like Descartes and Arnauld. Averroes defended the diaphanum as a special potential form enabling the revelation of real hylemorphic bodies in the original construction of the mediation based receptive intellect through dual intentionality (ch. 2.4.2). Averroes, according to the interpretation of *De anima*, requires mediation through the diaphanum. It creates a formal causality to establish the mode *proportio* and *similitudo* between the following phenomena: external things—receptive senses—sensual imagination—intellect in potency—active intellect—speculative intellect. The bond between the senses and the intellect cannot be made by efficient causality, because then the cognition ended with the material senses and not with the immaterial intellect. The role of the diaphanum has major function for the introduction of truth as Aristotelian correspondence. The diaphanum first receives the sun ray and actualizes the colors of the body. Then it mediates the sensual and intelligible cognition to show the actual forms and colors of the things in the intentional mode of being. Done in such a way, the world is given to our cognition. The eye is fully oriented to the reception of color as an intentional object (τὸ γὰρ ὁρατόν ἐστι χρῶμα τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ, *De anima* 418a29). The thing as the first substance exists *per se* and thereby causes the secondary reception of color as an epiphenomenon (τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ καθ' αὑτὸ ὁρατοῦ, *De anima* 418a30). The transparent environment (*perspicuum*) ensures at the level of the senses the transfer of the actual ray into a sense organ. The senses are never mistaken in the direct reception of the sense impression, since they receive it causally at the level of the first substance. An error can start at the level of sensual intentionality and reception in the human and the animal soul. Thanks to the intentional act of cognition, the first intentional content (*species sensibilis*) arises on the level of sensual imagination. This synthesis of cognition is the result of the individual activity of the human or the animal soul. The similar (but not the same) formal causality of the diaphanum is mediated by an intentional act of the receptive intellect. In this case it is the *species intelligibilis* that founds the intentional object. Therefore, cognition as true correspondence is given by the disclosure of the sense of being from the front, from the real thing. On a further level, the *intellectus possibilis* represents a new spiritual diaphanum in the immaterial environment of the intellectual cognition. The new form of mediation creates an environment of formal causality of cognition at the level of the *species intelligibilis*, which is already immaterial. The cognized properties of light, such as color, arise in the mind through the act of receptive intentionality. Therefore, they cannot exist as objective hypostatized being of the third kind in reality. The receptive intellect mediates cognition from the senses, which actualize it. Both forms of the diaphanum must be fully receptive, the one on material level, the other on the immaterial. The possible intellect has only a purely potential form, just as the diaphanum exists only potentially. The receptive faculty of the intellectual soul is tied to the *intellectus agens*, because it is immaterial as well as the active intellect. The actualization of cognition does not proceed from the external intellectual form illuminating the intellect. Thanks to the intentional act of cognition, the first intentional content (*species sensibilis*) arises on the level of the sensual imagination. In the body, causality is given directly in the order of efficient reception of the impression, i.e., at the level of the sense organ.

The hermeneutics following the letter of the CMDA explicitly emphasizes the fact that both forms of the diaphanum in the original state are merely formal and potential. Therefore, they are capable of universal actualization. The truth as proportionality is ensured by mediation given as twofold potency. The actual first substances act first on the potential diaphanum and not directly on imagination or on intellect. Therefore, Aristotle and the Commentator consider Democritus’s scheme of recognition by action of atoms in a vacuum as fundamentally wrong. In the vacuum there would be no diaphanum which makes the recognition possible.[[258]](#footnote-258) Modernity and postmodernity do not need mediation in the world of objective atomism. Postmodernism, after the abolition of the diaphanum, had to create an objective diacosmos of hypostatized primary and secondary qualities, which do not exist in reality. After the decline of the original meaning of the *Categories* and *De anima*, the *illuminati* filled the world with their own inventions, which they recognized evidently and directly. Simplicius, Nifo, Descartes, Arnauld and Locke projected the universals into the world of the first substances. Thanks to this paranoiac operation, the modernists found the objective ideas as substances—species. Arnauld “observed” them for the first time in postmodernism. Aristotle and the Commentator, on the other hand, found a potential and formal mediation between the thing, the senses and the intellect thanks to the precise phenomenology of the act of perceiving and cognizing. Both species (*sensibilis, intelligibilis*) arise from the act of receptive orientation of sensory or intellectual cognition towards the cognized object (*intentio*). The mediation makes actual and singular things to pass through the twofold intentionality in such a way that a formal and universal species arises in thinking. The first substance receives therefore an accidental color, because the first physically given diaphanum mediates it (*perspicuum*). The process of seeing abolished the Neoplatonic *illuminatio* from the direction of the solar intellect, which acts directly in the thinking of the illuminate thanks to the act of acquired intellect (*intellectus adeptus*). The main role is played by the twofold action of the diaphanum, which has twofold causal and formal activity. The following quotation shows the new character of diaphanum, which established the first theory of truth as *adaequatio* in the West.

“The transparent medium is not moved by color, nor does it absorb it, unless light is given (*diaffonum non movetur a colore neque recipit eum nisi quando lucet*). Likewise, the intellect does not take in recognized contents because they exist only when they are actualized by the intellect and illuminated by it (*perficitur per illum intellectum et illuminatur per ipsum*). The light causes the color to transform in potency into an actuality since it can actualize the diaphanum (*lux facit colorem in potentia esse in actu ita quod possit movere diaffonum*). Likewise, the active intellect transforms the potential knowledge into actual (*intellectus agens facit intentiones in potentia intellectas in actu*) by the material intellect accepting these intelligible contents (*ita quod recipit eas intellectus materialis*). In this way, we must conceive both the material and the active intellect.” [[259]](#footnote-259)

The light actualizes the colors in the moment of the illumination (*facit colorem in potentia esse in actu*). Thereby a movement of the forms occurs through the diaphanum, which mediates this transfer from the potency into the actuality (*ita quod possit movere diaffonum*). The diaphanum get an actual receptive form as *perspicuum* through the influence of light. The transparent environment is therefore not a substance, as postmodern commentators since Nifo think until today. This potential form of recognition is actualized by light like exposed colors on a geometric surface of a body. The bodies are in and of themselves already actual hylemorphic substances. Since they are now exposed by the actualized natural *perspicuum*, the senses can recognize the colors as intentional objects. The sensory transmission takes place at the level of efficient causality because the apprehension of senses is directly actualized by the physical diaphanum. Therefore, according to the *De anima* quoted above, the senses can never make a mistake in the reception of their object, unlike the thesis postulated by Avicenna and Descartes about primary fallibility of the senses and infallibility given in the self-reflection of the active intellect. In fact, it is exactly the opposite. Thanks to the effective causality of the real thing, the senses are infallible in the fundamental mode of pure reception. The illusion of the broken stick in the water is not on the level of the reception of the sense impression, but on the level of the individual synthesis of the recognized sensual species. The pure reception given by intentional orientation of the senses or thinking is, however, quite blind in its infallibility. There is still no object of cognition, either at the level of sense conception or at the level of the concept. Hence the necessity of a double diaphanum. The primary orientation of intentionality to the object is given in terms of effective causality that comes from the reception of senses. They make part of the body as the first actual substance. In the second step, the formal causality makes a necessary condition for the synthesis of sensible and intelligible species. Now it is evident that the diaphanum must be a kind of potentiality, since it must be fully receptive to receive the actualized perceptions that are coming from the senses. The synthesis of cognition arises only at the level of imagination (*sensus communis*) or intelligible cognition (*intellectus agens*). The process of formalization completes the active intellect, which produces the resulting forms of cognition (*intellectus agens facit intentiones in potentia intellectas in actu*). Here already an error is possible, because it is an individual act of the human or animal soul. The key character is the fact that the diaphanum transfers potential forms of cognition whether sensual or intelligible. Thanks to the immaterial basis, the individual *intellectus possibilis* takes as a new form the diaphanum for intellectual forms on the basis of already actualized sensual species. Therefore, the possible intellect creates a new immaterial diaphanum, which is again given as a potential form capable of actualization from outside. This establishes the second act of intentionality given by attention of receptive intellect to the already synthesized sensible forms. This *species sensibilis* is already a cognitive form; therefore, it has its own actuality at the level of the sensory conception. The sheep, thanks to intentionality, infallibly sees “something” with its senses. Thanks to the intentional reception of sensory impressions and their subsequent synthesis, it recognizes (or it does not recognize) that this “something” is a “wolf.” Man has another level of intentionality and another diaphanum, which is given on the level of intellect. These forms, unlike the sensually recognized forms, are immaterial and universal and are expressed through linguistic terms. The active component of the soul exposes them in the same mode of immateriality as the *intellectus possibilis*, thus making them intelligible in the resulting form of the speculative intellect. Thanks to that kind of immateriality, the diaphanum in the mode of *intellectus possibilis* differs from sensual perception. These potentially given immaterial forms, which are intended by the new form of the diaphanum, are actively abstracted by the *intellectus agens* as another faculty of the human soul. Therefore, in contrast to the sheep, we can say in the mode of universal cognition: “This is the wolf.” Thanks to the transmission of the actual sensual impression, the cognition passes in the mode of formal and potential *proportio* or *similitudo* through the twofold act of intentionality. Therefore, the immaterial receptive intellect in the soul differs only formally from the active component of the intellect. Both acts of cognition are immaterial potency of the soul. Therefore, the analysis of CMDA distinguishes *perspicuum* as physical mediation in nature from the *diaphonum* as intentional mediation in the animal or the human soul. The course of intentional synthesis goes from potency to act. The first form of the *diaphonum* is determined by the intentional activity of the sensual imagination and the second by the synthetic activity of the active intellect. Intentional activity is oriented by the twofold act of receptivity (the senses, the receptive intellect) to the actually given impression in the senses. The twofold intentionality (sensual, intellectual) needs the diaphanum to synthesize the empiric and intelligible cognition in the twofold act of synthesis (*phantasia, intellectus agens*). The resulting process of drawing conclusions in the act of animal *cogitatio* ou human *intellectio* is again twofold (*vis aestimativa, intellectus als tertium genus*) and creates a twofold knowledge, which is given as material and immaterial knowledge (a *species* *sensibilis* making the recognition of “this wolf”; the essence of the “wolf in itself” as *intellectum*). In contrast to the Neoplatonism, modernism and postmodernism, the Aristotelian scheme of cognition captures the formal and causal way of correspondence of cognition that goes from the real thing to the senses and to the intellect. The Aristotelian intellect given in the soul is not a subsisting form. It makes the faculty of soul that is an entelechic form of the body. The scenario of disclosure from the front ensures the correspondence of things and intellect through the combination of an efficient and formal causality in the common animal and human mode: external actuality of the world—actual sensual receptivity in the body— immaterial potency of receptivity in the soul—intentional synthesis in the soul—act of judgment in the imaginative (animals)—intellectual faculty of the soul (humans). Every cognition begins in the order of effective causality in the senses. The similarity between thing and thought is given as genesis of cognitive forms . The cognitive formes started to be synthesized in the imagination and they have been mediatized by the diaphanum (*idola, phantasmata*). The terminal form of the first mediation is *species sensibilis*. The receptive causality of the senses is efficient in the order of the causality of the first substances. Therefore, we can partially replace the activity of the eye or the nerves by a material instrument. The senses are activated in the order of effective causality directly from the direction of real things. Then follows the mediation of sensible species by the formal causality of the receptive component, which is given in the faculty of *anima intellectiva* or animal *vis aestimativa*. This formal causality cannot be replaced anymore, because it is the activity of the unique soul, which is the immaterial form of the hylemorphic body. The diaphanum is based on formal and therefore immaterial causality. Consequently, animals have immaterial knowledge as well (*esse spirituale1*), even if their knowledge is not intellectual. The mediation from the direction of the senses creates an intentional act of the unique and irreplaceable recognition of animal and human beings. This act is in both cases of immmaterial nature that possesses a fully intelligent and universal character in human being. The receptive immaterial intellect is exposed by the senses and this orientation (*intentio*) of the intellect forms the ontological trajectory (*formale Anzeige*, *Vor-blickbahn*, ch. 1). The disclosure from the front is formally given from the direction of the sensually actualized forms (diaphanum1). Animals have the recognition based on the reception of sensual forms, because the sensual intentions are actively formalized by the *sensus communis*. The immaterial form of the diaphanum is given only in human beings. This receptive potency acts in the environment of immaterial mediation and is finalized by the active intellect (diaphanum2). The intentional, individual and freely given intelligible cognition mediatizes the *intellectus in potencia* as spiritual diaphanum on the level of formal causality (*esse spirituale2*). The new form of the immaterial diaphanum enables a fundamental manifestation of the cognitive form that receives immaterial, intellectual and universal nature (*species intelligibilis*). Both forms of diaphanum are given only potentially in the subject and both mediate cognitive forms in virtue of the formal causality. This twofold diaphanum is given in the act of twofold intentionality, sensual, on the one hand, and intelligible on the other. Therefore, the correspondence between cognition and thing is from the direction of the thing exposed by the ray and it runs through the senses to the intellect. Human cognition is provided on the level of a purely formal actualization of the intellect. Therefore, it is fundamentally different from the Neoplatonic illumination.

Thanks to the two sides of one and the same formal potency of mediation, the *intellectus possibilis* reveals the universal forms through the act of immaterial and material mediation. In relation to the causally given *species sensibilis*, the receptive intellect appears as immaterial potency. The animals recognize one step lower in the series: sensory organs—sensory reception—imaginative synthesis—sensory inference. The *sensus communis* formalizes the sensible intention to create an object of imagination. That object is taken up by synthetic activity of the *vis aestimativa*. The diaphanum on the first level of reception already holds a subjective and individual role in animals as well. This mediation goes on in the immaterial animal soul, in contrast to the purely material reception in the sensory organ. We can artificially replace the materially given sensual reception in the bodily organism or in the brain center of blind and deaf people; the ability of intentionality and synthesis is an individual soul act of the animal or the human being (*esse spirituale1–2*). Therefore, it cannot be replaced. The synthetic ability (*potentia*) of drawing conclusions formally corresponds on the sensual level (*sensus communis*) to the human intellect, which is given on the higher, immaterial level of cognition. The resulting synthesis of animal runs on the level of *vis aestimativa*, in the case of humans on the level of *intellectio*. The formal causality mediatized by the diaphanum is distinguished by the material or spiritual reception. The potency is given by the act of animal or human intentionality and in the mode of formal causality bound to the receptive imagination. But at the second level of intentionality of humans, the formal causality is intelligible and immaterial and therefore universal, and not sensible and material and therefore singular. The receptive imagination or intellect as the second diaphanum cannot be replaced by an objective simulacrum in the form of *tertium ens* as it is the case of the objective worldview. Instead of the mediation of the real world, it comes to knowledge of the diacosmos of the third kind. The universal intentionality mediates a potential *species intelligibilis*, which is given in the mode of *intentio* in such a way that it can be taken up by the *intellectus agens*. To make the final concept, the active intellect takes the immaterial form of the intelligible intentional objects that are produced by the act of the receptive intellect (*intellectio*). This actualized passive and active intellect exists in the mode of *tertium genus*, see previous chapter. The immaterial cognition goes from the intentional *species intelligibilis* as *intellectum* to the accomplished recognition in language as *conceptum*. The complete unity of universal meaning is given in the conceptual form of universal cognition as *intellectus speculativus*. The modern and postmodern illuminates see the truth of the world directly irradiated by the sun of objective understanding. Such cognition is not guided by the metaphysical dative, but its modern upgrade (*dativus obiectivus*). Averroes does not consider the diaphanum as a substance, because only the cognition of the person is actual as the first substance (*tertium genus*). The same potency of mediation lets the senses and the intellect to the actual thing to be seen and recognized in its colorfulness. Thanks to the formal and hidden effect of the transparent environment, we see the colors in the personal and effective act of recognition. The color receives the first mediation from the sunbeam and the next mediation proceeds through the intentions. Since mediation proceeds through the same potential and formal causality, it is true of all human beings that they are connected to the reality of the world in the same formal way and hence they recognize the common world (*quartum genus*). Therefore, the writing *De interpretatione* explicitly links the discussed teaching about judgment to the writing *De anima*. The classically educated Aristotelians of the West knew very well that fact (OBJ II, ch. 1.1). This formal causality, which guarantees universal cognition to all people, is found in Kant’s terminus *Schematismus der reinen Vernunft*.[[260]](#footnote-260) This postmodern philosopher, however, sees a transition from sensory cognition to understanding only in the analogical mode (*Analogien der Erfahrung*) and not at all in formal causality. The schematism is given by permanence of the postmodern substance of the third kind (*Erscheinung*), by their mutual effect and by their temporal sequence. That diacosmos of beings of the third kind provides for the transition between the categories of pure understanding and the manifestation of phenomenal things in our cognition. Duns Scotus was the first consistently modern thinker to introduce this process of mediation through postmodern substance and the analogy of the objective being (*analogia entis*). The first postmodern thinkers, Suárez and Wolff, adopted Scotus’s metaphysical deduction and integrated it into an objective system of *metaphysica generalis*. This procedure led to a complete eclipse of the first substance. The causality of the world in Averroes’s *proportio* can no longer be present in postmodern Kant, because he considers the real thing an hardly recognizable *Noumenon*. In his scheme connecting senses and understanding no longer figures the formal causality given by the diaphanum, but the modern analogy given objectively by transcendental deduction. Kant makes a new kind of transcendental deduction to reach the real world. In principle, it is same paranoiac way of postmodern cognition as Descartes developed before him. The process of cognition opted out the normal causality to get the analogical scheme according to the Oxfordian Fallacy. Kant’s *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* follows the path of modernity. Classical metaphysics rejected the modern analogy between dichotomy of intellect and the non-existent diacosmos of third substances. Kantian analogy of experience arises only in thought and is not based on the real formal causality given by mediation. Therefore, it does not guarantee the conception of truth as correspondence.

Thanks to its potency to absorb and mediate anything, the diaphanum show the whole of the world. Aristotle and after him Averroes clearly show that the diaphanum is given not only for sight, but for all senses. This is shown by the analysis of *De anima* and the CMDA regarding the intentional mediation of sound and scent. We perceive through it something that exists in the real world. Therefore, the last oracle of the Greek mysteries instructs the wise philosophy to save the phenomena (ch. 1.3.3). The world, which exists actually for itself, must manifest itself potentially for us in its wholeness, since the soul is everything in some way. Averroes defines a potential form of intentionally based cognition that creates a mediation between the illuminating ray and the illuminated body. The formally determined potency has no subsistence of its own like Simplicius’s atomic substances, Avicenna’s pure forms, Arnauld’s objective ideas, or Locke’s primary qualities. The transparent environment is not an individual single thing to be there (τόδε τι). The purely formal and potential diaphanum manifests fundamentally different world than Avicenna’s diacosmos inspired by Jamblichus (ch. 2.3.3). The hypostatic union of substances as *tertium ens* has been adopted by postmodernism through the erroneous process of thinking. Primary and secondary properties of the body became hypostases fictives. The mediating role of diaphanum was objectively forgotten by modernism and postmodernism. It was rediscovered during Heidegger’s separation from Husserl’s phenomenology in years 1919–21. Existential concept of the diaphanum was introduced at the very beginning of Heidegger’s philosophy. The initial triad of the act of understanding established the ontologic meaning of being (OBJ III, ch. 4). By reading Aristotle and Paul von Yorck during his lecturing in Freiburg, the young philosopher discovered a new form of diaphanum (*Durchsichtigmachen eines Seienden*).[[261]](#footnote-261) The new form of diaphanum established the definition of man as *Dasein*. Heidegger as converted Aristotelian definitely separated himself from the objectivism of Husserl and thus from the Avicennian determination of the person. The writing *Brief über den Humanismus* (1947) completed Heidegger’s definitive separation from the objectivity. The essay outlined the basic problems of nihilistic metaphysics and its concept of human being. We have quoted the concept of “*Ek-sistenz*” (ch. 2.1.2), whose nihilistic variant (*exsistere*) will play a key role in the Oxfordian Fallacy as a new determination of being. Like Averroes, Heidegger understood in the next millennium that phenomena cannot be saved by making of them the entities of the third kind. The existing *Dasein* constitutes the sense of being thanks to the ability of intentionality and understanding. Therefore, the mediation of the real world represents the first explored phenomenon in the introductory part of the major work *Being and Time*. The hermeneutics of objectivity follow the threefold formal path of ontological understanding (SZ, § 2). The things in the world and the being of the world are not at all objective and self-evident. That was an assumption of postmodernism blinded by the light of Neoplatonic solar intellect. This solar intellect has been given in the form of the objectivism of the neopositivists and Husserl’s objective phenomenology. Therefore, Husserl’s intentionality differs from Heidegger’s exploration given in the mode of Being-in-the-world (*In-der-Welt-sein*). Averroes established the new metaphysics as first science in conflict with Avicenna. Heidegger remade the first philosophy in conflict with Husserl. The Commentator asked the same question as Heidegger later did in Freiburg: How is the manifestation of the world in relation to the existentialist understanding as *tertium genus*? The following question follows: What kind of diaphanum mediates understanding for *Dasein*? Modernity has no possibility to grasp the invisible diaphanum. Non-existent things are exposed directly from the direction of the mythical “intellect—sun.” Objectivity does not recognize the role of diaphanum as receptive intellect in the soul. There no kind of mediating transparency that is necessary for the act of understanding on the level of *Dasein*. The objective cognition does not ask such a question because it does not see this problem at all. Neoplatonic Nifo, who lived at the time of the Renaissance, was probably the last philosopher that saw and wrongly solved the role of the Aristotelian diaphanum in the commentary on *De anima*. Nifo made out of it a being of the third kind. Modernity has no possibility to define the pure potency in any other way than a *tertium ens*. The diaphanum is neither a first actual substance nor a being of the third kind. It is not “something” substantial, but an intentional proceeding “how” living beings get to know the world. In the metaphysics of Averroes, the explored being keeps its status as substance *qua* substance. It is received through a different form of intentionality than in Avicenna. Therefore, he discerns a different sense of the world than modern and postmodern Alexandrians. The second mediation of the forms goes through the spiritual diaphanum as possible intellect, see quote above (*recipit eas intellectus materialis*). The intentional contents given in the possible intellect are actualized by the active intellect that transforms them into actual cognition. The intention processed by the diaphanum emerges as *species sensibilis* and *intelligibilis*. They are determined by formal causality because it makes the act of the animal or human soul (*tertium genus*). The resulting intellectual concept arises in man by the fact that intentional species make transition to the active intellect. Universal concept is definitely formed in the speculative intellect. There is a fundamental difference between two levels. The individual act of understanding is given by effective causality (*intentio*, *intellectio*); the resulting universal content or concept is given by formal causality (*intentum*, *intellectum*). The newly defined *intellectus possibilis* exercises the formal causality. It actualizes the forms neither in the external thing nor in the brain as the material subject of cognition, but in the intentionally active soul as animating form of the body. The universal forms of cognition are mediatized from the direction of the singular sense impressions in a special form of the intellect, which is given as an immaterial faculty of the animate person. Similarly, the diaphanum works in the nature to actualize the potential color of the thing through the actual sunbeam. It reveals the body as colored and that body exists independently of color. This is shown by the above-mentioned quotation from the CMDA (*secundum quod dat diaffono formam aliquam*). Therefore, *intellectus possibilis* as a new diaphanum ensures the formal *proportio* for cognition from the senses to the intellect in the mode of the metaphysical dative. Averroes’s concept of dual intentionality strictly adheres to the model of disclosure of cognized being from the front, i.e., from the direction of the first actual substance. Modernists recognize the world in the mode *per prius* from the direction of the parousia of being of the third kind. Therefore, they are blinded by the shining of their own intellect staging as a modern sun. They do not see the process of mediation from the reality to the intellect. This process is ensured by the *intellectus possibilis* as intellectual diaphanum. Universal predication of modernity sees in the mode *per prius* the material intellect as being of the third kind. The next volumes investigate the history of that kind of Averroism.

The simulacrum of CMDA replaced twofold definition of intellect as *tertium* and *quartum genus*. Thus, the Aristotelian division of intellect entered the epochal Lethe where exists the metaphysics in its *a/lētheia* guarded in a musical and historial way. The untruth of modernity leads the objective history of the thinking in the mode of the epochal error until now. The victorious sophist modification of Averroes’s brilliant distinction, under the influence of the Furies, established the history of philosophy as a modern simulacrum given by the controversy over Averroism. The philosophy in the line of Neoplatonism displaced the role of diaphanum from the course of cognition. The disappearance of the diaphanum canceled the mediation. That is why modernity lacks the key element of formal agreement in the mode of truth as the *proportio*. Modern cognition is fatally divided into two separate components, given materially and immaterially. Modernity and postmodernity separate sensual from intellectual cognition, because soul and body do not perceive the same “thing.” Postmodernism gets along with the separated intellect as independent substance (*res cogitans*), which is separated from the body and lives in the Plato’s mythological cave. There it observes on the wall the objective shadows of reality in the form of evidence as a postmodern noema. The hypostatized modern mind, given as an independent substance, is everything by itself. It needs the external world for cognition only accidentally. Modernity has no twofold intentionality; therefore, it doubled reality by being of the third kind. The dialogue *Sophist* was the first to explore the doubled reality. In this mode of seeing given with the help of Neoplatonic illumination, the thing becomes a sophist simulacrum (εἴδωλον). The hermeneutic archaeology cannot accept the modern idolatry of objectivists, because it starts from the original event of truth as *alētheia*. Therefore, we examine the perspective under which Avicenna and Averroes considered the work of the diaphanum (*ortus scientiarum*). It makes the original place of the revelation of being in its recognized form (*Lichtung*). Gigantomachy concerning the modern substance is given by the fact that we see either the process of cognition from the direction of the real thing or from the direction of the ray of the mystical light that directly illuminates the intellect. The knowledge illuminates itself in the process, as Avicenna and modernists pretend to do. Or, the anti-modern Averroes makes real cognition of the real world through the diaphanum. The twofold path of vision, which is directed to the sense of being, results in a twofold concept of truth. The divine Muses as the source of truth and deception give everyone truth his own truth, *suum cuique*. The objective modernity assimilates the being of the third kind through the mythological model that Furies organize en masse in “global village.” The critical philosophy carries out an correspondence of the real material thing and the immaterial intellect. Therefore it looks for at least a wise man on the Earth. The formal causality makes a key element of the Aristotelian concordance and it was ingeniously interpreted in the CMDA. One and the same thing is illuminated and therefore recognized through the senses as well as through the intellect. Hermeneutics define the *intellectus in potencia*, which was discovered by the two geniuses of the Falsafa (al-Fārābī, Averroes) as the original *Lichtung* where the sensible and the intelligible forms meet together. Such historicity of objectivity follows the metaphysical *alētheia* that is tied to the twofold form of the metaphysical dative. Either we save the phenomena by performing a mediation through the diaphanum, which connects us to the real thing. Intentionality ensures adequate cognition of the actual thing given outside ourselves at the price of its absence in our mind. Therefore, we must first save the phenomena in their own being in order to be able to recognize them truthfully. The modernity does not save the phenomena. The scientists construct their own world in the Platonic cave, which is illuminated by the solar intellect. They perform a new form of pseudo-mysterium by repeating the epoptic seeing of the Eleusinian Mysteries (ἐποπτεία). Vengeful Furies foisted that nonsense upon them, in the mode of simulacrum (*Ge-Stell*). Scientists gathered in the academic cave celebrate a modern parousia of beings of the third kind. In today’s nihilism, these academics are manipulated by global corporations, which is a complete tragicomedy of thinking. The objectivists engaged in the objective seeing of the “world” recognize directly and evidently their own products of mind. Then they save and store their digitally processed simulacra in cloud databases. This form of divine tragicomedy does not have to rescue the real phenomena. The truth is given as a global assimilation of objective facts created by subjective mind. Averroes interprets the real course of cognition on the basis of metaphysical *alētheia*, that is, in the perspective of the diaphanum determined from the thing. The spiritual diaphanum follows the physical *perspicuum* in the cognizing person. It enables the manifestation of sensual or intelligible forms. The cognition proceeds by formal causality, which ensures the true cognition as correspondence between the thing and personal intellect. The source of effective causality for cognition can only be the first actual substance that directly acts on the senses. The person recognizes the external thing through the formal causality which is mediated by the diaphanum. The cognitive form must find a corresponding intentional correspondence in animal as well as in human cognition through intentionality. Thanks to the metaphysical dative it is true that the recognized thing is not the first real substance, because we hold its corresponding intention in our imagination and thought. Therefore, a corresponding *adaequatio* must be upheld between the first and the second substance, that is, between the real thing and its cognition. This causal and formal *proportio* is mediatized by the intentional act that produces both kinds of species (*sensibilis, intelligibilis*). The writing *Categories* complete *De anima* and vice versa. Without causal and formal mediation, there is no truth as correspondence between thing, senses and intellect. Averroes summarizes the character of the receptive intellect in this quote:

“But we have maintained that the material intellect is eternal (*intellectum naterialem esse eternum*) and that speculative cognitions originate in the person and are corruptible (*intellecta speculativa esse generabilia et corruptibilia*), all this in the manner we have stated above. The material intellect recognizes both the material forms and the abstracted forms (*formas materiales et formas abstractas*). Then it is obvious according to this mode that the speculative and the active intellect have one and the same subject, namely the material intellect (*subiectum intellectorum speculativorum et intellectus agentis secundum hunc modum est idem et unum, scilicet materialis*). Similarly, in the case of diaphanum, which simultaneously absorbs both color and light (*simile huic est diaffonum, quod recipit colorem et lucem insimul*). The light is that which causally brings about the formation of the color (*lux est efficiens colorem*).” [[262]](#footnote-262)

The resulting synthesis in modes *tertium* and *quartum genus* establishes the new version of material intellect (*secundum hunc modum est idem et unum, scilicet materialis*). The unity is given by the twofold act of reception (*intellectus materialis intelligit utrumque*). The quotation makes together both sides of formalization together, i.e., the individual act of intentionality related to sensual forms (*formas materiales*) and the subsequent reception of those forms in the immaterial intellect (*formas abstractas*). Due to the receptivity of intellect as spiritual diaphanum, the proportion between the thing and the intellect is formally assured. The sensual and intellectual *proportio* proceeds from potency to actuality mediated by sensual and intelligible forms. The material intellect has the capacity to receive both kinds of forms. From the point of view of the reception of immaterial forms, the purely potential (and therefore also immaterial) *intellectus materialis* forms in the soul a new diaphanum, which mediatizes the process of cognition. The receptive intellect makes potential forms for the active intellect, which is a carrier of the final act of recognition (*subiectum intellectorum speculativorum et intellectus agentis*). The efficient causality ensures the transition from the external thing to the sense organ. Mediation begins by the formal causality of the diaphanum, which ensures the first stage of cognition for the animals as well. In the case of humans, moreover, the full *adaequatio* between the senses and the intellect applies, at the level of the second mediation. The material intellect is preserved in the mode of predication as *tertium genus*, because the intellect is actualized sensually and in the individual act of cognition. The material intellect became a pure potency of the existing real soul in the body. The immaterial intellect cannot be Alexander’s and Themistius’ substance. The universally defined immaterial receptivity of the *intellectus possibilis* is given in the mode of intelligible potency. It makes possible to know everything, since the receptive intellect preserves the immaterial form of diaphanum for *anima intellectiva*. Aristotle interpreted the human soul to make the body alive in an entelechic way. For this reason, the receptive part of the soulas diaphanum can recognize everything. At the same time, we can understand the concept of the possible intellect as well as a universal (*quartum genus*). In this case, we abstract from our own act of thinking, but not as a mythological Cartesian *cogito*. It has no body, and thus no source of basic actualization of the intellect. Therefore, the human society endowed with the immaterial receptive intellect differs from the world of animals and their sensual intentional cognition.

As living beings, we make part of the common world, albeit each through a different form of intentionality (*esse spirituale1–2*). The intentionality upholds the orientation of the soul to the real thing recognized by bodily senses. The sensual impression in the material organ must be transferred into the synthetic faculty of the soul. The apprehension in itself does not constitute the cognition, because it is of pure material nature, since the impression of the senses proceeds on the level of *causa efficiens*. The sense organ can be replaced by instruments. A living organism or the human being as a person recognizes the world through the intentional species. Cognitive activity of animals and humans is immaterial in nature and it is made on the level of formal causality. That part of cognition cannot be replaced by any other external means. The object of cognition is the form mediated by the diaphanum. It starts the synthesis of recognition from the thing given in reality. We cognize through the intentional and formal causality, and the subject of this cognition is the corresponding activity of the immaterial animal or human soul. The ability of reception is ensured by the soul in the body as the first actual substance. Human or animal body acts as *causa efficiens*. The conjunction between the bodily instrument of material cognition (sensual organs) and the soul as a carrier of immaterial cognition (intentional and synthesized form of cognition in the animal subject) is absolutely fundamental. That fact escaped both Avicenna and modernity. Postmodernism has made knowledge another quasi-physical element given as effective causality of the third kind. Francis Bacon still left knowledge as efficient causality to God alone (*ipsa scientia potestas est*; *Meditationes Sacrae*, 1597). But this “power” was later transferred to the efficient causality of objective knowledge. Human knowledge taken in itself cannot act directly in the world as *causa efficiens*. The first real substance is not changed by the fact that we know it. The transformation of the world happens only through the work of the human body, as the first real substance. The cognitive faculty given in the soul forms proceeds through the mediation of intentionality and that is determined by the real thing. The animals have this immaterial cognition as well. The carrier of the intention cannot be the “wolf” as first substance, but its intentional object, which is synthesized in the imagination of the sheep. This mental faculty resides in the body and it carries out the cognition as a subject of intentionality made in the mode *ipse* (*proprium subiectum intentionis*). The cognitive subject as *tertium genus* takes up this intentionality and carries out a synthesis of cognition. Aristotelians who interpreted the terms “desire” and “longing” (ὄρεξις, ἐπιθυμία), according to *De anima* 413b23–24, knew very well that the immaterial intentionality belongs to the organism as a whole, since it has no organ as the senses have.[[263]](#footnote-263) Aristotle, who observed all his life real living beings (and not being of the third kind), does not look for “what” is the *aisthēsis*, which is bound to localizable organs in the body. By scientific judgment, he establishes, “how” the organism recognizes as an entelechic unity. The scheme of intentionality in the quoted passage forms the inductive judgment (ὅπου...καὶ). The sensual impressions in the body organ (αἴσθησις) bring about the intentional activity of the animal as a unique creature conceived in a holistic way. Such a living animal is actualized in the sense of “directing oneself toward something” (ὄρεξις) and “wanting something” (ἐπιθυμία). The human being has the intellectual desire, which modifies the lower components of cognition fundamentally and therefore it separates human and animal intentionality. The cognition of the sheep is separated from the physical “wolf” even in two ways, that is, by the passive sensual perception and the active sensual abstraction. The perceived thing creates a sense impression in the bodily organ (“I see something”). The intentional synthesis operates formally in the soul and creates a sensual and individual form of the received sense impression (“It is a wolf”). Therefore, each sheep sees its own “wolf.” The sheep reacts to the danger individually, because it carries out a resulting synthesis and an evaluation of the environment according to its own mental ability (*cogitatio*, *vis aestimativa*). The leader of the flock of sheep or any other animals necessarily becomes the individual endowed with maximum sensual reception, intentional ability and resulting synthetic reactions. This life experience accumulated over time ensures the survival of the entire group. The herd raided by hunting predators instinctively separates as victims those individuals who are not at the level of the required task, i.e., the sensual receptivity and quick intentional reaction and adequately true synthesis. The animals in the herd know exactly what level of sensory perception and mental abilities possesses this or that individual. Natural selection, therefore, must be changed into a process of *tertium* and *quartum* genus as well. There is no “evolution” in the form of *tertium ens* as objective Darwinism assumes, which is reduced today to physical changes in DNA. Survival and reproduction are not just about which animal is evolutionarily more or less physically durable or genetically adaptable according to Darwin (*quartum genus*). Animals know well, thanks to the shared world of instinctive knowledge (*tertium genus*), which animal is more or less mentally alert and smart (*vis aestimativa*). This immaterial faculty given as individual knowledge of the world cannot be reduced to physical and genetic changes made at the level of the first substances. That is why the zoological gardens can ensure the survival of biological species, but never this ability of individual synthesis that makes the common world of animals. Such a common world (*Lebenswelt*) depends on the natural life of animals. In nature, the most physically capable individuals with the best skills of situation-assessment survive. Therefore, a strict hierarchy exists in animals because their survival depends on the individualized ability of early perception of danger or the ability to find food. This complex adaptation to the common world cannot be ensured by any zoo, because it breeds “stupid” animals. The animals in the herd complement each other and establish a “herd intelligence,” which is given in the collectively given mental ability of sensory discrimination and synthesis. When this herd refinement of the race and selection are carried out on the level of humans, they cease to be a person. The value of the person disappeared to be an individual. In Aristotelian metaphysics, there is no objective form of the “life” or the “value” of the third kind. Modern age of nihilistic thought univocally attributes one objective simulacrum to human beings and to animals. Confused postmodernism has given animals the “rights” that derive from animal individuality, and humans the dignity and rights that derive from human individuality. Political Aristotelianism cannot make such nonsense. The animal, from the nature of its intentionality, does not have the same common world as politically free citizens (Heraclitus, H. Arendt). Nihilistic postmodernism merged the perception of animals and people into a univocal objectivist concept. The hermeneutics of intentionality therefore distance itself from objectivist ethics, which in a utilitarian way connects the world of values of humans and animals, for example, through objectively conceived suffering.[[264]](#footnote-264) There is no such “suffering” since it is but a substance—species of the third kind. Thinkers at the beginning of the 13th century still used critical thinking on an excellent level and did not commit such obvious sophisms, because they distinguished the material and the immaterial acts of the soul as *tertium* and *quartum genus*. The common world of living beings, which is endowed with sensibility and intentionality, is individually and generically created by different faculties of reception and synthesis of plants, animals and man. These mental faculties create two generically different versions of the world from the point of view of intentionality. The animal world is characterized at the animal level by a similar formal operation of cognition as in humans (actuality of the real wolf, mediation, formal cognition of the sheep). Hermeneutics, on the basis of defense of the shared world of man and animal, distinguish in principle both types of imprinting, which are genetically and socially given. Genomic imprinting of animals are given chemically and physically, when the form of the gene in the dominant alleles on the part of the father or mother determines the process of replication in DNA (*quartum genus*). And something completely different is the social imprinting of animals determined by social relationships (parental and sexual imprinting). This kind of knowledge about the common world is irrevocably given in the animal soul, but in a completely different way than genetic information of DNA. The parental and sexual imprinting creates the individual *vis aestimativa* as *tertium genus*. The intentional reception comes from the receptivity of the animal soul as *tabula rasa*. The animal soul receives the individual imprinting from the sense perceptions to make a fixed cognitive form. The human soul, as a *tabula rasa*, acquires intellectual and cultural images of the world through intellectual education rather than through animal imprinting. Thanks to the immateriality of the diaphanum, which is given as a formal potency, the cognition of man and animal makes no univocal component of material processes in the “brain” as *tertium ens* objectif. But the formally identical course of cognition (*quartum genus*) means that we share a common world with all living beings. The term “life world” (*Lebenswelt*) has a completely Cartesian character in Husserl’s philosophy. It dates back to the Avicennian modernity given by the second Averroism of the Toledo school. Husserl’s Neoplatonism makes exposition of the “natural” world from behind, from the direction of the mathematical forms that determine the objective “ek-sistence” of the common world.[[265]](#footnote-265) Husserl’s active and passive constitution of meaning create only a mythopoetic diacosmos of Cartesian subjects as *tertium ens*. Aristotle’s and Husserl’s concept of the life world make two entirely different projects of metaphysics. They refer to different concepts of intentionality, different definitions of truth, different concepts of being, and thus they create principally different kind of the worldview. The Commentator, by interpreting Aristotle’s biological writings, the *Metaphysics* and *De anima*, fully defends the Aristotelian concept of science, which is oriented toward the world of first substances. Its sophistical equivalent, in the mode of the secular error of modernity (*Irrtum, Irre*), became finally the epochal destiny of the West through dogmatic ontotheology. Aristotle’s conception of intentionality was discovered for the West by Blund’s school through a thorough reading of *De anima* (OBJ II, ch. 2.1.2). The CMDA came to the Latin West after the year 1220 in the form of the Neoplatonic translations made in the school of Toledo. The true interpretation of the CMDA was achieved after 1230 in the Sicilian school that moved to Paris. The translator Michael Scotus visited the Paris University and founded the school of the first Averroism based on integral interpretation of the scientific writings of Aristotle. The cognition and nature of intellect given in the CMDA were defended for the first time in full by Albert the Great in the introductory part of the writing *De homine* (ca. 1242) and by Roger Bacon in the interpretation of *Metaphysics*. Both interpretations were truly made “*ad mentem Averrois”*. Averroes, like Aristotle, follows the process of *similitudo* and *proportio* from things to cognition of all living beings, not just humans. Both eminent thinkers knew well that living beings possess their own life world due to sensual intentionality. They are not animated postmodern *automata* in the mode of the *bête-machine* of Descartes, Hobbes, Malebranche as well as the postmodern factories producing meat, milk and eggs. Scholastic modernity introduced the multiplicity of substances into definition of man and the Enlightenment and the postmodernity made of the animal an animated machine. The result is a twofold dehumanization of man and the living world. The animal is not a person, but an hylemorphic first substance, being entelechic and living as a unique individual. The act of subjective intentionality and individual existence as *tertium genus* guarantees to the animal and partly also to the plant an individual, thus indivisible uniqueness of the animate substance. In the age of accomplished metaphysical nihilism, the neurophysiological Alexandrians gave the formal and universal function of *intellectus materialis* directly to the brain as the material organ of cognition. They accomplished the postmodern transformation of the existing person into a non-existent entity of the third kind. Averroes is not a modernist who constructs an objective diacosmos through the analogical experience of the world, like the objectivist Kant. The critical realist from Cordoba wants to investigate the world scientifically and truthfully; therefore he explores the real world in a corresponding way based on efficient and formal causality. The diaphanum play a key role in the whole scheme because it ensures a formal transition of cognition from the thing to the senses and to the receptive intellect. The diaphanum mediates the visible world through the causality transmitted to senses. According to Averroes, the diaphanum and the material intellect has only a formal and potential nature; therefore they make no essential and actualized entity. Either they act as physical environment (*perspicuum*) or as potential form for the senses (*diaffonum*) or as potential form intellect (*intellectus possibilis*). The concept of diaphanum created a new manifestation of the world and renewed the correspondence theory of truth after Aristotle. The intention given by the diaphanum brings a sensual and intellectual form first into the *sensus communis* and then into the active intellect. The universal species given in this way differs from external things just as the first substance given in the reality differs from the second substance given in the thought. The synthesized *species sensibilis* and the *species intelligibilis* arise thanks to the twofold formal similarity of cognition with the external thing. The process of passive intentional mediation and active abstraction finally expresses the first real substance either the singular animal cognition or the universal meaning. The common world is truly acknowledged and scientifically predicated as such.

Modernity worships its own products made out of the hypostatized intellect, which is erroneously defined as Averroistic *intellectus possibilis*. This simulacrum of numerically one substance is unified (*copulatio*) with the individual (and not personal) receptive cognition. This mythopoetic genesis of meaning ensured the objectively same reception for all people as individuals of the third kind. The objective metaphysics, blinded by the light of the solar intellect, cannot see the original function of the diaphanum. Without diaphanum, there is no unconcealment of the world in its hermeneutic and phenomenological *alētheia*. The diaphanum is defined in modernity in the mode of “this here” (*hoc aliquid*) and this substance of the third kind entails the truth for the subject (*certitudo*, *rectitudo*). Such a recognition runs in the mode of metaphysical *Irrtum*. The objective thinking of postmodernism was left only with the concept of diaphanum as *tertium ens* in its hypostatized *veritas*. This idol created the Averroism of modernity that has nothing to do with Averroes’s metaphysics. The objective thinking automatically makes a substance out of the potency, because it illuminates everything with the light of the autonomous intellect. It does not need for the cognition either a first actual substance or the mediation. Modernity does not save the phenomena. Instead of saving the world, the *illuminati* organize a global religious worshipping (τά ὄργια, *conferentia*) of their objectively enlightened mind. The orgiastic intellect of Avicennists and Alexandrians is a substance and it reveals itself through the self-reflexive presence (*parousía*). The self-presence is given either absolutely intellectually or absolutely materially, which is one and the same in the resulting fallacy of modernity. The substantial nature of the *intellectus in potencia* in the objective mode contributed to the epochal eclipse of the metaphysics of the *Modernorum*. With regard to his contemporaries, Averroes wrote a self-critical gloss showing the epochal oblivion of Aristotelian sense of being (*Seinsvergessenheit*).

“Ibn Badja and we have long been deceived by the fact that modern thinkers no longer read Aristotle (*quia Moderni dimittunt libros Aristotelis*) and take to hand only the works of commentators (*considerant libros expositorum*). This is most evident in the case of the doctrine of the soul (*maxime in anima*), because the modernists claimed that Aristotle’s writing *De anima* cannot be understood properly (*iste liber impossibile est ut intelligatur*). This is especially true for Avicenna, who followed Aristotle only according to the writing *Dialectica*, but was mistaken in the other things, most of all regarding the writing *Metaphysics* (*maxime in Metaphysica*). And this happened because he started the investigation from his own inventions (*incepit quasi a se*).” [[266]](#footnote-266)

The quotation defends the Aristotelian conception of science and provides an original interpretation *De anima* by making the return to Aristotle. His predecessors evaded this step because of alleged incomprehensibility and difficulty of Aristotelian Corpus. The modernists repeated the problematic teaching of ancient commentators of the Corpus instead of reading the original (*Moderni dimittunt libros Aristotelis*). The final sentence criticizes the narcistic beginning of the first science that was established the modernity. Avicenna placed at the first place his own cognizing subject and not at the first substance (*quia incepit quasi a se*). Averroes clearly confirms the leading role of Avicenna, who brought about a new type of thinking into the metaphysics. Modern philosophy received its beginning not from the first substance, but from the first objective thinker of the West. The thinking of modernity has given itself to be the beginning. It makes a nihilistic delivery (*Ge-Stell*) of sense of being from itself. Modernity makes of itself a subjective fundament of all meaning (*incepit quasi a se*). The new metaphysics begins with the cognizing subject of modernity, which put itself as Archimedes’s fixed point, from where it moved the world to its present state in the age of Anthropocene. The quotation reveals in the mode of *alētheia* the epochal *Lichtung* of all next stages of objectivity. Averroes found the metaphysical *arkhē* of Western objectivity and rejected Avicenna’s being of the third kind. The archaeology of objectivity shows that thought began to perceive the world in the mode of self-sufficient autonomy. It separated itself from sensually apprehended reality. Modern and postmodern thinking became paranoid with regard to reality and schizophrenic with regard to the real existence of person. The quotation shows the principal difference in the metaphysics between the two thinkers. Hermeneutics explained the difference between the “meta-physics” of Averroes and the objective general science of Avicenna. Avicenna and after him scholastic Avicennists are blinded by the solar intellect as a mythopoetic entity. Their metaphysical obscurantism (Avicenna’s “obscurity”) lies in the fact that *illuminati* cannotrecognize the role of diaphanum in the process of cognition. They make from themselves a vision of the world that is completely formed by their own subjectivity. The modern intellect, illuminated by hypostatized forms of the third kind, ultimately reflects only itself. Averroes fully accomplished Aristotelian exit from the Neoplatonic cave of cognition, so he was deservedly and therefore objectively punished by modern academics. The Commentator founded a new first science. He abolished Neoplatonic metaphysics and established the classic Aristotelianism.

Averroes’s metaphysical view was innovative and ingenious in such a great measure that it was not understood to its full depth by any of his Muslim contemporaries living in the decline of the Falsafa. The whole dispute about the determination of the intellect and its cognition took place again in the Latin West, but under different conditions. The great Aristotelians in Latin scholasticism explained formal and causal role of the possible intellect. They adopted Averroes’s causal and formal relation for sensible and intellectual abstraction and refused the scheme of cognition according to Avicenna’s *illuminatio*. Avicenna’s modernism and later postmodernism do not need a correspondence given by the real causality of the world. The modernists have a unitary world given by the objective ontotheology of *Modernorum* or by the postmodern anthropocentrism made out of various forms of *tertium ens*. Contemporary diacosmos of *tertium ens* is founded in the framework of the infinite plurality of language games, and in the culture of the narcissistic ego. The eclipse of the first substance started with the illumination of being made outside of the first real substance and outside of its sensually experienced causality. The common world of the third kind is now produced in the framework of mathematics and computer science. They hypostatize primary and secondary properties of everything that can be done. The virtual debt and financial derivatives represent the *tremendum fascinosum* of nihilistic simulacra, whose planetary operated orgy is run by the world stock exchanges. The tragic thinking of Latin Sophists (*sophistae Latini*) caused in the 13th century that Averroes’s ingenious solution was called “Averroism.” The goddesses of Vengeance led the modern hybris of the *illuminati* to celebrate their own mysteries of their enlightened mind. Furies created a new metaphysical specter of the Western thinking by the oblivion of being and by the objectivist madness of modern metaphysics.

## 2.5 Tragic Destiny of Metaphysics

The history of objective Western philosophy celebrates the victory of objective substance. To each his own, *suum cuique*. Such kind of knowledge must be extinguished in the Apollonian *epokhē*, so that the original sense of being come to light in a Pythian and therefore in a Socratic way. The archaeology of the original sense of objectivity starts in the the cave where Hermes was born. The archaic hermeneutics explore the objectivity from the original music trajectory of vision (*Vor-blickbahn*). The methodological approach of hermeneutics begins in darkness of the Apollonian oracle. The philosophical reflection looks for the origin of metaphysics and therefore of objectivity. It explained the initial way how this knowledge displaced the original worldview and how it establishes and sustains the modern type of science and education. The explanation cannot go the way of objectively given methodology of sciences. The study follows the truth accomplished in the hermeneutic triad of historiality, historicity and history. The present interpretation of an objective view of the world avoided descriptive analyses of history and the ontic history (*Geschichte*) of philosophy. The philosophy can be researched objectively, but this type of research makes the basis of specialized ontic sciences. Previous phases of knowledge must be extinguished in their objective meaning. The critical interpretation of objectivity established the original act of *krísis* made by wisdom of the first philosophy and the writers of Greek tragedies. Prophetess Pythia in Delphi proclaimed to the Lydian king Croesus what possibilities are hidden in his actions. If he crossed the river Halys, he would destroy a great empire (*Hist*. 1.53.13). The crossing of the river Halys had the symbolic meaning as hidden sign for later Greco-Persian Wars that Herodotus explored in his work. He recorded the saying of the Delphic oracle that reveals the meaning of Croesus’s action in the mode of archaic *a/lētheia*. The foolish king interpreted the oracle in such a way that he crossed the river and went to the lost war with the Persians led by the king Cyrus. The tragic interpretation of the prophecy brought the destruction of the empire of the Medes and the rise of globally successful Persians. Thus, the next prophecy about Cyrus was fulfilled: the mule became the king of the Median Empire (*Hist*. 1.55.6). Apollonian semantics follows hidden historicity tracing the history of Persian Empire. Delphic oracle sees the beginning of the Persian dynasty in a certain type of distinction and reflection, which the silly and proud Croesus considered unnecessary. The founder of history quotes the Delphic prophecy concerning Cyrus. Together with Pythia he saw the crossing of the river Halys as an epochal phenomenon shaping the history of the Greek-Persian wars. The Athenians showed the correct interpretation and discernment of the Delphic oracle before the Battle of Salamis (480 BC). Delphic divination said that in Greece would remain wooden fortifications to withstand the onslaught of the Persians (*Hist*. 7.141.17). Themistocles as the army commander presented a convincing interpretation of the prophecy, according to which a victorious strategy of Greeks was shaped. The warriors left Athens and let the city be plundered by the Persians. Instead of defending the fortifications, they won a naval battle at Salamis and Xerxes lost the decisive battle of the Greek-Persian wars. The domination of the Persian Empire passed away and the golden age of Athenian democracy began. Modern historiography considers about fifty Delphic oracles in Herodotus’s works to be mythical relics of previous phases of Greek thinking. His admiration of the Delphic oracles spoils the scientific value of his major writing that established history as a modern science. The critically applied objective science must reject archaic *krísis* applied by Herodotus. The science cannot verify Apollonian truth. What cannot be verified objectively that has no meaning for modern sciences. Therefore, archaic semantics was pushed out of the victorious history of objective thought and it was banned from the modern historiography. Herodotus became a new pseudo-Socrates and the objective historiography celebrates his objectively given ascension into the scientific pantheon. *Suum cuique*. Plato set up the same ascension for Socrates’s simulacrum in the metaphysics. The modern troglodytes decorated the Platonic cave with objective simulacra of their founders. This antiquarian and monumental form of idolatry was accurately seen by Nietzsche, who despised all nihilist forms of history. The phenomena and signs, which modernity is not able to see, must be logically and necessarily kept away from the history. The critical interpretation of philosophy, on the other hand, follows the hidden signs that constitute the original semantics of historicity. The thought of Herodotus and Socrates and the hermeneutics based on them are not determined by mythopoetic narratives of modern Athenian sophists and their academic successors. Unlike the objective historiography of today, Herodotus knew well that the archegetic dative (*dativus archegeticus*) proclaimed in Delphi revealed the sense of contemporary world history. Pythia prophesied the fullness of future events as archaic truth (*a/lētheia*), which encompasses past, present, and future (*Iliad* 1.70). This kind of prophetic truth was retroactively confirmed by Herodotus as a historian that described historic events made by Pythian truth and deception (*alētheia*). Herodotus interpreted the quoted oracular sayings of Pythia as critically as Socrates did in the case of famous oracle concerning his person. His personal quest for the truth solved the meaning of the fateful prophecy from Delphi, which recapitulated his past, present and future destiny in the manner of the Pythian historiality (*Geschichtlichkeit*). Through the hidden archegetic leading of Delphi, a twofold musical figure of philosophy and history emerged, which build up the new seeing of the world. This fundamental distinction between three levels of history of effects concerning Apollonian oracle (*Wirkungsgeschichte*) is quite important. Apollonian semantics grounds the historiality of philosophy in its archegetic *a/lētheia* (*dativus archegeticus*). The *Lichtung* of primordial *a/lētheia* put forward the principal undisguised sense of Being (*alētheia* of Parmenides) that has established the historicity (*Geschichte*) of first philosophy (*dativus principalis*). The degradation of the first philosophy into the metaphysical dative (*dativus metaphysicus*) creates the metaphysical truth as *veritas* of Plato and Aristotle. This event, after the decline of classical metaphysics as the first science of substance *qua* substance, founded the ontic history of modern philosophy as the first science of objective simulacrum (*ens inquantum ens*). Archaic hermeneutics is based on the Apollonian *modus ponens* in the Delphic adyton. The reason for that dwelling is the fact that *Homo sapiens* keptthe first complete view of the world in Greek mysteries. The epoch of the first philosophers and tragedy writers was replaced by the epoch of metaphysics. The new epoch of metaphysics as the first philosophy was created by the original sin that conceived the truth as an idea. Therefore the modernity searches in vain the lost paradise of Being investigated by the first philosophy. This paradise was directly contemplated and described in a Pythian way by the generations of soothsayers and wise people. Following writers of Greek tragedies, Herodotus and Socrates, critical thinking wants to be wise, and not metaphysically true. It is clear that the metaphysical definition of what substance is must be investigated anew in the hermeneutics. The trajectory of critical thinking avoids the ideal knowledge of metaphysics, which lost the original whole of Being. The newly established priority of the Apollonian truth is given against the secondary truth of the metaphysical substance. The hermeneutics follow the effect of the archegetic Apollonian dative from Delphi through the musical semantics of Socrates and through Herodotus’s historial wisdom. The archaic wisdom of the first philosophy followed a different conception of truth than the idealist school founded by Plato. The historicity concerning the unconcealment of Being in the mode of *alētheia* must be separated from the metaphysical revelation of substance, which is given here and now in ideal knowledge (*veritas*). The archegetic and principal dative were replaced by the metaphysical dative of metaphysics. The new form of the first philosophy replaced the original word view of the first philosophers. The synthesis of Aristotelianism and Platonism emerged in the Neoplatonic schools of Late Antiquity through the modernization of the metaphysical dative. It was tied to the new kind of individually conceived substance as being of the third kind (ἄτομος οὐσία, *Porph. in Cat.* 90.31). The present interpretation of the metaphysics of the first part interpreted the *tertium ens* of antiquity and the Falsafa from the point of view of the archaic nature of truth, which was followed by Socrate as the wisest man of all people. Archaic hermeneutics follow the Apollonian path of *krísis* revealed in the founding act of Socratic judgment. Wisdom is tragic according to Socrates’s life and it passed to the contemporary epoch as global tragicomedy of thought. Unfortunately, this tragicomedy cannot be avoided, after the decline of metaphysics.

Let us briefly summarize the main features of objectivity in Neoplatonism and Falsafa, because they are of fundamental importance for the next development of the Western civilization. This study will examine them in the next two parts in the form of so-called matrices. Since Plato’s foundation of metaphysics, Being is already permanently hidden (*Seinsverlassenheit*). Persian Falsafa made a decisive step toward the creation of Western objectivity. The first modernists created an ontotheological determination of the *tertium ens*. By combining Neoplatonism and Aristotelianism into a new form of ontotheology, a new epoch emerged. The metaphysic being as Platonic idea, Aristotelian substance and Avicennian essence took up the vacant place of Being. The first philosophy passed into the historically constituted Lethe and the facticity of *tertium ens* prevailed in the following epochs of thinking. Heidegger’s concept of *Bildung* described this change in connection with Plato’s term παιδεία (ch. 1). The original controversy concerning *tertium ens* took place in the first school of Neoplatonism. The univocal predication of being as a transcendental entity makes out of it the highest genus assigned to everything in the form of homonymy and analogy. Porphyry rejected the Neoplatonic interpretation of Aristotle in the polemic with Plotinus, because Being cannot be conceived as the highest genus (ch. 1.3). Thinkers of Falsafa took up the Neoplatonist definition of Being to constitute a new field of revelation, in referrence to the categorial predication. Taken in that new perspective, the being of substance manifests itself in two perspectives of relational meaning (*Bezugssinn*) that are based on twofold ontological comprehension (*Vor-blickbahn*). Either the intellect is determined from the direction of the material forms or from the direction of the purely intellectual forms. Alfarabi presented the first analysis of the ambivalent character of the intellect, which forms a new *Lichtung* of Western metaphysics. The Second Master became the forefather of the Western objectivity, since he restored the twofold determination of the substance in his project. The predication *per prius* and *per posterius* runs on the borderline of two conceptions of metaphysics. The first current existed already in the Baghdad House of Wisdom before his teaching. The Neoplatonist al-Kindī conceives the being of created things in the framework of univocity and homogeneity of Neoplatonic being as the highest genus. The intellect illuminated from the realm of cosmic forms ascends and descends on the ladder of the existences up to the highest and separated One. Neoplatonic *illuminati* consider unimportant the sensual reality in the Aristotelianism that is secured by the hyparchical primacy of the first actual substance. The Second Master rejected participation of the substances in the being of the One to be a kind of direct ontological dependence. The real unity of the first science does not arise by the conjunction of the essence and existence, since it is but a mental concept. Being cannot be attributed to the things from outside as an accident, that is, moreover, defined in the order of Neoplatonic emanations from the separate Being of the One. Alfarabi placed the new metaphysics on the line of connection between Plato and Aristotle. He solved the relation between the first and the second substance according to the plan of the book *Categories*. The new form of predication rejected the world of Neoplatonic simulacra and led philosophy out of the Platonic cave back to the real world. The sensual apprehension shapes causally and formally the intellectual cognition and the intellect goes through the senses to the first real substance. The first real substance actualizes cognition by enabling a synthesis of meanings in the animal or intellectual soul. Both forms of receptivity are merely potential at the level of intentionality and their actualization proceeds in the twofold process of abstraction. The imagination and the synthesis of sensory perceptions form together a *species sensibilis* done at the animal level of sensual cognition. The intellect then creates universal concepts in intelligible human soul. The intellect is given in the capacity of the individual soul *per prius* and it forms *per posterius* the universal destiny of mankind. The first project of *universitas humana* founded by Alfarabi is possible thanks to the immaterial form of *intellectus possibilis*. The animals receive and synthesize the cognition out of the senses; therefore they do not possess this form. The cosmic intelligences do not need it, since their intelect is fully actualized. This gave rise to the first philosophy of mankind based on the concept of specific *intellectus in potentia*. However, Alfarabi held on to the tradition of the mystical-philosophical illumination given by the Neoplatonists and became the founder of objectivity.

Avicenna develops the Neoplatonic line of al-Kindīs and the Second Master. He understands the sensual recognition of things in the world as a mental preparation for the autonomous activity of human intellect in the realm of pure forms. The new Aristotelianism makes the predication of real entities through the generic form of being (*ens inquantum ens*). The Persian philosopher, astronomer, political advisor, physician and devout Muslim founded a new revelation of being thanks to the ontotheological structure of objectively conceived metaphysics. Avicenna created the predication *per prius* related to the Neoplatonic being of the One and connected that predication with the categorical determination of the Aristotelian substance. The predication of Aristotelianism changed into a new predication concerning the Neoplatonic amphibolia. Certain transcendental properties (being, unity, truth, intellect) enable the predication *ad unum* in the mode of univocity. In such a transcendental predication, the last level of categorial meaning is not determined by the generic meaning of Aristotelian second substance. Transcendental entities present a higher genus of being in the new kind of predication. The objective production of the world runs as mythopoetic *creatio ex nihilo* through universal comitation of generic beingness (*Ge-Stell*). The delivery of divine objectivity to the think tank of modernists is ensured by the *tertium ens* as minimal being (*esse diminutum*). The intelligible forms have received the ontotheological status of a substance of a third kind and their mediation is ensured by the transcendental predication *per prius*. The specific being and non-being of amphibolia were placed behind the categorical unity of the Aristotelian metaphysics in which the Principle of Excluded Third applies. Taken in the intentional way, the objective being “exsists” (*exsistere*) in the sphere of the modern divine intellect. The last unity refers to modern God as the Giver of forms (*Dator formarum*). Modern God ensures the continuity of immaterial forms in the lower levels of the created world. Avicenna elaborated the first model of objective being according to the definition of the Holy Trinity in the work of Ibn Adi. The holy vision of the last unity of being shifted from human thought to the divine intellect. The eternal One became the objective Many through the difference of divine being and thinking in the mode “*esse ad.”* Modern God contemplates in his eternity the potential being as intentional contents of his exclusive thinking. Taken from the perspective of real creation, it is a pure non-being, since it is not yet really made real. Modernity turned the modern God into a schizophrenic being that had to follow the path of dualistic subject. The mythopoetic existence of this simulacrum characterizes in a fundamental way the objective anthropomorphism. Both products of modernity died in the epoch of contemporary nihilism, since the disappearance of modern God started the death of the postmodern Cartesian subject. Avicenna created an objective ontotheology by introducing a new concept of intentionality and abstraction that is univocally attributed to both divine and human thought. Avicenna’s view of the pure being in its individually and generically given beingness radicalized the predication of the Second Master. The new worldview enabled the transition into the realm of objective forms thanks to the new act of recognition and intentionality. The objective being grasped in this way became an object of research for the metaphysically conceived onto-psychology of Islamic and later Christian modernity. Avicenna created for the West a gnostic story about the minimal being. It came into the world out of nothing, and divine intelligence ensures its objective existence through intentionality. The divine onto-psychology and the divine intellect of the *illuminati* are separated from reality in the mode *absolute*. The mythopoetic “eksistence” of the objective world is based on the objective “eksistence” of the minimal being (*exsistere*). This absolutely sure and evident form of the *tertium ens* arises in the mythopoetic act of creation before the real existence of the world. The creation of the objective diacosmos is accomplished in modern God and his terrestrial creator through the comitative predication. The new cognition of the world is radically intellectual and at the same time religious and mystic. This vision of objectivity provided a new cognition of the world, God and man. Avicenna reshaped the philosophical fairy tale in the dialogue *Timaeus* into an objectively valid story of modern philosophy. The academics proclaim the myth of the absolutely poor being, which became absolutely rich in the virtue of their divine thinking. Such nonsense has shaped the history of the uncritical West until today. The modernists in Baghdad created a philosophical and theological fairy tale to explain how the absolute poor being came to its absolute academic happiness. Let’s not forget that the first modernists lived at the time of the famous *Tales of the Arabian Nights*.

Avicenna as the founder of western modernism created a new form of objectivity thanks to a newly conceived abstraction given by the light of the separated active intellect. The thinking substance is active by its own nature and through the act of completely autonomous self-reflection creates a cognitive form of itself. The human intellect is not primarily oriented to the existing thing, but to the cosmic active intellect (*intellectus agens*). The causal nexus for modern cognition is given in the acquired intellect (*intellectus adeptus*), where the first and second abstractions intermingle. Averroes rejected this view and found the original Aristotelian interpretation of *De anima*. The imposition of actuality into the intellect establishes the possibility of univocal predication between the individual intellect (*tertium genus*) and its universal form of cognition (*quartum genus*). The concept of the unity of humanity as intellectual capacity to know everything is given by the supposition of the universal species. It is Alfarabi’s human nature and Averroes’s *species humana*, out of which Dante later makes a political unity of humanity (*universitas humana*) under the guidance of divine Muses. Modern humanism glorifies man as a corpse in the mode of hypostatized species. This *tertium ens* has the character of objective humanity, which the same divine powers of Muses shape into a modern chaos of thinking. The basic characteristic of the humanism of modernity is the disappearance of the person made out of categorical imposition. The illuminates blinded by the solar intellect are not able to distinguish between the two acts (*intellectus possibilis, intellectus agens*) of an intellectually existing person. Both faculties are mediated by the formal causality. Thus, they have the same generic potency, but they perform two specific functions, which are exercised by the actuality of the spiritualized body. Instead of it, the modernists see in the mythopoetic being of the third kind (“man”) two substances (*res extensa, cogitans*) and not two formal acts of the unified existential and personal cognition of the world. After the displacement of the diaphanum, there is no formal causality, which connects the human faculties with each other. The faculties of the soul become Neoplatonic hypostases that caused the disappearance of the person in her or his ipseity. Cartesian Avicennism transformed modern hypostases into two separated substances of the third kind. Modern man became a non-existent being of the third kind and, on top of that, an objective schizophrenic. One cannot find these simulacra in the world of the real first substances. Therefore they need an objective parallel world done by the academically graduated Furies to proceed their *coniunctio* and mythopoetic *copulatio*. Man has become a demiurgic deity. The divine forces in Greek tragedy punished such a sacrilege by death. The modernist then produced the ontotheology of Jamblichus and the postmodernity made the ontotheological mathematics of Leibniz. The rationality made a higher kind of synthesis of being of the third kind, which stands outside the existing world. At the beginning of the 20th century, the pendulum of modern rationality swung in the other direction when Nietzsche operated banishment of the Platonic academic mind. Metaphysical nihilism interprets man as a super animal or today even only as a supercomputer. The sciences, which build on metaphysical nihilism as the first science of being of the third kind, then profess through neuroscience the omnipotence of the hylic intellect given only on the level of body. Then, there is no difference between man and animal, which is an actual tragedy of today’s intellectually bankrupt nihilism. After the death of the modern God came the epoch of the complete eclipse of the first substance and necessarily that of the critical reason as well. In the darkness of Aristotelian rationality, postmodernism made another step. After the death of the modern God made by Avicenna, the modern subject also made its way to the Lethe administered by the Furies. This subject was likewise founded by the metaphysical forefather of all Western *Modernorum*. The death of the postmodern subject came through another metaphysical *Irrtum*. It is the transformation of man into an objectively improved animal. Now, after the death of the modern subject, everything living is coming to the slaughterhouse, because we are living in an epoch of mass extinction of species at the end of the Holocene. All living things are going the way of death determined by Western modernity. The metaphysics built on the critical Aristotelianism cannot live on allegorical philosophical tales, even they are absolutely convincing, such as the dialogue *Timaeus*. The modern Alexandrians affect the world objectively through their demiurgic thinking according to the predication *in artificialibus* (OBJ II, ch. 1.4). Philosophical mythopoetic established the objective diacosmos of Avicenna and the best possible world of Leibniz. From the nihilistic diacosmos, which is given in the heads of these or those illuminates, plutocrats and oligarchs, one must return to the reality of the common world. This is given first physically by the action of the first substances and then biologically by living entelechic substances. Living beings intend and synthesize the first form of the common world. This world of life must receive higher meaning by the existence of wise people. Where the sage people held the dialogue about the truth, there the Muses begin to speak in the mode of *alētheia*. There was and there is only one true wisdom in the thinking, because the common world exists only in one copy.

Al-Ghazālī and after him Averroes was critical in principle to Avicenna’s gnostic teaching of objective emanations and comitation, which Leibniz transformed into demiurgic calculus of the objective world. The correspondence theory of truth refuses the pseudo-mystic of being adopted by Avicenna. Aristotelianism starts with the knowledge of real biology and real physics. The project of “meta-physics” cannot be connected either with the world of cosmic intelligences nor with the intentional effect of modern God. Modern God of Avicenna intentionally creates the elegant world in his demiurgic thinking. Gigantomachy about substance conducted between Averroes and Avicenna shows the hidden effect of historiality of truth through the new historicity of metaphysics. Hermeneutics consider the Commentator to be the first Western Aristotelian to earn this honorary title after Boethius. Averroes’s concept of the first science as “meta-physics” consistently and principally rejected Avicenna’s ontotheological conception in all key points. The Commentator is the first intellectual of the West who restored through the critical judgment the original autonomy of philosophy, since he separated it from mysticism and theology. In the first science as Aristotelian metaphysics, the reality of sensually cognizable things is the only source of actuality accessible to cognition. The intellect can pass through causality to the original immaterial first cause and substance, which is shown by the *Metaphysics*. That writing implements the *Physics* and also *Categories*, *De anima* and the *Second Analytics*. Averroes let Aristotle be an Aristotelian and did not change him into a Neoplatonist. He refused to meet the demands of modern mysticism and theology based on the diacosmos made out of the entities of the third kind. The Commentator completes the project of “meta-physics”, which emerged from Alfarabi’s school. He follows the unity of being in dependence on the categorical predication based on the first substance existing *per se*. Aristotelian determination of metaphysics took over the tradition of first philosophy, which was represented for him by Alexander Aphrodisias. The latter, however, separated the physics from the metaphysics. That view rejected the Commentator in principle and he presented the first and last unifying project of Aristotle’s first science in the West. The metaphysics becomes the cognition of the immaterial bodies, which exist beyond the sublunary world. The cognition also applies to their separated first cause of the movement or the origin and the decline. The cognition of the biologist, the physicist and the metaphysician relates to the real living or to non-living material or immaterial substance. The existence of the created world is determined by the First Mover through the fundamental difference between the divinity residing beyond the first sphere and the creative movement founded by it within the framework of the cosmic spheres. The dependence on this first cause to make human cognition is causal and ontological and not mythopoetic. The path to the first cause of the movement is indicated by the causality of the first real substance and not by the intentional psychology of the divine thinking in the mode *esse ad*. The true knowledge needs the causal proof (*dalā'il*) to reach the first cause. Such metaphysics does not create an ontotheology of being of the third kind, because it starts from the effect of the metaphysical dative. The mind goes to the hidden God in the mode of the original Greek sign left to the pilgrims on the way in the form of a heap of stones (*hérma*). The scientific path to the First Cause is found in Alfarabi, Algazel and especially in Averroës. The knowledge of God through causality makes a hermeneutic and by no means a hermetic tradition of thinking. Aquinas’s concept of the five causally given paths to God as the First Cause relates to that tradition. Real substance makes cognition in a causal way because its actuality passes through the senses and it forms the cognition in our soul. The meaning of the substance in the soul is illuminated from the real world. The bodily incorporated intellect carries out the act of cognition. It is a specific kind of movement, which is in full immaterial measure peculiar only to the human being, the cosmic intelligences and the Immobile Intellect. In this case, the metaphysical truth consists in the correspondence of the formal and universal intellect (mode of existence as *idem*) with the unique and actual thing (mode of existence as *ipse*). This relation expresses the metaphysical *proportio* which, through the formal causality of the diaphanum, establishes the architecture of the first science. Therefore, there is no need of supernatural intervention in human cognition, as the modern Bonaventure and after him the postmodern representatives Descartes, Malebranche and Berkeley thought. The real cognition given by disclosure of being from the front is neither schizophrenic nor paranoid. Thanks to its own receptivity and the existence of the first substance, it exists really outside of ourselves. Averroes’s metaphysics has no ontotheological character, which, on the other hand, is in Avicenna’s thinking the condition *sine qua non* for the unity of being predicated toward the modern Giver of forms. The acquired intellect of Alfarabi and Avicenna finally passed into the shape of postmodern Avicennism. Descartes identified the *intellectus adeptus* with the sphere of the autonomous *cogito* given as actual thinking substance. The modernists rehabilitated mysticism objectively through the mythical ontotheology of the being of the third kind and through the schizophrenic conception of the person made out of two or more substances. Averroes created the new figure of *intellectus possibilis* and showed the new sense of being, which is revealed by the unified architectural structure of physics and metaphysics. The critical wisdom of the Aristotelians of that time rejected this nonsense in principle. Islam accomplished that fundamental act of distinguishing truth from the untruth in the Falsafa between the 10th and the 12th centuries. The relation to the modernity divided the House of Wisdom (*Bajt al-Hikma*) in Baghdad into two antagonistic schools. Finally, none of the other scholars understood their dispute anymore. The interpretations of modernists threatened the authority of the Quranic corpus that was in the process of being created. The hidden Muslim historicity of the first conflict between the modernists and the anti-modernists led to the division of the wisdom of the West into two distinct histories. As we will see further, the formally same process occurred in the Latin West in the 13th century but with the opposite result. The metaphysical truth as a correspondence of reality and intellect perished in modernity because an objective simulacrum of Aristotelian truth emerged. The modern subject originated in Avicenna and then it was introduced in the Latin West. As Averroes rightly commented upon, Avicenna determines the thinking exclusively in himself, outside of classical metaphysics. In the process of modern intentionality, the potentially given being does not arise from reality, but from a subjectively made comitation. Made in that way, a new form of the modern diacosmos emerged. Avicenna established the comprehension of the real world in a logic way, through objective ontotheology and demiurgic mathematics. This *mathesis universalis* includes the divine onto-psychology and the calculative faculties as well. Leibniz as postmodern Avicennist finalized the death of the god of *Modernorum* because he laid this modern idol to eternal rest. The mathematics took over all the calculative activities which this modern simulacrum had made before. The system of postmodern scientific gnosis in the work *De rerum originatione radicali* (1697) provides the principle for the postmodern production of being.[[267]](#footnote-267) Postmodern metaphysics founded physics in the framework of logical necessity (*habemus physicam necessitatem ex metaphysica*). Necessity is determined within the framework of supposition based on the subject as the only source of the modern meaning of being. This “deduction” was erroneously declared to be a metaphysical necessity, which in classical metaphysics is determined only by the imposition of meaning from the reality. The world in its metaphysical sense is no longer necessary (*mundus non sit metaphysice necessarius*). The real world does not prove the necessity of thinking, but vice versa. The dogmatic logic, which is objectively valid for all conceivable beings, is confirmed by the physical law of gravitation only in the mode *ex post*. The postmodernists need the real thing or the physical case of gravitation only as additional confirmation of the mythopoetic truth given by ontotheological deduction (*Ge-Stell*). Therefore, the physical and metaphysical necessity of the real world is only secondary to the mathematical and logical necessity (*est tamen necessarius physice vel determinatus*). The essence and the logical being must ever exist, at least according to Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason (*contrarium implicet contradictionem seu absurditatem logicam*). The comitation of the objective properties of being does not start from the Aristotelian scientific deduction (*demonstratio*), but from the modern logic. From the point of view of the objective definition of reality (*pro ratione realitatis*), every possibility has formally the same ontological claim (*omnia possibilia pari iure*) to actual existence (*ad existendum tendunt*). Leibniz’s comitation of the hypostatized properties of being in the objective mode “*esse* *ad”* is determined by the principle of maximally effective rational production. This mythopoetic production establishes a hypothetical world with a maximum of objectively given possibilities (*prodit mundus per quem maxima fit possibilium productio*). In the age of metaphysical nihilism, this globally important role of Leibniz’s calculating God and the producer of objective meanings has been taken over by cloud databases and supercomputers. The quotation shows the *Lichtung* where the truth and untruth of the instrumental rationality emerged that later conquered the postmodern West. The Frankfurt school, in the age of metaphysical nihilism, rejected this rationality in a fundamental way. It produces a fascist type of capitalism that has fully totalitarian features.

The dispute between the two conceptions of metaphysics concerns the fundamental comprehension (*Vor-blickbahn*) that enables everything to be revealed in the intellect. The emergence of the new metaphysical comprehension is attested as a conscious choice of Avicenna and Averroes, who saw a different sense of being than their predecessors. Averroes created a dual character of the intellect. The immaterial potency of the person is actualized here and now in the personal act of the first substance (*tertium genus*). The immaterial potency of cognition of the whole humanity is postulated on the basis of the universal unity concerning the human species (*quartum genus*). That specific kind of intellect makes a potential concept in the form of second substance. Only the living person can fulfill the historic destiny through true thought and action. This rational nature of the person, which is given by the *intellectus possibilis* and the *intellectus practicus*, can be abstracted and adequately predicated at the level of all humanity. See the cited terminus “*décision ontologique”* (ch. 2.4), which is the fundamental choice of the Commentator as the impartial judge in the field of metaphysics, morality and general law. The abstracted being given in the intellect has only potential and abstract character (*ens rationis*), in contrast to the simple and real being of the first substance. Averroes successfully defended the value of first real substance, which the Aristotelian Porphyry had done before him against Plotinus’s school. The difference between the two metaphysicians led Averroes to reject Avicenna’s dialectic in favor of apodictic scientific proof. The new worldview emerges in the figure of the possible intellect (*intellectus possibilis*). With the help of that concept Averroes overcame the quoted “obscurity” of metaphysics hidden in Avicenna’s conception. The first science of Neoplatonists and modern *illuminati* is based on the mystical enlightenment, which is given by the separated intellect. Modernity abolished in its metaphysics the scientific cognition of the real world. This cognition is determined in the deductive syllogism given by the real existence and the causality of the first substance (ἀπόδειξις, *demonstratio*). Modernists do not perform a demonstration of the real world in critical thinking. They make a speculation that concerns mythological divine thought and intentionality. By displacing the metaphysical dative from cognition and from metaphysics, the *ousía* became merely a *parousía* of mythopoetic meaning. This *parousía* is given in the thought of the *illuminati*. After the disappearance of the ipseity of the first substance, it began the reign of the unrestricted ontotheological identity of everything with everything. The first modernists of Falsafa did not see the real world, but its image. It was made by the cosmic intelligences and they considered it in the mirror (*speculum*) of the acquired intellect (*intellectus adeptus*). In the age of contemporary nihilism, the computers and the mathematics replaced the separated cosmic intelligences. The modern knowledge became a historically effective vision of the world by the fact that it is founded on the *coniunctio* of the human intellect with the separated cosmic intellect and today with computer-generated artificial intelligence. That mystical conjunction of two kinds of nonsense makes the truth as assimilation of everything with the intellect of the modern illuminates. Engaged in the act of objective *copulatio*, they unite with their own projection of the non-existent world given as *tertium ens*. Psychological narcissism and metaphysical anthropomorphism make the foundation of modernity. Such an intellectual certainty is made by illumination. It projects its own ideas and the mythopoetic production of *tertium ens* into the metaphysical order of the world. Averroes claimed that in such a form of dialectical there is no true relation to the world, which is expressed in various ways in the CMDA (*similitudo, proportio, adaequatio, dispositio*). The Commentator rejected in principle the Neoplatonic concept of hypostatized acquired intellect. The key to the new conception of intellect consists in the entirely different statute of species that separated Averroes from Avicenna. The modern species is a cosmic form as *tertium ens*. The *illuminati* reflect that mythopoetic form by their acquired intellect.

The Commentator proved in the line of Aristotle and Alfarabi that the intellect is actualized in the mode *per prius* by the first substance. It is sensually perceived and subsequently intended and abstracted into the intelligible species that are given only in thought. The new way of revealing the meaning of being passes through the diaphanum, whose importance for sensual cognition confirms the writing *De anima*. Alfarabi proves the importance of mediation (*diaphonum*), which Neoplatonists completely passed over. Averroes discovered the diaphanum as a new form of the material intellect (*intellectus possibilis*). The role of *intellectus adeptus* is replaced by speculative intellect, but in a different scheme of cognition than in Avicenna’s theory. Avicenna emphasized from the writing *De anima* the illumination given by effective causality: the Sun (*causa prima*)—the ray (*intellectus agens*)—the color (*intellectum*)—the eye (*intellectus adeptus*). The Commentator understood through excellent reading of *De anima* that the immaterial intellect must be actualized from the front, from the direction of sensually perceived things and through the act of intentionality made out by the senses and intellect. The actualisation of knowledge is causal and formal, because this is the way how the diaphanum operates with respect to the world and the things. The sensual cognition is not given materially in the immaterial (animal, human) soul. Nevertheless, it starts in the body that is exposed to the sense impression given physically in the receptive sensual organ. The diaphanum transfers the causality of the sensually perceived world into the animal or human soul. With regard to the soul, the diaphanum appears in the role of the immaterial mediator of the formal causality (*esse spirituale*). Therefore, the senses require mediation by intentionality in order to know external reality. In a similar way, the receptive *intellectus possibilis* as a pure faculty of the soul is actualized to receive the *species intelligibilis*. Only than the active intellect as another faculty of the soul can bring about the cognition actively. It takes over the immaterial form already received, which is given by the sensory cognition of things in the possible intellect. The actualization of the potential forms of cognition runs through the reception of external material things. That makes the actuality of cognition that enables the emergence of intelligible contents in the immaterial soul. According to *De anima*, the sensual imagination (*sensus communis*) and the receptive intellect (*intellectus possibilis*) are given only in potency. They operate in the subject as diaphanum through the individual act of sensual and intelligible intentionality. The cognizing soul, thanks to the potential intellect, forms a universal medium of reception of the cognitive forms and subsequently enables their actualization by the *intellectus agens*. Likewise, the *perspicuum* is given in the original possibility of reception and mediation, which is actualized on the physical level by the ray of light. The diaphanum uphold the metaphysical dative as an invisible phenomenon by transferring a real thing already given in a past mode into our knowledge through an act of mediatized donation. What is in the mind cannot have effective causality on the level of the first substances, as modernity mistakenly thinks. The donation of the thing changes in the metaphysical dative into a donation of the cognized form, either sensuous or intelligible. The cognition, thanks to the diaphanum follows the thing in the reality; but the cognized form exists only in our thinking as an intentional object (*species sensibilis, intelligibilis*). Intentional content is conveyed to us in a sensually or intellectually abstracted form. It is only formally determined, since it makes part of the first real substance. The correspondence with the thing runs through the intentional act of sensory perception. The formal causality is mediated by potential diaphanum given in the cognizing person (*intellectus possibilis*). At the next level of cognition, the abstracted forms given in the receptive intellect are synthesized by the active intellect in the process of *intellectio*. The result of the synthesis is universal cognition (*intellectum*) in the speculative intellect. The properties of the first real substance are mediated in the CMDA by the twofold diaphanum given by physical space (*perspicuum*) and by twofold subjective intentionality (*diaffonum*). Then we see a colored flower, perceive its fragrance, and can universally predicate the knowledge in the concept. The fundamental *proportio* between reality and intellect takes place as twofold mediation by the diaphanum situated in the senses and in the intellect. The world comes to us causally through the senses and we take it in through the twofold movement of mediation. The diaphanum does not exist for the Alexandrians and the Cartesians because it is not a subsistent being as *hoc aliquid*. But the Aristotelians know that thanks to its formal and potential character, the possibility of true cognition of the world passes through the senses and the intellect, it is guaranteed in that way. The formal causality, which is given by the diaphanum from the senses to the receptive intellect, is something different from the modern *analogia entis*, which works with the generic concept of being. Neoplatonic eclipse of the intellect given in the act of mystical or objective illumination abolished the Aristotelian *proportio*. The defense mechanism worked out under the influence of the Furies suppressed the effect of the metaphysical dative from the thought of modernity. The oblivion of the first substance and its real causality made it impossible to see the unity of the first science, which is founded on the true cognition of the real world. After establishing the actual act of knowing in the CMDA, Averroes developed the new form of Aristotelian metaphysics in his commentaries on Aristotle’s *Physics* and *Metaphysics* and on the writing *De caelo*. A significant factor that accounts for the emergence of objectivity is tied to the different interpretation of the diaphanum in Falsafa. The discovery of the diaphanum changed the basic scene of the metaphysical revelation of being (*Lichtung*). Avicenna’s school, which was succeeded by the translators from the school of Toledo, did not see the role of the diaphanum. Averroes made it a central point of the interpretation of the new type of intentionality and receptive intellect. The diaphanum does not exist for the Neoplatonists and the objectivists even today. According to Averroes, for this principled reason, they do not have a *proportio* of the senses and the intellect and therefore no truth as *adaequatio* between the senses and the intellect. The suppression of the diaphanum opened in the West the process of forgetting of being described by Heidegger. It finally led to the constitution of objectivity as fundamental blindness to the first substance. Every mental act is essentially given by imposition from the person as real substance. The generic meaning of intellect in CMDA is not the same as in Avicenna, because the logical supposition is fundamentally different from the metaphysical imposition. The two philosophers differ fundamentally in their understanding of the phenomenon of “intellect” because they do not mean the same thing. The vision of man in the Aristotelian and modern humanism cannot be the same. The identity of the intellect as second universal substance exists in Aristotelianism on the basis of the ipseity of the person as first actual substance. The *illuminati* do not see the world in the same way as the critical thinkers and both groups do not share the same conception of truth.

The disclosure of being in the mode of Heidegger’s *Vor-blickbahn* forms a fundamental dividing line between Avicenna and Averroes. Porphyry’s redoubled One—Being (ch. 1.3.1) started the process of objectivity. In the first stage, only a few illuminates of Avicenna’s type have the gift of objective vision. Such a Danaé’s gift, thanks to the mystical directives received in dreams, created a new sphere of ontotheological determination of the *tertium ens*. Avicenna’s metaphysics shines in the objective truth, which is based on the interpretation of being of the third kind. The cost to pay was the destruction of classic metaphysics. The disappearance of Aristotelian truth as the correspondence of things and intellect caused an eclipse of the first substance (*Seinsvergessenheit*) in Falsafa and in Latin West. Avicenna’s metaphysical obscurity, which was condemned by Averroes, preferred the disclosure of being from behind, from the cosmic intelligences and from the hypostatized forms. Latin Avicennists adopted the faulty metaphysics given by eclipse of the first hylemorphic substance. The emergence of Aristotelian metaphysics and truth bound to monotheism became a common ecumenical work of the Baghdad House of Wisdom. The wisdom creates unity as the wise people seek the truth. The event of a twofold mode of the eclipse of the first substance (*Ereignis*) determines the tragic destiny of the thought in the Islamic and Latin West. The divine comedy under the leadership of Muses is based on the fact that the history of the West follows the mythopoetic path of victorious Avicenna. Averroes defended true recognition of the real world. The paranoiac creators of the Western objectivity made out of him a mythopoetic and demonic *bête noire* of the Western metaphysics by the *Abwehrmechanismus* of Freudian inversion into the opposite (*Verkehrung ins Gegenteil*). After such a sacrilege of thinking, the historical effect of the objectivity given by the Persian Falsafa could not be stopped. The figure of Averroes’s metaphysics manifests itself in the epoch of objectivity only in the mode of the Freudian mechanism of inversion into the opposite, i.e., in the figure of the so-called Averroism. The victorious modernists objectively displaced Averroes’s metaphysics and imposed on it the academic *damnatio memoriae*. The subject who runs that metaphysics of fury manifests itself in the gnostic form of Western intellectual. This subject emerged in the environment of the synthesizing stream of Islamic Falsafa at the turn of the 10th to the 11th century (Avicenna, Ibn Bajjah). Subsequently, this subject of the Western intellectual-illuminate came into being in the Latin West through the Neoplatonic reading of the *Nicomachean Ethics* and through the controversies closed by the Paris condemnation in 1277. This lineage is represented by the thinkers of the school so-called second Averroism. Descartes finally creates a postmodern figure of the *illuminati*, who presents a new objective interpretation of the world and the mathematical determination of the *tertium ens*. Thus, he brought postmodernism back to Neoplatonism characterized by the analogical relations of Simplicius and by the mythopoetic dialogue *Timaeus*. Islamic interpreters of Aristotle represent the displaced figure of the Western intellectual. Among them are thinkers such as Ibn Adi, al-Ghazālī, and Averroes. This current proceeded through scholastic thinkers in the school so-called first Averroism. Albert the Great, Roger Bacon, Siger of Brabant, Boethius of Dacia picked up the legacy of rational Averroes and criticized the Latin *illuminati* from the second Averroism who founded the *via Modernorum*. Today’s objective researchers placed the Aristotelian intellectuals from the Rue du Fouarre in the historical formation of modern progressives of the Avicenna type and made of them the objective figure of the Latin intellectual (Libera 1991, 1994). The first critic of the modern *illuminati* was al-Ghazālī, who rejected the ontotheology of modernists like Avicenna. For the emergence of the person in the West was absolutely important that al-Ghazālī’s defense of divine indeterminate choice (*irāda*) and human free will (*ikhtiyār*) prevailed over Avicenna’s necessity in the Islam. Avicenna’s person as *tertium ens* followed the logical nature of his metaphysics. Algazel correctly saw that Avicenna’s predication of comitation was in fact an emanation model of Neoplatonic thought. The anthropomorphization of God necessarily leads to the objective death of modern God through philosophical sophistry. Islamic thinkers took up the incursion of Neoplatonic philosophy into theology with the same criticism as the first scholastic connoisseurs of Averroes. They disagreed with the modernist transformation of philosophy and theology in the Latin West. The key protagonist of this school of the first Averroism was the Parisian archbishop Guilielmus Alvernus as *Algazel redivivus*. Al-Ghazālī in the work *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah* drew up a list of twenty principal errors of Avicenna. The errors that al-Ghazālī assigned to Avicennists we find again in the new round of gigantomachy in the doctrine of the second Averroism. These were indeed fundamental themes: the death of God in philosophy, the problematically constituted eternity of the world, the rejection of divine real causality, the monopsychic unity of the intellect, universal determinism given as emanations. To al-Ghazālī’s criticism of the death of God in modern philosophy thematically tied the Parisian condemnation of the 13 theses, which were promulgated on December 10, 1270, by Etienne Tempier, the bishop of Paris. The representatives of the first Averroism still had influence on the editing of the 13 condemned theses, which was confirmed by the declaration of the magisters of the Faculty of Arts on April 1, 1272. But the key condemnations of 1277 were already conceived by the representatives of the second Averroism. This school of Avicennist modernists defeated and destroyed the critical thinking of the first Averroism. Aristotelianism at the philosophical faculty on Rue du Fouarre followed the tragic fate of the Baghdad House of Wisdom. The same dispute had taken place in the Falsafa two centuries earlier; but instead of the philosophical modernists, the Islamic theologians and jurists had triumphed. The schools of law based on the oral traditions of the Quran destroyed the entire school of Mutazilites, that is, the modernists and also the Aristotelians. In Islam, which was characterized by oral and written traditions of various cultures, philosophy was replaced by the collective wisdom of the Islamic cultures, which formed sanctified traditions and schools. Islam followed its further path without the Falsafa. It was left with the wisdom of theology, the legal order to limit the arbitrariness of political power, social justice and the social order bound to the associated traditions of the Quran. The objective divine idol of the *Modernorum* did emerge in Avicenna’s philosophy; but it did not prevail in the history of Islam because of authoritarian annihilation of the entire Falsafa. Islamic Aristotelianism passed into the epochal Lethe after the death of the Commentator and it no longer acted as effective force in the history of Islamic thought. Islam authoritatively saved the knowledge of God from His objective death in the modernity by throwing out the baby with the bathwater. Islam abolished the philosophical tradition of wisdom, which was brilliantly defended by Averroes at the end of the Falsafa. The Commentator rejected Algazel’s sweeping attack on the Falsafa because God of the philosophers is recognizable as *causa prima*. As the first cause, this God directly and effectively recognizes all of creation. Therefore, God and man is not an essential corpse as in the modernist Avicenna. In the next century, the dogmatic thinkers and jurists of the Quran were no longer capable of a critical distinction of the philosophical scholars as was al-Ghazālī. That is why Averroes was expelled from the thinking of the Islamic theologians of the Sharia school. In Islam, God of modernity could not die because this idol was rejected in principle; and moreover, the whole Falsafa was destroyed for safety. In both cases, the defeated were cursed with *damnatio memoriae* of ecclesiastical interdicts imposed by Islam and Christianity. The scholars of the Quran imposed the first form of *damnatio memoriae* on the writings of the Commentator already in the era of the Falsafa. After them, the Latin modernists, enlightened by the light of Neoplatonic metaphysics, performed the same fury. They rejected Averroes’s Aristotelian rationalism and unified conception of the person. The first modernists continued the destruction of the Aristotelian stream of the Falsafa in the Latin West. Aristotle and Averroes became heretics.

After the reception of Averroes in the Latin West, another fight broke out over the true figure of metaphysics, presided over by Alvernus, the bishop of Paris and the chancellor of the Paris University. The Latin modernists adopted the system of Avicennian comitation and combined it with the ontotheological scenario of metaphysics. Bonaventure created a new figure of Avicennian Christian metaphysics, which was linked to Aristotelianism. A similar interpretation, but in the spirit of the Neoplatonic emanation, was introduced into Western scholasticism by the Neoplatonist Jan Scotus Eurigena before Avicenna (ch. 1.3.1). The simulacrum of the objective God and the world prospered in Western metaphysics until Nietzsche’s philosophizing with the hammer. Ontotheology built on the Aristotelian version of Avicennism became a philosophical anthropology par excellence. It created both the humanized God and the world conceived objectively from the divine psychological perspective in its image. Descartes’s *Mediationes de prima philosophia* places the active human subject in a foundational, meaning-giving role. This subject became an industrious agent of Western civilization. In the consummate metaphysical nihilism, the death of God of *Modernorum* was historically necessary and inevitable, which the above-mentioned Leibniz proved exactly. Postmodernism let God of modernity, languishing in agony, to think only the rational best possible world (Leibniz). The instrumental calculus of this idol prepares the best possible world logically necessary and mathematically correct before the creation of the real world. Philosophy lost autonomy in the mystical syncretism of Jamblichus and in the Neoplatonism of Eastern Christianity, the syncretistic Falsafa and the later objectivity of a Scotus, Descartes and Leibniz. The controversy of the postmodern metaphysicians changed the worldview into metaphysical nihilism. Avicenna opened the path of thinking toward the one objective truth and his ontotheological concept of metaphysics laid the foundations of modern objectivity. The historical effect of the oblivion of being (*Seinsvergessenheit*), which was brought into being after the decline of Falsafa and the subsequent deformation of Averroes’s philosophy, caused the metaphysical mind (*Irre*) to wander in the disputes of high scholasticism. Islamic civilization refused to participate in this gigantomachy, since it opted for the wisdom of theology and law. The death of God was postponed indefinitely for that part of the West, as tribes and civilizations converted to Islam and conquered the crumbling Eastern *Imperium Romanum* after the decline of Late Antiquity. The internal crusade of Islamic theologians against the philosophical schools prevented the death of modern God, which the Latin West completed with such a great success. From the essence of the metaphysical event mentioned above, it is clear that the next encounter between the Muslim East and the Christian West did not take place in the study room of the already extinct Baghdad House of Wisdom, but on the battlefield of the Crusades from the 11th to the 13th century. These medieval crusades find their continuation today in the form of hybrid wars and terror in the Middle East, wherein the *illuminati* of the nihilistic West joined forces with the *illuminati* of the postmodern Wahhabist despotism. For the wisdom this is only an apparent paradox, because the thinking of both groups is dominated by the irrational forces of Revenge. In the rattle of weapons, Muses are silent. Then speak to the fools only through the ideology of manic Furies. They control the lethal operation of today’s metaphysical nihilism from the objectively non-existent underworld.

### Abbreviations

**ABMA** William of Ockham: *Dialogus. Latin Text and English Translation. Edited by John Kilcullen, John Scott, George Knysh, Volker Leppin, Jan Ballweg, Karl Ubl, Semih Heinen*. The treatise *Dialogus* is quoted according to the digital edition *Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi* (www.britac.ac.uk/pubs/dialogus/).

**CCSL** *Corpus Christianorum Series Latina*. Ed. Brepols, 1953—.

**CMDA** *Averrois Cordubensis Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De anima Libros*. F. Stuart Crawford (ed.). Cambridge: Mediaeval Academy of America, 1953.

**DK** *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* *I—III*. Herausgegeben von Hermann Diels und Walter Kranz. Curych: Weidmann 1952.

**GA** Heidegger, Martin. *Gesamtausgabe*. Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main (1975—).

**Hegel** Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. *Werke in zwanzig Bänden*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1969—1971 (Theorie-Werkausgabe).

**KdRV** Kant, Immanuel. *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. The first edition in 1781 (Berlin: Akademieausgabe, 1904, Band IV.) is quoted as „A“. The second edition in 1787 (Berlin: Akademieausgabe, 1911, Band III) is quoted as „B“.

**KdPV** Kant, Immanuel. *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*. Berlin: Akademieausgabe 1913, Band V, 1–163.

**KdU** Kant, Immanuel. *Kritik der Urteilskraft*. Berlin: Akademieausgabe 1913, Band V, 165–485.

**KSA** Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Bänden*. Hg. von Giorgio Colli und Mazzino Montinari. München und New York 1980.

**LCDA** Averroes (Ibn Rushd) of Cordoba. *Long Commentary on the De anima of Aristotle*. Translated and with introduction and notes by Richard C. Taylor with Therese-Anne Druart, subeditor. New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2009.

**OBJ** *Hermeneutik der Objektivität I—III*. In the text, the tome and the chapter are quoted.

**PL** *Patrologiae latinae cursus completus*. Ed. Migne, 1844—1864.

**RRP** *The Richard Rufus of Cornwall Project*, University of Stanford (http://rrp.stanford.edu). Richard Rufus of Cornwall.*In Aristoteli Analytica posteriora* (ed. Rega Wood); *Memoriale in Metaphysicam Aristotelis* (eds. Rega Wood & Neil Lewis, 2013); *In Aristotelis De anima. Redactio brevior. Liber 1–3*. (Eds. Christopher J. Martin, Neil Lewis, Rega Wood 2007).

**SZ** Heidegger, Martin. *Sein und Zeit*. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 171993.

**WA**  *The Works of Aristotle I—XII*, ed. W. D. Ross. Oxford, 1908—52.

### Index locorum

The index contains the work (or volume and *quaestio*), the page and the line of the critical edition that is indicated in the biography.

**Aeschylus**

*Agamemnon* 178 63

*Eumenidae* 377‒80 64

*Eumenidae* 690–1 65

**Alexander of Aphrodisias**

*De anima liber cum Mantissa* 88.23‒24 275

*De anima liber cum Mantissa* 107.15‒20 202

*De anima liber cum Mantissa* 107.17 202

*De anima liber cum Mantissa* 110.4 215

*De anima liber cum Mantissa* 111.32 206

*De anima liber cum Mantissa* 111.32‒36 206

*De anima liber cum Mantissa* 111.34 206

*De anima liber cum Mantissa* 88‒89 201

*Alex.* *in Met*. 671.12‒13 375

*Alex.* *in Met*. 671.13 375

*Alex.* *in Met*. 671.15 375

*Alex.* *in Met*. 671.16 375

*De anima liber cum Mantissa* 107.15‒20 415

**al-Fārābī**

*De intellectu* 117.86–87 204

*De intellectu* 117.87–88 204

*De intellectu* 118.110–12 204

*De intellectu* 119.135–140 218

*De intellectu* 119.150–153 220

*De intellectu* 120.189‒92 244

*De intellectu* 121.207–214 224

*De intellectu* 123.300–310 233

*De intellectu* 68.4–7 203

*De intellectu* 74.22‒30 208

*De ortu* *scientiarum* 23.33 195

*Die Abhandlung von den Tendenzen der aristotelischen Metaphysik von dem zweiten Meister* 57.26–28 254

*Die Antworten Alfārābī's auf einzelne vorgelegte Fragen* 146.23–147.6 193

*Die Harmonie zwischen Plato und Aristoteles* 46.12–17 251

*Tendenzen der aristotelischen Metaphysik* 56.1–14 253

*Tendenzen der aristotelischen Metaphysik* 56.23–25 254

*Tendenzen der aristotelischen Metaphysik* 57.3–9 254

*The philosophy of Plato and Aristotle* 130.23–35 194

*De intellectu* 119.144–148 219

*De intellectu* 119.155–59 221

*De intellectu* 122.257–66 211

*De intellectu* 124.326–330 216

*De ortu* *scientiarum* 21.15–17 195

*Der Musterstaat von* *Al-Fārābī* 92 238, 242

**al-Ghazālī**

*Revival of the Religious Sciences* 2066.18–21 232

*Tahāfut al-Falāsifah* 11 350

*Tahāfut al-Falāsifah* 130 349

*Tahāfut al-Falāsifah* 28 350

*Tahāfut al-Falāsifah* 64 351

*Tahāfut al-Falāsifah* 16.8–11 349

**Ammonius**

*Amonii in Cat*. 86.11‒12 157

*Amonii in Cat*. 86.21‒22 157

**Aristotle**

*Anal. Post*. 100a10‒11 97

*Anal. Post*. 100b11–12 222

*Anal. Post*. 71b9‒12 98

*Anal. Post*. 85a31 43

*Anal. Post*. 88b37 283

*Anal. Post*. 89b10–11 283

*Anal. Post*. 90a1 207

Anal. Post. 93a26–27 387

*Anal. Prior*. 24b27 98

*Anal. prior.* 402b7‒8 197

*Cat*. 10b19 91

*Cat*. 10b21 91

*Cat*. 11a38 90

*Cat.* 11b13 153

*Cat*. 1a12 157, 391

*Cat*. 1a20–b9 91

*Cat*. 1a21 91, 93

*Cat*. 1b11‒12 98

*Cat*. 1b4 92

*Cat*. 2a11 120

*Cat*. 2a11–12 92, 105, 120, 143

*Cat*. 2a11–13 91

*Cat*. 2a11–16 192, 197, 199, 221, 261, 363, 380, 389, 402, 442

*Cat*. 2a14 143

*Cat*. 2a14–15 98, 106, 128, 146, 193, 391

*Cat*. 2a14–16 97, 116, 380

*Cat*. 2a14‒16 94

*Cat*. 2a15–16 95, 146, 228, 432, 442, 450

*Cat.* 2a3 153

*Cat*. 2b20 99, 106, 193

*Cat*. 2b25 99

*Cat*. 2b5 93

*Cat*. 2b5–6 93

*Cat*. 2b7–8 93, 142, 442, 460

*Cat*. 2b8 104

*Cat*. 3a37 91

*Cat*. 9a2-3 157

*Cat*. 9a28 157

*Cat*. 9a32–33 158

*Cat*. 9a33 158

*Categories* 2a14–16 124

*De anima* 412a6 90

*De anima* 413b19‒23 496

*De anima* 413b23–24 496

*De anima* 413b24‒27 445

*De anima* 417a1‒2 403

*De anima* 417a14 276

*De anima* 417a3‒7 274, 275

*De anima* 418a29 481

*De anima* 418a30 481

*De anima* 418a31‒b1 471

*De anima* 418ab1 471

*De anima* 418b1 472

*De anima* 429a14‒18 405

*De anima* 429a18 404

*De anima* 430a14 213

*De anima* 430a14–15 419, 443, 444, 447, 457, 460

*De anima* 430a14‒15 208, 275, 406

*De anima* 430a14–17 208

De anima 430a16–17 209

*De anima* 430a20 463

*De anima* 430a20–25 459, 460

*De anima* 430a21 459, 461

*De anima* 430a22 461, 462

*De anima* 431b20–21 430

*De anima* 431b21 205, 274, 275, 276, 286, 287, 297, 405

*De anima* III.4‒8 202

*De gen. et corr*. 319b3 179

*De gen. et corr*. 320b23 173

*De generatione animalium* 736b12 390

*De Int.* 16a3–8 162

*De interpretatione* 16a3–8 102

E.N. 1096b27–28 138

E.N. 1107a1 330

E.N. 1177b33‒34 215

*Gen. anim.* 768b5‒1 114

*Met*. 1003a33–34 375

*Met*. 1005b14–16 222

*Met*. 1006a3–5 35

*Met*. 1006a6 80, 386

*Met*. 1006a7–11 383

*Met*. 1011a25 164

*Met*. 1011b26–29 102

*Met*. 1011b27 164

*Met*. 1017a23 120

*Met*. 1022b4–5 154

*Met.* 1022b4–6 153

*Met*. 1022b4‒6 154

*Met*. 1022b6 154

*Met*. 1026a27‒32 390

*Met*. 1026a33 362

*Met*. 1026a33‒35 255

*Met*. 1026a33–b2 196, 243, 362

*Met*. 1026b30–31 364

*Met*. 1027b25–27 362

*Met*. 1027b30–31 362, 388

*Met*. 1027b34 363

*Met*. 1028b34 91

*Met*. 1029a18–19 173

*Met*. 1031a12–13 92

*Met*. 1044a1–2 141

*Met*. 1053b18‒20 101

*Met*. 1069a18–1072b16 374

*Met*. 1069a34 140

*Met*. 1070a4 375

*Met*. 1070b2–7 93

*Met*. 1071b4 140

*Met*. 1076b13–16 100

*Met*. 1077b1‒2 100

*Met*. 998b22–23 100

*Met*.1003a33 126

*Phys*. 193a3 308

*Phys*. 193a3‒6 308

*Phys*. 200b33–34 168

*Phys*. 209b6–7 173, 176

*Phys*. 209b8 173

*Phys*. 209b9 173

*Phys*. 219a27–28 169

*Phys*. 219a33–34 169

*Phys*. 219b1 169

*Refut. Soph*. 165a6 91

*Top*. 144b10–11 100

**Arnauld, Antoine**

*Des vraies et de fausses ideés* 46‒47 556

**Averroes**

*Averroes On Aristotle’s Metaphysics* 109.417 363

*Averroes On Aristotle’s Metaphysics* 110.423 364

*Averroes On Aristotle’s Metaphysics* 24.14 394

*Averroes On Aristotle’s Metaphysics* 59.205 382

*Averroes On Aristotle’s Metaphysics* 77.270 394

*Averroes On Aristotle’s Metaphysics* 82.287 390

*Averroes On Aristotle’s Metaphysics* 89.321–90.323 391

*Averroes On Aristotle’s Metaphysics* 90.324 392

*Averroes On Aristotle’s Metaphysics* 90.326 393

*Averroes On Aristotle’s Metaphysics* 92.328 393

CMDA 118.77‒79 427

CMDA 12.21–26 396

CMDA 120.41‒44 427

CMDA 123.25–32 438

CMDA 232.45–49 472

CMDA 232.68–233.74 473

CMDA 243.47‒54 482

CMDA 277.27–33 474

CMDA 317.17‒20 480

CMDA 401.424‒402.431 430

CMDA 404.501‒503 434

CMDA 405.528–33 440

CMDA 405.528–533 454

CMDA 406.575‒407.581 431

CMDA 406–409 410

CMDA 407.587–96 451

CMDA 407.594–600 449

CMDA 408.610–15 452

CMDA 409.654–62 446

CMDA 411.693–702 483

CMDA 415.62–68 449

CMDA 415.62‒68 418

CMDA 433.149‒53 370

CMDA 436.8–13 459

CMDA 437.18–438.24 443

CMDA 439.71–76 425

CMDA 443.1–8 460

CMDA 444.13–18 455

CMDA 446.93–447.97 456

CMDA 447.106–13 457

CMDA 447.121–23 463

CMDA 448.134–139 460

CMDA 449.158 459

CMDA 470.42–48 502

CMDA 499.559–66 494

CMDA 501.640–502.649 467

*Comm. Magnum in Met.* 1423 386

*Comm. Magnum in Met.* 1423–24 382

*Comm. Magnum in Met.* 1424 382, 384

*Comm. magnum in Met.* 1543 395

*Commentum medium super libro Praedicamentorum Aristotelis* 2.2.20 380

*De substantia orbis* 62 392

*De substantia orbis* 63 392

*In Aristot. Metaph. IV*.67 B 378

*In Aristot. Metaph. VI*, 151 H 388

*In Aristot. Metaph. VII*.153 H 380

*Tahafut al-tahafut* 241 372

*Averroes On Aristotle’s Metaphysics* 39.77 376

CMDA 210.29‒37 403

CMDA 225.44–50 417

CMDA 225.53–55 417

CMDA 317.17‒20 412

CMDA 317.32‒35 412

CMDA 382.26–30 404

CMDA 394.217–19 414

CMDA 396.282–83 407

CMDA 398.340–43 410

CMDA 404.507–12 416

CMDA 422.47–50 411

CMDA 430.50–54 411

CMDA 440.96‒98 116

CMDA 484.128–134 422

CMDA 496.481‒87 407

*Comm. Magnum in Met.* 1426 385

*Comm. Magnum in Met.* 1436 376

*Comm. Magnum in Met.* 1521 376

**Avicenna**

*Kitāb al Najāt* 34.13‒22 288

*Kitāb al Najāt* 53.26‒32 276

*Kitāb al-Nağāt* 333.2‒5 284

*Kitāb al-Shifā* 1.213–219 297

*Liber de anima* 127.36–39 278

*Liber de anima* 127.39–47 279

*Liber de anima* 127.41 290

*Liber de anima* 127.48–50 283

*Liber de anima* 129.82‒130.90 301

*Liber de anima* 134.45–49 327

*Liber de anima* 153.10‒18 287

*Liber de anima* 184.6–10 300

Liber de anima 29.60–63 295

*Liber de anima* 4.60–64 342

*Liber de anima* 93.60 290

*Liber de anima* 99.82–84 333

*Liber de philosophia prima* 12.37‒39 315

*Liber de philosophia prima* 149.44–50 291

*Liber de philosophia prima* 15.86–16.91 340

*Liber de philosophia prima* 20.74‒76 323

*Liber de philosophia prima* 228.29–36 298

*Liber de philosophia prima* 231.74–81 318

*Liber de philosophia prima* 234.42–44 315

*Liber de philosophia prima* 234.58–60 306

*Liber de philosophia prima* 34.55‒35.59 303

*Liber de philosophia prima* 35.62–68 305

*Liber de philosophia prima* 36.78‒83 311

*Liber de philosophia prima* 37.95 335

*Liber de philosophia prima* 423.81–85 282

*Liber de philosophia prima* 478.73–78 343

*Liber de philosophia prima* 51.83–88 356

*Liber de philosophia prima* 511.79–83 348

Liber de philosophia prima 55.58‒56.69 321

*Liber de philosophia prima* 55.64‒56.66 323

*Liber de philosophia prima* 70.14–71.18 334

*Liber de philosophia prima* 71.30‒33 337

*Liber de philosophia prima* 72.47‒48 336

*Liber primus Naturalium* 66.29‒35 307

*Quaestiones Naturales* 53.18‒21 297

**Boethius, Anicius**

*In Porph. Isag.* 2.16 108, 119, 121, 184

**Damascius**

*In Phil*. 105.1–6 136

**Descartes, René**

*La Dioptrique* 6.85.24‒27 477

*Principia philosophiae* 7.22.3‒9 294

**Dexippus**

*Dexip.* *in Cat.* 40.14 140

*Dexip.* *in Cat.* 40.14–18 140

*Dexip.* *in Cat.* 40.15–16 140

*Dexip.* *in Cat.* 40.17–18 140

*Dexip.* *in Cat.* 42.20 141

**Elias**

*Eliae in* *Isag*. 71.2‒3 241

**Euripides**

*Bacchae* 470 69

**Freud, Sigmund**

GW 10, 219 87

**Gundissalinus, Dominicus**

*In* *De anima* 42.14–15 295

**Heidegger, Martin**

GA 12, 115 21

GA 14, 80 60

GA 14, 82 60

GA 14, 88 63

GA 14,84 60

GA 40, 125 19

GA 5, 337 63, 75

GA 5, 338 75

GA 5, 368 68

GA 59, 60–89 17

GA 6.1, 177−78 38

GA 63, 80 18

GA 65, 64 69

GA 65, 71 72

GA 7, 141 271

GA 7, 183 72

GA 79, 32 76

GA 9, 196‒97 74

GA 9, 218 34

GA 9, 225 37

GA 9, 230 33

GA 9, 231 37

GA 9, 323‒24 250

GA 9, 330 74

SZ 133 59

SZ 170 59

SZ 27 18

SZ 7 489

**Heraclitus of Ephesus**

B 49 16

B 93 61

**Herodotus**

*Hist*. 1.141.17 505

*Hist*. 1.53.13 504

*Hist*. 1.55.6 504

**Hesiod**

*Theogonie* 27‒28 26

**Homer**

*Iliad* 1. 70 23, 58, 69, 71, 187, 505,

*Odys.* 18.264 7

**Husserl, Edmund**

*Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften* 151.5‒11 499

**Ibn Adi**

*Défense de la Trinité contre Al-Kindi* 118–28 264

*On the Four Scientific Questions* 92 261

*On the Four Scientific Questions* 95 260

*Traité* 1.18‒19 262

*Traité* 1.20 263

*Traité* 1.22 263

*Traité* 3.33 269

*Traité* 6.75 268

*Traité* 6.80 260

*Traité* 7.81–83 265

*Traité* 7.89–91 265

*On the Four Scientific Questions* 90 308

*On the Four Scientific Questions* 96 265

**Kant, Immanuel**

KdRV B 176 488

KdRV B 308–310 469

KdU 179 13

KdU 189 14

**Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm**

*De rerum originatione radicali* 661 511

**Liber de causis**

4.49 133

**Locke, John**

*An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* 177 478

**Nietzsche, Friedrich**

KSA 1, 269 51

KSA 13, 373 5

KSA 6, 80 40

**Nifo, Agostino**

*De Intellectu* 437.1–10 476

**Ockham, William**

*In I Sent.* 234.1‒3 379

**Old Testament**

*Ex* 33:18–33 80

*Gn* 28:12–18 405

**Parmenides**

B 1.53 64, 81

B 3 24

B 6.5 30

B 6.8 24, 58, 341

B 6.9 30

**Philoponus**

*De aeter*. 424.10 179

*De aeter*. 424.10–11 179

*De aeter*. 424.9 179

*De aeter*. 424.9–11 179

*Phil. in De gen. et corr.* 63.11 180

*Philoponi in Cat*. 149.19 157

*Philoponi in Cat*. 149.20 158

**Plato**

*Apol*. 20e5‒21a8 28

*Rep*. 508e2–3 32

*Rep*. 514a2−517a7 31

*Rep*. 515c2 32

*Rep*. 515d4 32

*Rep*. 515d6–7 32

*Rep*. 517c3–4 32

*Rep.* 596b7−8 38

*Hippias maior* 287d3 46

*Parm*. 143a 127

*Parm*. 156d3 128, 252

*Parm*. 156d5–e1 128

*Rep*. 506d8-e1 46

*Rep*. 509b9 254, 340

*Soph*. 246a4–5 8

*Soph*. 254a–259c 127

*Soph*. 254d 89

*Theait*. 176b1‒2 215

*Theait*. 191d7–9 406

*Tim*. 31a3–4 168

*Tim*. 36b7 171

*Tim*. 48e–53c 406

*Tim*. 50c7 169

*Tim*. 50d1 170

**Plotinus**

*Enn*. 5.5.7.4 263

*Enn*. 5.5.7.5 268

*Enn*. 6.2.12.12 89

*Enn*. 6.2.12.13–14 103

*Enn*. 6.2.15.18 89

*Enn*. 6.2.21.24–59 103

*Enn*. 6.3.5.1–2 90

*Enn*. 6.3.5.2–3 90

*Enn*. 6.3.5.3–4 90

*Enn*. 6.3.8.32 90

*Enn*. VI.1–3 89

*Enn*. 2.4.12.36–37 176

*Enn.* 5.5.7.1 130

*Enn.* 5.5.7.4 130

*Enn.* 5.5.7.5 130

*Enn*. 6.1.6.20‒21 128

*Enn*. 6.1–3 135

*Enn.* 6.7.17.41–42 127

**Plutarch**

*De facie in orbe lunae* 923A3‒4 212

**Porphyry**

*Porph. in Cat.* 90.19–20 104

*Porph. in Cat*. 91.3–4 124

*Isag*. 1.10–14 135

*Isag*. 13.23–19.3 103

*Isag*. 7.27–8.3 119

*Porph. In Cat*. 90.25–26 105

*Porph. In Cat*. 90.30–91.1 106

*Porph. in Cat*. 90.31 118, 507

*Porph. In Cat*. 90.31 105

*Porph. in Cat*. 90.31–33 119

*Porph. in Cat*. 90.32–33 119

*Porph. In Cat*. 90.32–33 106

*Porph*. *in Cat*. 95.19–20 159

*Porph. in Parm.* 12.25‒26 184

*Porph. in Parm.* 12.25–33 129

*Porph. in Parm.* 12.26 131

*Porph. in Parm.* 12.29–30 128

*Porph. in Parm.* 12.31 128, 129

*Porph. in Parm.* 12.32 127, 131

*Porph. in Parm.* 12.32–33 127

*Porph. in Parm.* 12.33 131

*Isag*. 7.27‒8.3 108

**Proclus**

*Procl. in* *Parm*. 981.12–13 133

*Procl. in* *Parm*. 981.5‒27 133

*Procl. in* *Parm*. 981.8‒9 133

*Procl*. *in Tim*. 257.8–9 145

*Procl*. *in Tim*. 257.9–11 145

*Sent*. 36.16–17 127

*Procl. in Tim*. 130.24 289

**Quran**

Sura 17 348

**Simplicius**

*Simpl*. *in Cat*. 116.25–26 139

*Simpl*. *in Cat*. 13.3–5 161

*Simpl*. *in Cat*. 13.5–6 161

*Simpl*. *in Cat*. 2.13 140

*Simpl*. *in Cat*. 73.21‒23 161

*Simpl.* *in Parm*. fr. 5.36 139

*Simpl. in Cat.* 12.18‒25 150

*Simpl.* *in Cat*. 163.31 154

*Simpl. in Cat*. 164.13–21 153

*Simpl.* *in Cat*. 164.15 154

*Simpl.* *in Cat*. 164.16 155

*Simpl.* *in Cat*. 164.19‒20 155

*Simpl.* *in Cat*. 164.20 154

*Simpl.* *in Cat*. 164.21 155

*Simpl.* *in Cat*. 164.9 155

*Simpl. in Cat*. 350.22 172

*Simpl. in Cat*. 351.13 171

*Simpl. in Cat*. 351.14 172

*Simpl. in Cat*. 351.3 172

*Simpl. in Cat*. 351.8–9 172

*Simpl. in Cat*. 61.10 153

*Simpl. in Cat*. 61.9 153

*Simpl. in Cat*. 61.9‒11 153

*Simpl.* *in Cat*. 73.20 148

*Simpl.* *in Cat*. 73.25 148

*Simpl.* *in Cat*. 85.11 147

*Simpl.* *in Cat*. 85.11−12 147

*Simpl.* *in Cat*. 85.12–13 145

*Simpl. in Phys*. 227.30 169

*Simpl. in Phys*. 230.12–13 175

*Simpl. in Phys*. 230.23 175

*Simpl. in Phys*. 230.25-26 175

*Simpl. in Phys*. 537.10 176

*Simpl. in Phys*. 537.10–11 174

*Simpl. in Phys*. 623.16 181

*Simpl. in Phys*. 623.17 181

*Simpl. in Phys*. 623.18 176

*Simpl. in Phys*. 623.18–19 177

*Simpl. in Phys*. 623.19–20 177

*Simpl. in Phys*. 623.20 177

**Themistius**

*In Aristotelis libros de anima paraphrasis* 103.30–31 407

*In Aristotelis libros de anima paraphrasis* 103.32 407

*In Aristotelis libros de anima paraphrasis* 94.5‒15 409

***Theologia Aristotelis***

*Theologia Aristotelis* 161 356

*Theologia Aristotelis* 18 263

### Subject and Name Index

A

*a/lētheia* 22, 39,61, 73, 117, 119, 182, 184, 189, 210, 240, 252, 258, 304, 341, 352, 427, 466, 492, 505

Abd al-Malik 353

Abélard 307

*abstractio* 217, 238, 282, 284, 417

abstraction 298, 323, 327

Abu Bishr Matta 374

*actus essendi* 131, 392, 431, 440

*ad mentem Averrois* 476, 499

*adaequatio* 277, 325, 483, 494, 516, 518

Aeschylus, see *Index locorum*

*akhira* 347

*ālam al-mithāl* 347

Albert the Great 219, 399, 437, 444, 450, 464, 499

Alcibiades 36

*alētheia* 113, 258, 267, 271, 287, 387, 398, 409, 437, 452, 492

Alexander of Aphrodisias, see *Index locorum*, 143, 201, 235, 275, 366, 374, 422, 513

Alexandrians 370, 428, 491

al-Fārābī, see *Index locorum*

al-Ghazālī see *Index locorum,* 192, 232, 337, 387, 394, 431

*aliud esse* 218, 223, 227, 228, 230, 236, 237, 242, 261, 272, 279

al-Kindī 191, 260, 333, 356, 399, 480, 508

Allegory of the cave 212, 274, 336

*al-muğarrad* 218

*al-šaj* 347

Alvernus 219

Ammonius, see *Index locorum*

amphibolia 241, 279, 284

amphibolic predication 242, 245, 247, 253, 266, 297, 300, 304, 307, 332, 510

anabasis 256

*analogia entis* 138, 254, 360, 394, 518

*Andenken* 270

Andronikos of Rhodes 384

*Anfang* 271

*Anfang*/*Beginn* 39, 68, 69, 71, 79, 183, 381

*anima intellectiva* 295, 414, 421, 427, 450

*animal sociale et rationale* 185

Anthropocene 303, 469, 480

anthropomorphism 332

*Anwesen* 270

*apaideusía* 80, 82, 117, 386, 403, 436

Apate 34, 187

*ápeiron* 174

Apollo 40

Aquinas, T. 425

*Arbor Porphyriana* 96, 106, 116, 248, 253, 300, 450, 453

Archytas 30, 181

Aristophanes 31

Aristotle, see *Index locorum*

Aristotelian logic 309

*arkhē* 502

Arnauld, A. see *Index locorum,* 213, 477, 480

Asharites 351, 356

*Aufhebung* 143

Avendauth 294

Averroes, see *Index locorum*

Averroism 465

Avicebron 180

Avicenna, see *Index locorum*

B

backward disclosure 97, 196

Bacon, R. 399, 499

*Bajt al-Hikma* 233, 260, 269, 353, 511

*barzach* 347

*bête-machine* 428, 500

*Bezugssinn* 17, 199, 387

*Bildung* 507

Blund, J. 208, 213, 248

Boethius, Anicius, see *Index locorum*

Bonaventura 187

*Book of Divinity* 197

Brain in a Vat 285

Broglie, L.-V. 471

C

Calchas 23

Cargo cult 520

Carnap, R. 3

*Categoriae decem* 158

*causa efficiens* 495

*causa prima* 78, 272, 351, 523

*certitudo* 236, 291, 303, 305, 306, 310, 323, 324, 327, 359, 413, 437, 501

*circulus* *vitiosus* 1, 11, 20, 310, 326

*coaequatio* 277, 322, 413, 480

*cogitatio* 280, 288, 330, 359, 497

*cogito* 159, 284, 292, 346

*cogito ergo sum* 293

*coincidentia oppositorum* 138

*collectio* 282

*colligatio* 362

comitation 310, 336, 342, 378, 391, 511

common world 498

concept of infinity 335

*conceptus simpliciter simplex* 305

condemnation 1277 16, 231, 254, 479, 523

*coniunctio* 234, 302, 310, 326, 362, 423, 425, 428, 515, 519

*continuatio* 410, 425, 430, 433, 441, 447, 457

copula 341

*copulatio* 457, 501, 519

corporeity 391

cosmic species 307

*creatio ex nihilo* 151, 186, 198, 269, 310, 334, 335, 338, 347, 349, 357, 450

Crusades 454, 525

D

*dalā'il* 386, 513

Damascius, see *Index locorum*

*damnatio memoriae* 354, 372, 403, 521, 524

Dante, A. 85, 231, 233, 327, 448, 466, 519

Darwin, Ch. 497

*das Offene* 251

*Dasein* 59, 456, 490

*Da-sein* 74

*dativus archegeticus* 22, 40, 73, 505

*dativus metaphysicus* 22, 62, 90, 112, 134, 135, 150, 162, 215, 270, 303, 310, 325, 379, 392, 397, 443, 467, 493, 506

*dativus obiectivus* 22, 113, 151, 299, 443, 488

*dativus possessivus* 114, 299

*dativus principalis* 22, 58, 302, 506

*Dator formarum* 251, 267, 291, 295, 308, 327, 332, 346, 360, 402, 509

Dawud al-Zahiri 352

*De sex rerum principiis* 153

death of god 358, 372, 525

*décision ontologique* 515

dedoublement of being 129

deductive syllogism 453

*definiens/definitum* 170, 178

Delphi 504, 507

demiurge 38, 311, 327

Democritus 482

*demonstratio* 283, 288, 392, 441, 448, 515

demonstrative proof 365

*denudatio* 218, 224, 227, 238, 248, 256, 276, 280, 281, 284, 293, 322, 330, 336, 359, 377, 417, 449, 468

Descartes, R, . see *Index locorum,* 15, 188, 213, 293, 328, 336, 412, 477, 524

*destructio primis* 93, 116, 174, 261, 451

*Deus otiosus* 355

*dévalorisation de l’Alētheia* 26

Dexippus, see *Index locorum*

diacosmos 136, 137, 168, 178, 195, 221, 239, 242, 251, 295, 333, 334, 345, 393

dialogue *Timaeus* 147, 160, 333, 337, 347, 396, 510, 520

diaphanum 207, 209, 211, 214, 249, 278, 325, 402, 478, 485, 514, 516

diaphanum1-2 472, 474, 486

*dihaíresis* 111, 115, 117

Dilthey, W. 2

divine comedy 77

divine intention 264

divine man 138, 182

divine Trinity 342

*doctores Latini* 429

*donya* 347

doubled Being 131, 242, 184, 251

Duns Scotus 105, 224, 335, 379, 478

E

eclipse 126, 175

eclipse of the first substance 521

eidetic time 172, 176

*eídolon* 65, 82

Einstein, A. 471

*Ek-sistenz* 250, 490

Elias, see *Index locorum*

emanation 132, 141, 218, 243, 326, 344, 355, 357

*ens commune* 101

*ens diminutum* 267, 344

*ens inquantum ens* 122, 200, 248, 253, 324, 345, 357, 358, 360, 365, 374, 378, 379, 381, 396, 397, 424, 506

substance *qua* substance 390

*ens rationis* 270, 515

*ens ratum* 338

épistémè 2

*epokhē* 67, 79, 82, 83, 126, 152, 184, 210, 289, 324, 504

*equinitas* 298, 300, 303

*equinitas tantum* 230, 248, 332, 359

*Ereignis* 22, 31, 69, 79, 113, 126, 163, 210, 238, 249, 257, 323, 325, 358, 398, 422

Erinyes 126, 403

*Erklären/Verstehen* 2

*Es gibt* 68

*esse ad* 153, 159, 264, 265, 267, 332, 356, 360, 510, 513

*esse aliud* 303

*esse diminutum* 114, 266, 301, 310, 326, 378, 449, 509

*esse proprium* 303, 305

*esse ratum* 114

*esse spirituale* 486

*esse spirituale* 354, 516

*esse tantum* 413

*essentia* 454

Euripide, see *Index locorum*

evolution 497

*ex inmediatis* 101, 398, 432

Exclusion of the Third 335

*existere* 250

disclosure from behind 143, 146, 206, 331, 469, 521

disclosure from the front 259, 364, 468

*exsistere* 247, 266, 284, 295, 306, 345, 475, 509

*extensio* 173

extermination camps 449

F

*factum* 266, 340

Feyerabend, P. K. 3

financial derivatives 469

first Averroism 190, 354

First Mover 195, 386, 395, 400, 513

first philosophy 272

first science 340

first substance 93, 305, 381, 389, 394

*fiṭra* 231, 232

*fiṭra mushtarika* 231, 441

Flying Man 285, 309, 310, 327, 454

formal causality 486, 488, 493

*formale Anzeige* 486

Foucault, M. 2

Frankfurt school 512

Freud, S., see *Index locorum* 87

frontal disclosure 95, 97, 194, 274, 491

Furies 130, 220, 256, 341, 381, 449, 467

*furor interpretandi* 250

future events 246

G

Gadamer, H.-G. 9

*ġaraḍ* 272, 341, 360, 369

Gauthier, A. R. 371

*Gehaltsssinn* 17

generic individual 308

*genitivus subiectivus/obiectivus* 78

*Geschichtlichkeit* 271

*Ge-Stell* 76, 78, 150, 201, 311, 324, 326, 406, 466, 493, 502, 509

gigantomachy 16, 161, 191, 273, 308, 397, 403

Gilson, E. 281, 284

Gnosticism 136

Gödel, K. 6

Greco-Persian Wars 504

Grosseteste, R. 292

*Grund* 339, 399

*Gründung* 66, 82, 339, 346, 347, 371

Gundissalinus, D. see *Index locorum,* 210, 295

H

*ḥadīth* 352

habitus 130, 154, 156, 159, 166

*harmonie préétablie* 343, 350

Harun al Raschid 269

Heidegger, M. see *Index locorum,* 456, 489

henology 129, 198, 341, 343

Henry of Ghent 304, 309, 335

Heraclitus of Ephesus, see *Index locorum*

heresy 332

*hérma* 513

hermeneutic triad 89, 189, 324, 330

hermeneutics, archaic 7

hermeneutics of facticity 17

*hermeneutisches* *Wie* 18, 340, 387, 426

Herodotus, see *Index locorum*

*Herstellung* 38

Hesiode, see *Index locorum*

*hístor* 24

historiality 15, 17, 59

historicity 11

*hoc aliquid* 124, 295, 331, 405, 411, 415, 425, 439, 447, 465, 501, 518

*hoc esse tantum* 267, 338

Holy Spirit 356

Homer, see *Index locorum*

*homo ipse intelligit* 411

*homo mortuus* 97

*homo sapiens* 506

hubris 130, 135

humanism 415, 519

*humanitas* 301, 356

humanity 433, 434, 436, 447, 448, 452

Hunain Ibn Ishāq 333, 353

Husserl, E. see *Index locorum*, 2, 152, 188, 307, 309, 412, 490

hyparchic predication 252, 334, 392

*hypodokhē* 169, 210, 337, 406

I

Ibn Adi 297, 308, 332, 345, 480

Ibn Bajjah 405, 438

Ibn Kullāb 353

*ifāda* 191

*ilhām* 294, 327

*illuminati* 166

*illuminatio* 217, 483, 503

illumination 221, 228, 277, 280, 287, 326

*iltaqaṭa* 282

imagination 281, 306, 328, 420

Immobile Mover 341, 351, 384, 386, 389

*impositio/suppositio* 93, 96, 104, 108, 197, 198, 432, 444

imposition 143, 147, 364, 388, 389, 397, 441, 455

*In-der-Welt-sein* 490

*individuum* 107, 110, 113, 135, 144, 146, 152, 266, 299, 302, 307, 309, 310, 326, 332, 388, 394, 399, 436, 439, 441, 447, 509

*inquantum/qua* 382

instrumental rationality 184

instrumental reason 9

*intellectio/intellectum* 491, 517

intellect-substance 202

intellect-sun 126, 206, 211, 217, 274, 323, 407, 491

*intellectum primum* 216, 221, 226, 228

*intellectum secundum* 203, 205, 215, 242

*intellectio/intellectum* 155,. 215, 255, 450

*intellectus adeptus* 201, 206, 207, 224, 232, 236, 242, 257, 260, 268, 275, 284, 302, 304, 310, 326, 327, 330, 335, 399, 422, 431

*intellectus agens* 149, 152, 165, 186, 195, 201, 203, 204, 220, 222, 233, 234, 237, 238, 242, 256, 288, 325, 327, 346, 360, 399, 416, 448

*intellectus in effectu* 216, 220, 222, 225, 229, 239, 243, 257, 277, 286, 292, 294, 432

*intellectus in habitu* 294, 401, 407, 431

*intellectus in potencia* 259, 274, 279, 287, 358, 366, 415, 445, 456

*intellectus materialis* 201, 202, 217, 235, 285, 288, 330, 369, 401, 404, 414, 428, 440, 443, 495

*intellectus possibilis* 203, 204, 213, 214, 225, 231, 232, 235, 294, 296, 325, 330, 366, 388, 406, 408, 415, 420, 437, 456, 475

*intellectus practicus* 515

*intellectus sanctus* 286, 326

*intellectus speculativus* 401, 406, 485, 487

*intentio secunda* 248

intentionality 194, 301, 305, 336, 344, 346, 412, 417, 471, 498, 510

*ipse homo intelligit* 444

*ipse/idem* 39, 67, 80, 160, 163, 388, 400, 411, 514

*irāda* 522

*Irre* 74, 80, 135, 149, 151, 183, 189, 201, 256, 325, 340, 387, 398, 423, 455, 525

*Irrtum* 75, 77, 80, 82, 107, 111, 115, 135, 150, 166, 190, 210, 219, 230, 250, 256, 271, 325, 340, 341, 346, 371, 383, 398, 403, 453, 469, 479, 520

*ittiṣāl* 234, 243, 268, 284, 367

J, K, L

Jamblichus 136, 303, 326, 520, 524

Jan Scotus Eurigena 163, 524

Kalām 351, 353

Kant, I. see *Index locorum*, 4, 13, 469, 488

Kilwardby, R. 429

Quran 523

*krísis* 504

Kuhn, T. 3, 86

Law of the Excluded Third 309, 325

Leibniz, G. W. see *Index locorum*, 129, 511

Lethe 76

*Liber de causis* see *Index locorum*, 122, 194, 242, 258, 333

*liberum arbitrium* 167

*Lichtung* 59, 64, 72, 83, 89, 97, 107, 129, 151, 188, 189, 200, 201, 202, 234, 238, 246, 249, 251, 270, 279, 292, 304, 323, 325, 335, 341, 346, 370, 387, 427, 466, 480, 502, 506, 508, 512, 518

life world 499, 500

limbo 342

Limited/Unlimited 137, 156, 169, 178, 242, 334, 338

Locke, J. see *Index locorum*, 156, 478

*locus specierum* 279, 333, 359

*Logica Vetus* 96

*lumen naturale* 59

M

*ma'qūl* 247

*ma'qūl ṭhānī* 266, 419

*Magna Graecia* 40, 61, 77

*magnitudo* 173, 174, 176

Marx, K. 187

*materia prima* 180, 181, 337, 391, 393

*mathesis universalis* 190, 266, 351, 511

*medium* 101, 105, 174, 181, 204, 205, 207, 288, 328, 398, 445

*memoria* 280, 358

*méta‑ontologie* 136

*metaphysica generalis* 120, 123, 253, 358, 360, 379, 488

*metaphysica transcendens* 123

meta-physics

meta-physics 396, 400, 426, 466, 468, 512

*Metaphysics Lambda* 339, 344, 350, 351

metaphysics of chimeras 328, 335

*méthexis* 242

*métis* 7, 10

Michael Scotus 213, 499

Mind-Body Problem 435, 454, 469

minimal being 335, 336, 343

modern God 131, 267, 339, 342, 344, 345, 349, 510

modern logic 341, 346

*modo geometrico* 134, 267

modulated terms 250

*modus cognoscendi* 304

*modus essendi* 304

*modus essendi/cognoscendi* 388

*modus intelligendi* 155, 215

*modus ponens* 21, 67, 103, 175, 332, 383, 400, 424, 435, 450, 506

*modus tollens* 103, 116, 143, 169, 260, 450

Moerbeke, W. 142

monotheism 251, 269, 339

*more geometrico* 36, 37

Muhammad 328

Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī 352

*mundus imaginalis* 347

Musaion 12

Muses 117, 452

*musica universalis* 30

Mutakallim 353, 358

Mutazilites 352

N

neopositivism 3

*neutrum* 252, 256, 262

Nietzsche, F. . see *Index locorum*, 4, 17, 328, 505

Nifo, A. see *Index locorum*, 476, 483, 490

nihilism 346, 418, 452, 466, 468

Nogales, S. G. 370

*Nominales* 178, 259, 308, 322, 337

*non repugnat esse* 180, 335

non-being 335, 343

*Noumenon* 488

O

objective body 171, 334, 336

objective emanation 342

objective matter 337

objective physics 171

objectivity

Kant 13, 14

modern sciences 13

analytic philosophy 3

Ockham, W., see *Index locorum*

Oedipus complex 436

Olivi, J. 335

One/Many 343, 344

ontological choice 365

ontotheology 132, 136, 251, 282, 302, 349, 358, 397, 510, 513

*ōrexis* 496

*ortus scientiarum* 68

*ousía* 345

*ousía/parousía* 112

Oxfordian Fallacy 182, 249, 283, 379, 405, 488

P

paradigm shift 86

Parmenides, see *Index locorum*

parousia 271, 345

*passio entis* 244

*passiones entis* 258, 311

Paul von York 489

*peccatum originale* 135

pedagogy 34

*per posterius* 302, 334

*per prius/per posterius* 93, 96, 98, 132, 163, 193, 198, 199, 245, 248, 259, 267, 301, 339, 360, 380, 386, 396, 401, 456, 507, 508

Pericles 29

*perspicuum* 211, 472, 481, 517

Petritsi, Ioane 258

*phantasia* 485

*phantasmata* 486

phenomenology 3

Philip Chancellor 229

Philip the Chancellor 343

Philoponus, see *Index locorum*

physics 339, 340, 377

Plato, see *Index locorum*

Plotinus*,* see *Index locorum*

plurality of substances 226

plurality of substantial forms 438

Plutarchus 182

*De facie in orbe lunae* 923A3–4 182

Popper, K. R. 3

Porphyry*,* see *Index locorum*

Porretans 350, 357

*positum* 67

possible worlds 343

*postpraedicamenta* 156

*praedicabilia* 121

*praedicamenta* 156

predication

accident 153

*ad unum* 126, 132, 141

hyparchic 128, 130

hyparchic 94, 95, 197

*per prius* 130, 140, 145, 148, 177

predication *ad unum* 333, 509

predication *in artificialibus* 216, 333, 351, 409, 520

predication *per posterius* 447

predication *per prius* 229, 232, 235, 262, 271, 272, 343, 358, 363, 433, 442, 455

primary/secondary qualities 478, 489

*Primum mobile* 255, 258

*Primum Mobile* 183

*primum/secundum intellectum* 419

*principium* 68, 71

Principle of sufficient cause 357

Principle of the Excluded Third 437

problem of universals 116

*processio* 265

Proclus, see *Index locorum*

prohyparchic being 344

*proportio* 404, 410, 414, 418, 420, 426, 440, 444, 453, 457, 458, 480, 485, 494, 518

*pros hen* 126, 160

Pythagoras 30, 181, 187

Q

*qua/inquantum* 388, 390, 424

quality 130

quantity 176, 179, 337

quantum physics 471

*quartum genus* 402, 411, 435, 440, 448, 458, 460, 488, 495, 515, 519

*quasi materia et subiectum* 416

*quidditas* 91, 92, 112, 113, 134, 147, 189, 270, 271, 336, 388, 398, 407, 412, 418, 435, 443, 454

*quinque viae* 386

*quo est* 214, 435, 443

Quran see *Index locorum*, 231, 233, 347, 352, 353

R

*ratio sufficiens* 152, 177, 190

*rationes seminales* 160

*rectitudo* 165, 236, 501

double Being 166

Reformed Epistemology 351

*relatio* 152, 159

*reminiscentia* 280

*res* 310, 311, 324

*res a reor reris* 310

*res cogitans* 159, 230, 287, 293, 347, 439, 454, 492, 519

*res extensa* 519

*resolutio* 131, 148, 201, 229, 343

*restitutio ad integrum* 32, 34, 36

resurrection of the body 349

Ricoeur, P. 31

Rufus of Cornwall 152, 322, 413, 442

S

Saussure, F. 6

scholasticism second 85

school of Porretans 307

school of Wisdom 297

*scibile* 152, 304

*scientia cogitabilis* 178, 292

*scientia transcendens* 120, 123, 132

*scriptio defectiva/plena* 353

second Averroism 190, 351, 438

second substance 336

*secundum intellectum* 306

*secundum quod* 435

seeing/knowing 5, 32, 212

*Seinsvergessenheit* 76, 78, 86, 113, 162, 166, 182, 183, 189, 201, 210, 250, 281, 309, 324, 325, 336, 341, 403, 439, 469, 501, 521, 525

*Seinsverlassenheit* 69, 76, 79, 166, 183, 189, 398, 507

self-reflection 283, 290

*semel/semper* 178, 266, 302, 312, 322, 355, 358

*sensus communis* 484, 487, 517

*separabilis/separatus* 411, 416, 446, 464

Sharia 353, 524

sheep/wolf 484, 496

Sicilian school 499

Siger of Brabant 443

*significatio* 417

Simonides of Ceos 35

Simplicius, see *Index locorum*

Socrates 454

*sola gratia* 357

*sophistae Latini* 354, 429, 503

Sophocles 73

*species humana* 451, 466, 519

*species intelligibilis* 244, 247, 280, 283, 419, 481, 516

*species sensibilis* 159, 247, 274, 276, 280, 326, 419, 421, 447, 451, 481

*species singularis* 309

*species specialissima* 346

*speculatio* 276

*speculum* 291, 326

*Stocheiōsis theologiké* 258

Suárez, F. 358

*subiectum* 36, 75, 137, 179, 249, 436, 439

subject/object 310

substance

al-Fārābī 192

indivisible 106, 107, 112, 118

Neoplatonism 139

Plato 33

Simplicius 142, 146

*species* 142, 168, 170

τό τί ἦν εἶναι 134

τόδε τι 91

τοιόνδε 135

substance *qua* substance 374, 379, 385, 389, 397, 491, 506

suffering 498

Sufism 328, 347

*sūmbolon* 302, 310

*Summa Halensis* 182

Sun eclipse 478

supposition 364, 388, 390

T

*tá metá tá phusiká* 384

*tá ónta* 22, 43

*tabula rasa* 96, 292, 408, 412, 421, 447, 454, 498

*talbīs* 349

Taormina, D. P. . 136, 171

technology 38

*tertium ens* 80, 113, 220, 297, 298, 307, 342, 391, 393, 437

*tertium genus*  402, 411, 435, 455, 488, 490, 491, 514, 519

Thales 427

Themistius see *Index locorum*, 374, 404, 407, 408

Themistocles 505

*Theologia Aristotelis* see *Index locorum*, 130, 263

*theologia naturalis* 272, 360

theories of the transcendentals 311

theurgy 168, 326, 332

Thomas Aquinas 386, 390

*tóde ti* 78

school of Toledo 210, 295, 368, 499

transcendental being 306

transcendental predication 264

*translatio entis* 148

*translatio studiorum* 88, 147, 149, 152, 163

Trinity 260, 262, 300

Trojan War 8

truth as correspondence 404

truth as identity 309, 323, 325

*truth-veritas* 507

*truth-adaequatio* 227

twofold truth 71

U, V, W, T

Unified Science 186, 379

unity of intellect 430, 431, 434

unity of person 366, 390, 410, 418, 428

universal hylemorphism 337, 437

universals 482

*universitas humana* 231, 466, 508, 519

*valeur* 6

*Verkehrung ins Gegenteil* 87, 402, 424, 521

Vernant, J.-P. 23

*via Modernorum* 11, 69, 113, 237, 269, 308, 354

*vis aestimativa* 277, 330, 419, 420, 432, 485, 487, 497

*vita contemplativa* 237

*Vollzugssinn* 17, 387

*Vor-blickbahn* 19, 30, 33, 85, 108, 126, 134, 149, 160, 181, 188, 190, 198, 199, 223, 227, 235, 245, 266, 270, 272, 295, 297, 306, 331, 340, 368, 382, 387, 397, 399, 406, 432, 442, 466, 490, 521

Wahhabism 525

*wahm* 277, 288, 401

*Was-sein* 37

*Wesensschau* 152, 307

will to power 5, 38

William of Auvergne 354

*Wirkungsgeschichte* 3, 15, 506

wisdom 452

Wittgenstein, L. 3

τό τί ἦν εἶναι 91

τόδε τι 122, 124

### Bibliography

The list contains the authors and works of the three combined volumes. Quotations from Greek texts without explicit indication of the critical edition are taken from the digital edition *Thesaurus Linguae Graeciae*, The Packard Humanities Institute, *The Perseus Project and others*, 1999–2007.

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Václav Umlauf

Hermeneutics of Objectivity I.

Divine Comedy of Classical Metaphysics and Tragedy of Falsafa

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1. “Und zuletzt haben sie in der Constellation etwas ausgelassen, ohne es zu wissen: eben den nothwendigen Perspektivismus, vermöge dessen jedes Kraftzentrum − und nicht nur der Mensch − von sich aus die ganze übrige Welt construirt, d. h. an seiner Kraft mißt, betastet, gestaltet... Sie haben vergessen, diese Perspektiven-*setzende* Kraft in das »wahre Sein« einzurechnen... In der Schulsprache geredet: das Subjekt-sein...” (*Nachlaß Frühjahr* 1888, 14 [186]; KSA 13, 373) [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. “Nun ist die Zweckmäßigkeit eines Dinges, sofern sie in der Wahrnehmung vorgestellt wird, auch keine Beschaffenheit des Objects selbst (denn eine solche kann nicht wahrgenommen werden), ob sie gleich aus einem Erkenntnisse der Dinge gefolgert werden kann.” (KdU 189) [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Hermeneutic triangle of history, historicity and historiality determine proposed phenomenology (Umlauf 2010, 62‒65). The hermeneutics of historiality understand the basic dynamism of philosophy with respect to difference between synoptic vision of the world and theoretical concept of that vision. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. “Alles liegt daran, vom unbestimmten, aber irgendwie verständlichen Anzeigegehalt aus das Verstehen auf die rechte *Blickbahn* zu bringen. Das Gewinnen dieser Blickbahn kann und muß prophylaktisch unterstützt werden durch Abweisung *scheinbar* verwandter und deshalb von selbst andrängender Blickstellungen, wie sie in einer jeweiligen Lage des Forschens herrschend sind.“ (GA 63, 80) [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. “Der Ausdruck »Phänomenologie« bedeutet primär einen *Methodenbegriff.* Er charakterisiert nicht das sachhaltige Was der Gegenstände der philosophischen Forschung, sondern das *Wie* dieser.“ (SZ 27) [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. “Die Blickbahn des Anblicks muß im voraus schon gebahnt sein. Wir nennen sie die Vor-blickbahn, die”Perspektive “. So wird sich zeigen: Das Sein ist nicht nur nicht in unbestimmter Weise verstanden, sondern das bestimmte Verstehen des Seins bewegt sich selbst in einer schon bestimmten Vorblickbahn.“ (GA 40, 125) [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. “Hermes ist der Götterbote. Er bringt die Botschaft des Geschickes; ἑρμηνεύειν ist jenes Darlegen, das Kunde bringt, insofern es auf eine Botschaft zu hören vermag.“ (GA 12, 115) [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. See classical studies *Homme grec*, *La mort dans les yeux*, *De la présentification de l’invisible à l’imitation de l’apparence* collected in posthumous edition (Vernant 1996). [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Interpretation of soothsayer’s and rhapsode’s vision that constitutes the first pole of hermeneutic ellipse and therefore created basics of triadic understanding in mode of historiality, historicity and history (Umlauf 2010, 11‒66). [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. “Le grec *ístor* prend place dans la même série et la valeur propre de cette racine \**wid —* est éclairée par la règle énoncé dans le Ṡatapatha Brāhmana (…) : Si maintenant deux hommes se disputent (ont un litige) en disant, l’un “moi, j’ai vu”, l’autre “moi, j’ai antendu”, celui qui dit “moi, j’ai vu”, c’est celui-là que nous devons croire.” (Benveniste 1969, t. II, 173) [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. “We are able to say a lot of deceptions that resembles the truth; we are also capable if we want to let sound the truth.” (ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα, ἴδμεν δ 'εὖτ' ἐθέλωμεν ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι; *Theogony*, vv. 27‒28) [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. “Älteste Form der Idee, relativ klug, simpel, überzeugend. Umschreibung des Satzes „ich, Plato, bin die Wahrheit.” (*Wie die „wahre Welt“ endlich zur Fabel wurde*; KSA 6, 80) [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. “An der ὀρθότης, der Richtigkeit des Blickens, liegt alles. Durch diese Richtigkeit wird das Sehen und Erkennen ein rechtes, so daß es zuletzt geradeaus auf die höchste Idee geht und in dieser „Ausrichtung“ sich festmacht.” (GA 9, 230). [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. “παιδεία meint die Umwendung des ganzen Menschen im Sinne der eingewöhnenden Versetzung aus dem Bezirk des zunächst Begegnenden in einem anderen Bereich, darin das Seiende erscheint.” (GA 9, 218) [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. “But we have now posited that it is impossible for anything at the same time to be and not to be, and by this means have shown that this is the most indisputable of all principles.” *(*Met. IV.4, 1006a3–5; trad. Ross, WA 8) [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. “In diesem Wandel des Wesens der Wahrheit vollzieht sich zugleich ein Wechsel des Ortes der Wahrheit. Als Unverborgenheit ist sie noch ein Grundzug des Seienden selbst. Als Richtigkeit des »Blickens« aber wird sie zur Auszeichnung des menschlichen Verhaltens zum Seienden.”(GA 9, 231) [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. “L’Apollon de Delphes, le dieu de la parole oraculaire, autorise le départ et l’expédition de Jason. Ses oracles vont à la fois “montrer” et “signifier” les routes de la mer et les chemins que les Argonautes vont emprunter afin de gagner le pays mystérieux de la Toison d’or. *Sēmaínein* “faire connaître par le signes, avec des marques, des repères, des indices”, est un verbe fort de l’oracle apollinien. Il conjoint l’acte de parole et cheminement actif.” (Detienne 1998, 138) [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. “Hier wird es deutlich, wie nothwendig der Mensch, neben der monumentalischen und antiquarischen Art, die Vergangenheit zu betrachten, oft genug eine dritte Art nöthig hat, die kritische: und zwar auch diese wiederum im Dienste des Lebens. Er muss die Kraft haben und von Zeit zu Zeit anwenden, eine Vergangenheit zu zerbrechen und aufzulösen, um leben zu können: dies erreicht er dadurch, dass er sie vor Gericht zieht, peinlich inquirirt, und endlich verurtheilt; jede Vergangenheit aber ist werth verurtheilt zu werden — denn so steht es nun einmal mit den menschlichen Dingen: immer ist in ihnen menschliche Gewalt und Schwäche mächtig gewesen.” (Nietzsche, *Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen* II.4; KSA 1, 269) [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. “But when he falls because of his heedless outrage, he does not know it (πίπτων δ' οὐκ οἶδεν τόδ' ὑπ' ἄφρονι λύμᾳ); for pollution hovers over a man in this kind of darkness, and mournful rumor announces that a murky mist (μύσους) envelops his house.” (Aeschylus, *Eumenides*, vv. 377‒80, trad. H. W. Smyth et al.) [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. “Es ist »erleuchtet«, besagt: an ihm selbst *als* In-der-Welt-sein gelichtet, nicht durch ein anderes Seiendes, sondern so, daß es selbst die Lichtung *ist*.Nur einem existenzial so gelichteten Seienden wird Vorhandenes im Licht zugänglich, im Dunkel verborgen.“ (SZ 133) [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. “Die Lichtung gewährt allem zuvor die Möglichkeit des Weges zur Anwesenheit und gewährt das mögliche Anwesen dieser selbst. Die Ἀλήθεια, die Unverborgenheit, müssen wir als die Lichtung denken, die Sein und Denken, deren Anwesen zu und für einander erst gewährt. Das ruhige Herz der Lichtung ist der Ort und Stille, aus dem her es dergleichen wie die Möglichkeit des Zusammengehörens von Sein und Denken, d.h. Anwesenheit und Vernehmen erst gibt.“ (GA 14, 84) [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. “Von der Lichtung jedoch weis die Philosophie nichts. Die Philosophie spricht zwar vom Licht der Vernunft, aber achtet nicht auf die Lichtung des Seins. Das lumen naturale, das Licht der Vernunft, erhellt nur das Offene. Es betrifft zwar die Lichtung, bildet sie jedoch so wenig, das es vielmehr ihrer bedarf, um das in der Lichtung Anwesende bescheinen zu konnen. Dies gilt nicht nur von der *Methode* der Philosophie sondern auch und sogar zuerst von ihrer *Sache*, nämlich von der Anwesenheit des Anwesenden.“ (GA 14, 82) [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. “Dergestalt halt das Sein mit seiner Wahrheit an sich. Dieses Ansichhalten ist die frühe Weise seines Entbergens. Das frühe Zeichen des Ansichhaltens ist die Ἀ-λήθεια. Indem sie Un-Verborgenheit des Seienden bringt, stiftet sie erst Verborgenheit des Seins. Verbergung aber bleibt im Zuge des an sich haltenden Verweigerns. Wir konnen dieses lichtende Ansichhalten mit der Wahrheit seines Wesens die ἐποχή des Seins nennen.“ (GA 5, 337) [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. “Wie sich diese Auffassung des Denkens dann mit der Ansetzung und Gewinnung von »Kategorien« verkoppelt und die › Denkform ‹ der Aussage maßgebend wird. Dieses Denken war einmal – im ersten Anfang – bei Plato und Aristoteles noch schöpferisch. Aber es schuf eben den Bereich, in dem sich künftig das Vorstellen des Seienden als solchen hielt, in dem dann die Seinsverlassenheit sich immer verdeckter entfaltet.“ (GA 65, 64) [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. “Wann und wie kommen Dinge als Dinge? Sie kommen nicht *durch* die Machenschaft des Menschen. Sie kommen aber auch nicht *ohne* die Wachsamkeit der Sterblichen. Der erste Schritt zu solcher Wachsamkeit ist der Schritt zurück aus dem nur vorstellenden, d.h. erklärenden Denken in das andenkende Denken.“ (GA 7, 183) [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. “In allem je verschieden die Vor- und Mitgestaltung von Erkenntnis und wesentlichem Wissen als Gründung der Wahrheit. »Wissenschaft« nur ein entfernter Ableger einer bestimmten Durchdringung der Zeug‑anfertigung u. s. f.; nichts Eigenständiges und *niemals* in Zusammenhang zu bringen mit dem wesentlichen Wissen des Er‑denkens des Seins (Philosophie).“ (GA 65, 71) [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. “Der Mensch ist vielmehr vom Sein selbst in die Wahrheit des Seins »geworfen«, das er, dergestalt ek‑sistierend, die Wahrheit des Seins hüte, damit im Lichte des Seins das Seiende als das Seiende, das es ist, erscheine.“ (GA 9, 330) [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. “Die Irre ist der Spielraum jener Wende, in der die in-sistente Ek-sistenz wendig sich stets neu vergist und vermist. Die Verbergung des verborgenen Seienden im Ganzen waltet in der Entbergung des jeweiligen Seienden, die als Vergessenheit der Verbergung zur Irre wird. Die Irre ist das wesentliche Gegenwesen zum anfanglichen Wesen der Wahrheit. Die Irre offnet sich als das Offene für jegliches Widerspiel zur wesentlichen Wahrheit. Die Irre ist die offene Statte und der Grund des Irrtums.“ (GA 9, 196–97) [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. “Jedesmal, wenn das Sein in seinem Geschick an sich hält, ereignet sich jäh und unversehens die Welt. Jede Epoche der Weltgeschichte ist eine Epoche der Irre. Das epochale Wesen des Seins gehört in dem verborgenen Zeitcharakter des Seins und kennzeichnet das im Sein gedachte Wesen der Zeit.“ (GA 5, 338) [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. “Das Sein entzieht sich, indem es sich in das Seiende entbirgt. Dergestalt beirrt das Sein, es lichtend, das Seiende mit der Irre. Das Seiende ist in die Irre ereignet, in der es das Sein umirrt und so den Irrtum (zu sagen wie Fürsten- und Dichter-tum) stiftet. Er ist der Wesensraum der Geschichte.“ (GA 5, 337) [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. “Ge-Stell nennt jetzt auch nicht irgendein Beständiges des bestellten Bestandes. Ge-Stell nennt das aus sich gesammelte universaleBestellen der vollständigen Bestellbarkeit des Anwesenden im Ganzen. Der Kreisgang des Bestellens ereignet sich im Ge-Stell und als das Ge-Stell. Im Ge-Stell wird das Anwesen alles Anwesenden zum Be-stand.“ (GA 79, 32) [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. “Die *Verkehrung ins Gegenteil* löst sich bei näherem Zusehen in zwei verschiedene Vorgänge auf, in die *Wendung* eines Triebes *von der Aktivität zur Passivität* und in die *inhaltliche Verkehrung*. Beide Vorgänge sind, weil wesensverschieden, auch gesondert zu behandeln. Beispiele für den ersteren Vorgang ergeben die Gegensatzpaare Sadismus–Masochismus und Schaulust–Exhibition. Die Verkehrung betrifft nur die *Ziele* des Triebes; für das aktive Ziel: quälen, beschauen, wird das passive: gequält werden, beschaut werden eingesetzt. Die inhaltliche Verkehrung findet sich in dem einen Falle der Verwandlung des Liebens in ein Hassen.“ (*Triebe und Triebschicksale*; *Gesammelte Werke* 10, 219, ed. Anna Freud). [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. A classical formulation of this principle can be found in the writing *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, which was compiled around the year 1300. Unfortunately, it already conceives the first substance cited in the original Aristotelian text (*Cat*. 2b5) to be an objective individual: “*Destructis primis substantiis, id est individuis, impossibile est aliquid aliorum remanere*.” (*Les Auctoritates Aristotelis*, ed. Hamesse, p. 305) [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Pierre Aubenque investigates thoroughly that important step on Aristotle’s path to the unity of being (*Le problème de l’être chez Aristote*, 1962), namely on pages 190–92. The quoted section examines ultima ratio of Aristotle’s unity *pros hen* (tὸ δὲ ὂν λέγεται μὲν πολλαχῶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἓν καὶ μίαν τινὰ φύσιν, *Met*. 1003a33). Aubenque conceived Aristotle’s path to the unity of being aporetically, which does not apply to this study. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. “But in a secondary sense those things are called substances within which, as species, the primary substances are included; also those which, as genera, include the species.” (*Cat.* 2a14‒16, ed. WA 1, trad. Edghill) [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. “We conclude that these states of knowledge are neither innate in a determinate form, nor developed from other higher states of knowledge, but from sense-perception (ἀλλ' ἀπὸ αἰσθήσεως).” (*Anal. Post*. 100a10‒11; WA 1, trad. Mure) [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. “We suppose ourselves to possess unqualified scientific knowledge of a thing (ἐπίστασθαι δὲ οἰόμεθ' ἕκαστον ἁπλῶς), (…) when we think that we know the cause (τήν τ' αἰτίαν οἰώμεθα γινώσκειν) on which the fact depends (δι' ἣν τὸ πρᾶγμά ἐστιν), as the cause of that fact and of no other, and, further, that the fact could not be other than it is.” (*Anal. Post*. 71b9‒12; WA 1, trad. Mure) [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. The primary position of the first equivocally predicated substance establishes the logical (yet not metaphysical) validity of the principle “*dictum de omni et nullo*”. The categorical signification given *per prius* ascertains subsequent determinations of the subject given *per posterius* (κατὰ τοῦ κατηγορουμένου λέγεται, πάντα καὶ κατὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, *Cat.* 1b11‒12; *Anal. Prior*. 24b27). [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. “Grant, then, that they are prior in definition. Still not all things that are prior in definition are also prior in substantiality.” (οὐ πάντα ὅσα τῷ λόγῳ πρότερα καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ πρότερα, *Met*. 1077b1‒2; WA 8, trad. Ross). [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Aubenque summarizes Aristotle’s arguments against the Platonic conception of the unity of being as univocal predication referring to the One: “Il n’est pas possible que l’être soit une essence en tant qu’unité déterminée distincte du multiple (ὡς ἕν τι παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ), car il est un terme commun (κοινὸν) et n’existe qu’en tant que prédicat (κατηγόρημα μόνον).” (*Met.* 1053b18–20; Aubenque 1962, 228) [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. “In Porphyry’s view the Aristotelian categories are neither about ὄντα, nor about νοήματα, nor about φωναὶ exclusively. Rather, they are about significant articulate sounds (φωναὶ σημαντικαὶ) which signify things (πράγματα) by way of signifying concepts (νοήματα).” (Evangeliou 1988, 165) [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. “Σωκράτους γὰρ μὴ ὄντος ἔστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἀνθρώπου δὲ μὴ ὄντος οὐκ ἔστιν Σωκράτης.” (*Porph*. *in Cat.* 90.19–20) [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. “L’ambiguïté du σκοπός de l’*Isagoge* est une *fonction* de celle du σκοπός des *Catégories* : il y a autant de façons de répondre au problème de Porphyre qu’il y a de raisons de le formu­ler, c’est-à-dire de façon de *lire* les *Catégories*.” (*Isagoge*, Introd., p. XLIII, ed. Libera 1998) [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. “Continetur igitur individuum quidem sub specie (περιέχεται οὖν τὸ μὲν ἄτομον ὑπὸ τοῦ εἴδους), species autem sub genere (τὸ δὲ εἶδος ὑπὸ τοῦ   γένους). Totum enim quiddam est genus (ὅλον γάρ τι τὸ γένος), individuum autem pars (τὸ δὲ ἄτομον μέρος), species vero et totum et pars (τὸ δὲ εἶδος καὶ ὅλον καὶ μέρος), sed pars quidem alterius (ἀλλὰ μέρος μὲν ἄλλου), totum autem non alterius (ὅλον δὲ οὐκ ἄλλου), sed aliis (ἀλλ' ἐν ἄλλοις) ; partibus enim totum est (ἐν γὰρ τοῖς μέρεσι τὸ ὅλον).” (*In Porph. Isag*. 2.16; ed. Libera, p. 9; *Isag*. 7.27‒8.3) [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. Porphyry commented on the process of division in Aristotle’s work *De generatione animalium* IV.3. Original example of division concerns the tree and it proceeds through division of male and female including their physiological differences (*Gen. anim*. 768b5–1). This gave rise to the first scheme of what later tradition since Petrus Hispanus (c. 1240) called *Arbor Porphyriana* (Baumgartner 1980). [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. “Et omnia dicta ab Aristotele in hoc sunt ita quod universalia nullum habent esse extra animam, quod intendit Plato.” (CMDA III.18 ; 440.96‒98) [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. “Dans l’être c’est unité qui est première, ainsi que l’identité (ἡ μὲν ἑνότης προηγεῖται καὶ ἡ ταυτότης), l’altérité venant du fait que l’unité exerce son activité (δὲ ἑτερότης ἐκ τοῦ ἐνεργητικὴν εἶναι τὴν ἑνότητα γέγονε).” (Proclus, *Sent*. 36.16–17 ; trad. Taormina 1999, 22). [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. The Platonic pattern of this being of the third kind dates back to the term “moment” (τὸ ἐξαίφνης, *Parm*. 156d3), which connects all basic hypotheses in the dialogue *Parmenides*. It possesses the strange property of ecstatic suddenness (ἡ ἐξαίφνης αὕτη φύσις) that is placed outside of the space (ἄτοπός τις), furthermore, outside of the motion and rest (μεταξὺ τῆς κινήσεώς τε καὶ στάσεως) and it does not exist in the physical time of change (ἐν χρόνῳ οὐδενὶ οὖσα, *Parm*. 156d5–e1). [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. “Intelligentiae superiores primae quae sequuntur causam primam imprimunt formas secundas stantes quae non destruuntur ita ut sit necessarium iterare eas vice alia. Intelligentiae autem secundae imprimunt formas declines separabiles sicut est anima.” (*Liber de causis* IV, no. 49; ed. digitalis Pattin‒Zimmermann). [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. “La question essentielle serait alors plus radicale : une méta-ontologie est-elle possible ? En d’autre termes : est-il possible de donner à la méta-ontologie un statut scientifique tel qu’elle soit en mesure de contrôler toute la réalité ?” (Taormina 1999, 11) [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. “Le premier intellect, le pur, crée des formes distinctes (ἡ γὰρ περιγεγραμμένη εἰδοποιΐα νοῦ πρώτου ἐστίν, νοῦς δὲ πρῶτος ὁ καθαρὸς νοῦς). Elles sont, à ce premier niveau, les monades des formes, c’est-à-dire l’élément indifférencié en chaque forme (τὰς τῶν εἰδῶν μονάδας, τὸ ἑκάστου λέγων ἀδιάκριτον). Le deuxième intellect est la cause de l’être eidétique (οὐσίας αἴτιος εἰδητικῆς) ; le troisième intellect est la cause de leur création (ὁ τρίτος εἰδοποιΐας ἐν νοεροῖς).” (Taormina 1999, 52; Damascius, *In Phil*. 105, 1–6) [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. “Damascius témoigne du fait que le grand Jamblique « ramasse toute l’opposition en une seule intellection » (πᾶσαν ἀντίθεσιν εἰς μίαν συνάγει νόησιν) puisqu’il retient que les expressions « en lui même » et « en autre » signifient la contraction de l’opposition et n’expriment pas deux choses diffèrentes, mais une seule.” (*Simpl.* *in Parm*. fr. 5.36 ; Taormina 1999, 52–53) [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. “Sensible or composite *ousia* is homonymous in relation to intelligible *ousia*, this homonymy not being complete, however, since it is compatible with an analogical relation. This doctrine is implicitly presented as Aristotelian. (…) The analogical relation thus tends to be confused with the relation ‘from one and to one’ (*aph’ henos kai pros hen*), although this relation in not made explicit either in Aristotle or in Porphyry.” (Hadot 1990, 136) [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. The list compiled by Suidas on Porphyry’ works mentions Porphyry’s writing *On the unified view of Plato and Aristotle* (Περὶ τοῡ μίαν εἴναι τὴν Πλάτωνος καὶ Ἀριστοτέλους αἴρειν). Possibly Simplicius’s contemporary Elias also alludes to this in his commentary on the *Isagoge* (Evangeliou 1988, 5). Authors of Falsafa knew and used Elias’s commentaries on Aristotle through the collection of the Neoplatonic corpus attributed to this author. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. “Le commentaire de Simplicius sur *Cat*. 2a14 reconstruit les thèses du débat sur les universaux antérieurs à la pluralité et les universaux postérieurs à la pluralité. Les protagonistes sont Porphyre et Alexandre d’Aphrodise.” (Taormina 1999, 26) [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. “He then added the proximate concept (*tên prokheiran ennoian*): ‘Whatever signifies something in conjunction with number or in accordance with number.’ To the the relative [he added] ‘simply being said relatively to one another’, and ‘being of such a nature as not to be signified without one another’. (*Simpl. in Cat*. 61.9‒11; trad. Chase 2003, 75) [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. “Having (Ἕξις δὲ λέγεται) means a kind of activity of the haver and of what he has (ἐνέργειά τις τοῦ ἔχοντος καὶ ἐχομένου) something like an action or movement (ὥσπερ πρᾶξίς τις ἢ κίνησις). For when one thing makes (τὸ μὲν ποιῇ) and one is made (τὸ δὲ ποιῆται), between them there is a making (ἔστι ποίησις μεταξύ).” (*Met*. 1022b4‒6; trad. Ross, WA 8) [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. “C’est donc grâce à Porphyre et Simplicius que le rapport grammatical de déchéance de l’abstrait dans le concret, caractéristique de la paronymie, a *permis*, contre Aristote, d’honorer l’invitation malheureuse que son texte faisait de passer du Platonisme grammatical au Platonisme métaphysique.” (Libera 1996, 61) [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. The key section in Ammonius’s commentary already hypostatizes the accident, but still separates it from the first and second substances according to the original intent of the *Categories* (συμβεβηκὸς γὰρ ὐτῷ τὸ λευκὸν καὶ ἐπίκτητον, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ εἶδος, *Amonii In Cat*. 86.21–22). [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. The Categories describe the qualities as whiteness and sweetness, as follows: “It is evident that these are qualities, for those things that possess them are themselves said to be such and such by reason of their presence” (τὰ γὰρ δεδεγμένα ποιὰ λέγεται κατ' αὐτάς). (*Cat*. 9a32‒33; trad. Edghill, WA 1) [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. „...εἰ δὲ ὁμωνύμως λέγονται ἐπὶ τῶν νοητῶν αἱ δέκα κατηγορίαι, οὐκ ἔσονται αἱ αὐταί, εἴπερ ὀνόματος μόνου τοῦ αὐτοῦ κοινωνοῦσιν...” (*Simpl. in Cat*. 73.21‒23) [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. Erigène, *De la division de la Nature. Periphyseon*: “Car le genre généralissime consiste en une essence, qui englobe toutes les natures, et c’est par leur participa­tion à l’essence que tous les existants subsistent ; et c’est pourquoi on l’appelle généralissime. *L’essence descend à travers ces subdivisions successives*, en passant par les genres et les espèces jusqu’à cette espèce spécialissime, à laquelle les Grecs donnent le nom d’*atomos*, c’est-à-dire d’individu, tel que l’homme individuel ou le bœuf individuel.” (Libera 1998, Introd., pp. XIII–XIV) [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. See Sorabji 1987, 151–53. The cited commentary, unfortunately, passed over the role of Jamblichus’s transcendental categories of being (πέρας—ἄπειρον), which determine Simplicius’s and Philoponus’s concept of formal determinations, including the quantity. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. “Perhaps the solution is that their matter is in one sense the same, but in another sense different. For that which underlies them, whatever its nature may be qua underlying them, is the same: but its actual being is not the same.” (ὂν ὑπόκειται τὸ αὐτό, τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτό; *De gen. et corr*. 319b3, trad. Joachim, WA 2) [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. “It does not seem to be the traditional concept of prime matter usually assumed to be present in the Greek commentators…” (De Haas 1997, 145). [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. “Knowledge of the First Cause has truthfully been called ‘First Philosophy,’ since all the rest of philosophy is contained in its knowledge.” (D’Ancona 1998, 852). [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. Avicenna Latinus, *Scientia Divina I–IV, ed.* Van Riet, 1977. p. 1\*. On Avicenna’s reception of al-Fārābī’s metaphysics see Gutas 1988, 237–252, Menn 2013, 143; Bertolacci 2006, 37–64. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. “Die ersten Substanzen, d. h. die Individuen, bedürfen zu ihrem Sein nichts ausser sich selbst. Die zweiten Substanzen aber, wie die Arten und die Gattungen, bedürfen zu ihrem Sein der Individuen. Folglich kommt der Begriff Substanz den Individuen früher zu und sind sie dieses Namens „Substanz“ würdiger als die (Alldinge) Universalien. Eine andere Weise der Betrachtung ist nun aber die: Die allgemeinen Begriffe der Substanzen sind, da sie bestehend, bleibend und während, die Individuen (Einzelerscheinungen) dagegen vergehend und schwindend sind, des Namens „Substanz“ würdiger als die Individuen. Bei beiden Theorien ist klar, dass die Substanz von dem, wovon sie ausgesagt wird, im Früheren und Späteren praedicirt werde und ist „Substanz“ daher ein Wort mit Doppelsinn.” (*Die Antworten Alfārābī's auf einzelne vorgelegte Fragen*; ed. Dieterici, pp. 146.23–147.6) [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. “Therefore he had to give precedence to that inquiry in order to achieve a more perfect knowledge of natural things and complete the natural philosophy, and the political and human philosophy, which they lacked. Therefore Aristote proceeded in a book that he called Metaphysics to inquire into, and to investigate, the beings in a manner different than natural inquiry.” (*The Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle* III.19; trad. Muhsin 1962, 130.23–35) [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. „Dico quod substantia superior, postquam mentionem fecimus de illa et consideravimus eius essentiam, induxit nos ad inquirendum de illa et de eius massa.“ (*De ortu* *scientiarum* I.6; ed. Baeumker, p. 21.15–17) [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. The compilation of Plotinus’s *Enneads* IV, V, VI and the interpretation of Aristotle by Alexander Afrodisias probably existed in Syriac and was translated into Arabic under the title *Uthulugia Aristutālīs* (*Theology of Aristotle*) a *Kitāb al-Rubūbiyah* (*Book of Divinity*) at the beginning of the 9th century (Zimmermann 1986). [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. “The fact that Fārābī has exposed all of these errors of Avicenna before Avicenna made them makes his disclosure all the more persuasive: this shows (so Averroes can say) that what Averroes is taking from Fārābī is not an ad hoc response to Avicenna, rather Fārābī is pointing to objectively misleading features of the situation, and notably of the Arabic translations of Greek philosophical texts, which make it understandable that even someone as brilliant as Avicenna might be misled.” (Menn 2012, 68) [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. “Applying the rule to intellect, Alexander finds that the transcendent active intellect, which is ‘preeminently and by its own nature intelligible,’ can ‘with reason’ be considered the ’cause of other things’ intelligible thought (Alexander, *De anima* 88‒89). In a word, the active intellect is known to be the cause of human thought not because it is found to do anything, but inasmuch as it is the being with the highest degree of intelligibility.” (Davidson 1992, 21). [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. “In dieser Weise muss man es sich klarmachen, wie die Formen des Vorhandenen in dieses Wesen, welches Aristoteles in seinem Buch über die Seele den potentiellen Intellect nennt, gelangen.” (*Über die Bedeutungen des Worts 'Intellect', 'Vernunft'*; ed. Dieterici, p. 68.4–7) [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. “Secundum hoc exemplum oportet ut intelligas acquisicionem formarum eorum que sunt in illa essencia quam uocauit Aristoteles in libro de anima intellectum in potencia.” (*Liber Alpharabii De intellectu et intellecto*, ed. Gilson, p. 118.110–12) [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. “For just as light, being productive of actual vision, is itself seen along with its concomitants [sc. illumined things] (ποιητικὸν ὂν τῆς κατ' ἐνέργειαν ὄψεως) and it is through it that colour [is visible] (αὐτὸ ὁρᾶται καὶ τὰ σὺν αὐτῷ), so also the intellect from without (ὁ θύραθεν νοῦς) becomes the cause of thinking for us (αἴτιος γίνεται τοῦ νοεῖν ἡμῖν), when it is itself thought [by us], not by producing intellect itself but by, through its own nature, completing the intellect that exists and bringing it to its proper [activities].” (*De anima liber cum Mantissa* [*De intellectu*] 111.32‒36; trad. Schroeder 1950, 55) [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. “We conclude that in all our inquiries we are asking either whether there is a middle or what the middle is: for the middle here is precisely the cause, and it is the cause that we seek in all our inquiries (πάλιν τὸ διὰ τί ζητῶμεν ἢ τὸ τί ἐστι, τότε ζητοῦμεν τί τὸ μέσον).” (*Anal. Post*. 90a1; trad. Mure, WA 1) [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. “And in fact mind as we have described it is what it is by virtue of becoming all things (νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι), while there is another which is what it is by virtue of making all things (τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν): this is a sort of positive state like light (τὸ φῶς); for in a sense light makes potential colours into actual colours (τὸ φῶς ποιεῖ τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα χρώματα ἐνεργείᾳ χρώματα).” (*De anima* 430a14–17; trad. Smith, WA 3) [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. “Somit ist das Princip, wodurch der Blick actuell sehend ward, nachdem er doch vorher nur potentiell sehend war und das wodurch das Geschaute, welches nur potentiell erschaubar war, zum wirklich Geschauten wurde jene Sehfähigkeit (Durchsichtigkeit), die dem Blick von der Sonne her zukommt. In dieser Weise nun kommt jenem Wesen, dem potentiellen Intellect, etwas zu, das sich ebenso zu ihm verhält, wie die actuelle Sehfähigkeit zum Blick.” (*Über die Bedeutungen des Worts 'Intellect', 'Vernunft'*, ed. Dieterici; p. 74.22–30). [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. Aristotle’s writing *De anima* was translated from Greek into Latin in at least three stages. The first translation, known as the *Translatio vetus*, was probably done by Jacob of Venice (ca. 1150). Sometime around 1230, a new translation was made from Arabic (the so-called *Translatio nova*), probably by Michael Scotus, which was inspired by the CMDA. We owe a full translation of *De anima* to Guillaume de Moerbeke (1267) as so-called *Recensio nova*. [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
81. “Secundum hoc igitur exemplum in illa essencia que est intellectus in potencia acquiritur quiddam cuius comparacio est sicut comparacio irradiacionis in effectu ad uisum, et hoc tribuit ei intelligencia agens. Igitur ipsa est principium quod ea que sunt intellecta in potencia, facit esse intellecta in effectu. Et sicut sol est qui facit oculum uisumin effectu et uisa in potencia facit uisa in effectu cum lumine quod confert ei, sic et intelligencia agens est que trahit ad effectum intellectum qui est in potencia et facit esse intellectum in effectu cum eo quod tribuit illi ab illo principio et per illam intellecta in potencia iiunt intellecta in effectu.” (*Liber Alpharabii De intellectu et intellecto*, ed. Gilson, p. 122.257–66) [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
82. “Derselbe [i.e. intellectus agens] scheint aber nicht immerfort in Taetigkeit zu sein, sondern einmal ist er handelnd, ein andermal nicht. Die Unterbrechung des Handelns beweist aber notwendig einen Wandel des Zustands, sodass er von einem Zustand zum andern übergeht.” (*Über die Bedeutungen des Worts 'Intellect', 'Vernunft'*; ed. Dieterici, p. 78.1–5; *De Liber Alpharabii De intellectu et intellecto*, ed. Gilson, p. 124.326–330). [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
83. “Wird aber das Intelligible zum actuell Intelligibilen, so werden viele von diesen anderen Kategorien von ihm hinweggehoben, so dass sein Sein ein andres wird, ein Sein, was nicht jenes Sein war.” (*Über die Bedeutungen des Worts 'Intellect', 'Vernunft'*; ed. Dieterici, p. 69.12–15; ed. Gilson, p. 119.135–140) [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
84. “Ist nun das Intelligible zum actuell Intelligiblen geworden so wird es zu einem in der Welt Vorhandenen (*fiunt tunc unum de hiis que habent esse in mundo*) und rechnet man es somit als Intelligibles zur Gesammtheit des Vorhandenen (*numerantur esse de universitate eorum que sunt*). Es gehört aber zur Natur von allem Vorhandenen, dass es gedacht werden kann und als Form für dieses Wesen (den Intellect) statt habe.” (*Über die Bedeutungen des Worts 'Intellect', 'Vernunft'*; ed. Dieterici, p. 69.24–29; *Liber Alpharabii De intellectu et intellecto*; ed. Gilson, p. 119.144–148) [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
85. “Hec sint intellecta in quantum sunt intellecta in effectu et ipsa essencia sit intellectus in effectu et intelligat eciam. Igitur quod intelligitur tunc non est aliud ab eo quod est intellectus intelligens in effectu.” (*Liber* *Alpharabii De intellectu et intellecto*; ed. Gilson, p. 119.150–153) [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
86. “Jedoch ist das, was deshalb, weil irgend ein Intelligibles ihm zur Form geworden war, actueller Intellect wurde, einmal actueller Intellect in Beziehung auf diese Form allein, dagegen potentieller Intellect in Beziehung auf ein andres Intelligibles, was ihm noch nicht actuell zukam. Kommt diesem Intellect aber das zweite Intelligible zu, so wird es actueller Intellect im ersten und zweiten Intelligiblen (*fiet intellectus in effectu propter intellectum primum et intellectum secundum*).” (*Über die Bedeutungen des Worts 'Intellect', 'Vernunft'*; ed. Dieterici, p. 70.5–14; *Liber Alpharabii De intellectu et intellecto*; ed. Gilson, p. 119.155–59) [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
87. “Der erworbene Intellect ist also gleichsam Substrat für jene Formen und wird derselbe gleichsam zur Form für den actuellen Intellect und ist dieser letztere somit gleichsam Substrat und Stoff für den erworbenen Intellect. Der actuelle Intellect ist aber wiederum Form für dieses Wesen (den potentiellen Intellect) und dieses Wesen wie ein Stoff für jenen. Hierbei beginnen nun die Formen zu den leiblichen stofflichen herabzusinken, während sie vordem sich allmählich erhoben, bis sie sich langsam von den Stoffen trennten, und dem lmmateriellen mit einander wetteifernd, zustrebten.” (*Über die Bedeutungen des Worts 'Intellect', 'Vernunft'*; ed. Dieterici, p. 72.15–29; *Liber Alpharabii De intellectu et intellecto*; ed. Gilson, p. 121.207–214) [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
88. “Ihm erstand dann ein actueller Intellect, der höher steht als der Passiv-Intellect, der vollendeter und noch mehr als jener immateriell wurde, und noch näher dem schaffenden Intellect steht. Derselbe wird dann benannt 'der gewonnene (erworbene) Intellect'. Er steht zwischen dem Passiv-Intellect und dem schaffenden Intellect. Nichts andres liegt zwischen ihm und dem schaffenden Intellect. Der Passiv-Intellect ist also wie Stoff und Substrat für den gewonnenen Intellect und ist dieser Letztere wiederum wie Stoff und Substrat für den schaffenden Intellect.” (*Der Musterstaat von Al-Fārābī*, cap. 27a; ed. Dieterici, p. 92) [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
89. „Die erste Stufe, wodurch der Mensch zum Menschen wird, ist die, dass (in ihm) die natürliche annehmende und dazu wohlbereitete Grundanlage statthabe, diese dient dazu um actuell Intellect zu werden. Diese Grundanlage ist allen gemeinsam. Zwischen ihr und dem schaffenden Intellect liegen dann zwei Stufen nämlich die, dass der Passiv-Intellect wirklich erstehe, so wie auch die, dass der gewonnene Intellect statthabe.“ (*Der Musterstaat von Al-Fārābī*, cap. 27a; ed. Dieterici, p. 92) [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
90. “Farabi s’inscrit dans le prolongement direct de cette doctrine en parlant pour sa part de la «norme naturelle de l’humanité», *fiṭra insāniyya*, qui charactérise tous les hommes de saine constitution et qui constitue pour chacun d’eux une aptitude réceptive à l’égard d’un même ensemble d’«intelligibles premiers» et d’activités communes afférentes, ensemble qui est appelé par métonymie «norme naturelle commune», *fiṭra mushtarika*.” (Vallat 2004, 223) [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
91. Griffel quotes the work *Revival of the Religious Sciences*, ch. 29 (*Iḥyā’ ’ulūm al-dīn*) as follows: “I mean by it (*scil*. the intellect) the inborn original disposition and the initial light through which people perceive the essences of things.” (Griffel 2012, 6 [al*-*Ghazālī, *Iḥyā’* ed. Cairo 11:2066.18–21]). [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
92. “Nachdem er [ie. intellectus agens] aber die Formen dem Stoff verliehn, bemüht er sich nach der zwischen ihnen herrschenden Lage das Getrennte zusammen und einander nah zu bringen, sodass dieselben dem erworbenen Intellect, in welchem die menschliche Natur enthalten ist, zukommen, d.h. dass der Mensch in allem, was seine Natur herstellt, dem taetigen Intellect möglichst nahe steht. Hierin beruht denn auch das höchste Glück des Menschen und das himmlische Leben und wird hierdurch die höchste Vollendung und das Erhabenste, was seine Natur ausmacht, erreicht.” (*Über die Bedeutungen des Worts 'Intellect', 'Vernunft'*; ed. Dieterici, p. 77.5–14; *Liber Alpharabii De intellectu et intellecto*; ed. Gilson, p. 123.300–310) [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
93. “Als der Saal nahezu voll war, nahm einer der Ungläubigen das Wort und sprach: «Wir haben uns versammelt, um zu discutiren, sagte er, Ihr alle kennt die Vorbedingungen, Ihr Mohammedaner dürft uns nicht mit Beweisgründen bekämpfen, die aus Eurer Schrift geschöpft sind oder auf die Reden Eures Propheten sich stützen. Denn wir glauben weder an dieses Buch noch an Euren Propheten. Jeder von den Anwesenden soll sich nur auf Gründe berufen, die aus der menschlichen Vernunft genommen sind.»” (Kremer 1868, 241*−*42) [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
94. The contemporary debate about the so-called “second beginning” of Aristotle’s metaphysics dates back to Avicenna’s metaphysics *Ilāhiyyāt* (A. Bertolacci). Previously, the beginning of the second scholasticism was sought in Thomas Aquinas and in Scotus (L. Honnefelder) or in 12th century scholasticism, which was influenced by Avicenna’s metaphysics (A. Speer). For a survey of these debates, see Bertolacci 2014, 102. [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
95. “It is obvious that by equivocity in ‘order and proportionality’ Fārābī means essentially the same thing as modulated univocals (*asmāʾ mušakkika*). This is confirmed by the following quotation from Fārābīs *Kitāb al‑Burhān*, where ‘existent’, ‘one’, ‘thing’, and other similar terms are classified under modulated univocals.” (Treiger 2012, 350) [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
96. “Wenn der actuelle Intellect das Intelligible, welches ja in Formen für ihn in sofern besteht, als sie actuell gedachte sind, denkt, so wird der Intellect, den wir früher als actuell bezeichneten (*intellectus in effectu*) jetzt zum erworbenen Intellect (*intellectus adeptus*).” (*Über die Bedeutungen des Worts 'Intellect', 'Vernunft'*; ed. Dieterici, p. 71.5–9; *Liber Alpharabii De intellectu et intellecto*; ed. Gilson, p. 120.189‒92) [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
97. “If God knows that Zayd will set out on a journey tomorrow, to use one of al-Farābī’s examples, then Zayd will necessarily travel tomorrow. The event is necessary due to something else, in this case, God’s creative activity that manifests itself in God’s foreknowledge. If the event is looked at solely by itself, however, Zayd’s decision to travel is not necessary but merely possible, as it is still within Zayd’s power (*qudra*) not to travel. Divine foreknowledge does not remove human free will or the ability to act differently from what is foreknown.” (Griffel 2009, 140) [↑](#footnote-ref-97)
98. “With respect to ‘mixed deductions,’ Averroes criticizes al-Fārābī for ‘imagining’ that the major possible premise contains the condition which, according to al-Fārābī, is predicable of the whole in all the categories. For Averroes, both al-Fārābī and Alexander (of Aphrodisias) are in error in their interpretation of Aristotle on this point. As regards the possible in general, Averroes agrees with al-Fārābī’s concept of definition in the first figure, but disagrees with him regarding the composition of existential and possible premises, in which the conclusion is universal.” (Fakhry 2001, 40) [↑](#footnote-ref-98)
99. “Das Stehen in der Lichtung des Seins nenne ich die Ek-sistenz des Menschen. Nur dem Menschen eignet diese Art zu sein. Die so verstandene Ek-sistenz ist nicht nur der Grund der Möglichkeit der Vernunft, ratio, sondern die Ek-sistenz ist das, worin das Wesen des Menschen die Herkunft seiner Bestimmung wahrt. Die Ek‑sistenz läßt sich nur vom Wesen des Menschen, das heißt, nur von der menschlichen Weise zu »sein« sagen; denn der Mensch allein ist, soweit wir erfahren, in das Geschick der Ek‑sistenz eingelassen.“ (*Brief über den Humanismus*; GA 9, 323‒24) [↑](#footnote-ref-99)
100. „Da Gott, der Gepriesene lebendig ist und diese Welt mit allem, was darin ist, ins Dasein rief, so war nötig, dass bei ihm die Formen dessen, was er schaffen wollte, in seinem herrlichen und unvergleichlichen Wesen existirten.“ (*Die Harmonie zwischen Plato und Aristoteles*; ed. Dieterici, p. 46.12–17) [↑](#footnote-ref-100)
101. „Al-Fārābī’s ingenious solution is to say that things can be separate from matter (or separate from natural things) in two ways: either as substances that actually exist without matter, or as universal attributes like being and unity that apply both to natural things and to immaterial substances, and that in this way have an existence separate from natural things, unlike the *per se* attributes of natural things, which existes only in and through natural things.“ (Menn 2013, 145–46). [↑](#footnote-ref-101)
102. „Das erste Object dieser Wissenschaft ist das absolute Sein, so wie das, was demselben in der AlIgemeinheit gleich kommt, nämlich die Eins.“ (*Die Abhandlung von den Tendenzen der aristotelischen Metaphysik von dem zweiten Meister*, ed. Dieterici; p. 57.26–28) [↑](#footnote-ref-102)
103. „Al-Fārābī did not want religion and philosophy to collide, so he had either to identify them or to subordinate the one to the other. In effect he did both. He said that both philosophy *(Falsafa)* and religion (*milla*) gave you the truth, but that they did so in different versions, designed for different audiences. Philosophy, which had existed before religion, led you to things as they really were by means of proofs based on demonstration *(burhān);* religion represented the abstract truths of philosophy in symbols, images and similes that everyone could understand and secured acceptance for them by persuasion *(iqnā*ᶜ). “ (Crone 2004, 173) [↑](#footnote-ref-103)
104. “En suivant un raisonnement semblable, pour toutes les essences naturelles en dehors de lʿhomme, cela amène à admettre que leur connaissance est simplement la production de leurs formes et de leurs notions abstraites de la matière, dans lʿintelligence de lʿhomme.” (*Petits traités apologétiques*, *Traité VI*; Périer 1920b, p. 80) [↑](#footnote-ref-104)
105. “Because these forms are parts of the composite and for this reason are causes of it, and every cause is prior by nature to its effect, forms free of all concomitants will therefore be prior by nature to their effects. Their effects are the natural beings, so forms free [of all concomitants] will be prior by nature to the natural beings. When what is prior by nature is removed, what is posterior to it will be removed; and when what is posterior to it exists, it will exist.” (*On the Four Scientific Questions concerning the Three Kinds of Existence: Divine, Natural and Logical*, cap. 15; ed. Menn & Wisnovsky, p. 95) [↑](#footnote-ref-105)
106. The manuscripts from Tehran, which Périer did not yet know, prove Aristotelianism of Ibn Ādi: “Quant aux choses universelles, leur subsistance et leur manière d’être essentielle ne se trouvent que dans leurs choses particulières et leur individus.” (Platti 1983, 85) [↑](#footnote-ref-106)
107. “Il y a une analogie entre les trois Hypostases divines et l’intellect. En les comparant on voit que l’intellect pur (*al-‘aql al-muğarrad*) se trouve à la place du Père ; l’intelligeant (ou ce qui intellige d’une intellection pure) (*al-‘āgil ‘aqlan muğarradan*) se trouve à la place du Fils ; et l’intelligible (ou ce qui est intelligé d’une intellection pure) (*al-mā‘gūl ‘aqlan muğarradan*) vient à la place de l’Esprit. Ceci n’est pas une simple comparaison. Elle traduit une réalité interne de la Trinité.” (Platti 1983, 109) [↑](#footnote-ref-107)
108. “Or, il est évident que l’intellect ne comprend que par l’intellect et qu’il est une essence existence réellement. La notion d’intellect n’implique pas la notion *d’intelligent en acte* (*‘âgil*) ou *d’intelligible* (*ma’qoûl*), et la notion d’intelligible est différente de la notion d’intellect ou d’intelligent.“ (*Petits traités apologétiques*, Traité I ; ed. Périer, pp. 18–19) [↑](#footnote-ref-108)
109. “L’on peut dire ainsi de l’essence, considérée comme se représentant elle-même, qu’elle est intelligente et considérée comme représentée, qu’elle est intelligible. Il est encore évident que la notion de l’intellect considéré seul est le principe des deux autres notions d’intelligent et d’intelligible, puisque la suppression de cette première notion entraîne nécessairement celle des deux autres, tandis que l’existence de l’une de ces deux dernières suppose nécessairement la première.“ (*Petits traités apologétiques*, Traité I ; ed. Périer, p. 20) [↑](#footnote-ref-109)
110. “Denn das, was er [der Geist] wissen will, ist gleichsam sein eigener Stoff, denn er formte sich ja in der Form des Gewussten und Betrachteten. Formte sich aber der Geist in der Form des des Gewussten und Betrachteten, ward er wie dasselbe der That nach.“ (*Die sogenannte Theologie des Aristoteles* II.17; ed. Dieterici, p. 18) [↑](#footnote-ref-110)
111. “Il s’intellige lui-même. En tant qu’Il intellige son essence, Il est intelligent et intelligence en acte ; et en tant que son essence intellige, il est intelligible en acte.“ (Al-Farābī, *Al-Madīna*; see Platti 1983, 113) [↑](#footnote-ref-111)
112. “En effet, le Créateur est distinct de toutes les créatures, puisqu’il les a toutes produites, qu’il leur conserve la vie et les fait mourir. Or ces distinctions entre lui et les créatures ne lui sont pas substantielles puisqu’elles n’ont existé pour le Créateur qu’après un temps où elles ne lui convenaient pas.” (*Petits traités apologétiques*, Traité III ; ed. Périer, p. 33) [↑](#footnote-ref-112)
113. “En outre, puisque l’intellect en acte et l’intelligible en acte sont un dans le sujet ainsi que l’a démontré Aristote, et comme nous l’avons nous-même démontré dans notre Traité des trois sortes d’êtres [*On the Four Scientific Questions Concerning the Three Kinds of Existence*], et comme nous le démontrerons encore dans le présent traité, Il faut que nos intelligences, au moment où elles perçoivent le Créateur, fassent un avec lui.“ (*Petits traités apologétiques*, *traité VI*; ed. Périer, p. 75) [↑](#footnote-ref-113)
114. “Was das Denken als Vernehmen vernimmt, ist das Präsente in seiner Präsenz. An ihr nimmt das Denken das Maß für sein Wesen als Vernehmen. Demgemäß ist das Denken jene Präsentation des Präsenten, die uns das Anwesende in seiner Anwesenheit zu stellt und es damit vor uns stellt, damit wir vor dem Anwesenden stehen und innerhalb seiner dieses Stehen ausstehen können. Das Denken stellt als diese Präsentation das Anwesende in die Beziehung auf uns zu, stellt es zurück zu uns her.” (*Was heißt denken?*; GA 7, 141) [↑](#footnote-ref-114)
115. “Cuius comparatio ad nostras animas est sicut comparatio solis ad visus nostros, quia sicut sol videtur per se in effectu, et videtur luce ipsius in effectu quod non videbatur in effectu, sic est dispositio huius intelligentiae quantum ad nostras animas.” (*Liber de anima* V.5 ; ed. Van Riet, p. 127.36–39) [↑](#footnote-ref-115)
116. “L’oeuvre accomplie par l’Intelligence agente est précisément de dénuder la forme sensible de la matière et de tous les caractères qui en dépendent, pour l’imprimer dans l’intellect possible de l’âme raisonnable. C’est ce que l’on nomme *l*’*abstraction*. Abstraire n’est d’ailleurs pas transporter dans l’intellect la forme qui était dans l’imagination. Cela ne consiste pas non plus en ce que la forme sensible, une fois considérée dans sa nudité, produit dans l’intellect possible une forme semblable à elle.“ (Gilson 1930, 65) [↑](#footnote-ref-116)
117. “Ainsi, au niveau de la perception sensible, chaque degré de perception opère une abstraction plus ou moins complète sur cette forme, la séparant des conséquents matériels qui lui sont adjoints en raison de sa relation avec la matière.” (Sebti 2005, 110) [↑](#footnote-ref-117)
118. “Post haec oportet te scire quod, cum primus dicitur intelligentia, dicitur secundum intentionem simplicem quam nosti in libro De anima: ipse enim intelligit res simul, ita ut per eas non multiplicetur in sua substantia nec ut imaginetur certitudo suae essentiae esse hoc quod ipse imaginet eas, sed quod fluunt formae earum ab eo intellectae; unde ipse aptior est ad hoc ut sit intelligentia quam ipsae formae fluentes a sua intelligibilitate ; et quod ipse intelligit seipsum, et quod ipse est principium omnis quod est.” (*Liber de philosophia prima* VIII.7 ; ed. Van Riet, p. 423.81–85) [↑](#footnote-ref-118)
119. The writing *De anima* contains a comparison with the writing tablet, on which nothing is written so far (ἐν γραμματείῳ ᾧ μηθὲν ἐνυπάρχει ἐντελεχείᾳ γεγραμμένον, *De anima* 430a1–2). The term πίναξ ἄγραφος is later cited in the commentary of Alexander Aphrodisias (ἐοικὼς πινακίδι ἀγράφῳ, μᾶλλον δὲ τῷ τῆς πινακίδος ἀγράφῳ, ἀλλ' οὐ τῇ πινακίδι αὐτῇ, *De anima liber cum Mantissa* 84.25). [↑](#footnote-ref-119)
120. “The function of the theoretical faculty is to receive the impressions of the universal forms abstracted from matter (*al-ṣuwar al-kulliyya al-muğarrada ʿan al-mādda*). If these forms are already abstracted in themselves (*muğarrada bi-ḏātihī*), it simply receives them; if not, it makes them immaterial by abstraction (*bi-tağrīdihā*), so that no trace whatever of material attachments (*ʿalāʾiq al-mādda*) remains in them.” (*Kitāb al-Nağāt* [*The Book of Salvation*], ed. Dānešpazūh, p. 333.2‒5, cit. after D'Ancona 2008, 55‒56) [↑](#footnote-ref-120)
121. “The ‘intention’ is something in the object and not in the perciever, as Avicenna repeatedly stresses. It is an attribute of the object, such as ‘hostility,’ which has a connotation for the perceiver. *Ma’na* ist therefore probably best translated as ‘connotational attribute.’” (Hasse 2000, 132) The author further notes that “Avicenna gives connotational attributes a very independent ontological status” (*ibid.*, p. 135). [↑](#footnote-ref-121)
122. On the sources of this thought experiment in Avicenna’s corpus, see Marmura 1986; Druart 1988. On the development of that Avicenna’s concept throughout his work, see Hasse 2000, 80‒92. [↑](#footnote-ref-122)
123. “Les âmes humaines reçoivent ainsi les images provenant des âmes des sphères célestes par l’intermédiaire de leur imagination.” (Sebti 2005, 126) [↑](#footnote-ref-123)
124. “Possibile est ergo ut alicuius hominis anima eo quod est clara et cohaerens principiis intellectibilibus, ita sit inspirata ut accendatur ingenio ad recipiendum omnes quaestiones ab intelligentia agente, aut subito, aut pacne subito, firmiter impressas, non probabiliter, sed cum ordine qui comprehendit medios terminos (probata quæ sciuntur ex suis causis non sunt intelligibilia). Et hic est unus modus prophetiae qui omnibus virtutibus prophetiae altior est. Unde congrue vocatur virtus sancta, quia est altior gradus inter omnes virtutes humanas.” (*Liber de anima* V.6, ed. Van Riet, p. 153.10‒18) [↑](#footnote-ref-124)
125. “Thus the relation of the theoretical faculty to the abstract immaterial forms which we have mentioned is sometimes of the nature of an absolute potentiality; this faculty belongs to the soul which has not yet realized any portion of the perfection potentially belonging to it. In this stage it is called the ‘material intelligence,’ a faculty that is present in every individual of the human species. It is called ‘material’ in view of its resemblance to primary matter, which in itself does not possess any of the forms but is the substratum of all forms.” (*Kitāb al Najāt*, cap. 5; ed. Rahman, p. 34.13‒22) [↑](#footnote-ref-125)
126. “Dicemus igitur quod virtus intellectiva, si intelliget instrumento corporali, oporteret ut non intelligeret seipsam, nec intelligeret instrumentum suum, nec intelliget se intelligere.” (*Liber de anima* V.2, ed. Van Riet, p. 93.60) [↑](#footnote-ref-126)
127. “Cum enim transit in mentem eius qui discit id quod cohaeret cum intellecto inquisito et convertit se anima ad inspiciendum (ipsa autem inspectio est conversio animae ad principium dans intellectum) solet anima coniungi intelligentiae et emanat ab ea virtus intellectus simplicis, quem sequitur emanatio ordinandi.” (*Liber de anima* V.6 ; ed. Van Riet, p. 149.44‒50) [↑](#footnote-ref-127)
128. “Avicenna compares this with the intuitive perception on the part of the intellect of the necessary connexion between the premises and the conclusion. Nor does the universal element in the images produce it like in the intellect. The images are then not the cause of the intelligible at all. Their consideration by the soul is merely preparatory for the reception of the intelligible.” (Rahman 1952, 116) [↑](#footnote-ref-128)
129. “Etenim ad perceptionem, cui certum & indubitatum judicium possit inniti, non modo requiritur ut sit clara, sed etiam ut sit distincta. Claram voco illam, quæ menti attendenti praesens & aperta est : sicut ea clarè à nobis videri dicimus, quæ, oculo intuenti praesentia, satis fortiter & apertè illum movent. Distinctam autem illam, quæ, cùm clara sit, ab omnibus aliis ita sejuncta est & praecisa, ut nihil planè aliud, quàm quod clarum est, in se contineat.” (*Principia philosophiae*, cap. I; ed. Tannery 8, 22.3‒9) [↑](#footnote-ref-129)
130. “Ideo anima quam invenimus in animali et in vegetabili est perfectio prima corporis naturalis instrumentalis habentis opera vitae. “(*Liber de anima* I.1, ed. Van Riet, p. 29.60–63) [↑](#footnote-ref-130)
131. “Anima etiam non est substantia quæ sit corpus. Restat igitur ut sit substantia quæ est spiritus rationalis.” (*Gundiss. in* *De anima* 42.14–15) For Avicenna's reception of the soul as *hoc aliquid* in the Toledo school, see Boer 2013, 24–25. [↑](#footnote-ref-131)
132. “Then I say that matter is other than genus, since matter is a thing subject to all the things predicable of it. It fits their being and the being of each one of them according to the form which is proper of it. On the contrary, genus is not something existent, if its definition is known, but only a name. Its stability comes from its being in the thought of the thinker, but it does not exist nor is it an individual.” (*Quaestiones Naturales* II.28; Badawi, *Commentaires*, p. 53.18‒21; see Di Giovanni 2004, 264) [↑](#footnote-ref-132)
133. “As matter, then, *body* signifies the sole property of being a dimensional substance; as genus, it signifies the same property, but taken together with all the following ones inherent in the subject. When all these properties are specified, you get the species. When they are not all specified, you get the genus.” (*Kitāb al-Shifā*, ed. Anawati, tome I, 213–219; see Di Giovanni 2004, 262) [↑](#footnote-ref-133)
134. “Definitio enim equinitatis est praeter definitionem universalitatis nec universalitas continetur in definitione equinitatis. Equinitas etenim habet definitionem quæ non eget universalitate, sed est cui accidit universalitas. Unde ipsa equinitas non est aliquid nisi equinitas tantum ; ipsa enim in se nec est multa nec unum, nec est existens in his sensibilibus nec in anima, nec est aliquid horum potentia vel effectu, ita ut hoc contineatur intra essentiam equinitatis, sed ex hoc quod est equinitas tantum.” (*Liber de philosophia prima* V.1 ; ed. Van Riet, p. 228.29–36) [↑](#footnote-ref-134)
135. “Dico igitur quod quamvis prioritas et posterioritas dicantur multis modis, tamen fortasse conveniunt in uno secundum ambiguitatem, scilicet quia priori, inquantum est prius, aliquid est quod non est posteriori, sed nihil est posteriori quod non habeat id quod est prius.” (*Liber de anima* IV.1, ed. Van Riet, p. 184.6–10) [↑](#footnote-ref-135)
136. “Cum autem aliquam formam repraesentat sensus imaginationi et imaginatio intellectui, et intellectus excipit ex illa intentionem… nisi secundum accidens quod est illius proprium ex hoc quod est illud accidens, ita ut aliquando accipiat illam nudam, aliquando cum illo accidente. Et propter hoc dicitur quod Socrates et Plato sunt una intentio in humanitate.” (*Liber de anima* V.5 ; ed. Van Riet, pp. 129.82‒130.90) [↑](#footnote-ref-136)
137. “Unaquaeque enim res habet certitudinem qua est id quod est, sicut triangulus habet certitudinem qua est triangulus, et albedo habet certitudinem qua est albedo. Et hoc est quod fortasse appellamus esse proprium, nec intendimus per illud nisi intentionem esse affirmativi.” (*Liber de philosophia prima* I.5 ; ed. Van Riet, pp. 34.55‒35.59) [↑](#footnote-ref-137)
138. “Unaquaeque res habet certitudinem propriam quæ est eius quidditas. Et notum est quod certitudo cuiuscumque rei quæ propria est ei, est praeter esse quod multivocum est cum aliquid, quoniam, cum dixeris quod certitudo rei talis est in singularibus, vel in anima, vel absolute ita ut communicet utrisque, erit tunc haec intentio apprehensa et intellecta.” (*Liber de philosophia prima* I.5 ; ed. Van Riet, p. 35.62–68) [↑](#footnote-ref-138)
139. “Potest autem aliquis dicere quod animal ex hoc quod est animal non habet esse in individuis, quia quod est in individuis est aliquod animal, non animal ex hoc quod est animal.” (*Liber de philosophia prima* V.1 ; ed. Van Riet, p. 234.58–59) [↑](#footnote-ref-139)
140. “Et natura dicitur ad modum particularis et ad modum universalis. Sed quæ dicitur ad modum particularis, hoc est natura propria uniuscuiusque individui. Sed quæ dicitur ad modum universalis, fortassis aut erit universalis considerata ut species, aut erit universalis absolute, et ambae non habet esse in signatis scilicet individuis, nec sunt essentia existentes nisi in intellectu : dico enim quod non habet esse nisi particulare.” (*Liber primus Naturalium. Tractatus Primus de causis et principiis naturalium*; ed. Van Riet, p. 66.29‒35). [↑](#footnote-ref-140)
141. “Thus, because only what is expressed by the quiddity as ‘common nature’ will be instanced as such by a random or generic individual (and hence by the species it represents), the quiddity that corresponds to ‘common nature’ has a ‘divine’ existence and participates in the purpose of the divine flow.” (Lizzini 2003b, 137) [↑](#footnote-ref-141)
142. “Si autem non fuerit hoc propositum et haec coniunctio utriusque, non scietur quid sit res cuius quaerimus intentionem, nec separabitur a comitantia intelligendi ens cum illa ullo modo, quoniam intellectus de ente semper comitabitur illam, quia illa habet esse vel in singularibus vel in aestimatione vel intellectu. Si autem non esset ita, tunc non esset res.” (*Liber de philosophia prima* I.5 ; ed. Van Riet, p. 36.78–83) [↑](#footnote-ref-142)
143. “Ideo primum subiectum huius scientiae est ens ; et ea quæ inquirit sunt consequentia ens, inquantum est ens, sine conditione.” (*Liber de philosophia prima* I.2 ; ed. Van Riet, p. 12.37–39) [↑](#footnote-ref-143)
144. “Ex hoc enim esse nec est genus nec species nec individuum nec unum nec multa, sed ex hoc esse est tantum animal et tantum homo. Sed comitatur illud sine dubio esse unum vel multa, cum impossibile sit aliquid esse et non esse alteram istorum...” (*Liber de philosophia prima* V.1 ; ed. Van Riet, p. 234.42–44) [↑](#footnote-ref-144)
145. “Ad certitudinem vero ipsum essendi corpus, et ad sciendum nos illud esse corpus, non eget ut sit finitum. Finitio enim accidentale est ei et comitans. Et ideo ad imaginandum corpus non est necesse imaginari corpus finitum ; qui autem imaginat corpus infinitum non imaginat corpus non corpus, nec imaginat privationem finitionis nisi qui imaginat corpus.” (*Liber de philosophia prima* II.2 ; ed. Van Riet, pp. 70.14–71.18) [↑](#footnote-ref-145)
146. “Nostra autem dictio, scilicet *est*, continet in se designationem.” (*Liber de philosophia prima* I.5 ; ed. Van Riet, p. 37.95). [↑](#footnote-ref-146)
147. “Sic igitur oportet intelligi corpus: quod ipsum est substantia cuius haec est forma qua est id quod est.” (*Liber de philosophia prima* II.2 ; ed. Van Riet, p. 72.47–48) [↑](#footnote-ref-147)
148. “Avicenna’s reluctance to acknowledge this openly may stem in part from the fact, that he entertains two models of matter: one of matter as pure receptivity, a mere receptacle of forms, that mirrors them faithfully so that knowledge of these forms, or their knowledge of themselves, is tantamount to knowledge of the matter too; and the other of matter as a real principle of being, the source of chance and privation/evil, unknowable in itself and hence unpredictable in its relation to form.” (Ivry 1984, 167) [↑](#footnote-ref-148)
149. “Si enim necesse esset illud esse vel caelum vel in caelo, manifestum est tamen ex hoc quod, ad hoc ut ipsum sit corpus in effectu, non est necesse esse in corpore tres dimensiones in effectu secundum praedictos modos trium dimensionum.” (*Liber de philosophia prima* II.2 ; ed. Van Riet, p. 71.30–33) [↑](#footnote-ref-149)
150. “Unde, si quis interrogavit an humanitas quæ est in Platone, ex hoc quod est humanitas, sit alia ab illa quæ est in Socrate et necessario dixerimus non, non oportebit consentire ei ut dicat : “ergo haec et illa sunt una numero”, quoniam negatio illa absoluta fuit et intelleximus in ea quod illa humanitas, ex hoc quod est humanitas, est humanitas tantum, sed ex hoc quod ipsa est alia ab humanitate quæ est in Socrate quiddam extrinsecum est. Ipse vero non interrogavit de humanitate nisi ex hoc quod est humanitas. “(*Liber de philosophia prima*, V.1 ; ed. Van Riet, p. 231.74–81) [↑](#footnote-ref-150)
151. “Veritas autem quæ adaequatur rei, illa est certa, sed est certa, ut puto, respectu suae comparationis ad rem, et est veritas respectu comparationis rei ad ipsam. “(*Liber de Philosophia prima* 1.8, ed. Van Riet, pp. 55.64‒56.66) [↑](#footnote-ref-151)
152. “Sicut enim haec scientia est principium essendi illas, sic scientia huius est principium certitudinis sciendi illas. “(*Liber de Philosophia prima* I.3 ; ed. Van Riet, p. 20.74‒76). [↑](#footnote-ref-152)
153. “Anima autem intelligit seipsam, et hoc quod intelligit seipsam, facit eam intelligere se esse et intelligentem et intellectam et intellectum ; in eo vero quod intelligit ceteras formas non ita facit: ipsae enim per se in corpore sunt semper et in potentia in intellectu, quamvis in aliquibus rebus exeant ad effectum. “(*Liber de anima* V.6 ; ed. Van Riet, p. 134.45–49) [↑](#footnote-ref-153)
154. “Every time I was at a loss about a problem, concerning which I was unable to find the middle term in a syllogism, I would repair on its account to the mosque and worship, praying humbly to the All-Creator to disclose to me its obscu­rity and make its difficulty easy. At night I would return home, set the lamp before me and occupy myself with reading and writing. Whenever I felt drowsy or weakening, I would turn aside to drink a cup of wine to regain my strength and then I would go back to my reading. Whenever I fell asleep, I would see those very problems in my dream; and many problems became clear to me while asleep.” (Avicenna*, The Life of Ibn Sīnā* 28.3–30.3, zit. nach Bertolacci 2004, 157) [↑](#footnote-ref-154)
155. “Ich habe mich gefragt, ob man nicht alle diese obersten Werthe der bisherigen Philosophie Moral und Religion mit den Werthen der Geschwächten, Geisteskranken und Neurastheniker vergleichen kann: sie stellen, in einer milderen Form, dieselben Übel dar… der Werth aller morbiden Zustände ist, daß sie in einem Vergrößerungsglas gewisse Zustände, die normal aber als normal schlecht sichtbar sind, zeigen.“ (*Nachgelassene Fragmente* 14[65]; KSA 13, 250) [↑](#footnote-ref-155)
156. “Veritas autem intelligitur et esse absolute in singularibus, et intelligitur esse aeternum, et intelligitur dispositio dictionis vel intellectus qui significat dispositionem in re exteriore cum est ei aequalis. Dicimus enim: “haec dictio est vera” et “haec sententia est vera” ; igitur necesse esse est id quod per seipsum est veritas semper ; possibile vero est veritas per aliud a se, et est falsum in seipso. Quicquid igitur est praeter necesse esse quod est unum, falsum est in se. Veritas autem quæ adaequatur rei, illa est certa, sed est certa, ut puto, respectu suae comparationis ad rem, et est veritas respectu comparationis rei ad ipsam. Ex dictionibus autem veris, illa est dignior dici vera cuius certitudo est semper ; sed quæ dignior est ad hoc est illa cuius certitudo est prima, et non per causam. “(*Liber de Philosophia prima* I.8 ; ed. Van Riet, p. 55.58‒56.69) [↑](#footnote-ref-156)
157. “The (infinite) succession of individuals implies that divine providence selects for its aim what can be called a ‘generic’ or ‘random individual’, i.e. an individual that, whatever it is, is able to represent the species in such a way as to guarantee the permanent existence of the latter.” (Lizzini 2003b, 136) [↑](#footnote-ref-157)
158. “Deinde intellectui in effectu deservit intellectus in habitu, et intellectus materialis, cum aptitudine quæ est in eo, deservit intellectui in habitu.” (*Liber de anima* I.5 ; ed. Van Riet, p. 99.82–84) [↑](#footnote-ref-158)
159. Avicenna distinguished two concepts of the first science. The formal determination of subject (*subject-matter, mawḍū*) as *ens inquantum ens* is separated from what is sought as the ultimate goal (*ġaraḍ*) of the first science. This is the philosophical theology that Al-Fārābī already had according to the *Metaphysics Lambda* (see Bertolacci 2006, 114–26). [↑](#footnote-ref-159)
160. “Igitur quaestiones huius scientiae quaedam sunt causae esse, inquantum est esse causatum, et quaedam sunt accidentalia esse, et quaedam sunt principia scientiarum singularum. Et scientia horum quaeritur in hoc magisterio. Et haec est philosophia prima, quia ipsa est scientia de prima causa esse, et haec est prima causa ; sed prima causa universitatis est esse et unitas…” (*Liber de philosophia prima* I.2 ; ed. Van Riet, pp. 15.86–16.91) [↑](#footnote-ref-160)
161. “Dico igitur impossibile esse ut ipse Deus sit subiectum huius scientiae, quoniam subiectum omnis scientiae est res quæ conceditur esse, et ipsa scientia non inquirit nisi dispositiones illius subiecti, et hoc notum est ex aliis locis.” (*Liber de anima* I.1 ; ed. Van Riet, p. 4.60–64) [↑](#footnote-ref-161)
162. “Eius enim essentia immunis est ab omni quod est in potentia omnino, sicut iam supra ostendimus, sed ipse est intelligens omnia ut unum simul, et ex hoc quod intelligit, sequitur ordinatio bonitatis in esse, et intelligit qualiter est possibile et qualiter est elegantius provenire esse totus secundum iudicium sui intellecti.” (*Liber de philosophia prima* IX.4 ; ed. Van Riet, p. 478.73–78) [↑](#footnote-ref-162)
163. “Sic transeat in saeculum intellectum instar esse totius mundi, cernens id quod est pulchritudo absolute et bonitas absolute et decor verus, fiat unum cum ea, insculpta exemplo eius et dispositione eius, et incedens secundum viam eius, conversa in similitudinem substantie eius.” (*Liber de philosophia prima* IX.7 ; ed. Van Riet, p. 511.79‒83) [↑](#footnote-ref-163)
164. “Il reste cependant cette distinction essentielle : les prophètes sont *par nature* ce que les gnostiques et les saints ne deviennent qu*’après une longue dialectique de purification et d’ascèse morale et intellectuelle.*” (Gardet 1951, 121) [↑](#footnote-ref-164)
165. “We will make it plain that in their metaphysical sciences they have not been able to fulfill the claims laid out in the different parts of the [textbook on] logics and in the introduction to it, i.e. what they have set down in the *Second Analytics* (*Kitāb al-Burhān*) on the conditions for the truth of the premise of a syllogism, and what they have set down in the *First Analytics* (*Kitāb al-Qiyās*) on the conditions of the syllogism’s figures, and the various things they posit in the *Isagoge* and the *Categories*.” (Al-Ghazālī, *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah* 16.8–11, trad. Griffel 2009, 100) [↑](#footnote-ref-165)
166. “For the first effect, too, is simple, having no composition in it, except by way of its inseparable accidents. The two will, therefore, stand on par, inasmuch as each is intelligence divested of Matter. And this is a generic reality, for being pure intelligence is not one of the inseparable accidents of being, but the very quiddity. So this quiddity will be common to God and all the intelligences.” (Al-Ghazālī, *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah*, probl. VII; ed. Kamali, p. 130) [↑](#footnote-ref-166)
167. “Even if existence, substantiality, or being a principle is no genus (for none is given in answer to the question: What is it?), still you consider God to be a pure intelligence, as all other intelligences (who are the secondary principles of existence, and whom the philosophers also call Angels ‒ i.e., the effects of the First Cause) are pure intelliences divested of Matter. So this reality will include God and its first effect.” (Al-Ghazālī, *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah*, probl. VII; ed. Kamali, p. 130) [↑](#footnote-ref-167)
168. “Therefore, it is not improbable that something should be distinguished from what is opposed to it (as an alternative possibility) because of its relation to the system of things. But the moments of time are, on the contrary, absolutely similar in respect of the relation each bears to possibility and to the system of things. For this reason it is not possible to maintain that, if the creation of the world had been earlier or later by a single instant than it was, the system of things would not take shape.” (Al-Ghazālī, *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah*, probl. I; ed. Kamali, p. 28) [↑](#footnote-ref-168)
169. “An agent is he from whom an action proceeds because of the will for action: by way of free choice, and alongside of the knowledge of what is willed. But in your view the world bears the same relation to God as an effect to its cause. So it follows from Him by way of necessary causation. And, therefore, it is not conceivable that God should have been able to avoid His action, even as the shadow is unavoidable to a person, or light to the Sun. Now, this has nothing to do with an action.” (Al-Ghazālī, *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah*, probl. III. 1; ed. Kamali, p. 64) [↑](#footnote-ref-169)
170. “Diese unsere Weisheit nimmt von jener Urweisheit den Anfang, und die Ursubstanz rührt von der Weisheit her. Nicht aber war die Ursubstanz zuerst und dann erst die Weisheit, vielmehr ist die Substanz eben die Weisheit, auch ist die Urwesenheit die Substanz und die Substanz die Weisheit. Nicht, dass zuerst die Substanz und dann die Weisheit gewesen wäre, wie dies bei den Zweitsubstanzen der Fall ist, sondern Wesenheit, Substanz und Weisheit waren Eins.” (*Theologia Aristotelis*, ed. Dieterici, p. 161) [↑](#footnote-ref-170)
171. “Iam autem notum est quod differentiae non recipiuntur in definitione eius quod ponitur ut genus ; igitur ipsae non acquirunt generi certitudinem, sed acquirunt ei esse in actu, sicut rationale. Rationale enim non acquirit intentionem animalitatis, sed acquirit ei esse in effectu per successionem essendi proprie.” (*Liber de philosophia prima* I.7 ; ed. Van Riet, p. 51.83–88) [↑](#footnote-ref-171)
172. “Die Poesie, also die bewusste Erdichtung, war demnach ‘nur tolerierbar, wenn sie eine Wahrheit aussage im Sinne der Übereinstimmung mit der Wirklichkeit, d.h. der Übereinstimmung zwischen der Beschreibung (*wasf*) und dem Beschriebenen (*mawsuf*).’“(Schöller 2001, 139) [↑](#footnote-ref-172)
173. “However, there is a [certain] aporia in this; for if that which is always true is found only in that which exists always in actuality, there is no proof [of the truth] for things which exist now in actuality, now in potentiality.” (*Averroes On Aristotle’s Metaphysics*; ed. Arnzen, p. 109.417) [↑](#footnote-ref-173)
174. “Therefore, there is no falsity in these [things] except in the form of error, that is by believing that which is combined to be separated or that which is separated to be combined.” (*Averroes On Aristotle’s Metaphysics*; ed. Arnzen, p. 110.423) [↑](#footnote-ref-174)
175. The opposite position defends Davidson’s cited writing (Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, on Intellect, 1992), which arbitrarily divides Averroes’ conception of intellect into three separate stages. A well-founded critique of Davidson is provided by the introduction to Averroes’ middle-period works on the intellect (La béatitude de l’âme, ed. Geoffroy&Steel 2001, 47–51; 62; 69). [↑](#footnote-ref-175)
176. The Latin version of Avicenna’s *De anima* uses the term *intellectus materialis* for the possible intellect (Wéber 1991, 347). James of Venice mentions the term *intellectus possibilis* (*De anima* 430a24) in his translation of *De anima*, as evidenced by a paraphrase of his translation circa 1245 (*Lectura in librum de anima a quodam discipulo reportata*; ed. R.-A. Gauthier, 1985). The anonymous author of *De anima et de potentiis eius* (c. 1225) uses the term *intellectus possibilis* for the first time in the West in the sense of *De anima* III.5 according to Averroes’ CMDA commentary (ed. Gauthier 1982, pp. 30, 50). [↑](#footnote-ref-176)
177. “Et hoc contrarium est ei quod contingit Modernis ; nullus enim est sciens et perfectus apud eos nisi qui est Alexandreus. Et causa in hoc est famositas istius viri, et quia creditur esse vere unus de bonis expositoribus.” (CMDA III.14; 433.149‒53) [↑](#footnote-ref-177)
178. The quotation of Gauthier is found in the critical edition of Aquinas’s *Sentencia libri De anima*, *Editio Leonina* 45/1, 1984, p. 222\*. The original sentence comes from Nogales: “Averroes is not an averroist. If it is true that there were Averroists who admitted the unity of the human intellect, this is not true of Averroes himself, who admits the individual immortality of the human soul, even in the material intellect.” (Nogales 1976, 177) [↑](#footnote-ref-178)
179. “And likewise if we understand by ‘existence’ a mental attribute, it is not an addition to the essence, but if we understand it as being an accident, in the way Avicenna regards it in the composite existent, then it becomes difficult to explain how the uncompounded can be the quiddity itself, although one might say perhaps: ’In the way the knowledge in the uncompounded becomes the knower himself.’”(*Tahafut al-tahafut [The incoherence of the incoherence]*, 8th discussion; ed. Van Den Berg, p. 241) [↑](#footnote-ref-179)
180. “Then he [Alexander Aphrodisias] sets out to illustrate how this analogy is universal [and belongs to everything]. He says: ‘for instance if somebody says that the principles are three: form, privation and matter, but each one of these is different in every genus.’ He means: the meaning of our doctrine that the principles are one by analogy is as if we had said: form, matter and privation are the principles of the ten categories, but the form, the privation and the matter of substance are different from the form, the privation and the matter of each category, and that of one of them is different from that of another.” (*Comm. magnum in Met.* 1521; ed. Genequand, p. 119) [↑](#footnote-ref-180)
181. “[Ibn Sīnā] errs here in so far as in his [doctrine] the accidental which is attached to a thing in the intellect is confounded with the accidental which is attached to it in [extramental] existence, and [because] he was convinced that ‘one’ is predicated of all ten genera univocally, not *secundum prius et posterius*, and that it is [identical with] the numerical one with respect to what he conceived as its meaning in everyday language.” (*Averroes On Aristotle’s Metaphysics*, ed. Arnzen, p. 39.77) [↑](#footnote-ref-181)
182. “Avicenna autem peccavit multum in hoc, quod existimavit quod unum et ens significant dispositiones additas essentiae rei.” (*In Aristot. Metaph*. *IV*, ed. Juntina VIII, fol. 67 B) [↑](#footnote-ref-182)
183. “Averroes’s reference to ens as a disposition which is added to the essence of a thing was taken by some of the Latins as implying both that Avicenna defended real distinction between essence and existence, and that he regarded existence as a kind of accident which is superadded to essence.” (Wippel 2007, 45) [↑](#footnote-ref-183)
184. “Manifestum est quod primum de quo dicitur hoc nomen ‘ens’ simpliciter et principaliter est illud quod dicitur in responsione ad ‘quid est hoc individuum demonstratum exsistens per se’ ; et ista interrogatio est de substantia.” (*In I Sent.*, lib. I, dist. 2, q. VII ; OTh II, p. 234.1‒3) [↑](#footnote-ref-184)
185. “Et cum hoc interrogatur quid est illud individuum existens, quod dicitur substantia, non respondemus ad hoc per aliquid extra essentiam eius.” (*In Aristot. Metaph*. *VII*, ed. Juntina VIII, fol. 153 H) [↑](#footnote-ref-185)
186. “Et ille namque in quibus dicitur quod ipse sunt substantie secunde, sunt species in quibus inueniuntur singularia secundum modum similitudinis inuentionis partis in toto, et genera harum specierum etiam ; uerbi gratia quia Sortes cui innuitur est in specie eius, scilicet in homine, et homo in genere suo, quod est animal ; ergo Sortes cui innuitur est substantia prima ; et homo predicatum de ipso et animal ambo sunt substantie secunde.” (*Commentum medium super libro Praedicamentorum Aristotelis* II.2.20; ed. Hissette, pp. 19.47‒20.54) [↑](#footnote-ref-186)
187. “As for Ibn Sīnā, since he believes that no science can prove its own principles and takes that absolutely, he thinks that it is for the first philosopher to explain the existence of the principles of the sensible substance, whether eternal or not.” (*Comm. magnum in Met.* 1423–24; ed. Genequand, p. 74) [↑](#footnote-ref-187)
188. “But the philosopher speculating about the principles of being qua being is the one speculating about the principles of substance as has been said at the beginning of this book; now the first components and principles of substance are the principles of the object of natural philosophy. In that case, Metaphysics (‘ilm ilāhī) is the science which undertakes the demonstration of the principles of the object of natural philosophy, and natural philosophy merely postulates them.” (*Comm. magnum in Met.* 1424; ed. Genequand, p. 74) [↑](#footnote-ref-188)
189. “As for Ibn Sīnā, he erred in this [question] completely, for he thought that he who practices natural sciences cannot show that bodies are composed of matter and form and that it lies in the responsibility of the metaphysician to show this. The invalidity of all this is self-evident to anybody practising the two sciences (i.e., physics and this science [of metaphysics]).” (*Averroes On Aristotle’s Metaphysics*; ed. Arnzen, p. 59.205). [↑](#footnote-ref-189)
190. “For it is impossible that there should be a demonstration of absolutely everything. There would be an infinite regress (so that there would still be no demonstration); but if there are things of which one should not demand demonstrations, these persons could not say what principle they maintain to be more self-evident than the present one.” (Met. IV.4, 1006a7–11; trad. Ross, WA 8) [↑](#footnote-ref-190)
191. “He [Ibn Sīnā] says that the natural philosopher postulates the existence of nature, and that the metaphysician proves its existence; he did not distinguish between the two substances in that respect as is obviously case in this discussion.” (*Comm. magnum in Met.* 1424; ed. Genequand, p. 74) [↑](#footnote-ref-191)
192. “So we must understand what these two sciences have in common, I mean Physics and Metaphysics, in the inquiry into the principles of substance; I mean Physics explains their existence as principles of the movable substance, whereas the specialist in this science inquires into them as principles of substance qua substance, not of the movable substance.” (*Comm. magnum in Met*. 1426; ed. Genequand, p. 75) [↑](#footnote-ref-192)
193. “In sum, Averroes’s theory of metaphysical knowledge is characterized by the following claims: (1) The primary and truly apodictic demonstration of God’s existence is found in natural philosophy in the form of the proof for an Unmoved Mover. (2) The science of metaphysics formally depends on the demonstration of God’s existence in natural philosophy, since metaphysics receives its subject through this demonstration.” (Noone 1992, 37) [↑](#footnote-ref-193)
194. “According to the method leading from the things that are posterior to the things that are prior, called indications…” (*Comm. magnum in Met.* 1423; ed. Genequand, p. 74) [↑](#footnote-ref-194)
195. “Therefore, it is impossible to demonstrate the existence of the first substance except by means of motions; methods which are thought to lead to the existence of the first mover other than the method based on motion are all suasive; even if they were true, they would be a limited number of indications belonging to the science of the philosopher; for the first principles cannot be proved apodictically.” (*Comm. magnum in Met*. 1423, ed. Genequand, p. 74) [↑](#footnote-ref-195)
196. “Veritas namque, ut declaratum est in sua declaratione (definitione), est aequare rem ad intellectum, scilicet quod reperiatur in anima, sicut est extra animam.” (Boehner 1945, 142) [↑](#footnote-ref-196)
197. “Verum enim et falsum non sunt in rebus, sicut bonum et malum ut verum sit sicut bonum et falsum sicut malum, sed sunt in cognitione.” (*In Aristot. Metaph.VI*; editio Juntina VIII, fol. 151 H). [↑](#footnote-ref-197)
198. “We answer that if there is no substance other than those which are formed by nature, natural science will be the first science; but if there is an immovable substance, the science of this must be prior and must be first philosophy, and universal in this way, because it is first. And it will belong to this to consider being *qua* being (περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὂν ταύτης)—both what it is and the attributes which belong to it *qua* being (τί ἐστι καὶ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ᾗ ὄν).” (*Met*. 1026a27‒32; trad. Ross, WA 8) Original terms in brackets concern „*qua* being“ that is used in analogical way. It gives clear indication that the translation is influenced by the Oxfordian Fallacy made according to Avicenna’s concept of metaphysics. [↑](#footnote-ref-198)
199. “These [merely] imagined matters are related to sensible matters in such a way that the former exist potentially in the circle which is how sensible matters of things exist in sensible things.” (*Averroes On Aristotle’s Metaphysics;* ed. Arnzen, p. 82.287) [↑](#footnote-ref-199)
200. “Some [philosophers] made the three dimensions the first thing instilled in formless prime matter and the principles of a thing whereby matter receives form. Furthermore, they maintained that the term ‘body’ signifies most properly this meaning [of informed matter], since ‘substance’ signifies this only qua [abstract] root morpheme because substances are [that which is] not in a substrate.” (*Averroes On Aristotle’s Metaphysics;* ed. Arnzen, pp. 89.321–90.323) [↑](#footnote-ref-200)
201. “Other [philosophers] maintained that the three dimensions are sequels of a simple form which exists in prime matter, and that it is due to this form that body receives [the properties of] divisibility and continuity. They [also] claimed that this [form] is one [and the same] and common for all sensible things just as is the case with prime matter. This position is held by Ibn Sīnā.” (*Averroes On Aristotle’s Metaphysics*; ed. Arnzen, p. 90.324) [↑](#footnote-ref-201)
202. “It is evident that the primary dimensions would not settle upon the subject belonging to this form nor would those primary dimensions exist in it until after the form has settled upon it, and when I use the term ‘after’ I have in mind posteriority in respect to existence, not posteriority in respect to time.” (*De substantia orbis*, cap.I; trad. Hyman 1986, 62) [↑](#footnote-ref-202)
203. “For this reason Avicenna thought that the case of the three dimensions which exist in matter absolutely, that is to say, the [three] indeterminate dimensions, is the same as the case of the determinate dimensions in it. And he asserts that it is impossible but that a primary form settle upon the primary matter prior to the settlement upon it of the primary dimensions. And many absurdities follow from this view.” (*De substantia orbis*, cap. I; trad. Hyman, p. 63) [↑](#footnote-ref-203)
204. “We say now: As for the adherents of the first doctrine, i.e., those who held that dimensions are principles of a thing through which matter is constituted, they necessarily have to suppose that dimensions are substances, since they are principles through which prime matter is constituted, and that they [are that which] makes known the quiddity of the individual substance.” (*Averroes On Aristotle’s Metaphysics*; ed. Arnzen 2010, p. 90.326) [↑](#footnote-ref-204)
205. “As it appears from Ibn Sīnā’s words, and that the composite of this form and prime matter is the substance which has corporeality, that is to say the three dimensions, as an accident, and [that] this is what is signified by the term ‘body,’ or [rather] ‘corporeality’ (since a paronymous term, as said before, is most appropriate to signify this [accidentality] as far as it is conceived in this way), then, upon my life, this is a preposterous view…” (*Averroes On Aristotle’s Metaphysics*; ed. Arnzen, p. 92.328). [↑](#footnote-ref-205)
206. “For that reason, universals are second intentions, while the things of which they are accidents are first intentions (the difference between first and second intentions has been stated in detail in the discipline of logic). All this is self-evident for those who practise this discipline.” (*Averroes On Aristotle’s Metaphysics*; ed. Arnzen, p. 77.270) [↑](#footnote-ref-206)
207. “The demonstrations employed by Ibn Sīnā in this science [of metaphysics] in order to show [the existence] of the first principle are, on the other hand, altogether dialectical and untrue propositions, which do not state anything in an appropriate manner, as can be seen from the counter-arguments set forth by Abū Hāmid [al-GhazāIī] against these [propositions] in his book on The Incoherence [of the Philosophers].” (*Averroes On Aristotle’s Metaphysics*; ed. Arnzen, p. 24.14) [↑](#footnote-ref-207)
208. “It is known that true relation is a particular reciprocal relation, since the universals do not exists outside the soul and are only abstracted from the particular by discursive thought.” (*Comm. magnum in Met.* 1543; ed. Genequand, pp. 128–129) [↑](#footnote-ref-208)
209. “Deinde dixit : *Vivum autem universale*, etc. Demonstratur per hoc quod ipse non opinatur quod diffinitiones generum et specierum sunt diffinitiones rerum universalium existentium extra animam ; sed sunt diffinitiones rerum particularium extra intellectum, sed intellectus est qui agit in eis universalitatem, Et quasi dicit : et non attribuitur esse diffinitionum speciebus et generibus, ita quod ille res universales sint existentes extra intellectum. Vivum enim universale aut nichil est omnino, aut esse eius est posterius ab esse rerum sensibilium, si est aliquid universale ens per se. “(CMDA I.8; 12.21–26) [↑](#footnote-ref-209)
210. “Et dixit : *Dicamus igitur quod sensus non est in actu, sed in potentia*, etc. Idest, dicamus igitur in respondendo quod sensus non est ex virtutibus activis, que agunt ex se absque eo quod indigeant in actione que provenit ab eis motore extrinseco, sed sunt ex virtutibus passivis, que indigent motore extrinseco. Et ideo non sentiunt ex se, quemadmodum combustibile non comburitur ex se absque motore extrinseco, scilicet igne.” (CMDA II.52; 210.29‒37) [↑](#footnote-ref-210)
211. “Et potest intelligi sic : et necesse est ut sit de virtutibus passivis ita quod proportio sensus ad sensibilia sit sicut proportio intellectus ad intelligibilia. Et secundum hoc in ordine sermonis erit transpositio, et tunc debet legi sic : Oportet igitur ut dispositio eius sit secundum similitudinem: sicut sensus apud sensibilia, sic intellectus apud intelligibilia...” (CMDA III.3; 382.26–30) [↑](#footnote-ref-211)
212. “The thinking part of the soul must therefore be, while impassible, capable of receiving the form of an object (πάσχειν τι ἂν εἴη ὑπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ); that is must be potentially identical in character with its object without being the object (τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον). Mind must be related to (ὁμοίως ἔχειν) what is thinkable, as sense is to what is sensible (τὸ αἰσθητικὸν πρὸς τὰ αἰσθητά, οὕτω τὸν νοῦν πρὸς τὰ νοητά).” (*De anima* III.4, 429a14–18, trad. Smith, WA 3) [↑](#footnote-ref-212)
213. „...opinatus est Themistius quod intellectus qui est in habitu est compositus ex intellectu materiali et agenti. Et hoc idem fecit Alexandrum credere quod intellectus qui est in nobis est compositus aut quasi compositus ex intellectu agenti et ex eo qui est in habitu, cum opinatur quod substantia eius qui est in habitu debet esse alia a substantia intellectus agentis.“ (CMDA III.36 ; 496.481‒87) [↑](#footnote-ref-213)
214. On the difference between Themistius and Alexander with regard to the original interpretation of intellect in *De anima* III, see Bormann 1982, 6–20. [↑](#footnote-ref-214)
215. “Now if thinking is analogous to perceiving (τὸ νοεῖν ἀνάλογόν ἐστι τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι) (for the soul, as we also said earlier, makes judgments and becomes acquainted with [things] through both of these), then the intellect, too, would be in some way affected by the objects of thought, just as perception is by the objects of perception, and here too ‘would be affected’ has to be understood in just the same way [as with perception] (τὸ πάσχοι δ' ἂν καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀκουστέον παραπλησίως). It is, in other words, more appropriate to say that [the intellect] would be ‘completed’ to the fullest extent by being advanced from potentiality to actuality (εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἐκ δυνάμεως προαγόμενος). And it is obvious that [it is advanced] from potentiality (ἐκ δυνάμεως, δῆλον). That is why we do not always think (διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο οὔτε αἰεὶ νοοῦμεν), nor even always think the same things rather than different things at different times (τὰ αὐτὰ αἰεί, ἀλλὰ ἄλλοτε ἄλλα); this in fact is a sign that this intellect exists in potentiality (σημεῖον τοῦ δυνάμει εἶναι τοῦτον τὸν νοῦν), since there can be no transition from one activity to another unless a potentiality remains (δυνάμεως ὑπομενούσης) to display the different activities.” (*In Aristotelis libros de anima paraphrasis* 94.5‒15; trad. Schroeder, pp. 77‒78) [↑](#footnote-ref-215)
216. “Et iam declaratum est quod intellectus materialis impossibile est ut habeat formam in actu, cum substantia et natura eius est ut recipiat formas secundum quod sunt forme.” (CMDA III.5; 398.340–43) [↑](#footnote-ref-216)
217. “Et ista est dispositio intellectus in comprehendendo alietatem que est inter formam et individuum ; comprehendit enim formam per se, et comprehendit individuum mediante sensu.” (CMDA III.9 ; 422.47–50) [↑](#footnote-ref-217)
218. “Et dixit : Et quod accidit in intellectu, etc. Idest, et intelligendum est hoc quod diximus de hac intentione universali, scilicet passione que est in intellectu, quod est tantum receptio sine transmutatione, sicut receptio picture in tabula.” (CMDA III.14; 430.50–54) [↑](#footnote-ref-218)
219. “Et ideo in anima sunt intentiones et comprehensiones, et extra animam non sunt neque intentiones neque comprehensiones, sed res materiales non comprehense omnino.” (CMDA II.121; 317.17‒20) [↑](#footnote-ref-219)
220. “Et dixit *secundum quod est in hac dispositione, et in intentione* observando se ab intentionibus quas recipit intellectus ; ille enim sunt universales, iste vero tantum sunt iste.” (CMDA II.121; 317.32‒35) [↑](#footnote-ref-220)
221. “Et dixit etiam in tractatu quem fecit de Intellectu secundum opinionem Aristotelis quod intellectus materialis est virtus facta a complexione.” (CMDA III.5; 394.217–19) [↑](#footnote-ref-221)
222. “Continuatio igitur intellecti cum homine impossibile est ut sit nisi per continuationem alterius istarum duarum partium cum eo, scilicet partis que est de eo quasi materia, et partis que est de ipso (scilicet intellecto) quasi forma.” (CMDA III.5, 404.507–12) [↑](#footnote-ref-222)
223. “Et ista intentio individualis est illa quam distinguit virtus cogitativa a forma ymaginata… “(CMDA II.63; 225.53–55) [↑](#footnote-ref-223)
224. “Sensus, cum hoc quod comprehendunt sua sensibilia propria, comprehendunt intentiones individuales diversas in generibus et in speciebus; comprehendunt igitur intentionem huius hominis individualis, et intentionem huius equi individualis, et universaliter intentionem uniuscuiusque decem predicamentorum individualium.” (CMDA II.63; 225.44–50) [↑](#footnote-ref-224)
225. “Declaratum est enim illic quod virtus cogitativa non est nisi virtus que distinguit intentionem rei sensibilis a suo idolo ymaginato ; et ista virtus est ilia cuius proportio ad has duas intentiones, scilicet ad idolum rei et ad intentionem sui idoli, est sicut proportio sensus communis ad intentiones quinque sensuum. Virtus igitur cogitativa est de genere virtutum existentium in corporibus.” (CMDA III.6 ; 415.62‒68) [↑](#footnote-ref-225)
226. “Sed cum aliquis intuebitur omnes sermones istius viri et congregabit eos, videbit ipsum opinari quod, quando intellectus qui est in potentia fuerit perfectus, tunc intelligentia agens copulabitur nobiscum, per quam intelligemus res abstractas, et per quam faciemus res sensibiles esse intellectas in actu, secundum quod ipse efficitur forma in nobis.” (CMDA III.36; 484.128–134) [↑](#footnote-ref-226)
227. “Et fuit necesse attribuere has duas actiones anime in nobis, scilicet recipere intellectum et facere eum, quamvis agens et recipiens sint substantie eterne, propter hoc quia hee due actiones reducte sunt ad nostram voluntatem, scilicet abstrahere intellecta et intelligere ea. Abstrahere enim nichil est aliud quam facere intentiones ymaginatas intellectas in actu postquam erant in potentia ; intelligere autem nichil aliud est quam recipere has intentiones.” (CMDA III.18; 439.71–76) [↑](#footnote-ref-227)
228. “Et Alexander videtur hoc opinari in primis perfectionibus anime, et est contra Aristotelem et contra ipsam veritatem.” (CMDA I.88; 118.77‒79) [↑](#footnote-ref-228)
229. “Deinde dixit : Utrum vita est in uno istorum, etc. Idest, et perscrutandum est, cum hoc, utrum illud quod dicitur vita est in una aliqua istarum quinque virtutum, aut in pluribus una, aut in omnibus.” (CMDA I.89; 120.41‒44) [↑](#footnote-ref-229)
230. “I have been arguing that the psychological systems whose operations ‘present the world to thought’ constitute a natural kind by criteria independent of their similarity of function; there appears to be a cluster of properties that they have in common but which, *qua* input analyzers, they might perfectly well not have shared. We can abbreviate all this by the claim that the input systems constitute a family of modules: domain-specific computational systems characterized by informational encapsulation, high-speed, restricted access, neural specificity, and the rest.” (Fodor 1983, 101) [↑](#footnote-ref-230)
231. “Quare autem dicitur 'positio de unitate formarum' non satis intelligo.” (cit. podle Birkenmajer 1922, 60) [↑](#footnote-ref-231)
232. “Questio autem secunda, dicens quomodo intellectus materialis est unus in numero in omnibus individuis hominum, non generabilis neque corruptibilis, et intellecta existentia in eo in actu (et est intellectus speculativus) numeratus per numerationem individuorum hominum, generabilis et corruptibilis per generationem et corruptionem individuorum, hec quidem quaestio valde est difficilis, et maximam habet ambiguitatem.” (CMDA III.5; 401.424‒402.431) [↑](#footnote-ref-232)
233. “Quoniam, quia opinati sumus ex hoc sermone quod intellectus materialis est unicus omnibus hominibus, et etiam ex hoc sumus opinati quod species humana est aeterna, ut declaratum est in aliis locis, necesse est ut intellectus materialis non sit denudatus a principiis naturalibus communibus toti speciei humane, scilicet primis propositionibus et formationibus singularibus communibus omnibus ; hec enim intellecta sunt unica secundum recipiens, et multa secundum intentionem receptam.” (CMDA III.5; 406.575‒407.581) [↑](#footnote-ref-233)
234. “Dicamus igitur quod manifestum est quod homo non est intelligens in actu nisi propter continuationem intellecti cum eo in actu.” (CMDA III.5; 404.501‒503) [↑](#footnote-ref-234)
235. “Intellectum enim videtur impossibile attribui alicui membro corporis. Et debes scire quod ista dubitatio non sequitur hic nisi quia non determinatur utrum sit unica secundum subiectum et plura secundum virtutes (ita quod divisio anime in suas partes sit sicut pomi in odorem colorem et saporem), so aut est una propter unam naturam communem, et plura quia ista natura habet diversas virtutes…” (CMDA I.92; 123.25–32) [↑](#footnote-ref-235)
236. “Declaratum est igitur quod prima perfectio intellectus differt a primis perfectionibus aliarum virtutum anime, et quod hoc nomen perfectio dicitur de eis modo equivoco, econtrario ei quod existimavit Alexander.” (CMDA III.5; 405.528–33) [↑](#footnote-ref-236)
237. “Et dixit : *Oportet igitur*, etc. Et intendit per istum intellectum materialem ; hec igitur est sua descriptio predicta. Deinde dixit : *et intellectus secundum quod facit ipsum intelligere omne*. Et intendit per istum illud quod fit, quod est in habitu. Et hoc pronomen “*ipsum*” potest referri ad intellectum materialem, sicut diximus ; et potest referri ad hominem intelligentem.” (CMDA III.18; 437.18–438.24) [↑](#footnote-ref-237)
238. “We have no evidence (οὐδέν πω φανερόν) as yet about mind or the power to think (περὶ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς θεωρητικῆς δυνάμεως); it seems to be a widely different kind of soul (ψυχῆς γένος ἕτερον εἶναι), differing as what is eternal from what is perishable (καθάπερ τὸ ἀΐδιον τοῦ φθαρτοῦ); it alone is capable of existence in isolation from all other psychic powers (τοῦτο μόνον ἐνδέχεσθαι χωρίζεσθαι).” (*De anima* II.2, 413b24‒27; trad. Smith, WA 3) [↑](#footnote-ref-238)
239. “Tertia autem questio (et est quomodo intellectus materialis est aliquod ens et non est aliqua formarum materialium neque etiam prima materia) sic dissolvitur. Opinandum est enim quod iste est quartum genus esse. Quemadmodum enim sensibile esse dividitur in formam et materiam, sic intelligibile esse oportet dividi in consimilia hiis duobus, scilicet in aliquod simile forme et in aliquod simile materie. Et hoc necesse est in omni intelligentia abstracta que intelligit aliud.” (CMDA III.5; 409.654–62) [↑](#footnote-ref-239)
240. “Et ex hoc modo possumus dicere quod intellectus speculativus est unus in omnibus. Et cum consideratum fuerit de istis intellectis secundum quod sunt entia simpliciter, non in respectu alicuius individui, vere dicuntur esse aeterna, et quod non intelliguntur quandoque et quandoque non, sed semper.” (CMDA III.5; 407.594–600) [↑](#footnote-ref-240)
241. “Quoniam cum sapientiam esse in aliquo modo proprio hominum est, sicut modos artificiorum esse in modis propriis hominum, existimatur quod impossibile est ut tota habitatio fugiat a Philosophia, sicut opinandum est quod impossibile est ut fugiat ab artificiis naturalibus.” (CMDA III.5; 408.610–15) [↑](#footnote-ref-241)
242. “Potest enim intelligi secundum Alexandrum quod intendebat per *intellectum in potentia* preparationem existentem in complexione humana, scilicet quod potentia et preparatio que est in homine ad recipiendum intellectum in respectu uniuscuiusque individui est prior tempore intellectu agenti ; simpliciter autem intellectus agens est prior.” (CMDA III.20 ; 444.13–18) [↑](#footnote-ref-242)
243. “Nos autem, cum vidimus opiniones Alexandri et Themistii esse impossibiles, et invenimus verba Aristotelis manifesta secundum nostram expositionem, credimus quod ista est opinio Aristotelis quam nos diximus, et est vera in se.” (CMDA III.20; 446.93–447.97) [↑](#footnote-ref-243)
244. “Et cum dixit : *Et quod est in potentia est prius tempore individuo*, potest intelligi per tres opiniones eodem modo. Secundum enim nostram opinionem, et Themistii, intellectus qui est in potentia prius continuatur cum nobis quam intellectus agens ; et secundum Alexandrum intellectus qui est in potentia erit prior in nobis secundum esse aut generationem, non secundum continuationem.” (CMDA III.20; 447.106–13) [↑](#footnote-ref-244)
245. “Cum declaravit naturam intellectus qui est in potentia, et qui est in actu, et dedit differentiam inter ipsum et virtutem ymaginationis, incepit declarare quod necesse est tertium genus intellectus esse et est intelligentia agens, que facit intellectum qui est in potentia esse intellectum in actu.” (CMDA III.17; 436.8–13) [↑](#footnote-ref-245)
246. “Et quod est in potentia prius est tempore in individuo ; universaliter autem non est neque in tempore. Neque quandoque intelligit et quandoque non intelligit. Et cum fuerit abstractus, est illud quod est tantum, et iste tantum est immortalis semper. Et non rememoramur, quia iste est non passibilis, et intellectus passibilis est corruptibilis, et sine hoc nichil intelligitur.” (CMDA III.20; 443.1–8) [↑](#footnote-ref-246)
247. “Et cum dixit : *Neque est quandoque intelligens et quandoque non intelligens*, impossibile est ut iste sermo intelligatur secundum suum manifestum neque secundum Themistium neque secundum Alexandrum.” (CMDA III.20; 447.121–23) [↑](#footnote-ref-247)
248. “Et ex hoc apparet quod sua intellectio non est aliquid scientiarum speculativarum, sed est aliquid currens cursu rei generate naturaliter a disciplina scientiarum speculativarum. Et ideo non est remotum ut homines adiuvent se in hac intentione, sicut iuvant se in scientiis speculativis. Sed necesse est ut inveniatur illud currens a scientiis speculativis, non ab aliis. Intellecta enim falsa impossibile est ut habeant continuationem, quoniam non sunt aliquid currens cursu naturali, sed sunt aliquid quod non intendebatur, sicut digitus sextus, et monstrum in creatura.” (CMDA III.36; pp. 501.640–502.649) [↑](#footnote-ref-248)
249. “Et manifestum est quod color, licet fiat a corpore lucido, tamen differt ab eo diffinitione et essentia ; color enim, ut dicitur, est ultimum diaffoni terminati ; lux autem est complementum diaffoni non terminati.” (CMDA II.67; 232.45–49) [↑](#footnote-ref-249)
250. “Et est manifestum quod, quando conservaverimus quod dicit Aristoteles in principio istius sermonis (et posuit ipsum positione quasi manifesta per se), tunc necesse erit ut lux non sit necessaria in essendo colores moventes diaffonum nisi secundum quod dat diaffono formam aliquam qua recipit motum a colore, scilicet illuminationem.” (CMDA II.67; 232.68–233.74) [↑](#footnote-ref-250)
251. „...scilicet esse in corpore colorato (et hoc est esse corporale) et esse in diaffono (et hoc est esse spirituale), ita odor habet duplex esse, scilicet esse in corpore odorabili et esse in medio ; et illud est esse corporale et hoc spirituale, et illud naturale et hoc extraneum.“ (CMDA II.97; 277.27–33) [↑](#footnote-ref-251)
252. “Et ideo in anima sunt intentiones et comprehensiones, et extra animam non sunt neque intentiones neque comprehensiones, sed res materiales non comprehense omnino.” (CMDA II.121; 317.17‒20) [↑](#footnote-ref-252)
253. “First, what are ‘intentions’? According to Avicenna, they exist in the sense–object, e.g. the wolf in the passage from *De anima* 1.5 quoted above. This is a crucial point since it distinguishes Avicenna’s doctrine from many other theories on intentions and intentionality: the ‘intention’ is not in the perceiver but in the object.” (Hasse 2000, 130) [↑](#footnote-ref-253)
254. „Intellectus vero agens ad intellectum potentiae comparatur ac ad intelligibilia, quemadmodum lux solis ad perspicuum et ad colores enim lux quasi de natura perspicui ac ipsius naturalis perfectio, ut Aristoteles ait, et similiter color est eius perfectio. Et per excellentiorem modum erit intellectus agens connaturalis perfectio intellectus potentiae ac intelligibilibus. Itaque quemadmodum colores non moventur perspicuum nisi actu luminis, ita intelligibilia non movent intellectum potentiae nisi actu intellectus agentis.“ (*De intellectu* II.24 ; p. 437.1–10, ed. Spruit) [↑](#footnote-ref-254)
255. “Et par ce moyen vostre esprit sera delivré de toutes ces petites images voltigeants par l’air, nommées des espèces intentionelles, qui travaillent tant l’imagination des Philosophes.” (*La Dioptrique* I ; ed. Tannery 6, 85.24‒27) [↑](#footnote-ref-255)
256. “Il [Descartes] sait bien que ces petits êtres voltigeants par l’air, et dont il devrait être tout rempli, que l’école appelle des espèces intentionnelles, ne sont que des chimères. (…) Elle [L’âme] ne a les voit donc point par eux-mêmes, et l’objet immédiat de notre esprit, lorsqu’il voit le Soleil, par exemple, n’est pas le soleil, mais quelque chose qui est intimement uni à notre âme, et c’est ce que j’appelle idée. Ainsi, par ce mot idée, je n’entends ici autre chose que ce qui est l’objet immédiat ou le plus proche de l’esprit, quand il aperçoit quelque chose.” (*Des vraies et de fausses ideés* IV ; ed. Simon, pp. 46‒47) [↑](#footnote-ref-256)
257. “Take a grain of wheat, divide it into two parts; each part has still solidity, extension, figure, and mobility: divide it again, and it retains still the same qualities; and so divide it on, till the parts become insensible; they must retain still each of them all those qualities. For division (which is all that a mill, or pestle, or any other body, does upon another, in reducing it to insensible parts) can never take away either solidity, extension, figure, or mobility from any body, but only makes two or more distinct separate masses of matter, of that which was but one before.” (*An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* 2.8.9, ed. Nidditch & Yolton, p. 177) [↑](#footnote-ref-257)
258. “Et ideo non intendit Aristoteles per hunc sermonem quod visus indiget medio necessario, sed declarare quod, cum sensibilia fuerint distincta ab eo, impossibile erit ut sit per vacuum ut existimavit Democritus. Et est sustentatus super hoc, quod sensus indigent medio necessario scilicet, quia sensibilia, cum fuerint posita super eos, non sentient, et quod visus etiam non erit nisi per lucem, et lux non invenitur nisi per medium.” (CMDA II.74; 243.47‒54) [↑](#footnote-ref-258)
259. “Et quemadmodum diaffonum non movetur a colore neque recipit eum nisi quando lucet, ita iste intellectus non recipit intellecta que sunt hic nisi secundum quod perficitur per illum intellectum et illuminatur per ipsum. Et quemadmodum lux facit colorem in potentia esse in actu ita quod possit movere diaffonum, ita intellectus agens facit intentiones in potentia intellectas in actu ita quod recipit eas intellectus materialis. Secundum hoc igitur est intelligendum de intellectu materiali et agenti.” (CMDA III.5; 411.693–702) [↑](#footnote-ref-259)
260. “Reine Verstandesbegriffe in Vergleichung mit empirischen (ja überhaupt sinnlichen) Anschauungen ganz ungleichartig und können niemals in irgend einer Anschauung angetroffen werden.” (KdRV B 176). [↑](#footnote-ref-260)
261. “Ausarbeitung der Seinsfrage besagt demnach: Durchsichtigmachen eines Seienden – des fragenden – in seinem Sein. Das Fragen dieser Frage ist als *Seins*modus eines Seienden selbst von dem her wesenhaft bestimmt, wonach in ihm gefragt ist – vom Sein. Dieses Seiende, das wir selbst je sind und das unter anderem die Seinsmöglichkeit des Fragens hat, fassen wir terminologisch als *Dasein*.” (SZ 7) [↑](#footnote-ref-261)
262. “Nos autem cum posuerimus intellectum materialem esse eternum et intellecta speculativa esse generabilia et corruptibilia eo modo quo diximus, et quod intellectus materialis intelligit utrunque, scilicet formas materiales et formas abstractas, manifestum est quod subiectum intellectorum speculativorum et intellectus agentis secundum hunc modum est idem et unum, scilicet materialis. Et simile huic est diaffonum, quod recipit colorem et lucem insimul ; et lux est efficiens colorem.” (CMDA III.37; 499.559–66) [↑](#footnote-ref-262)
263. “We notice a similar result in other varieties of soul, i.e. in insects which have been cut in two; each of the segments possesses both sensation and local movement; and if sensation, necessarily also imagination and appetition (αἴσθησιν, καὶ φαντασίαν καὶ ὄρεξιν); for, where there is sensation, there is also pleasure and pain (ὅπου μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις, καὶ λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονή), and, where these, necessarily also desire (ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ἐπιθυμία).” (*De anima* II.2, 413b19‒23, trad. Smith, WA 3) [↑](#footnote-ref-263)
264. “There are many areas in which the superior mental powers of normal adult humans make a difference: anticipation, more detailed memory, greater knowledge of what is happening, and so on. These differences explain why a human dying from cancer is likely to suffer more than a mouse. It is the mental anguish which makes the human’s position so much harder to bear. Yet these differences do not all point to greater suffering on the part of the normal human being.” (Singer 2011 [1979], 52) [↑](#footnote-ref-264)
265. “Wie kann nun das Vorgegebensein der Lebenswelt zu einem eigenen und universalen Thema werden? Offenbar nur durch eine *totale Änderung* der alltäglichen Einstellung, eine Änderung, in der wir nicht mehr wie bisher als Menschen des natürlichen Daseins im ständigen Geltungsvollzug der vorgegebenen Welt leben, vielmehr uns dieses Vollzugs ständig enthalten.” (*Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften*, § 39; ed. Biemel, Husserliana 6, 151.5‒11) [↑](#footnote-ref-265)
266. “Sed illud quod fecit ilium hominem errare, et nos etiam longo tempore, est quia Moderni dimittunt libros Aristotelis et considerant libros expositorum, et maxime in anima, credendo quod iste liber impossible est ut intelligatur. Et hoc est propter Avicennam, qui non imitatus est Aristotelem nisi in Dialectica, sed in aliis erravit, et maxime in Metaphysica ; et hoc quia incepit quasi a se.” (CMDA III.29; 470.42–48) [↑](#footnote-ref-266)
267. “Sicut enim omnia possibilia pari jure ad existendum tendunt pro ratione realitatis, ita omnia pondera pari jure ad descendendum tendunt pro ratione gravitatis, et ut hic prodit motus, quo continetur quam maximus gravium descendus. Ita illic prodit mundus per quem maxima fit possibilium productio. Atque ita jam habemus physicam necessitatem ex metaphysica, etsi enim mundus non sit metaphysice necessarius, ita ut contrarium implicet contradictionem seu absurditatem logicam, est tamen necessarius physice vel determinatus ita ut contrarium implicet imperfectionem seu absurditatem moralem.” (*De rerum originatione radicali;* ed. Janet, p. 661) [↑](#footnote-ref-267)